Tag Archive for: Quad

The geopolitics of water: How the Brahmaputra River could shape India–China security competition

This report assesses the geopolitical impact of a possible dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra. In particular, it exams the dam as a potential source of coercive leverage China may gain over India. A dam there would create four likely strategic effects: it would very likely consolidate Beijing’s political control over its distant borderlands; it would create the potential for massive flooding as a tool of violence; it may affect human settlement and economic patterns on the Indian side of the border, downstream; and it would give Beijing water and data that it could withhold from India as bargaining leverage in unrelated negotiations.

To mitigate those challenges and risks, the report provides three policy recommendations for the Indian Government and its partners in Australia and the US. First, it recommends the establishment of an open-source, publicly available data repository, based on satellite sensing, to disseminate information about the physical impacts of the Great Bend Dam. Second, it recommends that like-minded governments use international legal arguments to pressure Beijing to abide by global norms and conventions. Third, it recommends that the Quad—the informal group comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US—use its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) guidelines to begin to share information and build capacity for dam-related contingencies.

AUKUS and critical minerals: Hedging Beijing’s pervasive, clever and coordinated statecraft

AUKUS has a heavy focus on R&D of military capabilities. A number of departments, including defence, foreign affairs and prime ministerial equivalents are engaged. The science and technology to deliver those capabilities must resolve issues of insecure supply chains. Currently, supply chains for processed critical minerals and their resulting materials aren’t specifically included.

Yet all AUKUS capabilities, and the rules-based order that they uphold, depend heavily on critical minerals. China eclipses not only AUKUS for processing those minerals into usable forms, but the rest of the world combined. Without critical minerals, states are open to economic coercion in various technological industries, and defence manufacturing is particularly exposed to unnecessary supply-chain challenges.

This is where Australia comes in. Australia has the essential minerals, which are more readily exploitable because they’re located in less densely populated or ecologically sensitive areas. Australia also has the right expertise, including universities offering the appropriate advanced geoscience degrees, as well as advanced infrastructure, world-class resources technology and deep industry connections with Asia and Africa, which are also vital global sources of critical minerals.

This paper outlines why Australia offers an unrivalled rallying point to drive secure critical-mineral supply among a wide field of vested nations, using AUKUS but not limited to AUKUS partners, how WA has globally superior reserves and substantial expertise, and why northern Australia more generally has a key role to play. The paper also explains why policy action here must be prioritised by the Australian Government.

Countering the Hydra: A proposal for an Indo-Pacific hybrid threat centre

What’s the problem?

Enabled by digital technologies and fuelled by geopolitical competition, hybrid threats in the Indo-Pacific are increasing in breadth, application and intensity. Hybrid threats are a mix of military, non-military, covert and overt activities by state and non-state actors that occur below the line of conventional warfare. The consequences for individual nations include weakened institutions, disrupted social systems and economies, and greater vulnerability to coercion—especially from revisionist powers such as China.

But the consequences of increased hybrid activity in the Indo-Pacific reach well beyond individual nations. The Indo-Pacific hosts a wide variety of political systems and interests, with multiple centres of influence, multiple points of tension and an increasingly belligerent authoritarian power. It lacks the regional institutions and practised behaviours to help ensure ongoing security and stability. And, because of its position as a critical centre of global economic and social dynamism, instability in the Indo-Pacific, whether through or triggered by hybrid threats, has global ramifications.

Because hybrid threats fall outside the conventional frameworks of the application of state power and use non-traditional tools to achieve their effects, governments have often struggled to identify the activity, articulate the threat and formulate responses. Timeliness and specificity are problematic: hybrid threats evolve, are often embedded or hidden within normal business and operations, and may leverage or amplify other, more traditional forms of coercion.

More often than not, hybrid threat activity is targeted towards the erosion of national capability and trust and the disruption of decision-making by governments—all of which reduce national and regional resilience that would improve security and stability in the region.

What’s the solution?

There’s no silver-bullet solution to hybrid threats; nor are governments readily able to draw on traditional means of managing national defence or regional security against such threats in the Indo-Pacific.

Because of the ubiquity of digital technologies, the ever-broadening application of tools and practices in an increasing number of domains, it’s evident that policymakers need better and more timely information, the opportunity to share information and insights in a trusted forum and models of how hybrid threats work (we provide one here). Exchange of information and good practice is also needed to help counter the amorphous, evolving and adaptive nature of hybrid threats.

We propose the establishment of an Indo-Pacific Hybrid Threat Centre (HTC, or the centre) as a means of building broader situational awareness on hybrid threats across the region.1 Through research and analysis, engagement, information sharing and capacity building, such a centre would function as a confidence-building measure and contribute to regional stability and the security of individual nations.

While modelled on the existing NATO–EU Hybrid Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Finland, the centre would need to reflect the differences between the European and Indo-Pacific security environments. Most notably, that includes the lack of pan-regional Indo-Pacific security institutions and practice that the centre could use. There are also differences in the nature and priorities assigned to threats by different countries: the maritime domain has more influence in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe, many countries in the region face ongoing insurgencies, and there’s much less adherence to, or even interest in, democratic norms and values.

That will inevitably shape the placement, funding, and operations of an Indo-Pacific HTC. A decentralised model facilitating outreach across the region would assist regional buy-in. Partnership arrangements with technology companies would provide technical insight and support. Long-term commitments will be needed to realise the benefits of the centre as a confidence-building measure. The Quad countries are well positioned to provide such long-term commitments, while additional support could come from countries with experience and expertise in hybrid threats, particularly EU countries and the UK.

As with the NATO–EU Hybrid CoE, independence and integrity are paramount. That implies the positioning of the Indo-Pacific HTC core in a strong democracy; better still would be the legislative protection of its operations and data. Accordingly, we propose scoping work to establish policy approval, legislative protection and funding arrangements and to seed initial research capability and networks.

Introduction

Hybrid threats are a mix of military and non-military, covert and overt activities by state and non-state actors that occur below the line of conventional warfare. Their purpose is to blur the lines between war and peace, destabilise societies and governments and sow doubt and confusion among populations and decision-makers. They deliberately target democratic systems and state vulnerabilities, often leveraging legitimate processes for inimical ends, and typically aim to stay below the threshold of detection, attribution and retaliation.2 They’re the same activities that the Australian Government attributes to the ‘grey zone’, involving ‘military and non-military forms of assertiveness and coercion aimed at achieving strategic goals without provoking conflict.’3

Hybrid threats are increasingly of concern to governments as they grapple with the effects of digital technologies, Covid-19 and an increasingly tense geopolitical environment. Ambiguous, evolving, at the intersection of society, commerce and security, and transnational in character, hybrid threats challenge and undercut ‘normal’ conceptions of security. Unmet, they stoke division and anxiety in societies and states. They threaten to erode national security, sovereignty and societal resilience, leaving nations and their people vulnerable to coercion, particularly by authoritarian states and criminal elements.

The immediate targets of motivated hybrid activity are typically non-traditional, in the sense that government security apparatuses aren’t expected to manage and repulse them. Hybrid activity takes advantage of other, easier targets and means of generating confusion and disruption at the nation-state level: individuals may be targeted for repression or assassination; fishing vessels harassed; intellectual property stolen; commercial advantage pillaged; researchers and journalists intimidated; ethnic communities hijacked; and elites co-opted for corrupt ends.

The Indo-Pacific region is particularly vulnerable. For example, it lacks the more practised security frameworks, cooperative mechanisms and understandings present in Europe. There’s little shared awareness and understanding of the nature and consequences of hybrid threats. The region is also especially economically and demographically dynamic and socially diverse, featuring a number of competing political systems and institutions.

That offers both challenge and opportunity. In this paper, we consider the nature of hybrid threats, explore the threat landscape in the Indo-Pacific, turn our attention to the potential ‘fit’ of an Indo-Pacific HTC and make recommendations for the way forward.

A number of the thoughts and insights incorporated in this paper emerged during ASPI’s consultations with governments, businesses and civil society groups in the Indo-Pacific, as well as in Europe and the UK. We thank those respondents for their time and insights.

  1. Danielle Cave, Jacob Wallis, ‘Why the Indo-Pacific needs its own hybrid threats centre’, The Strategist, 15 December 2021. ↩︎
  2. See NATO’s definition, online, and the Hybrid Centre of Excellence’s definition. ↩︎
  3. Defence Department, Defence Strategic Update, Australian Government, 2020, 5. ↩︎

What is AUKUS and what is it not?

What IS the new AUKUS partnership between the US, the UK and Australia? How does it fit with the Quad, ASEAN and other new forums like the government-tech Sydney Dialogue?

This new ASPI Insight sets out what AUKUS is—a technology accelerator that’s’ about shifting the military balance in the Indo Pacific. Just as importantly, it sets out what AUKUS it isn’t, to reset some of the discussion that has made some assumptions here. AUKUS isn’t a new alliance structure, a competitor to the Quad between Australia, India, Japan and the US, or a signal of decreased commitment to ASEAN forums by the AUKUS members.

And the Insight proposes some focus areas for implementation of this new ‘minilateral’ technology accelerator, including having  a single empowered person in each nation charged with implementation and ‘obstacle busting’. This is to break through the institutional, political and corporate permafrost that has prevented such rapid technological adoption by our militaries in recent decades. As is the case with James Miller in the US, this person should report to their national leader, not from inside the defence bureaucracies of the three nations.

On purpose and urgency, the report identifies a simple performance metric for AUKUS implementers over the next three years. On 20 January 2025, when the Australian prime minister calls whoever is the US president on that day, AUKUS has become such a successful piece of the furniture, with tangible results that have generated broad institutional, political and corporate support that, regardless of how warm or testy this leaders’ phone call is (think Turnbull-Trump in January 2016), AUKUS’s momentum continues.

Tag Archive for: Quad

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Tag Archive for: Quad

The Quad can help Australia monitor China’s naval behaviour

Australia should enlist partners in the Quad to help address China’s increasingly assertive naval behaviour in the Indo-Pacific.

The Quad may be slow in moving into security roles, but one militarily useful function that it has adopted is maritime domain awareness—knowing what is going on at sea. Quad members, which also include Japan and the United States, can cooperate in monitoring Chinese naval movements.

On 19 February, three Chinese warships were identified sailing 277km east of Sydney before engaging in live fire drills in the Tasman Sea on 21 February.

The incident created alarm in the region—including in Cook Islands, which has become closer to Beijing recently—because of the risk it posed to airline traffic over the area. It also raised concerns around transparency, as China provided little notice.

While China’s actions didn’t violate international law, they demonstrated a willingness to engage in risky behaviour. Moreover, they came in the wake of similarly assertive actions, including China’s interception of an Australian surveillance jet engaging in routine flights in international air space above the South China Sea.

Clearly, China is sending a message that it can operate close to Australia and New Zealand, just as the two Pacific powers operate in the South China Sea. Last year, the two countries, along with Japan, sent ships through the Taiwan Strait. The difference is that those passages were conducted without engaging in unsafe behaviour.

Such behaviour from China is becoming more common. The Australian Department of Defence has called on all militaries to operate transparently and with safety and professionalism. This is to be expected, but perhaps more is needed as China’s navy expands and its operations in the Indo-Pacific become more routine.

There can be little doubt that once China’s latest aircraft carriers become fully operational, they will engage in patrols in the South Pacific. China’s aircraft carrier program is proceeding at pace, with the 70,000-ton Shandong apparently now fully operational, with two more—the 80,000-ton Fujian and another, even larger unnamed carrier—on the way.

A more serious policy issue is how countries in the region should respond to China’s expanding naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. Defence has said that it is monitoring the movement of the Chinese ships as long as they are ‘in the vicinity of Australia’s maritime approaches.’ The department is also coordinating with the New Zealand Defence Force.

This is an understandable response, but what happens in the coming years when there are many more Chinese warships operating across the Indo-Pacific?

It would be foolish to imagine that the Chinese navy’s patrol along the east coast of Australia is a one-off incident. Australia, New Zealand and their strategic partners should not be under any such impression. Moreover, China has repeatedly demonstrated that it is not a responsible power that respects either international law or basic, common-sensical behaviour.

Australia needs to position itself to deal with China’s irresponsible behaviour in the coming years, and it cannot do so alone or with only New Zealand. China’s outing in Australia’s exclusive economic zone should prompt like-minded and capable partners to come together to track China’s naval movements in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia should engage with the Quad—comprising Australia, Japan, India and the US—to monitor China’s naval movements in the Indo-Pacific.

The Quad has been reluctant to engage in actual security cooperation, presumably because India is dragging its feet. But this kind of cooperation could be seen to fall within the scope of maritime domain awareness, which is part of the Quad agenda. Moreover, such cooperation can be structured in a manner that is much less intrusive than interoperating military forces, as it could be limited to information-sharing on surveillance and monitoring of Chinese naval activities.

Such cooperative and focused activities around marine domain awareness could also allow Quad partners to pool their limited resources in a much more coordinated manner. This would provide them with visibility over the entire region rather than just their littoral waters.

Japan, Australia and India are limited in their capacity to monitor the seas much beyond their shores. But coordination would help all four Quad countries get a better grasp of Chinese naval activities: The US could help to monitor areas that cannot be monitored by the other three, such as southern Indian Ocean or much of the Pacific. Quad countries should accept that all of them cannot be involved in every maritime theatre in the Indo-Pacific. Burden-sharing is necessary to securing the region. The Quad is not there yet, but that is where it should be heading.

A unified Quad focus would allow other countries in the region to join these activities. South Korea would be the immediate contender, but some Southeast Asian powers might also step in. This would also give the Quad a greater security role, without infringing on India’s well-known fears of military forces operating together (outside of exercises or small-scale operations such as humanitarian relief or counter-piracy).

China’s naval activities will undoubtedly expand in the coming years. Australia and its partners must develop the means to monitor such expansion instead of simply complaining about it.

Undermining unity: Disinformation as a threat to the Quad

Disinformation campaigns targeting the Quad, a partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, challenge its credibility. These campaigns, often state-linked, misrepresent Quad initiatives, exploit internal differences among its members and portray the group as warmongering. This erodes public trust in the Quad, heightens geopolitical tensions and complicates regional cooperation.

The origins of the disinformation campaigns are not completely clear, but it can at least be said that they suit the purposes of China and, perhaps, Pakistan.

The Quad promotes a free, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific by addressing challenges such as health, climate change, cybersecurity and infrastructure development. However, intensifying geopolitical tensions have exposed a fundamental limitation: the Quad’s reluctance to explicitly focus on security challenges. This strategic ambiguity makes the partnership vulnerable to disinformation campaigns. These campaigns often spread false or misleading information to manipulate public opinion, targeting the group and its members.

Two narratives dominate disinformation campaigns targeting the Quad. The first, and most persistent, frames the Quad as a security alliance formed to contain China. This stokes fears of open confrontation caused by Quad involvement in Indo-Pacific disputes, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan.

To support the false narrative, evidence is often fabricated. For instance, in September 2024 an image of a 2017 US-Japan military drill was falsely presented as a standoff between Chinese and US vessels in the South China Sea. The image (below) was used as a thumbnail for a video claiming that the Quad was preparing for military confrontation with China in the South China Sea. The video, which was viewed almost 200,000 times, was posted on a channel that had repeatedly shared misinformation.

The second dominant narrative exploits political and interpersonal differences among Quad members to sow discord. Some campaigns highlight strategic divergences, such as India’s historical non-alignment, Australia’s rebuilding of economic ties with China and Japan’s pacifist stance. Others target relationships between leaders. For example, during the September 2024 Quad summit, a video doctored to depict then US president Joe Biden showing disrespect to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi circulated widely. It was aimed at inflaming anti-US sentiment in India.

Disinformation campaigns also exploit issues that indirectly weaken the Quad’s cohesion. Immigration has been used as a wedge issue, with false claims circulating that US President Donald Trump planned to deport 18,000 illegal Indian immigrants as soon as he was inaugurated. Media monitoring revealed that accounts such as @PSYWAROPS (below), which predominately follows Pakistani sources, shared pieces of false information to strain US-India relations and undermine India’s domestic confidence in the partnership.

Health security, a central focus of Quad cooperation, has also been targeted by disinformation. Japan has been falsely accused of labelling mRNA Covid-19 vaccines as deadly. This was done by misrepresenting a Japanese press conference. These claims were first shared in simplified Chinese and spread across platforms such as X (below), Facebook and Weibo.

Such disinformation is particularly damaging, as the Quad Vaccine Partnership was designed to bolster regional health security. With the US hosting Pfizer-BioNTech’s supply chain and Australia opening a Moderna vaccine facility in Victoria last year, these false claims risk damaging the Quad’s credibility in delivering health initiatives.

Another example emerged in 2022, when online users masquerading as local activists falsely said a planned facility in Texas of Australian mining company Lynas Rare Earths would cause pollution. Although this disinformation primarily targeted Lynas, it indirectly affected the Quad’s work to secure its supply chain, as the company was selected by the Pentagon to develop the initial engineering and design for the commercial heavy rare earths separation facility in the US.

Although the immediate effect of these disinformation campaigns on Quad’s cohesion has been limited, their potential for long-term harm is significant. Persistent and convincing false narratives could erode public trust, reduce domestic support for Quad initiatives and hinder its ability to build stronger security partnerships. Narratives framing the Quad as belligerent, divided and ineffective not only diminish its legitimacy; they also complicate its ability to keep the Indo-Pacific free and open.

To mitigate these risks, the Quad should adopt a more coordinated and proactive approach. It should continue to cooperate, including through regular information-sharing on measures against disinformation. Additionally, collaboration with regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations could further build resilience against disinformation through joint capacity-building and media literacy programs.

Furthermore, engaging with social media platforms to address vulnerabilities, promote transparency, and improve content moderation can help combat disinformation. Japan’s recently launched public-private partnership project to improve technological literacy offers the Quad a model initiative.

The Quad foreign ministers joint statement: short and sweet

Today’s joint statement from the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting in Washington is short and sweet, particularly for those who have been arguing that the grouping should overtly embrace security cooperation.

The statement’s emphasis on ‘security in all domains’ is a noteworthy and welcome shift from the previous, awkward position that the Quad was not a security partnership, despite working together in health security, cybersecurity and maritime security.

This inherent contradiction was unnecessarily self-limiting and confusing but persisted because Quad members, including Australia, saw this self-constraint as necessary to assuage Southeast Asian sensitivities about counterbalancing or containing China.

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade should update its official description of the Quad, which is currently a ‘a diplomatic, not security, partnership’.

Also absent from the statement is any reference to ‘ASEAN centrality’. This is notable because past Quad statements have all dutifully replicated this diplomatic deference to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This ellipsis is an early indication that the Trump administration does not intend to pursue cooperation through the Quad only at a pace that is comfortable for Southeast Asian countries. In fact, ASEAN doesn’t appear to register at all as a policy concern among some members of Trump’s cabinet line-up.

While China is not named either, a joint commitment to ‘oppose any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion’ leaves little doubt that Beijing is the Quad’s common challenge. A subsequent reference to ‘strengthening regional maritime, economic and technology security in the face of increasing threats’ should remove any remaining doubt. Beijing will inevitably react to such bluntness. But the Quad’s belated embrace of security cooperation is welcome. After all, security is a public good just like other elements of the Quad’s agenda, and something which the four countries should openly aspire to strengthen, without fear of offending others in the region.

Defence cooperation is not mentioned directly in the joint statement as part of the Quad’s security agenda. But it is strongly hinted in the commitment that ‘rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity’ should be ‘upheld and defended’ in the Indo-Pacific. (Note ‘defended’.) The Quad navies already exercise together in the annual Malabar drills. It is likely that a military dimension to four-way cooperation will now develop within the Quad, not only in unwarlike activities as disaster relief but also focused on deterrence. This should not dilute the Quad’s collaborative agenda in other policy fields, such as supply chain resilience and maritime domain awareness, but rather complement it.

The fact that the Quad foreign ministers meeting was virtually Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first official activity will be read as a sign of President Trump’s willingness to back the quartet, which after all was revived in 2017 during his first term in office. This will come as a relief to Australia, India and Japan. And it underlines the Quad’s strategic utility not simply as a counterbalance to China but also as a means to anchor the US security role in the Indo-Pacific via a broad-based partnership with three of its most important regional partners, including its closest regional ally, Australia, and its most important one, Japan. India, which offers the heft as the world’s most populous country and democracy, will host the next summit of Quad leaders this year. Trump’s attendance in Delhi will be essential to maintaining the momentum.

This is a promising turn in the Quad’s fluctuating fortunes. It is tempting to inversely correlate the impact of joint statements with their length. The commendable brevity of this two-paragraph statement packs policy punches that were patently missing from some of the Quad’s recent, prolix pronouncements. When it comes to drafting joint statements, concision should be best practice: less means more.

Australia must be clear-eyed and pragmatic about Donald Trump

Australia must be clear-eyed and pragmatic about Donald Trump’s return to the White House, looking past the rhetoric to focus on advancing our strategic interests in an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific region.  

His ‘America First’ declarations may unsettle traditional diplomatic sensibilities, but they mask a crucial reality: the United States isn’t withdrawing from global leadership; it’s redefining how that leadership works. While it is a rejection of the idea the US can, and should, continue to underwrite security and stability to the world alone, critics are wrong to call it isolationist. 

In fact, one of the first executive orders signed on day one was to require American foreign policy to be guided by domestic interests. That isn’t withdrawal from the world or in fact radical. One of Joe Biden’s stated foreign policy priorities was always to ask: ‘What will our foreign policy mean for American workers and their families?’ 

For Australia, Trump’s second term presents both challenges and opportunities, but only if we can distinguish between his style and the substance of American strategic objectives. 

The key for Australia will be to focus on actions, not words. Trump’s inauguration speech, while light on foreign policy specifics, revealed an approach grounded in peace through strength—suggesting that US superiority means fewer conflicts through deterrence. This aligns with Australia’s interests in three crucial areas: maintaining a stable Middle East with a secure Israel, preventing Russian victory in Ukraine, and most importantly, ensuring China cannot use its economic power to impose its military, technological and diplomatic might on the rest of us. 

US involvement will, however, come with a requirement that allies make an equal or meaningful contribution. In this way, Trump’s modern-day America First movement differs from the first incarnation in 1940 of those Americans who did not want to enter World War II regardless of Britain doing more than its fair share to save the world from fascist authoritarianism. 

It is likely that the Trump administration will challenge China’s behaviour early in the term. This includes by calling out cyber attacks, and by demanding fair and equitable trade. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s congressional testimony as part of confirmation hearings provides the most recent, and clearest, indicator.  

The Quad foreign ministers’ meeting has provided a further early indication, producing a joint statement that was brief but heavily security focussed. The fact that the Quad was effectively the first international meeting of the new administration also highlights the US will look to continue leading on regional stability. 

And the Quad’s pre-eminence shows the need to see global affairs as far more than just US-China rivalry.

As the European Union’s President, Ursula von der Leyen, notes, we’re entering an era of ‘harsh’ strategic competition. While US-China rivalry dominates headlines, the reality is more nuanced. Multiple nations are engaged in a sophisticated contest for influence, with Australia positioned at the epicentre of this competition in the Indo-Pacific. Our success will depend on our ability to deploy both hard and soft power effectively.

Australia holds unique advantages in this environment. Our democratic credentials, commitment to the rule of law, and long history of regional engagement provide a strong foundation for leadership. The challenge is to build on these strengths while working in partnership with our neighbours and allies. This means maintaining our strategic alignment with the US while speaking with our own voice on regional issues.

The AUKUS partnership exemplifies how Australia can successfully navigate this new era. It represents more than just a submarine deal—it’s a blueprint, as Rubio has called it, for modern alliance-building that delivers tangible benefits to the broader Indo-Pacific region. This kind of innovative thinking shows how like-minded nations can work together to maintain a free and open regional order while sharing the burden of regional security. 

The path forward requires sophisticated diplomacy that can work with Trump’s unorthodox style while advancing our regional interests. We must judge both the US and China by their actions, not their words—particularly given Beijing’s history of breaching international agreements while claiming to uphold them.  

As we prepare for this new era of strategic competition, Australia must be bold in its vision while pragmatic in its execution. We need political leadership that can see past rhetorical flourishes to identify and pursue our core strategic interests. The foundations are there in our democratic values, our regional relationships, and our strategic partnerships. The challenge now is to build upon them with the creativity and courage that these complex times demand. 

The success of this approach will depend on our ability to look beyond Trump’s unconventional diplomatic style to the underlying strategic alignment between Australian and US interests. By focusing on actions over rhetoric, strengthening our regional partnerships, and maintaining our independent voice while working closely with allies, Australia can effectively navigate the challenges and opportunities of this new era in global politics. 

The Quad should help Indonesia achieve underwater domain awareness

Indonesia’s underwater domain awareness (UDA) is a critical gap that the Quad security partners—Australia, India, Japan and the United States—can and should fill. UDA includes detecting and monitoring underwater activities, including tracking submarines and protecting underwater resources against espionage.

It’s also a means for researching marine environments, which is vital for economic and environmental advances. Collective support from the Quad nations can be instrumental in bridging Indonesian technological and operational gaps to secure its underwater domain.

The underwater realm has become a contested area in the Indo-Pacific, placing significant pressure on the Indonesian military and law enforcement to build the country’s UDA.

First, the South China Sea dispute and the rivalry between the US and China raise concerns for regional littorals. In 2020, Indonesian fishermen discovered a Chinese uncrewed submarine near South Sulawesi. Indonesian authorities also suspect that Chinese oceanographic vessels using the Sunda and Lombok straits are gathering data that could aid China’s submarine operations.

Second, the geopolitical rivalry is also leading to the proliferation of submarines in the region. All Southeast Asian nations, except landlocked Laos, have acquired submarine fleets or intend to do so. The AUKUS trilateral partnership of Australia, the UK and the US seeks to strengthen Australia’s submarine capabilities by developing nuclear submarines to be operated by Australia. The submarines could be positioned near Indonesian waters, raising safety concerns, as Indonesia also operates submarines. The sinking of the Indonesian submarines KRI Nanggala during a torpedo drill in April 2021 was a reminder of the danger of underwater operations.

Third, Indonesian waters are vast, and monitoring the seabed is vital, including to protect subsea pipelines and cables.

These issues have prompted Indonesia to prioritise the development of UDA.

However, the ambition is inconsistent with Indonesia’s limited capacity in undersea warfare. The Indonesian navy currently operates four diesel-electric attack submarines of the Cakra and Nagapasa classes. Additionally, it has bought 11 Airbus AS 565MBe Panther helicopters for antisubmarine warfare. These have short range and endurance compared with maritime-patrol aeroplanes.

In March 2024, Indonesia finalised an agreement with the French company Naval Group and Indonesia’s own PT PAL to build two Scorpene class submarines with lithium-ion batteries at PT PAL’s shipyard. Indonesian defence experts note that the Scorpenes will be able to deploy uncrewed submarines.

According to Indonesia’s navy chief, Admiral Muhammad Ali, the country needs at least 12 full-size submarines to monitor its maritime territory adequately. Additionally, some Indonesian scholars note that the navy has proposed establishing underwater detection networks similar to the US Sound Surveillance System, better known as SOSUS, at the nation’s strategic chokepoints. This would be a major step forward for UDA, but details of are murky.

Indonesia’s UDA capabilities will not only serve a military purpose; they will support the country’s economic and environmental security. They can provide Indonesia with a significant advantage in exploring seabed resources, enabling Jakarta to uncover and use valuable marine resources effectively. UDA can also improve tsunami early warning systems through deep-water acoustic sensors, similar to systems used in India.

However, Indonesia is encountering constraints in developing UDA. They include inadequate infrastructure, shortage of money, limited personnel training and insufficient access to advanced sonar systems, underwater drones and satellite surveillance. Integrating data from multiple sources for real-time analysis remains a major hurdle. Addressing those gaps requires international collaboration, particularly with technologically advanced and strategically aligned partners such as the Quad nations.

They can support Indonesia in developing UDA by providing technological and operational assistance.

The Quad has the capacity to provide Indonesia with advanced surveillance technology, which includes underwater drones, sonar systems and satellite imaging tools. The Quad’s Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific can equip Indonesian personnel with the essential skills to operate and maintain those technologies. Joint maritime exercises would enhance Indonesia’s tactical and operational strengths. Moreover, the Quad can help Indonesia establish infrastructure for efficient data integration and real-time analysis, leveraging India’s expertise from its Information Fusion Centre for regional maritime security.

Second, the Quad can help to secure Indonesia’s maritime infrastructure. Japan has decades of experience in operating underwater sensor systems for monitoring waters around its islands and especially ports. It could help upgrade Indonesia’s port security and improve its monitoring of underwater traffic and infrastructure. The Quad’s Australia-based Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre can build Indonesia’s capacity in that area.

Indonesia’s quest for enhanced UDA is both a national priority and a regional necessity. In 2023, Indonesia’s then-president Joko Widodo wished to view the Quad and AUKUS as ‘partners, not competitors’. According to a survey conducted by Indonesia’s National Research and Innovation Agency in December 2023, 51 percent of Indonesian government officials agreed that the Quad ‘strengthens regional security and stability’. Among academics, more than 60 percent agreed. The Quad’s concrete security assistance to Indonesia, such as in UDA capabilities, might increase this proportion further.

Where the Quad can help: satellites and Asian disaster relief

Pictures from satellites are pretty useful, especially for disaster relief. And the more data, the better, so Asian nations have a mechanism for sharing their images. 

A problem is that most Asian nations are not using the data as well as they could be, because of technical and organizational challenges. But that should not be a problem, because expertise for full exploitation of satellite images is readily available among the four members of the Quad—Australia, India, Japan and the United States.  

So, those four countries should establish a training program to heighten Asian expertise and thereby ease the suffering caused by earthquakes and floods. Doing so would also help Asian nations prepare for climate change. Indeed, improving disaster readiness is already part of the mission of the Quad partnership. 

Satellites can provide images of oil spills, rising floodwater, fire fronts, shattered roads, and collapsed buildings. Their pictures can also help in disaster preparation through historical analysis to predict what might happen next time. For example, observation of geological characteristics can reveal risks of mudslides. 

The information that Asian nations uses comes from their own satellites and from commercial space operators they have under contract. They voluntarily share through a joint organization called Sentinel Asia.  

Proposed by the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Sentinel Asia uses Earth observation satellite data and geospatial analysis to enhance disaster management. Its work includes pre-disaster hazard mapping, early warning, and emergency observation and analysis.  

It includes 97 member organisations from 29 countries (including Australia, India, and Japan) and 17 international organisations. Geospatial information shared through this mechanism goes to member entities, mainly space agencies. 

Technical factors make satellite-observed geospatial information challenging to use. For example, an orbiting synthetic-aperture radar can observe an area at night and through clouds, but picking out features from its pictures requires expertise. Then a different set of skills is required to understand the implications for future disasters revealed in a series of radar, optical, or infrared images. 

A Quad-supported training program would not replace Sentinel Asia; instead, it would increase regional proficiency and effective use of data assembled through the Asian organisation. 

It would particularly promote Asian nations’ whole-of-government geospatial technical capacity and understanding. Key tasks would be building a geospatial foundation while demonstrating the practical application of satellite support and information processing in disaster preparedness and management. This would include education on imagery exploitation techniques, analytical methods, and information dissemination strategies.  

The program would expose trainees to available regional geospatial resources and the benefits of civil-military geospatial coordination. Fostering such interagency coordination and communication is critical to effective disaster management. 

Each Quad nation should incorporate the training into existing unilateral geospatial aid programs. Doing so would make the training available to Asian nations sooner. 

Servir Southeast Asia and Servir Mekong are two such US programs. They provide Southeast Asian nations with access to tailored geospatial data and tools to promote local sustainable solutions to address the climate crisis. The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center believes Servir Mekong has increased regional geospatial informed decision-making in the Mekong Delta but assesses there is ‘a long way to go before these tools are fully integrated within government agencies.’ Supplementing Servir Mekong’s effort, Quad-training could further such integration. 

Asian nations would use the training to predict high-risk disaster areas, develop evacuation routes, conduct damage assessments and optimise resource allocation. The training would also improve coordination and response by assisting international entities with real-time information sharing. 

Increasing Asian geospatial capacity in cooperation with Sentinel Asia would further demonstrate the Quad’s commitment to the region by improving interoperability within the established regional framework.  

Not just another naval exercise: Malabar’s vital messaging

US President Theodore Roosevelt once said, ‘A good navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace’. Those poignant words were uttered in 1902 but they have a distinct relevance to the era in which we find ourselves now.

In 2007, the Royal Australian Navy’s guided missile frigate HMAS Adelaide executed manoeuvres in the northwest Indian Ocean alongside two aircraft carriers, INS Viraat and USS Kittyhawk. While naval exercises are a common part of an Australian ship’s program, this exercise was particularly important. The Adelaide’s manoeuvres alongside ships from India and the US represented Australia’s inaugural participation in Exercise Malabar.

Australia’s recent defence strategic review clearly outlined a strategy for deterrence by denial. There’s a genuine debate to be had on whether this concept is scalable to an appropriate maritime strategy for Australia. That was eloquently canvassed by pre-eminent Australian maritime strategist, the late James Goldrick, in a 2021 piece titled ‘Sea denial is not enough: an Australian and Indian perspective’, coauthored with Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande. Their argument is compelling and makes it clear that sea denial is unlikely to be a sufficient maritime strategy for Australia.

But the Royal Australian Navy does play a crucial role in this nation’s deterrence strategy. Effective deterrence is often considered to be underpinned by the three Cs—communication, capability and credibility.

Maritime tasks are generally grouped into three broad areas, military, constabulary and diplomatic. Naval exercises such as Malabar, which gets underway off Australia tomorrow, represent an important element of the naval diplomacy task, one that remains a consistent obligation of navies the world over, whatever the geostrategic context or technological advances. Within this context of deterrence communication, capability and credibility, naval diplomacy comes to the fore in Exercise Malabar.

Malabar originated as a bilateral exercise involving just the US and India in 1992. Conducted at irregular intervals, it had a renewed focus following the US entry into the global war on terror, after which it became a regular exercise. Following the inaugural Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007, Exercise Malabar moved to the Bay of Bengal and incorporated Singapore, Japan and Australia. Building on its participation in the multilateral Indian-led Exercise Milan, the RAN’s engagement in Malabar in 2007 signalled an increasing maritime focus between the two Indian Ocean neighbours.

The 2007 iteration of Malabar sparked objections from China regarding the location and growth of the exercise. In 2008, the then prime minister, Kevin Rudd, stopped Australia’s participation in the exercise following a meeting with the Chinese foreign minister. Australia’s withdrawal from this key aspect of the Quad clearly struck a nerve with India. Australia spent many years trying to rejoin the exercise, but those efforts were reportedly regularly rebuffed by India.

In 2015, while on a visit to India, the then defence minister, Kevin Andrews, reiterated Australia’s willingness to rejoin the exercise. But no invitation was forthcoming. Japan joined the exercise in 2015, and in 2018 Tokyo expressed support for Australia’s inclusion, but to no avail. The consistent rejection of Australia’s efforts to rejoin Malabar came despite the establishment in 2015 of a bilateral exercise between Australia and India, AUSINDEX, and India’s inclusion in the Australian-led major multilateral Exercise Kakadu.

In the week in which Exercise Malabar is due to commence its first ever iteration of the exercise located in Australia – the history of this exercise is important. It’s more than just another naval exercise.

Australia’s withdrawal from the exercise, and India’s subsequent reluctance to allow it to rejoin, were clearly linked to China’s perception of both the exercise and the Quad. In 2020, Australia rejoined the exercise during a significant period of economic coercion from China and has been an annual participant in the three iterations since. Significantly, the 2020 exercise was executed in the Bay of Bengal—where it was held just before China’s original objection. It has since been held in the Philippine Sea, the East China Sea, and now off the coast of Australia.

Both the location and the very fact that Australia is participating are important. Despite the tumultuous history of Australia’s involvement in Malabar, this communicates a clear message that the Quad countries have the capability and, through the regularity and complexity of the exercise, the credibility to work together. This is essential to the defence strategic review’s deterrence strategy. Naval diplomacy and a credible RAN underpin this. Investing in our defence force, and particularly our navy, as Theodore Roosevelt remarked so long ago, is the surest way to guarantee a peaceful region.

New technologies will allow Indo-Pacific states to build ‘sovereign maritime domain awareness’

Understanding what’s happening in the maritime domain, known as maritime domain awareness or MDA, is an essential element for any country that wishes to govern its maritime zones. But in the Indo-Pacific, many countries struggle to afford the costly top-down, military-style surveillance systems used by wealthy countries. However, new technologies provide the opportunity to democratise access to information and help Indo-Pacific countries to have sovereign capabilities to better monitor their maritime domains.

In recent decades, many countries around the world have claimed jurisdiction over huge areas of the ocean and exclusive rights over the resources in the water and seabed. Many Indo-Pacific island states now have maritime jurisdictions many times larger than their land areas—Maldives, for example, claims that it is 99% ocean. Some have begun calling themselves ‘blue continents’.

But while drawing lines on ocean maps may look impressive, in reality these are often largely ungoverned spaces. The first, and arguably most essential, step in exercising maritime governance is understanding what’s occurring in the maritime domain. Many countries have little idea about what’s happening far from shore, making their maritime claims more in the realm of theory. The truth is that unwatched space is ungoverned space.

But achieving a reasonable level of awareness over huge expanses of ocean can be an expensive proposition. For rich countries like Australia, MDA has traditionally involved collating visual information from ships or aircraft, data from large military satellites and data from automatic signalling devices carried by commercial vessels (known as AIS). The cost and complexity of these top-down surveillance systems has left many poorer countries struggling.

But a multi-faceted technological revolution is bringing MDA within reach of even the smallest of countries, potentially giving them the tools to understand and govern their own maritime domains at an achievable price. These technologies include satellite-based data, low-cost commercial drones, artificial intelligence, and even crowd-sourcing of surveillance.

First, the proliferation of low-cost commercial and other non-military satellites, many of them in low-earth orbit, has brought much of the oceans under regular observation. These satellite systems use a range of technologies to sense vessels below, such as optical observation, radiofrequency detection of vessels using radio or radars (for example, the Hawkee360 system) and VIIRS, a scanning radar that detects reflected light.

Several web-based platforms are now becoming available at no or low cost to Indo-Pacific countries that overlay AIS with satellite data. This allows users to identify so-called dark vessels that have switched off or spoofed their AIS devices to reduce the chances of detection while they engage in illicit activities such as illegal fishing or drug smuggling. One such platform is SeaVision, offered by the US as part of the Quad Indo-Pacific MDA Initiative. Other equivalent platforms are available, including the EU’s IORIS system and the UK’s SOLARTA system. Importantly, users can have access to multiple platforms from multiple sources, reducing the ability of providers to withhold information.

Multiple data sources are now being supplemented by AI systems (such as the Skylight system, provided for free by a US-based non-government organisation) that analyse the behaviour of vessels to predict their activities and intent (for example, if a vessel’s track is indicative of a fishing vessel or whether it may be engaging in a ‘dark rendezvous’ with another ship). These systems cue suspect vessels for further investigation by authorities.

Smaller countries often also struggle to afford air and sea platforms that are key to visual surveillance. All Quad partners are now providing selected regional partners with patrol boats, maritime patrol aircraft, drones and patrol boats (including Australia’s successful Pacific patrol boat program). However, these military-grade assets can still be expensive to maintain and operate, requiring continuing external assistance.

But the proliferation of low-cost commercial drones increasingly enables maritime surveillance at a fraction of the cost of crewed patrol aircraft or military-grade drones. Many of them are controlled through terrestrial radio links, making them suitable only for inshore applications or for surveillance within relatively short distances from patrol vessels. However, as satellite-linked commercial drones become available, they will be suitable for surveillance of distant waters in exclusive economic zones and beyond.

Another approach is to effectively crowd-source MDA by having ocean users be the eyes and ears of maritime law enforcement. Some solutions can be simple. When the Maldives government provided subsidised satellite phones to its fishermen to enhance maritime safety, it also empowered them to give real-time reports of foreign trawlers in their waters, making it a key fisheries enforcement tool.

A new and interesting crowd-sourcing solution is the SeaWatch app, being trialled in the Philippines. It is a maritime equivalent of the popular crowd-sourcing Citizen app used to report traffic accidents or crimes onshore.

The SeaWatch app allows fishermen to use mobile phones to take pictures of (and provide other relevant information on) any vessels they suspect of engaging in illegal fishing or other illicit activities. These geolocated reports are then available to all app users. Reports made from beyond mobile range are automatically uploaded when coverage is reached, which means there may be some latency. (Satellite systems such as OneWeb are also being rolled out that will allow fishermen to communicate via mobile phone with authorities from distant waters.) It also depends on fisherman having access to smartphones, which a reasonable proportion already do, even in poorer countries.

SeaWatch reports may be used by maritime enforcement authorities to ‘tip and cue’ investigation of suspicious vessels or vessels that have been identified as suspect by other means such as AIS and satellite data.

Put together, these technologies are potentially revolutionary for Australia’s smaller neighbours that struggle to buy, operate and maintain high-end military-style maritime surveillance systems. They offer multiple new sources of data and analysis for free or at low cost. Their use can empower many Indo-Pacific countries to achieve a high degree of sovereign MDA over their maritime jurisdictions.

All talk, no dialogue on Asian security

The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s largest security conference, has wrapped up its 2023 meeting in Singapore. The context for this year’s summit was not propitious: Russia’s bloody invasion of Ukraine grinds on, while Chinese President Xi Jinping continues his uncompromising approach to global affairs.

If one thing was obvious during the two days of defence diplomacy, it is that the Sino–American competition is far from being managed effectively. A robust bilateral dialogue is almost non-existent at the ministerial level, with military-to-military contact even more limited. Efforts by US President Joe Biden’s administration to restart talks fizzled earlier this year after a Chinese spy balloon was shot down in American airspace. Some senior officials are in contact, potentially paving the way for high-level visits. But for now, China is in no hurry to re-engage.

As the US warns of an alarming increase in ominous intercepts from Chinese military aircraft and vessels amid escalating tensions over Taiwan, its partners want China to talk. The focus, they argue, should be on better military-to-military communication to build confidence. In delivering this year’s Shangri-La keynote, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described more dialogue as the “first and most fundamental” guardrail on US–China relations.

In his speech at the conference, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin also emphasised bilateral dialogue, especially between military leaders. The right time to talk, Austin said, was “anytime and every time.” Dialogue is not a reward, but a necessity, he continued—perhaps with China and US hawks in mind—adding that a “cordial handshake over dinner” is “no substitute for a substantive engagement.”

Despite this appeal, Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu rebuffed Austin’s request to meet. That’s not surprising, given that Li has been under US sanctions since 2018 for buying Russian weapons. Nevertheless, China’s adamant opposition to broader defence diplomacy is inexcusable. When asked about the need for guardrails and confidence-building measures, including to manage confrontations at sea or in the air, Li said the answer was not military-to-military dialogue. Rather, the West should ‘mind its own business’ and stay out of the waters and airspace near China.

The US and its partners, Li argued, were using freedom of navigation as a pretext for ‘hegemony.’ Making it clear that China has no interest in examining its own conduct in the Indo-Pacific, Li repeated the now-familiar lines that his country would never bully or coerce others and has no hegemonic aspirations. The irony of such remarks was not lost on many of the delegates. The Philippines, for example, challenged Li on the ‘disconnect’ between China’s words and its actions in recent years, not least in the South China Sea.

Li was unperturbed. China’s narrative is aimed at a domestic audience, as wll as any regional elites disillusioned with the West and reflexively suspicious of the US. The Chinese delegates, predominantly from the People’s Liberation Army, were quick to encourage Southeast Asian ‘autonomy’ and to portray the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and AUKUS security groupings as undermining the centrality of ASEAN and regional stability. Similarly, Li took aim at US ‘exceptionalism and double standards,’ a charge he knew would resonate with some in the audience.

The second takeaway from the conference concerns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: while the war preoccupies the US and its close partners, Southeast Asia remains indifferent. The argument that Russia’s aggression must be opposed, not least to guard against the possibility of a similar situation in Asia, was repeated ad nauseam at the conference. For the West, this is self-evident.

But in many less-developed parts of Asia, the Russian and Chinese narrative of the war and its causes, including ‘provocation’ by NATO, has gained considerable traction. For example, Indonesian defence minister and presidential candidate, Prabowo Subianto, issued a seemingly impromptu peace proposal, which called for a ceasefire ‘at present positions,’ a demilitarised zone, and United Nations-supervised referenda in ‘disputed territories.’

The half-baked initiative was dead on arrival. European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov, and many others quickly condemned the plan, arguing that it would result in an unjust peace. But Chinese delegates welcomed the proposal, and some Southeast Asian attendees, who complained that calls for negotiation were automatically seen as pro-Russian, sympathised with the idea.

Equally striking, the ‘power of partnerships’—as the Biden administration describes it—was on full display at the conference. Leaders and ministers from the US, Europe, the UK, Japan, Australia, and Canada sang from the same song sheet on both Russia and China, harmonising their calls for dialogue and deterrence. Moreover, US-led trilateral meetings were held on the sidelines, a ‘new Quad’ meeting of the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines took place, and senior defence officials from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) held discussions. India was notably absent, though, with its defence minister skipping the event yet again.

It would be a mistake, however, to equate a strong showing of alignment between the US and its Indo-Pacific and European allies at Shangri-La with the broader mood in Southeast Asia. Concluding the conference, Singaporean Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen once again warned about US–China tensions, a more militarised Indo-Pacific, and the risk of conflict. Some Southeast Asian delegates quietly expressed their ambivalence about US policy toward China, along with worry about the possible return of Donald Trump after next year’s US presidential election, while Indonesia’s concerns about the Quad and AUKUS were subdued but certainly present.

For all its quiet hedging, Southeast Asia continues to worry about the risk of war. But regional leaders are determined to avoid the ‘invidious choice’ between the US and China, no matter how much their rivalry shapes the agenda and dominates discussions.

New satellite-based technologies a game changer for Indo-Pacific maritime security

A revolution is now happening in maritime domain awareness that will have a profound impact on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad’s Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, announced at the leaders’ summit in Tokyo in May, will combine new satellite-based technologies with existing systems to help identify illicit maritime actors. This and similar initiatives will be provide a significant boost to the ability of many Indo-Pacific countries, especially small island states, to govern their waters.

Maritime domain awareness involves gaining situational awareness of the maritime environment, especially through an understanding of the position and intention of actors in a given maritime space. It is fundamental to understanding what’s out there, what it’s doing and what should be done about it.

But achieving maritime domain awareness involves overcoming major challenges in combining data from multiple sources into a single common operating picture that can be analysed and acted on.

Over the past couple of decades, technological advances have allowed data from multiples sources such as coastal radars, ships, aircraft and satellites to be pooled and analysed on a single platform, in close to real time. This often involves sophisticated and expensive sensors and computing technology, making it accessible only to large or wealthy countries. The necessary resources and technologies are often out of reach for many countries, effectively leaving much of our oceans as ungoverned spaces for illicit or other bad actors.

Recent years have also brought a proliferation of regional information fusion centres that pool data and analysis at a regional level. This can make considerable sense for many countries, but it can also come with its own sensitivities, including for smaller countries that aspire to exercise sovereignty over their own maritime jurisdictions.

Regional maritime law enforcement agencies can also directly access several web-based information platforms. The SeaVision system, for example, provided by the US Department of Transport, is used in more than 100 countries.

All of these systems rely heavily on automatic identification systems, or AISs, which are transmitters required to be installed on most commercial vessels. That’s good for keeping track of legitimate or ‘white’ shipping, but is less useful in identifying vessels engaged in illicit activities. Illegal fishers, drug smugglers and other bad actors can go ‘dark’ by switching off or hacking their AIS systems so they can’t be tracked.

This big gap in maritime governance is being plugged. Under the Quad’s initiative, an enhanced version of the SeaVision platform will be offered to Indo-Pacific partners, allowing them to identify and track dark shipping. This includes radio frequency data from the commercial Hawkeye 360 satellite system that picks up electronic emissions (such as radar, radio and satellite phone signals) from vessels under its path. The SeaVision system compares that data with AIS data to identify vessels that have switched off or spoofed their AIS systems. Dark shipping can then be targeted for further investigation using other data sources.

Other satellite-based data is being progressively added to SeaVision to help identify the types and activities of dark vessels. This includes electro-optical imagery or synthetic aperture radar data, which can be used to build a 3-D picture of targeted vessels—helping authorities identify, say, a drug smuggling dhow or a mothership. Data from the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite, a scanning radar that detects reflected light, can help identify illegal fishers, which commonly use bright lights to attract fish at night.

Some data, particularly from commercial sources, is expensive, but prices will likely fall as providers and users proliferate. Time lags in the acquisition and dissemination of satellite-based data (which may be 12 hours or more) will also likely be reduced to give end users a closer to real-time picture.

The US Coast Guard is offering an enhanced SeaVision product to five Southeast Asian partners in the first phase of the Quad initiative, although the cost of commercially sourced satellite data currently constrains the broader rollout of the system.

Competing platforms are offered across the Indo-Pacific by other players, including the EU’s IORIS system, the UK’s SOLARTA system and the not-for-profit Skylight system. These tools can provide specific options or features. For example, the IORIS system allows users to share data bilaterally with others rather than through a common platform. The Skylight system focuses on using artificial intelligence to analyse vessel behaviour such as ‘dark rendezvous events’.

Together, these enhanced web-based systems will be a game changer for many Indo-Pacific island states and others that struggle to police huge maritime jurisdictions with few resources. Giving them direct access to satellite-based data with AI analysis effectively democratises maritime domain awareness for many users, reducing their information reliance on large countries or regional fusion centres.

While information is a fundamental requirement in the maritime domain, national enforcement agencies will also require the ability to take action against illicit actors, whether by interdicting them at sea or by conducting close surveillance that allows vessels to be specifically identified for others to interdict, prosecute or make their activities public.

The Quad initiative, once fully rolled out, will be a major tangible demonstration of the value of the Quad in providing public goods for the Indo-Pacific—in stark contrast to China’s lack of interest in helping others to police their waters.

But information by itself is not enough. It must be complemented with cost-effective capabilities such as vessels and drones that allow smaller Indo-Pacific states to take action against illicit or nefarious actors in the maritime domain. This should include expanding Australia’s successful Pacific maritime security program to additional users and platforms.