How might US policy in the Indo-Pacific change over the next four years? In anticipation of a new US administration and Congress in 2025, ASPI USA held an “alternative futures analysis” exercise in mid-October 2024 to explore the drivers of US policy and how they might evolve through to November 2028. The workshop involved seven Indo-Pacific experts, who discussed a range of factors that could determine US policy and assessed how key factors could drive different outcomes.
The participants determined that the two key drivers affecting the US role in the Indo-Pacific over the next four years that are simultaneously most uncertain and most determinative for US policy are:
Washington’s perception of China’s strength in the Indo-Pacific
the level of US attention to the region.
The former is a key determinant of Washington’s threat perception, and the latter is a key determinant of Washington’s capacity to sustainably engage in the region. The nexus of those drivers produced a skeleton of four potential scenarios:
Failing to walk and chew gum: Perceived high China power and a low level of US attention. In this scenario, Beijing continues to advance its interests across the region while Washington fails to prioritise imperatives in the Indo-Pacific amid ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere.
Follow US: Perceived high China power and a high level of US attention. In this scenario, the possibility of Chinese regional hegemony is growing, but the US adopts a focused, harder-edged security strategy and leads like-minded states to confront the challenge.
The Peaceful Pivot: Perceived low China power and a high level of US attention. In this “stars align” scenario, the perception of diminishing competition and conflict with China couples with the US implementing the decade-old promise of a pivot to Asia.
Leading from behind: Perceived low China power and a low level of US attention. China’s capacity to project power falters in this scenario, but the US—pulled into global events elsewhere and distracted by its own domestic politics—does not provide forceful leadership in the region and leans on allies and partners to carry the load.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/07130103/The-future-of-US-Indo-Pacific-policy-Banner-1.png368908markohttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgmarko2025-02-07 13:17:422025-03-12 14:54:32The future of US Indo-Pacific policy
The Critical Technology Tracker is a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas. It provides a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology capability.
It first launched 1 March 2023 and underwent a major expansion on 28 August 2024 which took the dataset from five years (previously, 2018–2022) to 21 years (2003–2023). Explore the website and the broader project here.
Governments and organisations interested in supporting this ongoing program of work, including further expansions and the addition of new technologies, can contact: criticaltech@aspi.org.au.
Executive Summary
This report accompanies a major update of ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website,1 which reveals the countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—leading scientific and research innovation in critical technologies. It does that by focusing on high-impact research—the top 10% of the most highly cited papers—as a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology (S&T) capability.
Now covering 64 critical technologies and crucial fields spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas, the Tech Tracker’s dataset has been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)2 to 21 years of data (2003–2023).3
These new results reveal the stunning shift in research leadership over the past two decades towards large economies in the Indo-Pacific, led by China’s exceptional gains. The US led in 60 of 64 technologies in the five years from 2003 to 2007, but in the most recent five years (2019–2023) is leading in seven. China led in just three of 64 technologies in 2003–20074 but is now the lead country in 57 of 64 technologies in 2019–2023, increasing its lead from our rankings last year (2018–2022), where it was leading in 52 technologies.
India is also emerging as a key centre of global research innovation and excellence, establishing its position as an S&T power. That said, the US, the UK and a range of countries from Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East have maintained hard-won strengths in high-impact research in some key technology areas, despite the accelerated efforts of emerging S&T powers.
This report examines short- and long-term trends, to generate unique insights. We have updated the recent five-year results (2019–2023) to show current research performance rankings (top 5 country results are in Appendix 1). We have also analysed our new historical dataset to understand the country and institutional trends in research performance over the full 21-year period. In select technologies we have also made projections, based on current trends, for China and the US to 2030.
The results show the points in time at which countries have gained, lost or are at risk of losing their global edge in scientific research and innovation. The historical data provides a new layer of depth and context, revealing the performance trajectory different countries have taken, where the momentum lies and also where longer term dominance over the full two decades might reflect foundational expertise and capabilities that carry forward even when that leader has been edged out more recently by other countries. The results also help to shed light on the countries, and many of the institutions, from which we’re likely to see future innovations and breakthroughs emerge.
China’s new gains have occurred in quantum sensors, high-performance computing, gravitational sensors, space launch and advanced integrated circuit design and fabrication (semiconductor chip making). The US leads in quantum computing, vaccines and medical countermeasures, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, small satellites, atomic clocks, genetic engineering and natural language processing.
India now ranks in the top 5 countries for 45 of 64 technologies (an increase from 37 last year) and has displaced the US as the second-ranked country in two new technologies (biological manufacturing and distributed ledgers) to rank second in seven of 64 technologies. Another notable change involves the UK, which has dropped out of the top 5 country rankings in eight technologies, declining from 44 last year to 36 now.
Besides India and the UK, the performance of most secondary S&T research powers (those countries ranked behind China and the US) in the top 5 rankings is largely unchanged: Germany (27), South Korea (24), Italy (15), Iran (8), Japan (8) and Australia (7).
We have continued to measure the risk of countries holding a monopoly in research for some critical technologies, based on the share of high-impact research output and the number of leading institutions the dominant country has. The number of technologies classified as ‘high risk’ has jumped from 14 technologies last year to 24 now. China is the lead country in every one of the technologies newly classified as high risk—putting a total of 24 of 64 technologies at high risk of a Chinese monopoly. Worryingly, the technologies newly classified as high risk includes many with defence applications, such as radar, advanced aircraft engines, drones, swarming and collaborative robots and satellite positioning and navigation.
In terms of institutions, US technology companies, including Google, IBM, Microsoft and Meta, have leading or strong positions in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and computing technologies. Key government agencies and national labs also perform well, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which excels in space and satellite technologies. The results also show that the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—thought to be the world’s largest S&T institution5—is by far the world’s highest performing institution in the Critical Tech Tracker, with a global lead in 31 of 64 technologies (an increase from 29 last year, see more on CAS in the breakout box on page 19).
The results in this report should serve as a reminder to governments around the world that gaining and maintaining scientific and research excellence isn’t a tap that can be turned on and off. Too often, countries have slowed or stopped investing in, for example, research and development (R&D) and manufacturing capability, in areas in which they had a long-term competitive advantage (5G technologies are an example6). In a range of essential sectors, democratic nations risk losing hard-won, long-term advantages in cutting-edge science and research—the crucial ingredient that underpins much of the development and advancement of the world’s most important technologies. There’s also a risk that retreats in some areas could mean that democratic nations aren’t well positioned to take advantage of new and emerging technologies, including those that don’t exist yet.
Meanwhile, the longitudinal results in the Critical Tech Tracker enable us to see how China’s enormous investments and decades of strategic planning are now paying off.7
Building technological capability requires a sustained investment in, and an accumulation of, scientific knowledge, talent and high-performing institutions that can’t be acquired through only short-term or ad hoc investments.8 Reactive policies by new governments and the sugar hit of immediate budget savings must be balanced against the cost of losing the advantage gained from decades of investment and strategic planning. While China continues to extend its lead, it’s important for other states to take stock of their historical, combined and complementary strengths in all key critical technology areas.
This report is made up of several sections. Below you’ll find a summary of the key country and institutional findings followed by an explanation of why tracking historical research performance matters. We then further analyse the nuances of China’s lead and briefly explain our methodology (see Appendix 2 for a detailed methodology). We also look more closely at 10 critical technology areas, including those relevant to AI, semiconductors, defence, energy, biotechnology and communications. Appendix 1 contains visual snapshots of top 5 country rankings in the 64 critical technologies.
We encourage you to visit ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website (https://techtracker.aspi.org.au) and explore the new data.
What is ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker?
ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker is a unique dataset that allows users to track 64 technologies that are foundational for our economies, societies, national security, defence, energy production, health and climate security. It focuses on the top 10% of the most highly cited research publications from the past 21 years (2003–2023).9 The new dataset is analysed to generate insights into which countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—are publishing the greatest share of innovative and high-impact research. We use the top 10% because those publications have a higher impact on the full technology life cycle and are more likely to lead to patents, drive future research innovation and underpin technological breakthroughs.10
Critical technologies are current or emerging technologies that have the potential to enhance or threaten our societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors. By focusing early in the science and technology (S&T) life cycle, rather than examining technologies already in existence and fielded, the Critical Technology Tracker doesn’t just provide insights into a country’s research performance, but also its strategic intent and potential future S&T capability. It’s only one piece of the puzzle, of course: it must be acknowledged that actualising and commercialising research performance into major technological gains, no matter how impressive a breakthrough is, can be a difficult, expensive and complicated process. A range of other inputs are needed, such as an efficient manufacturing base and ambitious policy implementation.
The Tech Tracker’s dataset has now been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)11 to 21 years of data (2003–2023). This follows previous attempts to benchmark research output across nations by focusing on quality over quantity, key technology areas and individual institutions, as well as short-term, long-term and potential future trends. This update continues ASPI’s investment in creating the highest quality dataset of its kind.12
Both the website and two associated reports (this one included) provide decision-makers with an empirical methodology to inform policy and investment decisions, including decisions on which countries and institutions they partner with and in what technology areas. A list of the 64 technologies, including definitions, is on our website.13 Other parts of this project include:
the Tech Tracker website: ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker14 contains an enormous amount of original data analysis. We encourage you to explore these datasets online as you engage with this report. Users can compare countries, regions or groupings (the EU, the Quad, China–Russia etc.) and explore the global flow of research talent for each technology.
the 2023 report: We encourage readers to explore the original report, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power.15 In addition to analysing last year’s key findings, it outlined why research is vital for S&T advances and it examined China’s S&T vision. The report also made 23 policy recommendations, which remain relevant today.16
visual snapshots: Readers looking for a summary of the top 5 countries ranked by their past five years of performance in all 64 technologies (see example below) can jump to Appendix 1.
Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, ASPI, Canberra, 1 March 2023. ↩︎
21-year dataset with improved search terms and institution cleaning, see Methodology for more details. ↩︎
In the early years, such as 2003–2007, some of the 64 technologies have not yet emerged and the credits assigned to top countries or institutions are too low to be statistically significant. Where this is the case we have avoided pulling key insights from the rankings of countries and institutions in these technologies. ↩︎
Bec Crew, ‘Nature Index 2024 Research Leaders: Chinese institutions dominate the top spots’, Nature, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
Elsa B Kania, ‘Opinion: Why doesn’t the US have its own Huawei?’, Politico, 25 February 2020. ↩︎
See, for example, Zachary Arnold, ‘China has become a scientific superpower’, The Economist, 12 June 2024. ‘China’, Nature, 9 August 2023, https://www.nature.com/collections/efchdhgeci ; ‘China’s science and technology vision’ and ‘China’s breakout research capabilities in defence, security and intelligence technologies’ in Gaida et al. ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 14–20; Tarun Chhabra et al., ‘Global China: Technology’, Brookings Institution, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/global-china-technology/ ; Jason Douglas and Clarence Leong. “The U.S. Has Been Spending Billions to Revive Manufacturing. But China Is in Another League”, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/the-u-s-has-been-spending-billions-to-revive-manufacturing-but-china-is-in-another-league-75ed6309 . ↩︎
Eva Harris, ‘Building scientific capacity in developing countries’, EMBO Reports, 1 January 2004, 5, 7–11. ↩︎
These technologies were selected through a review process in 2022–23 that combined our own research with elements from the Australian Government’s 2022 list of critical technologies, and lists compiled by other governments. An archived version of the Australian Government’s list is available: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 28 November 2022. In May 2023, the Australian Government revised their list: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 19 May 2023, https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/list-critical-technologies-national-interest . A US list is available from National Science and Technology Council, ‘Critical and emerging technologies list update’, US Government, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf . On our selection of AUKUS Pillar 2 technologies, see Alexandra Caples et al., ‘AUKUS: three partners, two pillars, one problem’, TheStrategist, 6 June 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-three-partners-two-pillars-one-problem/ . ↩︎
Felix Poege et al., ‘Science quality and the value of inventions’, Science Advances, 11 December 2019, 5(12):eaay7323; Cherng Ding, et al., ‘Exploring paper characteristics that facilitate the knowledge flow from science to technology’, Journal of Informetrics, February 2017, 11(1):244–256, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joi.2016.12.004 ; Gaida et al., ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 9. ↩︎
Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power. ↩︎
See more details in the full methodology in Appendix 2. ↩︎
‘List of technologies’, Critical Technology Tracker. ↩︎
See Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power. ↩︎
Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, 44. ↩︎
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/12110516/ASPIs-two-decade-Critical-Technology-Tracker_-The-rewards-of-long-term-research-banner.png478790markohttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgmarko2024-08-28 11:11:002025-03-26 10:54:51ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker: The rewards of long-term research investment
Enabled by digital technologies and fuelled by geopolitical competition, hybrid threats in the Indo-Pacific are increasing in breadth, application and intensity. Hybrid threats are a mix of military, non-military, covert and overt activities by state and non-state actors that occur below the line of conventional warfare. The consequences for individual nations include weakened institutions, disrupted social systems and economies, and greater vulnerability to coercion—especially from revisionist powers such as China.
But the consequences of increased hybrid activity in the Indo-Pacific reach well beyond individual nations. The Indo-Pacific hosts a wide variety of political systems and interests, with multiple centres of influence, multiple points of tension and an increasingly belligerent authoritarian power. It lacks the regional institutions and practised behaviours to help ensure ongoing security and stability. And, because of its position as a critical centre of global economic and social dynamism, instability in the Indo-Pacific, whether through or triggered by hybrid threats, has global ramifications.
Because hybrid threats fall outside the conventional frameworks of the application of state power and use non-traditional tools to achieve their effects, governments have often struggled to identify the activity, articulate the threat and formulate responses. Timeliness and specificity are problematic: hybrid threats evolve, are often embedded or hidden within normal business and operations, and may leverage or amplify other, more traditional forms of coercion.
More often than not, hybrid threat activity is targeted towards the erosion of national capability and trust and the disruption of decision-making by governments—all of which reduce national and regional resilience that would improve security and stability in the region.
What’s the solution?
There’s no silver-bullet solution to hybrid threats; nor are governments readily able to draw on traditional means of managing national defence or regional security against such threats in the Indo-Pacific.
Because of the ubiquity of digital technologies, the ever-broadening application of tools and practices in an increasing number of domains, it’s evident that policymakers need better and more timely information, the opportunity to share information and insights in a trusted forum and models of how hybrid threats work (we provide one here). Exchange of information and good practice is also needed to help counter the amorphous, evolving and adaptive nature of hybrid threats.
We propose the establishment of an Indo-Pacific Hybrid Threat Centre (HTC, or the centre) as a means of building broader situational awareness on hybrid threats across the region.1 Through research and analysis, engagement, information sharing and capacity building, such a centre would function as a confidence-building measure and contribute to regional stability and the security of individual nations.
While modelled on the existing NATO–EU Hybrid Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Finland, the centre would need to reflect the differences between the European and Indo-Pacific security environments. Most notably, that includes the lack of pan-regional Indo-Pacific security institutions and practice that the centre could use. There are also differences in the nature and priorities assigned to threats by different countries: the maritime domain has more influence in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe, many countries in the region face ongoing insurgencies, and there’s much less adherence to, or even interest in, democratic norms and values.
That will inevitably shape the placement, funding, and operations of an Indo-Pacific HTC. A decentralised model facilitating outreach across the region would assist regional buy-in. Partnership arrangements with technology companies would provide technical insight and support. Long-term commitments will be needed to realise the benefits of the centre as a confidence-building measure. The Quad countries are well positioned to provide such long-term commitments, while additional support could come from countries with experience and expertise in hybrid threats, particularly EU countries and the UK.
As with the NATO–EU Hybrid CoE, independence and integrity are paramount. That implies the positioning of the Indo-Pacific HTC core in a strong democracy; better still would be the legislative protection of its operations and data. Accordingly, we propose scoping work to establish policy approval, legislative protection and funding arrangements and to seed initial research capability and networks.
Introduction
Hybrid threats are a mix of military and non-military, covert and overt activities by state and non-state actors that occur below the line of conventional warfare. Their purpose is to blur the lines between war and peace, destabilise societies and governments and sow doubt and confusion among populations and decision-makers. They deliberately target democratic systems and state vulnerabilities, often leveraging legitimate processes for inimical ends, and typically aim to stay below the threshold of detection, attribution and retaliation.2 They’re the same activities that the Australian Government attributes to the ‘grey zone’, involving ‘military and non-military forms of assertiveness and coercion aimed at achieving strategic goals without provoking conflict.’3
Hybrid threats are increasingly of concern to governments as they grapple with the effects of digital technologies, Covid-19 and an increasingly tense geopolitical environment. Ambiguous, evolving, at the intersection of society, commerce and security, and transnational in character, hybrid threats challenge and undercut ‘normal’ conceptions of security. Unmet, they stoke division and anxiety in societies and states. They threaten to erode national security, sovereignty and societal resilience, leaving nations and their people vulnerable to coercion, particularly by authoritarian states and criminal elements.
The immediate targets of motivated hybrid activity are typically non-traditional, in the sense that government security apparatuses aren’t expected to manage and repulse them. Hybrid activity takes advantage of other, easier targets and means of generating confusion and disruption at the nation-state level: individuals may be targeted for repression or assassination; fishing vessels harassed; intellectual property stolen; commercial advantage pillaged; researchers and journalists intimidated; ethnic communities hijacked; and elites co-opted for corrupt ends.
The Indo-Pacific region is particularly vulnerable. For example, it lacks the more practised security frameworks, cooperative mechanisms and understandings present in Europe. There’s little shared awareness and understanding of the nature and consequences of hybrid threats. The region is also especially economically and demographically dynamic and socially diverse, featuring a number of competing political systems and institutions.
That offers both challenge and opportunity. In this paper, we consider the nature of hybrid threats, explore the threat landscape in the Indo-Pacific, turn our attention to the potential ‘fit’ of an Indo-Pacific HTC and make recommendations for the way forward.
A number of the thoughts and insights incorporated in this paper emerged during ASPI’s consultations with governments, businesses and civil society groups in the Indo-Pacific, as well as in Europe and the UK. We thank those respondents for their time and insights.
Danielle Cave, Jacob Wallis, ‘Why the Indo-Pacific needs its own hybrid threats centre’, The Strategist, 15 December 2021. ↩︎
See NATO’s definition, online, and the Hybrid Centre of Excellence’s definition. ↩︎
Defence Department, Defence Strategic Update, Australian Government, 2020, 5. ↩︎
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/13124640/Policy-Brief_-Countering-the-Hydra_-a-proposal-for-an-Indo-Pacific-hybrid-threat-banner.png560790markohttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgmarko2022-06-07 12:45:002025-03-13 13:28:05Countering the Hydra: A proposal for an Indo-Pacific hybrid threat centre
A case for elevating the cyber–maritime security nexus
Summary
A safe and secure Indo-Pacific maritime domain is vital to the UK, Australia and Southeast Asian states for their national prosperity. While there are common objectives, the three parties have different priorities, capabilities and areas of expertis.
There’s a long history of multilateral cooperation between Southeast Asia and Australia, among other key partners. In the post-Brexit context and in the light of the UK Government’s Indo-Pacific tilt, London would do well to harmonise its maritime engagements with allies such as Australia and align its activities with priorities of Southeast Asian partners.
While maritime security cooperation at sea tends to be dominated by activities, programs and operations of navies, we recommend taking a comprehensive approach to maritime security cooperation that includes partnerships with non-military actors and considers civilian-related aspects of maritime security.
In finding a value-added role in the crowded space of maritime security cooperation and capacity building, we suggest exploring UK–Australia–ASEAN cooperation on issues of technology, cybersecurity and maritime-based digital infrastructure. Those are transformational aspects that will define the future of maritime activities in the Indo-Pacific and affect Southeast Asia’s safety, security, livelihoods and regional economic competitiveness.
This scoping report recommends UK–Australia–ASEAN cooperation to elevate and further explore the cyber–maritime security nexus.
Introduction: Understanding maritime security in the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific strategic concepts promulgated by Japan (reaffirmed in 2016)1, the US (2017)2, Australia (2017)3, India (2018)4, Germany (2020)5, the Netherlands (2020)6, the EU (2021)7, France (reaffirmed in 2021)8, the UK (2021)9 and others demonstrate the region’s geostrategic significance. While the various concepts differ significantly in scope, essence and strategy, they share one commonality: the idea of connected oceans in which Southeast Asian nations sit at the heart and form the epicentre of great-power competition that has come to define the Indo-Pacific. The region has become a ‘crowded space’ as the long-term and newer actors increase various engagement initiatives.
But Southeast Asia isn’t only an arena of competition: the region—collectively and as individual economies—has agency. ASEAN nations are able to steer competitors and partners towards meeting their own priorities.10 They’ve also been able to steer the global involvement towards political–military, economic, infrastructure and environmental agenda. While their overarching interests converge, the UK, Australia and their closest allies should acknowledge there may at times be divergences in approaches, activities and underlying values compared to those of ASEAN states.
In ASEAN’s 2019 Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, the 10 member states recognised the maritime domain as the foremost area for cooperation.11 However, the exact meaning of ‘maritime security’ is far from neatly defined. Discussions on maritime security have mainly focused on law enforcement at sea, the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the adequate management of fisheries and offshore resources, and the maintenance of sovereign maritime borders. By and large, issues of maritime security tend to focus on areas of regional security, transnational crime activities, economic and resource management, the marine environment and marine safety.
The maritime agenda is shared by ASEAN and its partners in the most extensive (by membership) security-focused institution—the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which includes Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the US along with the ASEAN member states (Figure 1). Table 1 summarises the main forums for maritime security cooperation in the region.
Figure 1: The ASEAN Regional Forum members’ maritime security priorities
Data source: Annual security outlook 2021, ASEAN Regional Forum, 2021, online. Clustering and categorisation by the authors.
Table 1: Key forums for maritime security cooperation
a ‘15th ASEAN Regional Forum’, ASEAN, Singapore, 24 July 2008, online. Source: Authors’ compilation.
The UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt
The UK government’s Global Britain in a competitive age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy presents the Indo-Pacific as a region of increasing geopolitical and economic importance over the next decade and suggests that competition will play out in ‘regional militarisation, maritime tensions and contest over the rules and norms linked to trade and technology’.12 Therefore, seeking closer engagement with states in Southeast Asia is an essential part of a strategy that seeks to position the UK as a global actor in the era of strategic competition.The UK government’s Global Britain in a competitive age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy presents the Indo-Pacific as a region of increasing geopolitical and economic importance over the next decade and suggests that competition will play out in ‘regional militarisation, maritime tensions and contest over the rules and norms linked to trade and technology’. Therefore, seeking closer engagement with states in Southeast Asia is an essential part of a strategy that seeks to position the UK as a global actor in the era of strategic competition.
Anchors for the UK’s renewed engagement with Southeast Asia in maritime security
The UK became ASEAN’s newest dialogue partner in 2021,13 in what was a first milestone after the announcement of the government’s ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’.14 In the context of the UK’s exit from the EU, London has been looking at the right justifications for its priorities and for ways to meaningfully distinguish itself from, as well as coordinate where possible with, the Indo-Pacific approaches that the EU, France, Germany and the Netherlands have initiated in parallel.
While the Indo-Pacific tilt is new, the UK’s presence in the region, particularly its maritime presence, is not. London maintained a limited presence in Southeast Asia after the UK’s withdrawal in the 1960s and 1970s in the form of small-scale deployments aimed at maintaining bilateral engagements with selected countries. In the past two decades, the UK has also participated in established multilateral exercises that involve ASEAN countries, such as Exercise Bersama Lima and SEACAT (Table 2 and Figure 2). Those exercises involve a large number of ASEAN states and external partners and focus on capacity building in various maritime domains. They aim to address many issues, including current concerns about regional stability and security and long-term efforts in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). The recent deployment of HMS Tamar and Spey to the Indo-Pacific are examples of the UK’s engagement with the Pacific. It would be interesting to see if it could become a possibility for future expansion of the scope to the wider Indo-Pacific.
Table 2: Selected flagship and regular multilateral exercises involving Australia, the UK and ASEAN countries
a The exercise was established under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). It’s been through many iterations since the first Exercise Bersatu Lima in 1972, including multiple expansions and renamings over the years. Exercise Bersama Lima was inaugurated in 2004 and was replaced by Exercise Bersama Gold in 2021 to celebrate the FPDA’s 50th jubilee. Source: Authors’ compilation based on official information.
Figure 2: Key multilateral exercises by Australia or UK with ASEAN countries in the Indo-Pacific
This map includes naval exercises by the UK, Australia with Southeast Asian partners in the Indo-Pacific conducted since 2013. The multilateral and enduring exercises are marked in orange. The data set can further be filtered for partners involved, key exercise themes and frequency.
The UK’s new maritime security effort to engage ASEAN states has revolved around Operation Fortis which involved the CSG 21 to conduct a variety of exercises in and around Southeast Asia between June and December 2021. This included bilateral passing exercises (PASSEX) with Thailand,15 Malaysia16 and Vietnam17 navigating through the South China Sea in 2021.18
A factor in this effort is the UK’s ability to maintain sustainability and a regular at-sea presence. London’s early diplomacy and activities under the Indo-Pacific tilt still needs to be calibrated. With the new initiatives, however, London also needs to be sensitive to perceptions and even reputational risks in the region. Part of the scepticism about the UK’s role in the Indo-Pacific arises from the fact that the ‘Global Britain’ aspiration has a predominantly Euro-Atlantic focus.19 The arguments also stress the UK’s stronger reliance on the US at the expense of its interconnectedness with Europe.
Australia’s Indo-Pacific policy
As a maritime nation at the juncture of the Indian and the Pacific oceans, Australia pursues comprehensive and proactive maritime security engagement in the region. Canberra’s most recent policy expressions—the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper20 and the 2020 Defence Strategic Update21—have emphasised the importance of the maritime rules-based order and the value of cooperation with regional partners. Australia perceives the maritime domain as one of the key battlegrounds for China’s coercive practices, particularly in the South China Sea.
The Royal Australian Navy has a history of participation in maritime security exercises in the region, including multilateral exercises. Unlike the UK, Australia served as host and initiator of exercises that engaged numerous ASEAN states and other Western allies, for example Indo-Pacific Endeavour and Exercise KAKADU (see Figure 2). The exercises also had sizable scale and scope, including antisubmarine warfare and live-firing training with the intent of sharpening proficiency and interoperability. These are signs of significant commitment.
Compared with the UK, Australia has the advantage of being a residential actor in the region. Combined with an enduring track record of working with a closely knit network of regional partners across different agendas, as well as the recently annualised Australia–ASEAN summit, the engagement from Australian partners has stretched beyond official channels through civil society, research, industry and think-tank communities.
In fact, stability in the maritime domain, particularly in the South China Sea, has been a common concern for Australia and the UK. Opposition to China’s militarisation of the artificial islands, the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia that undermined countries’ maritime rights and freedoms were reiterated in the most recent Australia-UK Ministerial Consultations (AUKMIN) in January 2022.22 Boris Johnson’s government recognises the value of Australia’s long standing connection to Southeast Asia. In the bilateral virtual meeting in February 2022, the UK committed £25 million to strengthen regional resilience in areas including cyberspace, state threats and maritime security.23 This complements Australia’s ongoing efforts in supporting regional security and reaffirms mutual shared commitment to working with ASEAN.
Anchors for Australia to partner with the UK and Southeast Asia
Australia—ASEAN’s first dialogue partner—has had a history of engagement, including naval exercises and maritime capacity building, for decades, including invitations to Southeast Asian partners to join as observers to local and regional exercises.
In recognising the importance of regional engagement, Australia secured commitment from Southeast Asian partners to directly address threats against their territory. Australia’s engagement focus has also shifted from support to countering illegal activities at sea and providing HADR to strengthening regional maritime security and stability. This probably reflects the intensity and volatility of the Indo-Pacific waters.
Australia doesn’t have claims in the regional maritime disputes in the South China Sea, but it has vested interests in supporting the applicability of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS24) and the safety of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for trade and passage. As co-chair of the ARF inter-sessional meeting on maritime security 2018-21, Australia has overseen a variety of confidence-building, regional support, training and workshop activities on UNCLOS that were initiated by individual ARF member states.25
In the past, Australia has lent a diplomatic voice to Southeast Asian partners, including by supporting and calling for the implementation of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling in the case between the Philippines and China.26 Australia as a maritime nation is invested in securing the commercial interests of maritime trade,27 and the security of the maritime domain has also come to the forefront of strategic competition. This is in sync with the UK’s diplomatic support for a legal approach to the management of disputes. The UK has also supported the PCA ruling, as well as Southeast Asian nations’ note verbale to the UN in objection to China’s excessive claims.28
In Australia’s recent efforts to play a more influential role in Southeast Asia,29 the government announced a range of financial ‘packages’ that constituted the largest Australian funding for the region since assistance after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.30 Measures announced by Prime Minister Scott Morrison in November 2020 included a A$65 million investment to further support regional maritime states to develop their marine resources sustainably and to address challenges, including through enhanced training, technical advice and cooperation.31
In Southeast Asia, where postcolonial sensitivities linger, it’s important for both London and Canberra to calibrate new initiatives with adequate diplomacy and make sure the engagements are sustained for mutual benefit. This is particularly pertinent when the concept of the ‘Anglosphere’ is invoked.32 The following section highlights the complexity of Southeast Asian positions towards UK–Australian ambitions to play a stronger role in the region. Their adequate understanding is critical for sustainable and effective engagement frameworks.
Southeast Asian views of the recent UK and Australian maritime security engagement
Southeast Asian nations’ attention to the UK’s role and interests in the region was heightened after the deployment of the UK’s Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG-21) in 2021. Although the UK’s military role in Southeast Asia isn’t new, CSG- 21’s presence in Asian waters produced a wave of reactions. During its 28-week deployment, CSG-21 visited some 40 countries and took part in more than 70 defence diplomacy activities across Europe, Middle East and Asia, which included training exercises and port visits. It was the UK’s largest operational naval deployment to Asia since the 1997 handover of Hong Kong.33
While the deployment was welcomed in some capitals, others expressed concern. Jakarta found the British naval presence worrying and perhaps contributing to further militarisation of the region. Indonesia was never fond of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) established in 1971, which involved the UK, Australia, New Zealand and its neighbours Malaysia and Singapore, but excluded Indonesia. The renewed activeness and ambitions of the UK in this domain invoked postcolonial discomfort. Indonesian strategists are concerned about an increasing ‘strategic overcrowdedness’34 caused by the renewed interest of ‘external powers’ in Southeast Asia. There is a feeling that too many naval ships exercising in the disputed waters may lead to incidents or accidents.
Hanoi, on the other hand, viewed the UK’s maritime activity positively. The Vietnamese government has applied a strategy of involving, rather than alienating, ‘external powers’. Due to power imbalances and China’s growing dominance in the South China Sea, its active militarisation activities and relentless challenge to other countries’ offshore resource rights, Vietnam has actively sought external partners’ involvement and engagement in the region. Moreover, for Hanoi, good relationships are also a function of improving trade relations. Vietnam and the UK have recently finalised a bilateral trade agreement, opening the post-Brexit British market to Vietnamese products and integrating the UK with the Asian economy.35 Singapore was also among the more welcoming Southeast Asian nations, although it stresses the need for a UK presence to be ‘principled, persistent and purposeful’.36
However, regional nations’ attention was most sharply focused by the announcement of the Australia–UK–US trilateral security partnership (AUKUS) in September 2021.
Predictably, individual countries reacted with varying degrees of concern. The dominating concern is that the new security arrangement could be a catalyst for a nuclear arms race in the region and might provoke some countries to act aggressively, especially in the South China Sea. Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob expressed that view directly to Scott Morrison, while Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry stated that it was ‘deeply concerned’ about the ‘continuing arms race and power projection in the region’.37 Both cited commitments engraved in ASEAN norms: the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976, to the latter of which Australia acceded to when it joined the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005.38 They called on Canberra to refrain from adding to regional tension. It was kept in the dark about AUKUS despite the fact that it had a ‘2 + 2’ dialogue (defence and foreign ministers’ meetings) with Australia just before the announcement.39 However, in the following months, after some efforts towards direct communications from the Australian Government, Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto has been reported as saying that he understands and respects AUKUS.40 Cambodia was alarmed by AUKUS and the nuclear-powered submarine deal and invoked international commitments to non-proliferation.
The Philippines produced self-contradicting statements from the government. President Rodrigo Duterte labelled AUKUS as an ‘arms race’, while Secretary of Defence Delfin Lorenzana and Foreign Minister Teddy Locsin both said that Australia has every right, and capacity, to shore up its own defence.41 Thailand, a treaty ally of the US, maintained an enigmatic attitude, making no direct statements or comments on the AUKUS announcement. Singapore42 and Vietnam43 were more measured. Both agreed that each country is responsible for its own security, as long as it doesn’t contribute to a regional arms race. Both are strategically astute and are aware of the growing security concerns in the region and the region’s limited capability to respond to those challenges. So, while they comprehend the AUKUS rationale, they both emphasise the need for keeping nonproliferation commitments, as well as the need for greater transparency in communicating new security partnerships that may affect the region as a whole.
Despite disparities in their assessments of the strategic value of AUKUS, the overall Australia–ASEAN relationship is wide-ranging and didn’t seem to suffer, and, just a month after the AUKUS announcement, the elevation of the relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership was announced.44
The fact that there was no joint ASEAN statement on the issue reflects divergence of views internally. This granularity of regional interests and views is to remind London and Canberra that receptiveness to their individual as well as collective initiatives will remain varied. Given those political sensitivities, and the concern that the UK’s Indo-Pacific involvement has been too defence-focused, it would be good for London to consider areas for maritime security cooperation and capacity building that would include more civilian elements of maritime security. It is also the reason why our report recommends practical areas of cooperation—ones that prioritise collective benefit.
It is important to note that, despite Southeast Asian diplomatic narratives, there are real concerns about the fragile regional stability. China’s active militarisation in the South China Sea and gradual control of the waters put increasing pressure on the littoral states. Recent reports suggest that Beijing has fully militarised three islands with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems, laser and jamming equipment and fighter jets,45 which undeniably adds to the already asymmetric balance of power in the region. In such a context, cooperation with external partners on all fronts, particularly when the resources are limited and especially in the post-Covid circumstances, should be welcomed.
And there’s no shortage of areas where Southeast Asians would be open to cooperative efforts and collaborative mechanisms. Many studies have defined the prospects and challenges around the application of international law, resolving territorial disputes, maritime deterrence, protecting offshore resources, combating unregulated fishing, piracy, transnational crime, strengthening law enforcement, and addressing the more pressing environmental crisis.46
While we agree with the severity of these issues and the need for the involvement of multiple stakeholders involvement in this report, and through the specific prism of UK-Australian-ASEAN cooperation, we suggest a focus on the nexus of maritime security and cyber and emerging technologies. This is an under-studied area but which has the potential to drastically shape the nature of maritime security in the years ahead. It is related to the safety and security of deep-sea vessels at sea and maritime commercial on-shore infrastructure as well as the monitoring of human and natural activities at, below and above sea level; the security of sea lines of communication, maritime supply chains and increasingly critical submarine communications infrastructure.
Exploring UK-AU-ASEAN maritime security cooperation: a case for cyber and technology capacity building
Our main recommendation for UK–Australia–ASEAN collaboration is to explore the newer and rapidly developing, but far less chartered areas of cybersecurity and emerging technologies and their application in the maritime security domain.
In cyber and technology issues, the UK and Australia have a demonstrated track record and expertise, experience and approaches. It’s also an area in which the UK and Australia can reasonably expect to have resources, drawn from the public and private sectors, to sustain this effort. Most of all, it’s also an area of growing interest from partners in Southeast Asia which are putting digital transformation and Industry 4.0 at the forefront of their (post-Covid) development strategies.47
At the nexus of cyber, technology and maritime security, limited qualitative data currently exists on cybersecurity in Southeast Asia or the take-up of emerging technologies in the maritime sector. Given the UK’s and Australia’s global credibility in this space, and the importance of cyber and tech for the future stability of the region, we explore four potential areas of cooperation: cybersecurity and digital transformation in the maritime industry; digital and emerging tech in the maritime domain; supply chains; and the security of submarine digital infrastructure.
Cybersecurity and the maritime industry’s digitisation transformation
The digitisation of shipping processes and the automation of oceangoing vessels, operators, insurers, certifiers, onshore facilities, and maritime safety and security agencies have surged in the past few years. IT and OT (operational technology48) systems have become critical to the functioning of ships and the safety of their crews and cargoes, and also help shipping to navigate safely and securely through troubled Indo-Pacific waters. That said, given the lifespan of industrial assets (for ocean-going vessel about 25–30 years), much offshore and onshore infrastructure operate with legacy software, which is a known ICT security risk.49
Various maritime-specific cybersecurity incidents have occurred that have resulted in the malfunctioning of critical control systems, in ships and onshore facilities; the exfiltration of sensitive data that’s monetised by criminals, including pirates; the manipulation of systems to allow for trafficking and smuggling activities to occur unnoticed; commercial and military espionage, for instance of ship designs, lading and trading routes; spoofing of navigation systems; and manipulation of identification transmissions.50
The maritime sector is known to lag other comparable industries in its level of cybersecurity maturity. ‘C-suite’ boardrooms still don’t adequately acknowledge cybersecurity as a business continuity risk.51 That isn’t unique to the maritime industry and, in fact, is unfortunately common practice across Southeast Asian industries. However, the potential consequences of cybersecurity incidents for ships, logistics or port facilities are massive and long term.
An incident in 2021, in which the MS Ever Given obstructed traffic in the Suez Canal, immediately reverberated through global supply chains and demonstrated the dependence of the world economy’s on accurate forecasting capabilities.52 There’s little room for errors or delays. The maritime domain in and around Southeast Asia is becoming of greater geopolitical and geo-economic importance, and there’s an increased likelihood that non-state and state actors will try to disrupt, manipulate or coerce actors. With the automation of navigation and the vulnerability of navigation systems, for instance to spoofing, a crisis could be easily caused.
Other examples include some shippers being complicit in manipulating their own IT systems. In 2018, a Singapore-managed oil tanker spoofed its GPS data to conceal from authorities a mid-sea transfer of petroleum to a North Korean ship, thereby circumventing UN sanctions.53 The same thing occurred with an Iranian ship in 2013 off the coast of Malaysia.54 Those tactics are also being used to disguise illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, which is an issue pertinent to maritime security for most Southeast Asian nations.
Initial efforts to boost cyber resilience by the Southeast Asian shipping industry are underway, but they’re far from concerted. In late 2021, Singapore’s Maritime and Port Authority organised a first cybersecurity exercise involving two port terminal operators and a shipping company.55 In 2021, the International Maritime Organization issued recommendations for maritime cyber risk management, mirroring standing international good practices but with compliance and enforcement remaining voluntary.56
A first stepping stone for cybersecurity capability is access to incident-response resources. In 2018, a private-sector initiative was announced by Wärtsilä Corporation and Templar Executives to establish an international maritime cyber centre of excellence, including a maritime-sector computer emergency response team, based on similar capabilities for the financial sector.57 The UK Government has supported British cybersecurity company CyberOwl to establish a footprint in the region.58 The Australian Government has been promoting business opportunities in Southeast Asia for the Australian local cybersecurity industry, too, although that effort is yet to have a specific maritime focus.59 At DEFCON, one the world’s largest annual hacking and security conferences, a Hack the Sea competition is being organised to specifically test cybersecurity in a maritime environment.60 For now, however, these efforts are just a drop in the ocean, given the magnitude of Southeast Asia’s maritime activity and the lack of an industry- and region-wide approach and apprehension of the risk.
Emerging digital technologies in the maritime domain
Digital and emerging technologies are starting to disrupt conventional business models and operations in the maritime industry. Gains in efficiency are achieved through the introduction of digital components in the shipping ecosystem, such as smart ships and e-ports.61 Next-level steps will include the introduction of partly autonomous surface ships, additional robotics and further automation of loading and offloading procedures.
Access to ‘maritime big data’, in combination with applications based on artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML), will help to inform decisions on most efficient routing, precise and reliable forecasting of scheduled arrivals, subsequent docking, off-boarding, load forwarding and reloading decisions, and risks related to maintenance and accidents.62 These emerging technologies also play a fundamental role in gathering and analysing meteorological, oceanographic and hydrographic data. They are also being applied to efforts related to responsible fishing (and combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing), the tracking of maritime pollution and the monitoring of maritime economic resources and biodiversity. For instance, Verumar, a programme focused on increasing situational awareness and fisheries management and supported by the UK’s Space Agency, identified nine groups of technologies that are disrupting fishing and other marine economic activities. They include space-based observation technologies, such as low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites; global navigation satellite systems, such as GPS, Galileo, Beidou and GLONASS; sensors and Internet of Things (IoT) devices; 5G connectivity; and data infrastructure and data processing (AI/ML, analytics.)63
These opportunities for broader and deeper maritime domain awareness (MDA), both onshore and offshore, have been at the centre of ongoing ARF attention. MDA is currently perceived fairly narrowly and restricted to highly traversed routes and those maritime areas under the supervision of coastguards. Human activities, marine animal movements and climatic trends occurring farther out to sea and below the surface remain largely unknown. LEO satellites will provide greater connectivity and coverage, especially in less serviced and remote areas,64 and better AI/ML is already helping to map and forecast movements in the ocean, such as sea-level change, currents65 and pollution dispersion.66 Unfortunately, Southeast Asia is also the world’s epicentre of marine pollution, especially plastics.67
The application of those technologies can also extend to assisting maritime operators in complying with existing international and domestic security provisions, such as the UN sanctions list, and helping maritime security agencies with oversight and compliance.68
Boosting the adoption of emerging technologies in parallel with improving cybersecurity in Southeast Asia’s maritime domain will contribute to strengthening overall awareness of civil and maritime security agencies, which not only supports security operations and law enforcement efforts but also offers new opportunities for more effective forms of marine protection and sustainable maritime socio-economic development. In global technology and standards-setting debates, the UK, Australia and Southeast Asia should consider how to reflect maritime requirements in those negotiations.
The Southeast Asian maritime sector will probably be best served by applications that rely on open, interoperable and secure digital infrastructure, given the sector’s global character, the many and diverse port infrastructures in Southeast Asia operated by many multinational service providers, and the traffic density in regional waters.
In the light of increasing risks of rising political, military and economic tensions in the Indo-Pacific, maritime nations in Southeast Asia should seek multinational and multi-stakeholder partnerships to adequately consider and address the potential risks of digitalising critical economic sectors. It appears Southeast Asian partners would benefit from access to expertise and opportunities to exchange experiences with peer communities in North and Northwestern Europe as well as in Oceania.
Digital technology and maritime supply chains
The maritime sector is a critical avenue for shipping resources and components for the world’s production and deployment of ICTs, tech hardware and batteries. For instance, supplies of critical, strategic or pivotal metals extracted in Australia that need to be transported to processing facilities in Southeast Asia and China. As acknowledged by the Australian Government, ‘technology supply chains are increasingly global, interdependent and complex’ and that there’s a need for transparency as ‘some states seek to leverage supply chain vulnerabilities for strategic advantage and as a possible vector for coercion.’69
In January 2022, due to delays and disruptions in global shipping, Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths opted to charter its own vessel and secure continuity of supply to customers through a processing facility in Malaysia.70 Overall, the industry is expected to need to meet demands for faster and more accurate and predictive shipping. As in particular Southeast Asia has been riding the wave of e-commerce71 , major manufacturers will require logistics partners that can ship more smaller loadings more instantly. That requires maritime transporters to be more flexible and agile. An ‘Uberisation’72 of maritime transport is already taking shape which may involve, in due course, a greater number of shippers operating with more small- and medium-sized transporters.73
Onshore, attention is shifting to the digitisation of processes at ports. This includes the establishment of interoperable data hubs where shippers, ports, buyers and sellers can instantly exchange data and communicate across the different transport segments; effective track and trace systems; the digitisation of the paper trail that accompanies international shipping, such as customs clearances and bills of lading; and the use of blockchain technology to ensure the safety and integrity of official documents and compliance with regulations.74
Altogether, these technological applications contribute to improvements in the transparency and security of financial transactions, including through government efforts to tackle trafficking, money laundering, tax evasion, organised crime and terrorism financing.
Security of marine-based digital infrastructure
A fourth component at the intersection of maritime security and cyber and tech is the security of submarine infrastructure. This mainly refers to the fibre-optic comms cables and relay stations that have been laid on the ocean floor and now transport 95% of the world’s data (Figure 3).75
Southeast Asia is not only a choke-point for maritime trade but also for internet connectivity. With a high concentration of fibre-optic cables landing in and traversing through the region, Southeast Asia is gradually developing into a hub for hyperscale data providers in the region’s digital economy.76 At the same time, Southeast Asian nations have been tightening ICT-related regulation and have imposed requirements on technology and connectivity providers that amount to establishing sovereign borders on the internet.77
While deliberate disruptions to physical submarine communication systems won’t be difficult to cause, especially when exact locations are known, cables are more likely to get damaged as the result of natural disasters or accidental collisions.78 The Indonesian government recognised that vulnerability when, in March 2021, the Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs tasked the Indonesian Navy’s Hydrography and Oceanography Centre to map and potentially rearrange its underwater geophysical landscape of cable and pipes to mitigate potential threats.79 For unconfirmed reasons, Chinese survey vessels have been extensively surveying contested waters in the South China Sea.80 The survey areas coincide with the locations of major internet cables that connect mainland China with the rest of the world, predominantly through Singapore.
Another important factor to consider is the increasing imbalance in demand and supply. While private and public investors are keen to expand the regional cable network, the market is dominated by only five companies that provide cable-laying and maintenance services: Nokia Alcatel (Finland, France, UK); TE-Subcom (Switzerland, US); NEC (Japan); Fujitsu (Japan); and Huawei Marine (China). Submarine communications infrastructure has become a matter of geo-economic importance, particularly in places that are contested or have a low density of connection points. Australia, Japan and the US have ramped up investments in new and redundancy cables in the Indo-Pacific in efforts to head off competing Chinese investments.
Given the inherent physical vulnerability of the cable system and its critical importance to economies across the Indo-Pacific, boosting its resilience is an important priority. This includes up-to-date domain awareness, regular and updated security and safety reviews, consideration of the expected global shortage of maintenance and repair resources and adequate redundancy. With Britain’s world-leading expertise in hydrography and as host to the International Cable Protection Committee, the UK government could facilitate and stimulate greater knowledge in the Indo-Pacific of the maritime security dimensions of (dense networks of) submarine cables and shape effective regional risk mitigation responses.
Recommended next steps for cooperation
Integrating cyber and tech considerations into maritime security engagements offers the UK, Australia and Southeast Asia ample opportunities to construct a holistic agenda that will help to underpin regional security, and ward off threats to it. Moreover, given the nature of the agenda, it doesn’t require either a permanent, or even a physical, presence in the region.
The cyber and tech area enables the three partners to start collaborating in practical efforts that are shareable and scalable, are inherently civil in nature, and don’t require full political alignments from the outset. It’s a suitable area not only for regional but also for interagency cooperation.
Three recommended areas for next steps are:
Investigate the needs and interests for a Southeast Asia-focused maritime sector-focused information sharing and analysis centre (ISAC). ISACs are non-profit organisations formed by critical infrastructure owners and operators to share information between government and industry.81 The ISAC should look at potential financial, staffing and infrastructure requirements. Given the current level of cybersecurity awareness and apprehension of the industry, a maritime-sector ISAC may initially require public funding before it can operate on a not-for-profit commercially viable basis. Such a service could be explored as part of a review of the mandate of ReCAAP.
Explore developing a program of work on standards and norms related to emerging technologies and their impact on the maritime sector and maritime security, for instance through the Global Partnership on AI of which the UK, Australia and Singapore are members, and with a focus on maritime domain awareness.
Facilitate the establishment of (informal) maritime and tech security communities of practice on issues such as cybersecurity trends and responses, and the security of submarine cable infrastructure and risk mitigation; and between individual governments’ hydrographic offices.
A further and deeper exploration of operational objectives for these areas is required, alongside a review of potential partners and delivery mechanisms. It will be crucial to work with existing and emerging local capabilities that can be supplemented by targeted UK and Australian expertise and enablers.
Since most cyber and tech dialogues take place outside of Southeast Asia’s conventional governance forums, it’s important for the UK to ascertain its ambitions, roles and representation, ideally in close coordination with Australia.
Conclusion
In this report, we’ve considered the landscape for maritime security cooperation, with a focus on exploring opportunities for new, practical and critical areas for cooperation that equally leverage the strengths of the UK, Australia and Southeast Asian partners. We’ve looked at potential areas of common interest in the military and civilian domains and reviewed the UK’s and Australia’s own national strategies in the Indo-Pacific and their respective national assets, as perceived by Southeast Asia. We’ve also noted that maritime security capacity building is seen as a crowded domain in which many international actors are already seeking to win the hearts and minds of partners in Southeast Asia.
There is a plethora of areas where the UK, in partnership with Australia, could contribute to maritime security in Southeast Asia. We suggest a reinvigorated plurilateral cooperation among the UK, Australia and Southeast Asian countries to focus on newly emerging areas that are yet underserved with attention, resources and policies. This isn’t a one-way engagement in which Southeast Asia is merely the beneficiary or recipient of engagements or technical assistance.
We’re making the case for elevating cybersecurity and emerging tech dimensions of maritime security. Managing the advent of new technologies in Southeast Asia’s maritime operations—military, civil and commercial—and securing the confidentiality, integrity and availability of systems and networks will increasingly underpin the safety and security of the maritime domain, including the legal aspects of maritime borders. Securing the digital components of the maritime domain is of common interest to all stakeholders, which is exemplified by our joint political and economic dependence on the region’s undersea fibre-optic cable systems.
For future steps, we recommend further in-depth studies to explore key priority areas for cooperation and to grasp the diverging and converging perceptions of urgency among Southeast Asian, Australian and British maritime security community groups. Such a survey should look with granularity at capacities, interests and priorities of and among ASEAN member states. A follow-up quantitative survey would be able to demonstrate the views of larger groups of stakeholders—governments, security services and the maritime industry—across the region. This would involve a systematic study that extends beyond security dialogues, discussions and roundtables of known experts and policymakers.
An in-depth study would be able to recognise individual countries’ preferences, measure capacity gaps among them and thus precisely identify the most effective modalities of cooperation. By having an understanding of converging priorities, the UK and Australia will be able to design an engagement and capacity-building framework that’s as sustainable as possible. That way, the UK and Australia could better position themselves as preferred partners of choice in maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.
Above all, we emphasise that, regardless of the issue-specific area of maritime security cooperation, engagements by the UK and Australia and jointly with Southeast Asia need to be enduring and continuous, based on mutual understanding and built on existing practices. Those are the key foundations for a lasting and effective cooperation with mutual benefit at the core.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Dr Collin Koh Swee Lean (RSIS), Dr Anthony Bergin (ASPI), Charles Brown (Booz Allen Hamilton) and Jocelinn Kang (ASPI) for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the report. We also acknowledge the contributions from consultations with colleagues from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Royal Australian Navy’s Sea Power Centre, King’s College London, and various Southeast Asian think tanks and Southeast Asian maritime and cybersecurity industry.
Other ASPI research staff have also contributed to this report.
The conclusions are the authors’ own, and represent neither the views of any government nor a consensus of the experts consulted.
About ASPI
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI’s sources of funding are identified in our Annual Report, online at www.aspi.org.au and in the acknowledgements section of individual publications. ASPI remains independent in the content of the research and in all editorial judgements. It is incorporated as a company, and is governed by a Council with broad membership. ASPI’s core values are collegiality, originality & innovation, quality & excellence and independence.
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First published March 2022. Cover image: Abstract low poly 3d cargo ship/vectorstock.com
Funding
Funding support for this report was provided via a grant from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office through the UK High Commission in Canberra through a competitive grant proposal bidding process.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign policy: Free and open Indo-Pacific’, Japanese Government, 2022, online. ↩︎
The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, online. ↩︎
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Australian Government, 2017, online. ↩︎
Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Prime Minister’s keynote address at Shangri-La Dialogue’, Indian Government, 1 June 2018, online. ↩︎
Federal Foreign Office, Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region, German Government, September 2020, online. ↩︎
Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia, Netherlands Government, 2020, online. ↩︎
EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, European Union, 2021, online. ↩︎
‘France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy’, French Embassy, Canberra, 2021, online. ↩︎
Louisa Brooke-Holland, Integrated review 2021: The defence tilt to the Indo-Pacific, UK Parliament, October, 2021, online. ↩︎
Huong Le Thu, ‘Southeast Asia: Between asserting agency and muddling through’, in Ashley J Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, Michael Wills (eds), Strategic Asia 2021–2022: Navigating tumultuous times in the Indo-Pacific, National Bureau of Asian Research, 11 January 2022, online. ↩︎
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2019, ASEAN, 23 June 2019, online. ↩︎
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/14141710/UK-Australia-and-ASEAN-cooperation-for-safer-seas_banner.png4501350nathanhttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgnathan2022-03-31 06:00:002025-03-14 14:26:44UK, Australia and ASEAN cooperation for safer seas
What IS the new AUKUS partnership between the US, the UK and Australia? How does it fit with the Quad, ASEAN and other new forums like the government-tech Sydney Dialogue?
This new ASPI Insight sets out what AUKUS is—a technology accelerator that’s’ about shifting the military balance in the Indo Pacific. Just as importantly, it sets out what AUKUS it isn’t, to reset some of the discussion that has made some assumptions here. AUKUS isn’t a new alliance structure, a competitor to the Quad between Australia, India, Japan and the US, or a signal of decreased commitment to ASEAN forums by the AUKUS members.
And the Insight proposes some focus areas for implementation of this new ‘minilateral’ technology accelerator, including having a single empowered person in each nation charged with implementation and ‘obstacle busting’. This is to break through the institutional, political and corporate permafrost that has prevented such rapid technological adoption by our militaries in recent decades. As is the case with James Miller in the US, this person should report to their national leader, not from inside the defence bureaucracies of the three nations.
On purpose and urgency, the report identifies a simple performance metric for AUKUS implementers over the next three years. On 20 January 2025, when the Australian prime minister calls whoever is the US president on that day, AUKUS has become such a successful piece of the furniture, with tangible results that have generated broad institutional, political and corporate support that, regardless of how warm or testy this leaders’ phone call is (think Turnbull-Trump in January 2016), AUKUS’s momentum continues.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/13231155/What-is-AUKUS-and-what-is-it-not_banner.png4501350nathanhttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgnathan2021-12-08 06:00:002024-12-13 23:14:28What is AUKUS and what is it not?
Australia has demonstrated the capacity and capabilities for fast, scalable responses to disasters and humanitarian crises in recent history. Australian governments, agencies, NGOs and the public have proven determined and flexible in both domestic and regional disasters and humanitarian crises.
Looking forward, Australia’s established capabilities are facing new and growing challenges in disaster preparedness and response. The Indo-Pacific is facing a complex network of established, evolving and intersecting climate, conflict and human-security risks.
Without innovation in strategy and capabilities, the financial cost of regional disasters will continue to vastly outpace the capacity of Australia to fund preparedness and response efforts comprehensively enough to mitigate the human and strategic security risks those disasters pose.
This report presents a snapshot view of the current Indo-Pacific threatscape looking forward for Australia; takes a retrospective look at how key Australian HADR capabilities have been developed through lessons from domestic and regional disasters; considers the possible value in a strategy for what value-add northern Australia can bring to national HADR capabilities; and presents three areas of ‘low-hanging fruit’ for HADR capability uplift.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/15001918/SR176-Snapshot-turbulent-time_banner.jpg4501350nathanhttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgnathan2021-10-28 06:00:002024-12-15 00:22:28Snapshot in a turbulent time: Australian HADR capabilities, challenges and opportunities
Indo-Pacific island states face diverse challenges as they grapple with their own unique vulnerabilities to the geopolitical consequences of growing strategic competition in the region. This report explores the vulnerability of island states to economic coercion and the risks they face in navigating the growing economic power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
In this report, the authors examine four perceived examples of economic coercion within the region that challenge the Quad’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. China’s increasing interest in the island states of the Indo-Pacific has led to concern that the imbalance in those relationships is so large that both domestic and broader regional stability are at risk.
This report offers a number of policy recommendations to protect Indo-Pacific island states from economic coercion, including:
Island states must be better invested in the rules-based international economic order;
Establishing codes of conduct to limit economic duress, limit undue economic influence and strengthen the rules-based international system;
Strengthening government institutions so they can resist economic coercion;
International partners should work with Indo-Pacific island states to help strengthen the ability of local businesses to take collective action against economic coercion.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/15002435/SR175_Economic_coercion_in_Indo-Pacific_states-banner.png4501350nathanhttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgnathan2021-09-28 06:00:002024-12-15 00:29:42Economic coercion in Indo-Pacific island states: Building resilience
This report by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre and India’s Observer Research Foundation argues that as the India-Australia bilateral relationship continues to grow and evolve, both governments should invest in the construction of a new India–Australia partnership on technology.
The foundation for such a partnership already exists, and further investment areas of complementary interests could stimulate regional momentum in a range of key critical and emerging technology areas including in 5G, Artificial Intelligence, quantum technologies, space technologies and in critical minerals. The report contains 14 policy recommendations that will help build this new technology partnership.
This new report outlines what this new India-Australia technology partnership could look like. It examines the current state of the India–Australia relationship; provides an overview of current technology cooperation and where challenges and roadblocks lie; analyses each state’s competitive and complementary advantages in selected technology areas and highlights opportunities for further collaboration across the areas of 5G, Artificial Intelligence, Quantum technologies, Space technologies and in critical minerals.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/15192535/PB39-Critical-technologies_banner.jpg4501350nathanhttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgnathan2020-10-15 06:00:002024-12-15 19:29:58Critical technologies and the Indo-Pacific: A new India-Australia partnership
Regional hegemons come in different shapes and sizes. Australia needs to think about what kind of hegemon China would be, and become, should it succeed in displacing the United States in Asia.
It’s time to think about this awful prospect because under President Donald Trump the US’s commitment to alliances is suddenly looking shaky. And there’s also the risk that even a fully committed US could try and fail to restrain China militarily—for example, in the crucial scenario of defending Taiwan.
Regardless of whether overt military force had been needed to supplant the US in Asia, leaders of a newly hegemonic China would likely initially try to portray the country as a much less aggressive and far more tolerable alternative keeper of the regional peace than the sceptics had thought.
With the region cowered and everyone else anxiously looking on, it would make great sense for a triumphant and unchallenged China to project a strong but benign image of itself to the world. Such a phase could last years and even decades, but it would not last forever.
Ideally, China’s leaders want China to be a regional hegemon that has tremendous military capabilities that it rarely, if ever, needs to use to get what it wants, principally because it is unmatched.
The prospect of the use of overwhelming military force combined with the usual economic carrots and means of political and social control across the region would, they’d hope, ensure that a hegemonic China’s interests automatically featured in the decision making of all regional countries.
That would be plan A.
China’s problem and ours is that most regional countries and the people that live in them would eventually tire of that dynamic and start pushing back.
That is problematic mainly because deference lies at the heart of Beijing’s conceptions of the virtues of a historically China-led regional order, making anything short of absolute submission difficult to tolerate.
China’s leaders are not looking to break new ground by seeking regional hegemony. Rather, they are trying to return China to a position of dominance that enables it to control what those in its orbit think, say and do.
Many of China’s coercive and technological means and methods to secure that high degree of external influence and control are new. Its desire to have them is not.
Working from the assumption that China won’t compromise on the deference front, Canberra and other regional capitals need to think about how much direction from Beijing they could stomach and how push-back might manifest itself.
This is where it starts to get messy.
The less China is challenged by a regional peer competitor, the more unacceptable even the smallest external acts of defiance will seem to a domestic Chinese audience. This means that for reasons of domestic political legitimacy alone, leaders of a hegemonic China will want to deal with any afront in a way that is seen to effectively deter others.
With internal pressure to act like a proper hegemon and no credible external checks and balances on its behaviour, it is not hard to imagine China’s leaders pursuing increasingly overt and punitive methods to compel obedience and engineer thought beyond its borders.
It is also not difficult to imagine that effort backfiring on Beijing sooner than it expected, leaving it with no apparent choice other than to use military force to achieve outcomes.
A hegemonic China would eventually overstep, eliciting a collective regional reaction that from Beijing’s perspective will need to be quashed. This would provide a pretext for China to become the expansionist and authoritarian power that it would say it never intended to become but now must to preserve regional stability.
Thinking about how far the leaders of a hegemonic China would want to go to avoid reaching that conclusion, and exactly what they would do when they reach it is anxiety inducing and unpleasant. But it’s a task policy planners need to take on instead of wilfully avoid.
China is clearly committed to its objective of kicking the US out of Asia and assuming what it feels is China’s rightful place in the region. But it is important to remember that China’s leaders too would be unsure and anxious about how an outcome in China’s favour would play out.
For us, facing the challenges posed by the potential emergence of a hegemonic China means thinking ahead and imagining ways to move forward in different circumstances without getting stuck.
Luck will play a role.
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In what might have been the longest presidential address to Congress in American history—an hour and forty minutes without intermission—President Donald Trump delivered a performance on Tuesday night that was simultaneously grandiose, confrontational, optimistic and revealing of the direction in which he intended to take his administration and his country.
It also received high marks from nearly seven in 10 Americans who watched it.
For Australian observers, the annual address, as expected at such spectacles, offered few specifics but did provide insights into how the United States’ role in the world is evolving. It’s a transformation with implications for the Indo-Pacific and allies’ strategic calculations.
Electoral politics is theatrical by nature, but Trump has elevated the art well beyond the standards of the campaign season and his first term in office. His address to Congress displayed all the elements of classic political theatre: the heroes (Trump himself, and the various ‘everyday Americans’ whose stories he highlighted), the villains (the Democratic opposition, sitting glumly throughout), and the dramatic narrative arc of national redemption
‘America is back,’ Trump declared in the opening moments, setting the tone for what would be a celebration of his administration’s accomplishments and a vision of US restoration.
The president’s embrace of tariffs signals a fundamental shift in American economic policy that will reverberate throughout global supply chains.
‘On April 2nd reciprocal tariffs kick in,’ Trump announced, explaining his philosophy: ‘whatever they tariff us, other countries, we will tariff them.’ This principle of reciprocity was framed not as protectionism but as fairness. ‘We will take in trillions and trillions of dollars and create jobs like we have never seen before,’ he added.
Trump’s economic vision represents a rejection of the post-Cold War neoliberal consensus that has dominated Western economic thinking. In its place stands a muscular economic nationalism that prioritises American manufacturing, energy production and job creation above abstract principles of free trade. Australia, with its robust trade relationships with both the US and China, will need to navigate carefully across this evolving landscape.
The president’s emphasis on US energy dominance further underscores this nationalist approach. By declaring a ‘national energy emergency’ and authorising expanded fossil fuel production as part of an all-energy policy, Trump is signaling a reversal of policies that is sure to rile many Americans and Australians.
Perhaps most consequential for Australia’s strategic position was Trump’s articulation of his foreign policy vision, which represents a break from both Republican neocons and Democratic liberal interventionism.
His approach blends two different veins of American foreign policy thinking identified by Walter Russell Mead. The president taps Hamiltonian elements, such as economic strength as power, national security linked to economic strength, and alliances between government and business. He talks about making the world safe for American business.
Trump also exhibits a Jacksonian streak—sceptical of foreign entanglements, preferring a restrained military but willing to exercise overwhelming force when US interests are directly threatened, and insisting on putting America—and rank-and-file Americans—first.
On Ukraine, Trump revealed he had received a letter from President Zelenskyy stating that ‘Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer.’ This announcement, coupled with Trump’s assertion that he had also had ‘serious discussion with Russia,’ simply repeated his determination to end the conflict rapidly.
‘It’s time to stop this madness,’ Trump declared. ‘It’s time to halt the killing. It’s time to end this senseless war.’ For Australia, which has supported Ukraine diplomatically and materially, this pivot represents a challenge. Canberra can get on the peace train now or decline to align with its chief security provider with the hopes that Trump won’t see Australia as an obstacle to ending the fighting and that prolonging the war may, perhaps, result in some future better outcome for Kiev.
Similarly, Trump’s approach to the Middle East suggests a willingness to allow Israel greater freedom of action while the US simultaneously works to end the conflict in Gaza. ‘Iran, of course, is at the nexus of Middle Eastern tensions,’ Trump said, suggesting a harder line against Tehran than his predecessor’s administration.
The president’s announcements regarding the Panama Canal (‘We are taking it back’) and Greenland (‘We need Greenland for national security’) are classic Trumpian figurative language but also reveal his policy of hemispheric prioritisation.
Perhaps most striking was the evidence of how Trump has transformed the Republican Party. His speech revealed a party no longer defined by free-market orthodoxy, limited government and interventionist foreign policy but instead by economic nationalism, cultural conservatism and a focus on working-class interests. Trump concluded his speech thus: ‘Every single day we will stand up and we will fight, fight, fight for the country our citizens believe in and for the country our people deserve.’
‘The Republican Party is now the party of peace,’ Trump declared, cementing his break with Republican primacists—those who are committed to US global dominance. His criticism of endless wars, coupled with his emphasis on border security and economic protectionism, represents realignment of American politics with Pacific implications. The US, after all, is a Pacific power and, among many things, a Pacific island state.
Trump’s address is just another signal of shifts that Australians have seen coming. First, his emphasis on America First economic policies suggests potential trade tensions, even with allies. Australia’s export economy may suffer from reciprocal tariffs and Trump’s focus on American manufacturing.
Second, Trump’s scepticism of legacy alliances and international institutions—whose value and utility he measures against contemporary US interests—may create uncertainty in the regional security architecture that Australia has relied on. While Trump did not specifically or directly address the Indo-Pacific or China in this speech, his America First theme should remind Australia to demonstrate its value to the alliance more explicitly.
Finally, Trump’s populist realignment of US politics mirrors a broader shift in Western democracies that may yet influence Australian politics. The success of his economic- nationalist and cultural messaging offers a template for Australian politicians.
Australians, watching this political theatre from afar, would do well to remember that this is also reality. Structural demands for change in the global order will remain on stage long after the applause for Trump fades.
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Japan’s relationship with the new Trump administration is off to not a bad start: so far, the two countries are agreeing on more than they are disagreeing.
The big development in the relationship since Donald Trump’s inauguration has been Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s meeting with him on 7 February.
Before the visit, there were several apprehensions. Those included Ishiba’s shaky political position at home, China’s status as Japan’s largest trading partner, former president Joe Biden’s blocking of Nippon Steel’s acquisition of US Steel, the persistent threat from North Korea and Trump’s unpredictable approach to Kim Jong-un.
Against this backdrop, Ishiba faced the difficult task of aligning Japan’s strategic priorities with the Trump administration’s policy positions, such as the imposition of tariffs, withdrawal from the World Health Organization, sanctions against the International Criminal Court, and controversial claims over Gaza, Greenland and the Panama Canal. A challenge for Ishiba was to address those issues in a manner that best served Japan’s national interests, while simultaneously building a personal rapport with Trump—similar to the relationship former prime minister Shinzo Abe cultivated—by adopting a conciliatory approach without compromising Japan’s interests.
It appears Ishiba played his cards well. From the outset, he met Trump’s expectations by pledging to increase Japanese investment in the United States to US$1 trillion. This commitment, particularly in the automotive sector, will not only support Trump’s ‘Made in America’ agenda but also create thousands of job opportunities.
Additionally, Ishiba offered to rebalance trade relations by increasing imports of US liquefied natural gas, conforming with a Trump-endorsed slogan, ‘Drill, baby, drill.’ He also skilfully negotiated the previously blocked Nippon Steel investment, agreeing to a compromise whereby the US will retain a majority stake.
Geopolitically, the two leaders agreed on their continuous commitments to a free and open Indo-Pacific, assuring the continuity of Abe’s foreign policy. Japan’s 2022 announcement to double its military spending by 2027, in response to the perceived threat from China and North Korea, aligned with Trump’s tough stance on Beijing—although the level of spending may not satisfy the Trump administration, which demands that NATO members contribute a minimum of 5 percent of GDP. The continued stationing of 54,000 US military personnel in Japan also sent a positive signal of the solid bilateral alliance.
During the meeting, Ishiba cautiously skirted around some of Trump’s other controversial policies—such as the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization, sanctions against the International Criminal Court, and territorial ambitions in Greenland and the Panama Canal. Those issues hold long-term significance for Japan, but do not require immediate action.
Notwithstanding those identified convergences, Japan has to face challenges and difficult decisions in the coming months. A major strategic dilemma for Japan will be balancing rules-based and merit-based approaches.
For instance, the US claims of ‘ownership’ of Gaza may contradict Japan’s support for a two-state solution. In the case of the US-China trade war and the imposition of tariffs, Japan must tread carefully, not only because China remains its largest trading partner and one of its primary investment destinations but also because China has lodged complaints about US tariff measures with the World Trade Organization.
Trump’s proposals to make Canada the 51st US state, gain control over Greenland (an autonomous Danish territory) and reclaim the Panama Canal, combined with China’s ambitions to unify Taiwan with the mainland, present complex challenges. Trump’s possible peace plan for Ukraine should cause concern among those who believe that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.
While the US-Japan joint statement opposes any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion, Japan will need to decide whether to draw a parallel between the US and China or adopt a double-standard. Alignment with US territorial claims needs careful legal and political scrutiny within the Japanese government. Diplomatically, such alignment could undermine Japan’s support for a rules-based order, complicating its response to similar attempts by China, Russia or North Korea.
Considering the evolving strategic dynamics, it appears that where Japan’s core interests are concerned it is now time for Japan to display its strategic autonomy. This will prove instrumental in enhancing its credibility in the region and expand the area of cooperation with other partners, such as Australia, India, South Korea and ASEAN members.
At the same time, while strategic autonomy may increase Japan’s policy manoeuvrability, it will be meaningless if it has neither its own principles nor policy alternatives. Regardless of the US policy, Japan’s facilitation of a free and open Indo-Pacific, including through the provision of development assistance and capacity-building based on the interests of recipient states, should not only stabilise regions where the US is expected to reduce its commitment; it should also make Japan a reliable and responsible guardian of the rules-based order.
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The international community must broaden its understanding of responsible cyber behaviour by incorporating diverse perspectives from the Indo-Pacific, a region critical to the future of global cyber governance.
As the mandate of the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group on the security and use of information and communications technologies ends in July 2025, the world must reflect on what it means to be a responsible state actor in cyberspace. Over two decades, the UN has developed a framework of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, which includes the acceptance that international law applies to state conduct in cyberspace and a commitment to observe a set of norms.
The framework, designed to address the weaponisation of cyberspace, narrowly focuses on high-stakes security concerns. While its emphasis on international peace and security is essential, this high threshold often sidelines domestic responsibilities and the challenges that developing and emerging economies face.
By amplifying the voices of mature cyber nations, it overlooks regions where the concept of responsible cyber behaviour is less expressed but no less important. As cyberspace is a cornerstone of economic, social, political, and military activities globally, we must expand the framework to address both domestic and international dimensions of cyber norms.
A report issued today and co-edited by ASPI and the Royal United Services Institute highlights this gap by examining how seven Indo-Pacific countries—Cambodia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan and Taiwan—perceive responsibility in cyberspace. We investigate how governments and societies interpret this responsibility, going beyond their expectations of other states to see how they demonstrate their responsibility internally.
Our findings reveal a lack of common understanding and implementation of the UN’s cyber norms across the region. While commitments to responsible state behaviour are formally acknowledged at the UN level, domestic policies and regulations are inconsistent. For many Indo-Pacific countries, responsible cyber behaviour is mainly understood in terms of ensuring state sovereignty and territorial non-interference through cyber means. Governments are also mainly guided by national security concerns. This information is often shrouded in secrecy, complicating oversight and accountability.
Economics also shapes regional cyber policies. For most Indo-Pacific countries, socio-economic development, digitalisation and connectivity are top priorities. Given their limited sovereign cyber and digital capabilities, they view responsible behaviour as the ability to freely choose strategic partners and attract investments, technical support and capacity-building initiatives. This pragmatic approach underscores the need to reconcile international commitments with domestic priorities such as combating cybercrime, achieving data sovereignty, and ensuring affordable and reliable connectivity.
However, pursuit of these priorities often results in over-regulation and reliance on surveillance technologies and restrictive policies to counter cyber threats. Many Indo-Pacific countries struggle to balance protection of critical infrastructure and the information environment with promotion of open and inclusive digital spaces. Our report highlights the need for clear guidelines on the purchase, sale and use of dual-use technologies. While some countries adhere to international frameworks, others lack robust safeguards, exposing cyber vulnerabilities.
The Indo-Pacific’s diverse perspectives on responsible cyber behaviour emphasise the importance of domestic expertise. Governments must nurture talent within both public and private sectors and ensure access to international platforms that foster collaboration and knowledge-sharing. Otherwise, the region risks being left behind in shaping global cyber governance. Furthermore, many Indo-Pacific stakeholders argue that the UN framework’s emphasis on international norms must be complemented by actionable standards addressing states’ internal responsibilities, such as securing their networks and fostering resilient digital ecosystems.
International discussions on cybersecurity are increasingly polarised, with major powers vying for influence over Indo-Pacific countries to shape regional norms. In this context, we must ensure that the perspectives of emerging economies are not overshadowed by the interests of major powers. Ignoring these viewpoints is not only a poor diplomatic strategy—risking the alienation of regional actors and complicating negotiations—but also undermines international efforts to address shared challenges. Incorporating these voices into the framework would create a more inclusive and representative system that fosters equity, trust and long-term cooperation, ultimately strengthening global cybersecurity.
To achieve this, international and regional institutions must prioritise capacity-building and technical assistance tailored to the needs of Indo-Pacific countries. This includes creating platforms that allow these states to share experiences and shape global discourse on cyber norms. An example of such a platform is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, through which member states have come to develop a norms checklist. It also requires the international community to recognise the interconnectedness of domestic and international cyber responsibilities. By grounding discussions in the specific contexts and priorities of the Indo-Pacific, the framework can evolve into a truly global standard that bridges the gap between developed and developing nations.
As the UN Open-ended Working Group mandate’s deadline approaches, we must reshape the framework of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. The Indo-Pacific’s challenges and perspectives can help strengthen the framework’s relevance and effectiveness. By incorporating diverse regional viewpoints, the international community can build a more equitable and resilient cyberspace that serves the interests of all states, not just the most powerful. This is not merely a matter of inclusion; it is a matter of global cyber stability and security.
http://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svg00markohttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgmarko2025-01-28 19:00:442025-03-18 13:32:28To regulate cyber behaviour, listen to Indo-Pacific voices
The Founding of Australia 1788 was painted in 1937 by Algernon Talmage. It was commissioned for the sesquicentenary celebrations of 1938. The painting depicts the moment that Captain Arthur Phillip proposed a toast to George III on January 26, 1788.
Imagine that this scene never took place. Imagine that the government of William Pitt the Younger decided in 1786 not to send the First Fleet to Botany Bay but instead to the other site for a penal colony that it was considering, Das Voltas Bay in present-day Namibia.
Would the Indigenous people of the Australian continent and their lands have been left undisturbed? Or would Europeans have inevitably arrived at some later point? Instead of a British colony, might several different colonies have been established under Britain, France, The Netherlands and Spain, each of which had, at various times, explored the continent’s coastline and its surrounding seas?
We assume the present was always going to be. That the past was destined to lead to the inevitable present. Counter-factual thinking prompts us to examine alternative historical timelines to better understand the contingent choices, forgotten circumstances and patchwork of occurrences that constitute the history of the present.
Those who consider Australia Day to be ‘invasion day’ have to ask: had the British not arrived in 1788, would there not have been an ‘invasion’ later? It would have been a different ‘invasion’ – possibly less violent, possibly more violent – but nonetheless it still would have led to the dispossession of the Indigenous people. That is not to justify dispossession but to better understand it in historical terms.
Those who celebrate the day have to ask: is the Australia that has emerged across the course of almost 250 years the only possible version of Australia that might have come into being? Might other possibilities have played out?
Instead of Australia as we know it, might several nations today inhabit the continent, each with different histories, national cultures and geopolitical world views and strategic interests?
It is almost certainly the case that in every plausible alternative historical timeline, the land that is known as Australia was always going to be occupied by one or more of the European powers of the 19th century, in some form or another. When, by whom and how is not certain. We will never know because history is run only once.
Had the colony not been established in 1788, it is most likely that Britain would have occupied points on the eastern seaboard of Australia and perhaps on its northern coastline, probably within 50 years.
In this altered timeline, Talmage might well have painted the scene of the establishment of a British base in Sydney in 1838, as the first European settlement on the Australian continent. From that base, Britain could have challenged the Dutch in the East Indies and the Spanish Empire in the Pacific and South America, in the event of a war with either or both.
From Sydney and from other bases in Port Darwin, Singapore (colonised in 1824) and Hong Kong (colonised on January 26, 1841), Britain could have better protected its trade with China, which had to pass through or close to the Dutch East Indies.
In the event of war in the region, British ships sailing to and from China could have been routed around the east of Australia and protected by a Sydney-based fleet.
What of the western and southern seaboards in this altered timeline? Perhaps after the Napoleonic Wars France might have claimed the southwest and southern portions of the continent. In the real historical timeline, France was certainly interested in the possibility.
Concerned about French intentions, in 1825 Britain extended the western edge of its territorial claim to Australia from the 135th meridian to the 129th meridian. Afterwards, it claimed the rest of the continent when it established the colony of Western Australia in 1829. In an altered timeline, imagine the French tricolour being hoisted over the Swan River, perhaps also in 1838, as the British Union Jack was being raised for the first time over Sydney Cove.
Now let us change the timeline again by supposing that no occupation of the Australian continent had occurred in the days of sail. By the 1870s, when steamships were replacing sailing ships, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and when undersea telegraphy cables were being laid around the globe, the strategic value of a continentally sized territory located at the hinge of the Indian and Pacific oceans would have been irresistible to numerous European powers. Locations around the coastline of the Australian continent would have been occupied, if only for the purpose of coaling trading ships and warships, securing telegraph cable connection points and protecting sea routes.
A scramble for Australia might have taken place, as occurred in Africa during the 1880s, when the quest for empire was at its peak, and European powers were seeking to extend their reach to all quarters of the globe for resources, markets, bases and strategic advantage. It would be ahistorical to think the Australian continent would have been left undisturbed. By 1888, it would have been occupied, with its fate and that of its Indigenous people perhaps determined by negotiation among the imperial powers, as occurred in the case of Africa at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85.
If we take a step back and consider these alternative timelines, there is a strong case to be made that because settlement began when it did in 1788, Australia’s colonial-era development benefited from the fact it occurred under the protection of British sea power and with access to British capital and markets, when Britain was at the peak of its powers. Settlement in 1788, followed by exclusively British colonisation (and with no other flags flying over the continent), also meant that Australia’s development occurred within a single framework of British institutions – especially parliamentary democracy, responsible government and the common law.
Exclusively British colonisation, and the British territorial clean sweep of the entire continent that was achieved finally by way of the claim in 1829 to the western portion, meant there were no European co-inhabitants.
With no land borders with the colonies of other empires (imagine, for instance, a border on the 129th meridian between British Australia and French Australia), the six colonies were able to pursue political, economic and social development in a stable and peaceful environment, even when one allows for the violence of frontier clashes with Indigenous people. No wars were fought between the European powers on the Australian continent. The colonists did not have to fight for their independence or to create a unified nation.
It is little wonder that Douglas Pike titled his history of Australia, which was first published in 1962, The Quiet Continent.
That Australia is a nation for a continent, and a continent for a nation, is a direct legacy of 1788 and Australia’s political development in the 19th century, which of course culminated in Federation in 1901.
Having a single nation on the Australian continent is today a source of geopolitical strength. One might imagine, for instance, the challenge that would be involved today in trying to shape a common defence and foreign policy at an imaginary Council of Australian Governments that was the supranational co-ordinating body for a confederation of four sovereign Australian nations, whose proceedings were conducted in English, French, Dutch and Spanish and whose deliberations were shaped by different and possibly conflicting strategic interests.
For all of its locational advantages, Britain never seriously exploited the strategic value of the Australian continent for the purpose of sea control or indeed for any other related purpose. Australia was never home to a significant British fleet. The closest that British sea power ever came was in the form of the great naval base in Singapore (1919-41) that was designed primarily to protect India against Imperial Japan. Australian governments of the interwar period naively hoped it also would provide for the naval defence of Australia. They were wrong.
Writing in 1883, British historian John Seeley famously said of the expansion of the British Empire that the “mighty diffusion of our race and the expansion of our state” had been undertaken indifferently, so much so that Britain had “conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind”. His point was that while Britain had acquired a great empire, its thinking was still unimaginative, concerned more with the affairs of Europe than with the wider world, where the future would be determined by enormous political aggregations, such as the US and Imperial Russia.
Seeley argued a ‘Greater Britain’, by which he meant a transnational union of Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, could rival these two behemoths. Of course, this never came to pass. Instead, it was Australians themselves who led on local matters of strategy and defence, acting more independently than our national myths would have it.
For instance, in 1883 Queensland annexed New Guinea to thwart Imperial Germany’s interest. The British government disallowed this action, although it did establish a protectorate in New Guinea in 1884 that became a colony in the southeast portion of New Guinea in 1888. It was transferred to Australia in 1902. In 1889, Henry Parkes used a report on the parlous state of the defences of the colonies to drive the strategic case for Federation.
Alfred Deakin championed the building of a powerful Australian navy, for use in the Pacific and the Indian oceans, a cause that was given impetus after the victory of Imperial Japan over Imperial Russia in the war of 1904-05.
Australia attacked the Imperial German base at Rabaul in New Britain in 1914, as part of a broader campaign to force that country’s squadron out of the Pacific. In 1919, Billy Hughes aggressively pursued Australian interests at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, prevailing on winning territorial control over New Guinea.
At least until the 1920s, Australians were more independently minded in strategic and defence affairs than we might think today.
However, and unfortunately, as a result of feeble political leadership in the interwar years, independent Australian thinking was not much in evidence at precisely the time when Australia was coming into its own as vital strategic space – that is, when sea and air power were coming together with the advent of aircraft carriers. As a result, by the time Talmage was painting his scene in 1937, Australia had become geopolitically vital in military terms, as was soon to be seen in the Pacific War.
Imagine in another timeline, where the French tricolour flew over the Swan River, what would have happened had French Australia in 1940 been the dominant power in the southern Indian Ocean? What if French Australia had gone with Vichy after the fall of France in June 1940, as had French Indochina? Britain would not have tolerated the resultant threat to India, Ceylon and Burma. Winston Churchill even might have decided to attack French Australia, probably from the British naval base in Ceylon. He did not shy away from doing so in the case of French Algeria in July 1940 and French West Africa in September 1940.
Today, Australia is one of the most vital strategic spaces on the planet, that being first demonstrated in the Pacific War of 1941-45. Its value as vital space started to be fully realised in the 1960s, with the establishment of US communications, space-based surveillance and intelligence facilities at North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar.
Today Australia is a bastion and a base at the hinge of the Pacific and Indian oceans, from where power can be projected into the rimlands of the Eurasian supercontinent and from where the Western Pacific and the Indian oceans can be guarded. Any conflict fought in the Indo-Pacific inevitably would involve calculations being made, by all protagonists, about how best to use Australia’s strategic space – and how best to neutralise it.
The “tyranny of distance” is one of the most famous and widely understood concepts in Australian historiography. For Australia, distance from war and conflict was for many years a blessing. It long gave us comfort, until the range of military systems and weapons started to eliminate the protective effects of distance. Imperial Japan’s aircraft carriers were the first to overcome the barrier of distance. Long-range bombers and missiles followed later. Today, we are in range – everywhere, all at once, physically and virtually. The sheltered land of our national imagination is no more.
In Richard III, Richard says: ‘All unavoided is the doom of destiny.’ Australia’s ‘doom of destiny’ is to inhabit vital strategic space, whether we like it or not. Our national imagination, which has deep roots in our colonial past and the long period of the solitude of the ‘quiet continent’, is today too conditioned by the comforting but obsolete notion that distance is our shelter and that troubles are far away. This is a strategic illusion.
Different timelines generate different fates. With a different past, there is a different present. The debate about Australia Day is, at its core, a debate about different pasts. Even if it came to be accepted that dispossession was inevitable – if not in 1788, then certainly by no later than the great European imperialist expansion of the 1880s – counterfactual analysis can still enrich the discussion by casting new light on questions such as why in the real historical timeline there was no sustained process of treaty-making with the Indigenous people, such as occurred in New Zealand. Can we imagine other timelines where sovereignty, land ownership and Indigenous rights were dealt with differently?
Or imagine Phillip had not been sent, and later occupation had been limited to the establishment of trading posts and naval bases around the coastline, with little or no settlement. Is it possible to imagine, in that alternative arc, that enough might have remained of the pre-colonial political, economic and social structures of Indigenous life, such that an independent Indigenous Australia might have emerged as a sovereign nation, as occurred when other colonies such as the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina and Malaya were granted their independence in the wave of post-war decolonisation?
The semiquincentenary of modern Australia will occur in 2038. The debate about Australia Day no doubt will continue to evolve. One thing about Australia Day is certain. The arc of history has seen Australia emerge and evolve as a single, unified political entity, inhabiting a continent on its own. Geopolitically, this blessing means that Australia, whose territory has been free of great-power conflict and whose people have been able to focus on national development in relative solitude and peace, is today in a position of strength to deal with its looming “doom of destiny”. History’s other arcs would have left us worse off.
That is worth celebrating on Australia Day.
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At a breakfast meeting in a well-known restaurant a stone’s throw from the White House on Saturday, I noticed the veteran actor and Oscar-winner Jon Voight across the room. Two days out from Donald Trump’s inauguration, the incoming President’s newly minted ‘Ambassador’ to Hollywood was no doubt in town for the big occasion of Trump’s return to the Oval Office.
As I made eye contact with Voight and got a smile in return, the moment encapsulated for me the remarkable situation we’re living through: the transformation of US politics and the study in contrasts that Trump’s return to the presidency represents, with a mix of familiar faces and new allies in tow.
The pre-inauguration weekend in Washington exemplifies great American traditions: NFL playoffs, biting winter weather, and gatherings of friends and family either celebrating or commiserating over the incoming president. But this year, the atmosphere in DC carries a unique tension after a week of confirmation hearings ranging from the mundane to the bizarre.
Voight is a case in point: a rare movie star who is comfortable among the Republican elite, the MAGA hats and the Trump paraphernalia dotting the wintery landscape outside, but who has also attracted controversy for comparing ‘leftists’ to Satan. The mere fact of appointing special envoys to Hollywood—the others being Sylvester Stallone and Mel Gibson—shows Trump’s extraordinary approach to transforming even sections of the nation that have generally viewed him with scepticism or antipathy.
On the one hand, the administration’s statements promise disruption to bureaucratic inertia—the very reason a majority of Americans voted for Trump and a recognition that widespread global tensions and conflict mean a business-as-usual approach is totally inadequate. On the other, some pronouncements have caused sharp intakes of breath among Washington’s politically attuned population, who watch with a mix of fascination and dread, unable to look away from what they fear might become a slow-motion train wreck or a fast-paced wrecking ball. This duality—the potential for both transformative change and concerning upheaval—defines Trump’s leadership style.
My morning meeting with an Australian venture capitalist focused on the future of AUKUS under Trump’s second term. Despite the uncertainties that come with any administration change, the mood was surprisingly optimistic. The sense is that AUKUS—the trilateral security pact between Australia, Britain and the US—still holds the promise we’ve hoped for. There’s a prevailing belief that under Trump, capital markets will surge, potentially accelerating the defense technology collaboration that underpins the agreement.
Walking around after my meeting and close encounter with a Hollywood star, I could see the extent to which the capital has transformed in preparation for the inauguration. Downtown Washington, locked down for security, has taken on the air of a Republican stronghold. The traditional pre-inauguration ‘People’s March’ forming in Farragut Square, usually a robust demonstration, appeared subdued and diminished—a visible sign of the shifting political winds.
Mother Nature, however, has her own plans for the inauguration. An Arctic front will bring the coldest temperatures in decades, forcing the ceremony indoors to the Capitol rotunda. This weather-induced change may be a blessing in disguise, rendering moot any potential debates about crowd size—a contentious point from Trump’s first inauguration. The limited capacity of the indoor venue will naturally constrain attendance, despite the million-plus supporters and observers who flocked to DC to attend.
I’m acutely aware of the unique responsibility that a think tank such as ASPI has in Washington. We serve as a bridge, injecting Australian and regional perspectives into American national security and defense discussions. Our mission isn’t to influence but to inform and diversify the debate while providing crucial insights back to the Australian people about policies that will affect our region.
This mission has become more complex with the recent defunding of our Washington office by the Australian government. Yet the importance of our work hasn’t diminished. If anything, in these uncertain times, the need for clear-eyed analysis and regional perspective has only grown.
Looking ahead to Trump’s second term, I find myself holding mixed emotions: hope tempered by trepidation, optimism checked by concern. But above all, I’m grateful to be here at this pivotal moment, positioned to contribute unique insights that few others can provide. As the world watches America’s political transition, the view from Down Under in Washington offers a valuable perspective on this historic moment and its implications for the Indo-Pacific region.
In these early days of Trump’s return to power, one thing is certain: the dynamic and unpredictable nature of his approach will continue to challenge conventional wisdom and traditional diplomatic frameworks. For those of us working in Washington to strengthen international partnerships, the task ahead is clear—to navigate this new landscape while maintaining the robust alliance relationships that have long served both American and Australian interests.
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The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 brought the European Union and Poland closer to like-minded states in Asia, including Japan. We realised that despite different histories and cultures we share the same values regarding international politics, namely the adherence to the international law-based order established in 1945.
We do not accept the concept of spheres of influence where the stronger dictate policies to smaller countries, we do not accept that might is right, that internationally agreed borders can be changed by force, or that members of the United Nations can be made to disappear. The Ramstein group created to help Ukraine militarily in April 2022 consists of over 50 states. It includes all NATO members, as well as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and some African and Latin American countries.
Over almost three years of the war in Ukraine, a linkage was made between Eastern Europe and East Asia. From a political perspective, a Russian victory would be interpreted as proof that aggression pays and can succeed because the liberal democracies of the world are weak, divided, lack strategic understanding and prefer to concentrate on commerce and profit, rather than sticking to the law-based order that made the world so successful after World War II. As a consequence, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait may soon face similar pressures. Abandoning Ukraine today will set an ominous precedent for some countries in East Asia.
In the European Union, and in Poland in particular, we realise that in the current situation security is the most important part of state policy. Germany’s Ostpolitik engagement and Wandel durch Handel (change through trade) policies failed in the past. Policies that encouraged Russia ended with its invasion of Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This is why the Polish EU rotating presidency in the first half of 2025 will concentrate on security: military, energy, food, pharma and cyber. This is why Poland will spend a record 4.7 percent of GDP on defence (in real terms, the fifth-largest spender in NATO) and already has the third-biggest army among member states.
In this context, the EU notes the political and economic support provided to Russia by China. In 2019, the organisation accepted the paradigm that China is a partner, economic competitor and systemic rival. Due to the war and the results of the American presidential election, this assessment has changed. China supports in principle Russia’s position on the United States, NATO and Western Europe. Specific Russian goals were described just before the invasion of Ukraine in the two treaty proposals from Russia to the EU and the US and published on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website on 17 December 2021.
The message was that NATO activities in former Soviet territories should be constrained and NATO should not be permitted to expand. The proposal was unacceptable to NATO members. The Russian invasion of Ukraine rendered them obsolete. NATO has a military presence on its eastern flank and previously neutral Finland and Sweden became full members.
The increasingly assertive security policies of China in the Indo-Pacific, which includes the supply of sensitive dual-use items to Russia (though denied by the authorities) may put in doubt China’s partner status in relation to the EU. As the EU’s new top diplomat Kaja Kallas stated in a hearing in Brussels, ‘My priority in contacts with China will be protection of the geopolitical and economic security of the EU.’ The new approach to China may concentrate more on the rival part and on pursuing de-risking strategies, especially in areas critical for EU member security. These areas include energy transformation, the pharmaceuticals sector, agriculture and new technologies. The new sanction regime may include Chinese companies suspected of selling components of potential military use to Russia.
We can expect that the US will demand that the EU follow the restrictions of trade and accept US regulations and technological standards in relation to China. Incoming president Donald Trump’s policy may concentrate on decoupling and there may be an expectation that the EU should follow suit, given that the bloc remains a large and basically open market for Chinese products and is dependent on China in some key industrial areas.
Should the US introduce high tariffs on Chinese products, the European countries may face increased imports. This in turn may result in a more assertive EU approach, as exemplified in the antidumping duties for Chinese electric cars. China, which regards the EU as a weak body dependent on the US, may in turn try to increase bilateral contacts with some EU member states that rely primarily on their supply chains and China-based production. As a result, EU member states may have different views on the de-risking strategy.
China regards Russia as its ally and partner in its rivalry with the US. The post-1945 international order is challenged, although in different forms, by both these countries. Both accept the idea of the spheres of influence and the logic that a few big and powerful states should exercise control over the other smaller and weaker entities. China regards positively the proposals for European strategic autonomy, as that may weaken transatlantic relations. It also aspires to be a partner or a guarantor of the new European security architecture proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin—a suggestion that is obviously unacceptable to the EU and NATO members.
The geopolitical changes after February 2022 produced some unexpected results. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, most European countries started to take defence and security seriously. In 2024, the goal of spending 2 percent of GDP annually on defence by NATO members was reached by 20 out of 32 states (three years earlier there were six). Europe decided to produce arms and munitions to recreate the once thriving industry dismantled in the 1990s.
Most importantly, the Europeans and the like-minded East Asians came to cooperate closely with each other on security. We have now strong links with the IP4 (Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea), but also with India and the Philippines.
Together, we can become resilient while facing international challenges.
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With Donald Trump’s return to the presidency now a reality, the Indo-Pacific faces an era of heightened uncertainty driven by North Korea’s growing military capabilities and China’s expanding regional influence. In this environment, trilateral security cooperation between the United States, South Korea and Japan is paramount.
However, Trump’s typical approach to alliances—characterised by unpredictability and transactional diplomacy—poses a challenge to this partnership. A recalibration of policies and priorities will be necessary to ensure that trilateral cooperation is effective and sustainable.
The Indo-Pacific security environment has evolved since Trump’s first term. North Korea has accelerated its nuclear and missile programs, with increasingly sophisticated weapons systems capable of threatening regional and global stability. China’s assertiveness has intensified, manifesting as aggressive actions in the South and East China Seas, economic coercion and expanded military presence.
North Korea presents the most immediate and existential challenge. Trump’s initial approach to Pyongyang, centred on high-profile summits with Kim Jong-un, produced no lasting denuclearisation outcomes. In Trump’s second term, shifts between direct engagement and heightened pressure could create an unpredictable policy environment.
Trilateral security cooperation could be a stabilising mechanism, enabling the three countries to align their deterrence strategies. Integrated missile defence systems, intelligence-sharing networks and joint military exercises are essential tools to counter North Korea’s provocations. Policymakers must also focus on closing operational gaps, such as improving interoperability between the US’s THAAD missile defence system and South Korea and Japan’s Aegis-based defences, to enhance collective security.
China’s regional ambitions require similarly urgent attention. Trump’s return is likely to intensify US-China competition, with a focus on economic decoupling, technological dominance and countering Beijing’s maritime expansion. Cooperation between South Korea, Japan and the US could reinforce freedom of navigation operations in contested waters, secure critical supply chains and strengthen cybersecurity defence. However, Trump’s past insistence on burden-sharing—such as his calls for increased financial repayment for US troop presence—could complicate this dynamic, particularly if allies perceive these demands as undermining mutual trust or commitment to shared objectives.
Historical tensions between South Korea and Japan could also obstruct effective trilateral collaboration. Despite recent steps toward reconciliation, unresolved issues related to historical grievances and territorial disputes continue to strain bilateral relations. The new Trump administration must act as a mediator to prevent these tensions from undermining collective efforts. This will require consistent diplomatic leadership, which was often lacking in Trump’s first term. By institutionalising mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation, such as trilateral defence ministerial meetings and joint crisis planning, the US can help ensure that Seoul and Tokyo remain focused on shared strategic priorities.
Policy implications for a second Trump presidency extend beyond traditional security measures. The evolving nature of threats, including economic security, cyber warfare and technological competition, demands a more comprehensive approach to trilateral cooperation.
Policymakers should prioritise joint investments in critical technologies, such as semiconductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence, to reduce dependency on China and bolster resilience. Expanding cooperation in space-based surveillance and defence systems would further enhance the alliance’s ability to respond to emerging threats. Additionally, public diplomacy is needed to foster greater mutual understanding and support for trilateral cooperation among the populations of all three nations, countering domestic scepticism fuelled by nationalism.
To ensure the long-term viability of trilateral security cooperation, the Trump administration must adopt a more strategic and less transactional approach to alliances. This includes reaffirming commitments to collective defence and providing clear and consistent communication.
Ultimately, Trump’s return to office presents both challenges and opportunities for trilateral security cooperation. While his leadership style and unpredictability may strain alliances, the strategic necessity of collaboration between the US, South Korea and Japan remains undeniable. By addressing operational gaps and expanding the scope of cooperation to include emerging security domains, the trilateral alliance can serve as a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific stability.
In a region defined by rapid change and intensifying competition, the success of this partnership will be a determinant of future peace and security.
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Ernest Hemingway wrote in The Sun Also Rises (1926) that bankruptcy occurs gradually and then suddenly. This should be treated as a rule of geopolitical affairs.
For centuries, political structures and hierarchies of power that once were thought to be unchanging often suddenly vanished. Demise was gradual but collapse was sudden.
The Russian Empire (abolished in September 1917) and the Soviet Russian empire (dissolved in December 1991) both exhibited permanence—until they did not. So did the Austrian-Hungarian Empire (abolished in October 1918) and the Ottoman Empire (abolished in November 1922).
Only last month we witnessed the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. Rulers in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang, Havana and elsewhere nervously understand the Hemingway rule, even if they have never read him.
There is another way to express this rule. After decades when nothing happens, decades can suddenly happen in weeks (a saying that is attributed to Vladimir Lenin). While we expressed hope on New Year’s Eve for a more peaceful and less chaotic world, one senses that as 2025 unfolds we will see decades suddenly happen in a blaze of geopolitical twists, turns and transformations.
The scene is bewildering. What will happen in the Russo-Ukrainian war? Will a peace deal be reached? Will Vladimir Putin keep his grip on power? Will Israel go to war against Iran? Will Iran recover from recent setbacks or will the regime start to unravel? Will it make a dash for nuclear weapons?
Will a dramatic Middle East peace deal, and a Palestinian homeland, emerge as a result of a regional realignment involving the US, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other key players and a freezing out of Iran? Will Islamic State or al-Qaida (or both) manage to galvanise supporters into launching a new wave of terrorist attacks in the West, perhaps by mobilising Muslim anger over the plight of the Palestinians? Will the India-China border remain quiet? What is Kim Jong-un plotting? Does he sense opportunity in South Korea’s political crisis?
What will happen in the seas of the Western Pacific, especially around Japan, Taiwan and The Philippines? Or in the next phase of US-China strategic competition? What of China’s calculations about its objectives and timelines, especially given the return of Donald Trump to the White House? Will China’s economic and social fragility combine with internal political tensions to shake Xi Jinping’s hold on power? Will Trump’s second term dramatically transform the role of the US in the world?
In the grey space between peace and war, will we see an acceleration of cyber attacks, sabotage (including against undersea infrastructure), covert disinformation and propaganda campaigns, and other forms of intimidation by Russia and China against the democracies of the West, in a bid to throw them off balance, to fracture their social cohesion and undermine the national confidence of their populations? At the other end of the spectrum, will nuclear weapons be used for the first time since 1945?
On some of these issues, there will be still months and years to play out. Some, however, will play out within weeks.
As Henry Kissinger often said, in the face of a wide range of uncertainties and imponderables, often action has to be taken when the opportunities and threats are only incompletely glimpsed, and when the probabilities and consequences cannot be calculated precisely. If we wait for time to play out, we are likely to be surprised when things happen suddenly.
As Australia grapples with this bewildering range of contingencies, it will need to focus its efforts on that which matters most. For Australia, the gradual and then sudden establishment of Chinese hegemony and a US strategic withdrawal from our region (whether by choice or through military defeat) would be the most adverse geopolitical occurrence in our history.
Everything else listed above matters. This would matter most. A hegemonic China, technologically dominant and militarily unchecked, with the US looking on from its hemispheric citadel, would be for Australia a more demanding overlord than Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan or Soviet Russia would have been had any one of them managed to achieve mastery in Eurasia. A dominant China would expect to get its way, and resisting would incur high costs.
Australian policy must be constantly directed to the challenge of working with others to prevent such an outcome.
In part, this will mean intensifying and accelerating our military, civil defence and national cyber defence preparations.
In the months and years ahead, there is a significant chance of a US-China military crisis in Asia, similar to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
If China continues to pursue a course of preparing for a blockade of Taiwan, the odds of this are likely to be at least 50 per cent. In the worst possible case, war might break out, gradually in the grey space between peace and war, and then suddenly with weapons being launched with little or no warning. The odds of this occurring between now and 2030 are likely to be about 10 to 20 per cent.
Aside from intensifying preparations for such eventualities, the other arm of policy that needs to be mobilised is our regional diplomacy. Australia last faced such dire prospects in the 1930s. In the face of the growing menace of Imperial Japan, it chose not to re-arm in time and as a result was defenceless in 1941, when John Curtin was forced to ‘look to America’. Neither did Australia act confidently and effectively enough in terms of its statecraft, even though it was more seized than was the British government of the growing threat posed by Imperial Japan.
We can learn the lessons of the ’30s. In the 90 years that have since passed, we have built a deep store of regional connections and we go to the region as a different Australia, independent and confident. We should engage with our neighbours on the need to stand together against Chinese coercion and aggression.
In doing so, we would not be seeking security from Asia but seeking it in Asia.
Our neighbours are highly attuned to geopolitical realities. Almost without exception, even if they do not say it, they are not keen to see China emerge as a hegemon. Equally, they would prefer to see the US remain engaged in the region, knowing that any regional power arrangement that had China at its head would be a vehicle for China to dominate.
However, most are not ready to tackle directly the question of China’s aggression and coercion. They see no need to do so—not perhaps until Chinese naval and coastguard vessels appear off their shores to assert Chinese sovereignty in disputed waters.
Short of them being directly threatened, attempts to enlist most of our neighbours into an anti-China coalition will not work. Here is where astute Australian foreign policy could have a significant impact. No one in the region believes that Australia is seriously trying to navigate US-China strategic competition. That it is trying not to choose a side.
Most believe Australia has already made its choice without being vocal about it. Australia’s presumed choice can be seen in our longstanding alliance with the US; the hosting of US strategic facilities in Australia; the basing arrangements that have been put in place for US military operations from Australia; Australia’s plan under AUKUS to acquire long-range nuclear-propelled attack submarines; and our participation in the growing US-led system of regional deterrence to counter China. While we have stabilised relations with China in recent years, our neighbours believe we are still working to thwart China’s rise as regional hegemon.
That certainty regarding Australian policy is credit in the strategic bank. We should leverage that credit. Instead of sliding and hedging, our message in the capitals of Asia and the Pacific should be a confident one of strategic solidarity. We should declare that we will stand with our neighbours in the face of Chinese aggression and coercion. This Australian pledge of solidarity should be extended to the following: Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Brunei in Southeast Asia; farther afield to Japan, South Korea, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, New Zealand and East Timor; the sovereign nations of the Pacific Islands Forum; and possibly others in the Indo-Pacific region. In a carefully couched and suitably adapted form that recognised current Australian policy on its status, the pledge even could be extended to Taiwan.
We would not ask any regional partner to take sides in US-China great power competition or in an anti-China coalition. Neither would the pledge involve or require the agreeing of a military alliance with Australia, although in some cases that might be considered as well and especially so in the case of Indonesia.
Specifically, Australia would pledge that were Chinese grey-zone aggression and coercion to occur in relation to the territorial integrity or national sovereignty of a neighbour, we would consult immediately with them on the best ways in which assistance might be provided by Australia in terms of diplomatic, economic, technical, intelligence and material support. Subject to there being in place a military alliance between our nations, this could involve defence assistance.
Australia would be pledging to deploy all elements of power to assist its neighbours.
In making this pledge, and by not taking the easy road of cowering in our sheltered land, relieved that the dragon was breathing fire on someone else, Australia would be undertaking its most significant independent strategic initiative in the region. The pledge would remove from the table the possibility that Australia might sit back and calculate the advantages for itself in silently acquiescing in, or even tacitly condoning, Chinese aggression and coercion against our neighbours.
The pledge would commit us to doing no more than a resolute and confident Australia would be likely to do in our own interests in the applicable circumstances. By making an explicit declaration now, before the eruption of a sudden crisis, Australia would be signalling that it was serious about contributing to collective security and resilience in the region, and that it was prepared to forgo hedging and ambiguity. With those neighbours that desired it, discreet planning could take place that would save time in a crisis.
Were others in the region to make similar and hopefully mutual pledges to their neighbours, Beijing’s calculations would become vastly more complicated. This would not be an act of altruism on Australia’s part. A more resilient region that was better able to withstand Chinese aggression and coercion, preferably through a web of mutual pledges of solidarity, would make for a more secure Australia.
Australia has long had a strong Asia consciousness. For instance, in 1934 the government of prime minister Joseph Lyons dispatched the first ministerial goodwill diplomatic tour of China, Japan, the Netherlands East Indies, French Indochina, Malaya, Hong Kong and The Philippines. It did not yield useful results, for reasons already mentioned, but it showed that we were at least willing to act on identifiably Australian interests in the region.
After World War II, a more distinctively Australian approach to the region began to be fashioned. By the ’90s, the Keating government was speaking of Australia finding security in Asia.
Building on this tradition of engagement, we should now make starkly clear that, amid all the flux, we are deeply committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific, where all nations are free to make their choices within rules that everyone has agreed. The Australian pledge as described here would give force to this commitment.
In today’s chaotic geopolitical world, the actions that we take now will echo for decades to come.
Hemingway wrote of bankruptcy. In our region we are strategically solvent after decades of engagement. Will we use our credit to help to build a more secure region, even as events unfold at a dizzying pace?
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On this day 27 December in 1941, John Curtin famously declared that in the war with Imperial Japan, Australia would look to the United States, ‘free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom’.In our national mythology, this is seen as Australia acting independently, instead of following Britain’s lead. However, Curtin had little choice but to appeal desperately for US military assistance, as Australiacould not defend itself, and could not rely upon Britain, which was fighting for its life against Nazi Germany.
Curtin’s pleato the US was also calculated.Heknewthat Australia would be a crucial base for future US operations against Imperial Japan. Hewanted Australia to have a say in the conduct of these operations.First, however, Australia would have to be defended.Curtin played on the fact that it was in the interests of the US to defend Australia as its vital southern base in the war.
In 1944, after the danger had passed, Curtin tried to resuscitate the idea of ‘imperial defence’, whereby Britain, Australia, and the other self-governing dominions would better co–ordinate their defence strategies.As such, Curtin’s ‘look to America’ was not the foundation stone of the Australia-US alliance, as the mythmakers would have us believe. Those foundations were not laid until 1951, with the signing of the ANZUS Treaty.
There is another myth: namely, that the US came to Australia’s aid out of feelings of kinship.This is not true. The US had a thoroughly unsentimental view of Australia’s strategic utility. MacArthur said as much on 1 June 1942, in confidential remarks that were recorded for posterity. He said that the US had a vital interest in securing Australia as a base, and not defending it on the basis of who inhabited the continent. As an aside, had ‘Australia’ instead been three separate European nations, say of British, French, and Dutch origin, and not a friendly and unified continental-sized British dominion, MacArthur’s calculations would have been very different, especially if French Australia had been aligned with Vichy France.Who inhabited the continent, which was the strategic consequence of the British settlement of Australia, did matter after all.
There are uncomfortable truthsabout this period of Australia’s history. In the 1930s, Australia should have better prepared itself. As Leader of the Opposition between 1935-41, Curtin had come closest to articulating what needed to be done. However, he lost the federal elections of 1937 and 1940, and could not therefore give effect to Labor’s policy of greater defence self-reliance.Had Australia been ruthlessly clear-eyed and more self-confident in the 1930s, thenational panic of 1941-42 could have been avoided. Had Australia rearmed in time, itcould have deployeda powerful force in its sea-air approaches, which could have disruptedImperial Japan’s attempts to project force throughpresent-day East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Indonesia (in the latter case, in co–operation with Free Dutch forces). Had Australia ‘looked to America’ sooner, combined US-Australian planning for the defence of Australia could have been undertaken before the war.
Just as Australia was found wanting strategically, it was also unprepared at home.In December 1941,Australia was not yet on a full war footing, despite having been at war for over two years. Curtin argued that as Australia was now inside ‘the firing lines’, its way of life had to be revolutionised, through an ‘all-in’ effort.Production of war material would have to be increased dramatically. Drastic austerity would have to be enforced.He would often say‘it’s fight andwork…or perish’.
Curtin was critical of the ‘lackadaisical Australian mind’.By this, he did not call into question the patriotism of Australians, or their sense of duty. He called these ‘ever present qualities’. What concerned him were the particularsof the task—the specificsthat would be involved in mobilising ‘dormant talents’ and ‘untapped resources’, something thatwould requireleadership and direction from the government, and service and sacrifice from the people.
The Curtin of 1941 was a hard patriot. He was stern, puritanical, and critical of half-hearted effort. In his youth, he had been a radical socialist, convinced that capitalism would inevitably collapseon the road to socialism, when there would be no nations, no militarism, and no war.In the 1920s, he began to better appreciate that the parliamentary path—and not socialist revolution—was the best hope for social improvement. While he was the editor of the Westralian Worker (1917-28), Curtin became avocalAustralian patriot, as he wrote about the‘dignity of Australian nationhood’, and his pride in Australia’s history and its accomplishments.
Hedid not see any contradiction inAustralia actingmore independently, while still retaining its dominion status, and its ties with the ‘mother country’. Curtin would have been puzzled by the tendencytoday on the part of some to engage in self-denunciationof our settler-colonial origins and history.While he thought that Australia should ratify the 1931 Statute of Westminster so as to achieve legal independence from the UK parliament (this was done in October 1942, with retroactive effect as at 3 September 1939), it would not have crossed his mind to cut ties withBritain, the Empire, or the Crown.
Curtin had a largeness of mindand a strength of character that allowed him to grasp and act on the uncomfortable reality of circumstances that did not suit his preferred political agenda of social reform.From the mid-1930s, herecognised that the times would require him to champion a different cause, which was onethat did not come naturally,either to him or his party—namely how best to defend Australia in a war in the Pacific, at a time when the prevailing orthodoxy was to rely on Britain, operating from its base in Singapore.
Curtin’s legacy puts the lie to today’sconventional wisdom that the Left should avoid engaging on matters of war because, so the argument goes, thisplaysto the strengths of the Right. Curtin would have seen this as anappalling abrogation of responsibility. He spoke of patriotism and of war, using the language of duty, service, and sacrifice. Were he alive today, the modern Left would criticise him for ‘beating the drums of war’.However, Curtin wasof an older Left. Like Clement Attlee, he saw no contradiction between socialism and the patriotic love of country. George Orwell was also in this tradition, and in 1941 wrote the great essay that squared patriotism and socialism, ‘The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius’.
Those who would seek to appropriateCurtin’s legacy in a performative display to demonstrate their credibility on defence issuescannot limit their appreciation to admiring only what he did as wartime leader, once the existential danger to Australia and its political independence was apparent.To do so would be to ignore the inconvenient truth of his legacy. To honour Curtin,we have widen the lens and examine the totality of his thought and policies, and then ask ourselves what a modern-day Curtin would make of our precarious strategic environment (said to be the worst in 80 years), and what he would doabout it.
Here is an attempt to properly honour Curtinin this way. A modern-day Curtin would be vocal about the threat posed by China. He would argue for greater defence self-reliance, and for at least 3 per cent of GDP to be spent on defence.He would be concerned about the threat of long-range missile and air attack, offensive cyber strikes, raids in remote areas, attacks on undersea infrastructure and so on. He would insist on the development of effective military solutions to these and other, similar problems. While a champion of defence self-reliance, he would recognise that a new‘look to America’ would be necessary. He wouldargue for ANZUS to be put on to an operational footing, with a standing headquarters (this time headed by an Australian),to command a combined Australia-US force. He would be a supporter of AUKUS, but would be focused on realising rapidbenefits, arguing that any capability pay-offs in the 2030s and beyond would not matter much if we lose a war in the meantime. He would give priority to home defence, mobilisation planning, and boosting local defence production. He would support universal national service for the defence of Australia.
On Curtin’s gravestone is carved the following:
‘His country was his pride/His brother man his cause’.
This epitaph captures his patriotism and his socialism. Curtin recognised that being prepared to fight a war is the price that has to bepaid for preserving freedom, democracy, and sovereignty, and protecting the nation, which is the best vehicle that existsfor social improvement. We do not need the Curtin myths. The hard truths of his legacy serve us better.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/11141036/Raisina_aspievents-banner2.png4501350nathanhttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgnathan2025-03-11 15:20:142025-03-11 15:20:18Raisina Down Under
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/11113306/Boris-Ruge-tile_Boris-Ruge.jpg10801920markohttp://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/16232551/ASPI-CMYK_SVG.svgmarko2024-12-10 11:37:332025-03-11 13:35:37In-conversation with H.E. Boris Ruge