Vice President Kamala Harris has officially secured the Democratic presidential nomination, after the Democratic National Convention announced late Monday evening in DC that 99 percent of delegates voted for her.

ASPI experts provide their analysis below on how Harris, if elected president, would guide US foreign policy and how this would affect Australia. 

 

Overview—Justin Bassi, executive director 

For Australia, a Harris presidency likely offers continuity with nuance on foreign policy and security.  

A priority for Australia with any new president is ensuring they understand the importance of the Indo-Pacific region to America’s security and the value specifically of Australia as a partner. No other country is at once an American ally, a member of the two most significant minilateral partnerships—AUKUS and the Quad—and a close partner of other countries in the region, through for example its membership of the Pacific Islands Forum and its position as ASEAN’s first comprehensive strategic partner. 

The new president’s in-tray will be bursting with competing priorities across Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, with increasing disinformation and foreign interference online, and malign actors looking to sow dissent in democracies. Compared with the 2016 and 2020 elections, it may be harder this time to make the case that countering China in the Indo-Pacific is the predominant challenge. 

Harris would likely maintain consistency with the Biden foreign policy that has been set while she was Vice President. However, it will be important for Australia to identify and understand where there may be nuanced views between Harris and Biden as well as her likely foreign policy and security team, most probably different personnel to those around Biden. We’ve seen such a nuance on Israel—with Harris clearly putting a greater emphasis in public remarks on Palestinian civilian casualties.  

Australia will need to ensure that the necessary focus of the US on the two war-torn regions of Europe and the Middle East does not see a Harris presidency deprioritising the Indo-Pacific, and specifically competition with China, as the top priority for US foreign and security policy. 

 

Defence—Bec Shrimpton, director of defence strategy and national security 

Harris is likely to bring continuity on key defence policy and force posture issues with decisions guided by a traditionalist lens on the role of the US in global stability and its support for the rules-based international order.  

To date, Harris has appeared domestically focused, prioritising law and order, suggesting she will instinctively pursue foreign policy that similarly defends rules and international law. One question, however, with the US facing so many domestic challenges, is how much Harris thinks the US needs to be the ‘global enforcer’. Given the extent of global instability, she will undoubtedly face early tests on the US role in the world and her willingness to use American defence capabilities to intervene in global conflicts and disputes.  

Part of the question relates to the extent to which Harris sees strategic competition with China as the top US foreign and defence policy and whether she would be a president who diplomatically manages that competition or aims to win it. The indications are that Harris might begin as more of a manager. But the reality of the strategic environment may require her to actively pursue superiority as quickly as possible across a range of areas.  

Given her vice–presidential responsibilities, including as Chair of the National Space Council, Harris will understand better than most leaders the importance of space to the defence and economic prosperity of the US and its partners. Harris has, for instance, launched efforts to create a moratorium on the use of direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles that can destroy rivals’ space craft—demonstrating strong, normative leadership. 

Space is one area in which Australia can work closely with the US, aligning American interests with Australia’s comparative advantage in capabilities. 

 

US foreign policy and strategic vision—Greg Brown, DC senior analyst

With all his years in the Senate, Biden was a known quantity on foreign and security policy—a traditionalist who believed in alliances and a strong role for the US in the world. The striking thing about Harris, by contrast, is how little we have to go on. 

She was a district attorney and attorney–general in California; served a short stint in the US Senate; ran for president in 2019 but dropped out before primary voting began; and served as a loyal Biden team member and vice president. That raises the question whether the foreign policy positions she’s expressed simply reflect that loyalty, and whether she will assume new positions if she becomes president.

Her unusual pathway to the presidential candidacy means there’s been no adversarial primary process in which she’s had to defend her foreign policy positions against even friendly rivals. 

Over the past fortnight, Harris hasn’t been asked media questions or spoken about foreign and security policy. Key questions include: will she double down on support for Ukraine? Upend President Joe Biden’s support for Israel? Distance the US from Saudi Arabia? Revive the old Obama policies of reaching out to Iran?  

Above all, will she shift attention, time, and money away from international security issues to promote the domestic causes we know she cares about? Australians should be wondering: where does the Indo-Pacific region and its key theatres rank in Harris’s prioritisation list—and why? 

 

China—Bethany Allen, head of program for China investigations and analysis

While another Donald Trump presidency would likely bring greater unpredictability to the US-China relationship, Harris is likely to pursue a steady policy that, at least initially, is unlikely to veer sharply from Biden’s tough but measured approach. Though she has never visited China or Taiwan, Harris has criticised China’s human rights record, expressed support for Taiwan and has repeated Biden’s line that the US must ‘responsibly manage the competition’. Indeed on Taiwan, she’s declared that the US ‘will continue to support Taiwan’s self-defence, consistent with our longstanding policy’.

Harris has denounced Beijing’s efforts to wrest control of shoals in the South China Sea that are occupied by the Philippines and sit within its exclusive economic zone, calling those attempts ‘unlawful and irresponsible’ as she stood aboard a Philippines ship near the shoals.

She has also said that Trump ‘lost that trade war’, suggesting she approves of going head-to-head with China economically, but not in the same way Trump did.  

Harris is also likely to keep the interests of Chinese-Americans near the front of her mind. She represented California, a state with large Chinese diaspora communities, as a senator from 2017 to 2021 and before that served as the state’s attorney general. Chinese-Americans suffered from a rise in anti-Asian racism during the pandemic, fuelled in part by inflammatory political rhetoric.

 

Southeast Asia—Fitriani, senior analyst

Harris showed commitment to expanding US-Southeast Asia relations by attending the 2023 ASEAN Summit in Jakarta. Her attendance was meant to dispel doubts about US commitment to the region and to the centrality of ASEAN—given Biden had visited India and Vietnam but missed the biggest head-of-state meeting in the region. On the South China Sea, Harris made a show of support by travelling to the Philippines island of Palawan, which is next to the disputed waters, and emphasising that the US would support its partner in the face of intimidation and coercion.  

Critics noted that such travel would only aggravate China. However, Harris’s policy towards Southeast Asia, if she wins, is predicted by several analysts from the region to be a continuation of the Biden administration’s. That includes providing an unprecedented US$1.2 billion in economic, development and security assistance to the region and a further US$90 million funding for ASEAN.  

The US’s sustained commitment to Southeast Asia is appreciated by commentators in the Philippines and Vietnam—two countries where analysts have published favourable articles on Harris’ presidential nomination.  

That said, most senior members of the Southeast Asian political establishment are sitting on the fence regarding Harris’ nomination. A notable exception is the intervention of Indonesia’s former president Megawati—its first and only female leader—who openly endorsed Harris and sent her a support letter, wishing for another female world leader. 

 

India—Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan, resident senior fellow

There are plenty of divisions within the US foreign policy establishment—such as on Gaza and Ukraine. But on India, there is a general bipartisan support for closer relations, which is likely to continue in a Harris administration. That said, it is also likely to be a much more stable relationship than what we might see under the mercurial Donald Trump.

However, there is little indication to suggest that India would be a major focus of a Harris administration either. New Delhi itself appears to value its strategic autonomy more than closer relations with the US. There have been recent tensions related to alleged Indian covert operations targeting Sikh separatists in the US and other countries. The Indian foreign policy establishment is also somewhat wary of Harris’s possible focus on democracy and human rights in foreign policy, which has been another source of irritation in US-India relations.  

Nevertheless, Harris can be expected to work through these issues with India because the relationship is important to both countries given their common worry about China’s growing power and behavior. 

 

Climate—Mike Copage, head of the climate and security policy centre

On global clean energy tech and supply trends, a Harris administration is unlikely to depart much from Biden’s approach. 

If anything, Harris appears more ambitious on climate—having co-sponsored the Green New Deal in 2019 and pitched a carbon tax in her 2020 platform. While her near-term focus as president would be on implementing the Inflation Reduction Act, her administration could ramp up domestic climate spending as inflation cools further. This looks all the more likely because her position on trade (favouring American manufacturing in clean tech) is also consistent with Biden’s, though firmer on labour and environmental safeguards.  

Harris’ domestic energy policy positions, such as her proposed fracking ban in her 2020 platform, might be moderated to secure support in swing states that have significant oil and gas projects, such as Pennsylvania, but that’s unlikely to sway her foreign policy positions on climate.  

On international climate finance, her record and messaging on environmental justice suggest she could bring a strengthened focus on responding to the effects of climate change. During the COP28 talks, she announced the Biden administration’s US$3 billion additional investment in the Green Climate Fund. This was not received as a significant contribution, given the high adaptation costs and funding gaps facing developing countries. Though she has not adopted a clear position on enhancing climate finance, doing so would be consistent with her past positions and could inform her priorities as president—with implications for funding across climate-exposed developing countries, including in the Pacific.  

 

Engaging young voters—Marika Vigo, DC events and communications manager

Unless there is a strong turnout from young voters, Harris faces a narrow path to the 270 Electoral College votes needed to win.  

Within a day of Biden announcing his departure from the race and endorsement of Harris, the Harris for President campaign adopted a robust digital strategy to engage online communities of Gen Z voters. The @KamalaHQ account began posting topical memes, sharing news of endorsements and fundraising records, and promoting Harris’ policy record and priorities. She was depicted in stark contrast to Trump and vice-presidential candidate JD Vance through a series of clips of her archived speeches and committee hearings.  

If her campaign is successful with this strategy of engagement, there is a good chance that Gen Z voters will deliver Harris the presidency. In the 48 hour period following Biden’s announcement, daily voter registration increased 700 percent, with voters aged 18 to 34 accounting for 83 percent of those new registrations, according to the non-partisan Vote.org.  

And should this bloc of voters deliver Kamala the presidency, they will expect her to listen on issues they care about—climate change, gun violence, reproductive rights, LGBTQIA+ protections, the war in Gaza to name a few. 

To ensure a stable campaign transition, Harris will likely maintain Biden’s platform as much as possible, including on international issues. But if she wins, she may be open to hearing more diverse views, especially from young Americans on pressing topics such as support for Gaza. 

Harris’s necessarily restrained presence as vice president might prove an asset now as she gets the chance to build her own strong coalitions and carve out her own priorities, particularly on international affairs.

‘The Pacific is inconstant and uncertain like the soul of man. Sometimes it is grey like the English Channel off Beachy Head, with a heavy swell, and sometimes it is rough, capped with white crests, and boisterous. It is not so often that it is calm and blue. Then, indeed, the blue is arrogant. The sun shines fiercely from an unclouded sky. The trade wind gets into your blood and you are filled with an impatience for the unknown.’

Somerset Maugham, The Trembling of a Leaf: Little Stories of the South Sea Islands, 1921

‘There is a gulf of difference between viewing the Pacific as “islands in a far sea” and as “a sea of islands”. The first emphasises dry surfaces in a vast ocean far from the centres of power. When you focus this way, you stress the smallness and remoteness of the islands.’

Epeli Hau’ofa, Our sea of islands, 1994

‘I wish I could tell you about the South Pacific. The way it actually was. The endless ocean. The infinite specks of coral we called islands. Coconut palms nodding gracefully towards the ocean. Reefs upon which waves broke into spray, and inner lagoons, lovely beyond description. I wish I could tell you about the sweating jungle, the full moon rising beyond the volcanoes, and the waiting. The waiting. The timeless, repetitive waiting.’

James A.Michener,  Tales of the South Pacific, 1947

 

The uncertain and unknown South Pacific is from Somerset Maugham as the bard of British colonialism at its highest moment—the rulers were still anxious about what they ruled.

Epeli Hau’ofa, one of the great thinkers of the modern South Pacific, dismantles the European view of the islands as ‘tiny, isolated dots in a vast ocean’ that could be divided and allocated by ‘imaginary lines across the sea’. The alternate understanding of a sea of islands makes Hau’ofa the intellectual father of today’s vision of the Blue Pacific continent.

The description of the sunny, peaceful islands opens Michener’s vivid account of the Pacific war, the most destructive of the powerplays that have surged through the South Pacific for 250 years. The life of the islands has been shaped by great power ambitions and machinations. Today’s powerplay brings Britain back to the South Pacific.

For the 50 years since the independence era in islands, Britain like the United States left Australia and New Zealand to worry about the security of Melanesia and Polynesia. As Washington advised in 1977, Canberra and Wellington should ‘shoulder the main burden’.

The China challenge means the US and Britain must turn back to the region as one element in the Indo-Pacific age.

The global balance will be set in the Indo-Pacific, and that slowly tilts British attention to the South Pacific it once dominated. A new era of powerplay revives old habits.

The British invasion of the islands can be dated from April 1769, when James Cook sailed the Endeavour into Matavai Bay in Tahiti. The great Australian journalist Alan Moorehead called it the start of The Fatal Impact, subtitling his book, ‘An account of the invasion of the South Pacific’.

From that time, the Pacific has always been a stage for plays by great powers. Following Cook, ‘British activities in the Pacific stemmed from imperial ambitions that at one time or another brought them into conflict with every other nation that sought a place in the sun,’ C. Hartley Grattan wrote in his account of the 18^th and 19^th century colonial contests in the Pacific involving  Britain, Spain, France, Holland, Germany, Russia and the United States.

The competition was fueled by commerce, colonial contest, and the desire for Christian converts.

‘During most of the 19^th century,’ Donald Denoon noted, ‘the British Navy was the main over-arching authority in the Pacific, exercising “informal empire” at a time when Britain was committed to free trade and reluctant to incur the costs of colonial administration.’ In the 20^th century, Britain shifted from informal to formal empire. Britain played a huge role in shaping the region’s religious, cultural and institutional life.

All that history stands in contrast to Britain’s minimal to non-existent security role in the South Pacific for the last 50 years.

When Britain’s foreign secretary visited the South Pacific after a G7 meeting in Japan in April 2023, the House of Commons foreign policy committee noted with ‘regret that no Foreign Secretary had visited most of these countries since the 1970s’.

The strategic absence is a strange lacuna in the rich British legacy in the life of South Pacific: Christianity, Westminster democracy and law, and English as the regional language.

In his 2001 history of the South Pacific, Ron Crocombe pointed to Britain’s reduced presence but lasting effect: ‘Having been the main superpower in relation to Oceania for nearly 200 years, Britain is now a minor player. Its historic role remains significant through English language and culture, extensive investments, aid, media, education, diplomatic presence, and many British people working in governments, business, NGOs, and missions.’

The British monarch is the head of state for Australia, Cook Islands, New Zealand, Niue, Norfolk Island, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu. Britain still has defence and foreign policy responsibility for its sole overseas territory in the region, the Pitcairn Islands.

Britain bequeathed much, but when it lowered the Union Jack and said it was off, it really left.

Contrast Britain’s departure with the actions of France, Australia and New Zealand in Melanesia and Polynesia, and the US in Micronesia. As Greg Fry comments: ‘For all except the United Kingdom (which retained only a token interest after withdrawing from its last major Pacific colony [New Hebrides, now Vanuatu] in 1980), strategic interest heightened as the region became more involved in Cold War competition.’

The United States and France are the external powers that have stayed and built their security roles. Australia and New Zealand are the outsiders that have become insiders, marrying history to geography to cement new forms of partnership with island states.

For Britain, part of decolonisation was military departure.  During the exit from the South Pacific in the 1960s and ‘70s, Britain was pulling back its military from East of Suez. Dean Acheson offered an eloquent but controversial diagnosis in 1962: ‘Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.’ As an Anglophile, Acheson enjoyed unloading epigrams on the Brits (and the Australians), as evidenced by his observation that Sydney was ‘rather like some English food, sustaining but uninteresting’.

The hard-nosed version of dispensing with empire is the judgement that Britain could no longer afford it, as Harold Wilson acknowledged by devaluing sterling by 14% and a few weeks later, in January 1968, announcing the withdrawal from military bases ‘east of Aden’.

The focus was on closing British bases in Malaysia and Singapore, but it also mattered in the South Pacific where military roots were shallower. Nothing like the Five Power Defence Arrangements for Southeast Asia was contemplated for the South Pacific.

Australia and New Zealand would need to step up, and the newly-independent states of the South Pacific would have to define their own strategic future. A telling expression of this was the 12-week ‘Coconut war’ in the New Hebrides in 1980 as the French-British condominium became the nation of Vanuatu. France blocked British marines from taking any action against the mini-rebellion (the final spasm of the condominium as pandemonium) and Vanuatu had to call in troops from Papua New Guinea to put down the unrest.

The peace dividend for the peaceful islands is that only Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga have their own military forces, while Vanuatu’s police have a para- military function. These small, lightly equipped forces traditionally look to Australia, New Zealand and France for equipment and training. The practical help expresses the security guarantee that Australia and New Zealand offer the English-speaking nations of Melanesia and Polynesia.

The new player seeking security partnerships in the islands is China, which was unsuccessful with its offer of a region-wide security treaty; now Beijing goes step-by-step with bilateral deals. China’s arrival confirms the history—expanding power systems reach the South Pacific.

Britain’s deepest continuing military ties are with Fiji, based on recruitment of Fijians. In 1961, the British Army struggled with volunteer recruitment after the abolition of national service. Recruiting teams were sent to three remaining colonies, and Fiji supplied 200 men and 12 women; about a third of the men served for 22 years or more.

Since 1998, Britain has regularly recruited soldiers from Fiji. Today, about 2200 Fijians are serving in the UK armed forces, most of them in the army. Fresh waves of Fijians keep volunteering. After the Covid lull, the tempo has lifted and in the last 12 months, Britain’s military has recruited 300 Fijians.

Britain’s ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific was proclaimed by its 2021 integrated review of security and national policy. The review ‘made scant mention of the Pacific Islands within its broader tilt to the Indo-Pacific,’ judged the House of Commons foreign affairs committee. The refresh of the integrated review in 2023 gave more attention, promising to deepen ‘our engagement with Pacific Island countries and regional resilience’, and support ‘the Pacific Way’. Britain is a co-founding member of Partners in the Blue Pacific, to support the Pacific’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.

Refreshing naval traditions, Britain has sent two Offshore Patrol Ships ‘to re-establish a permanent Royal Navy presence in the Indo-Pacific—the first time since the return of Hong Kong a quarter of a century ago’. Patrols have gone as far as New Zealand in the south and the Pitcairn Islands to the east. With no home port, the ships are a flexible asset at large in the Indo-Pacific. Smaller and more lightly armed than a frigate (with a crew of just 50), their size and capability matches well with South Pacific vessels; they complement rather than over-match.

Britain created a defence section at its Fiji embassy in February 2023, with coverage also of Tonga, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands. The British aim is not to enlist in a bidding war with China, but to act a good defence partner to the islands and complementary defence actor in the region.

Britain’s return to the South Pacific refreshes history as part of the tilt towards the new powerplay.

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak says ‘China poses an epoch-defining challenge’ threatening ‘to create a world defined by danger, disorder and division’. The British tilt is a nod to Australia’s strategic declaration: ‘The Indo-Pacific is the most important geostrategic region in the world.’

In this century, the global balance will be set in the Indo-Pacific. As Britain wants a role in setting the Indo-Pacific balance, so it must resume a role in the South Pacific, as one element of the power system.

Britain helped create much of value in the South Pacific during the powerplays of the previous 250 years. The tilt to the islands has deep roots that mean Britain can seek to serve island needs as well as the Indo-Pacific balance. The twin purposes were equally emphasised by the House of Commons foreign affairs committee, pointing to both the ‘great strategic importance’ of the South Pacific and what Britain could do for island societies:

Support for Pacific Islands needs to be long-term and consistent to dispel the current perception that the UK is only responding to increased diplomatic activity in the region by other countries, especially China. While China has the resources to supply infrastructure to the Pacific Island countries, it may be a less helpful partner than the UK in developing free and open societies, and a high-risk provider of security and defence.

What Britain bequeathed to the South Pacific means its tilt to the islands comes loaded with much valuable history; that heritage means the South Pacific response has had no trace of ‘Not you again’.

Instead, the island message to Britain is ‘welcome back’.

The elevation of the Australia-Vietnam relationship to the highest diplomatic level opens opportunities for deeper defence cooperation, especially the expansion of defence industry.

On 7 March, after the conclusion of the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in Melbourne, Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh made an official visit to Canberra where he and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese issued a joint statement on the elevation of the Australia-Vietnam relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP).

The agreement on a CSP includes a section on defence cooperation that pledges to expand current education and training programs, practical exchanges and peacekeeping support. Cooperation in peacekeeping will be elevated to a peacekeeping partnership. Since the establishment of defence cooperation relations in 2010, a remarkable 3500 Vietnam People’s Army officers have graduated from Australian-funded training in Australia and Vietnam.

Under the new CSP, defence cooperation also will be expanded to include defence industry, maritime security, information and intelligence sharing, strengthening maritime cooperation, and enhancing cooperation in cyber-security and critical technology, including through cyber security capacity-building initiatives to address cyber security threats.

The commitment to expand defence industry collaboration with Vietnam is timely. In February 2021, the 13th National Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party adopted a resolution of far-reaching importance for the modernisation of the Vietnam People’s Army. This resolution set the objective to ‘build a streamlined and strong Army by 2025, and a revolutionary, regular, advanced and modern People’s Army by 2030‘. It was assumed that Vietnam would rely on Russia to supply big ticket military platforms and defence technology.

However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a year later put paid to Vietnam’s plans as it faced the possibility of severe Western sanctions. Vietnam’s arms procurements have dropped to an all-time low as it marks time. In addition, Ukraine’s resistance to Russian military forces gave pause in Vietnam about its assumptions about the future of modern warfare in an era of drones, unmanned maritime platforms, cruise missiles, electronic warfare and missile defence.

This new strategic situation has opened two major opportunities for Australia.

First, it can expand defence industry cooperation with Vietnam in niche technology areas to assist in capacity-building to counter the new challenges and threats now on display in the Ukraine.

Second, Australia can initiate discussions with the United States, Japan and South Korea bilaterally and multilaterally—perhaps a new informal quadrilateral dialogue—to coordinate defence cooperation with Vietnam.

These opportunities build on a gradual shift in Vietnam’s strategic circumstances and perceptions over the past two decades. To comprehend the opportunities, it is useful to review how Vietnam has altered strategic course.

In 2001, Vietnam began to structure its foreign relations by negotiating strategic partnerships with its closest Cold War allies, Russia, China and India, while also seeking to ‘diversify and multilateralise‘ its external relations. Over the next decade and a half, a three-tiered hierarchy emerged consisting of comprehensive partnerships, strategic partnerships and comprehensive strategic partnerships, the highest level. China, Russia and India were upgraded to the exclusive top tier.

Six years after raising relations with India to a CSP, Vietnam suddenly raised relations with the Republic of Korea to a CSP in December 2022 followed by the United States (September 2023) and Japan (November 2023), and now Australia. The US, which was only a comprehensive partner, gazumped plans by Vietnam and Australia to elevate their strategic partnership in 2023 by agreeing with Vietnam to skip the intermediate stage and go directly to the CSP level.

In just 15 months Vietnam has expanded its constellation of three CSPs to seven by including the US and three of its closest allies in the Indo-Pacific. The fast-paced expansion of strategic ties to the West points to the change in Hanoi’s worldview and underscores the potential for coordination on the full defence cooperation agenda. This flurry of CSP signing is all the more extraordinary when we consider that three of the four partners (the US, Australia, and ROK) had troops on the ground during the Vietnam War.

Agreements on CSPs expand and deepen the scope of cooperation mapped out in the two lower-tier partnership agreements. All of Vietnam’s new comprehensive strategic partnership agreements include a separate section on defence cooperation.

The Vietnam-Republic of Korea joint statement on their CSP contains a section detailing increases cooperation on politics, defence and security, and promoting strengthening defence cooperation through technology, defence industry, and education and training.

The joint leaders’ statement on elevating US-Vietnam relations to a CSP, contains a separate section on defence and security that welcomes ‘further cooperation in defense industry and defense trade in accordance with each side’s conditions through mutually agreed mechanisms‘. The leaders’ statement also commits the US ‘to assist Vietnam to develop its self-reliant defense capabilities in accordance with the needs of Vietnam and established mechanisms‘.

The joint statement on the Vietnam-Japan CSP, which was fashioned as a document for ‘peace and prosperity in Asia and the world‘, contains a 15-point section on cooperation in security and national defence. The two leaders agreed on ‘transferring defence equipment and technology to the Ministry of National Defense of Vietnam‘. They also agreed to assign relevant agencies to discuss the content of Japan’s new Official Security Assistance (OSA).

The task of implementing commitments under these agreements will be complex from both an administrative and diplomatic point of view. Vietnam will need to tread cautiously to take advantage of the new avenues of defence cooperation without offending old friends and incurring strategic risks.

But of the four new comprehensive strategic partners, Australia is well placed to encourage and facilitate coordination. Australia has earned considerable trust in Vietnam because of a long history of engagement and policy consistency.

Australia and Vietnam established official defence relations in early 1998 and exchanged defence attaches in 1999 and 2000, respectively. A major turning point in defence relations was reached in 2010 with the signing of a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation. Since 2012, Australia and Vietnam have convened a joint foreign affairs and defence strategic dialogue at deputy secretary/deputy minister level. The two sides also hold annual defence cooperation talks, defence policy dialogue and a 1.5 track dialogue. The first formal meeting of defence ministers took place in Canberra in March 2013.

In March 2018, Australia and Vietnam issued a joint statement to establish a strategic partnership that covered cooperation in political matters; economics and development; defence, law, justice, intelligence and security; education, science and technology; labour, social affairs and culture, and people-to-people links; and regional and international affairs.

The section on defence cooperation committed the two parties to an annual meeting of defence ministers to facilitate high-level dialogue.

After raising bilateral relations to a strategic partnership, Australia and Vietnam adopted a ‘joint vision on further defence cooperation’. Funding for Australia’s defence cooperation program stands at $4.15 million in 2023-2024.  The program supports a big agenda of strategic dialogue and information exchange; continued assistance with Vietnam’s peacekeeping deployment to the UN Mission in South Sudan; education and training, including English language instruction; maritime security, including annual naval port visits; and Army and Air Force engagement.

At the recent ASEAN-Australia summit, Albanese announced several new initiatives to implement the government’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040—a $2 billion Southeast Asia investment financing facility, appointing 10 ‘business champions’ to facilitate greater commercial links and a ’landing pad’ in Ho Chi Minh City to bolster Australian technology exports.

The Albanese Government will now have to consider topping up funding for its defence cooperation program so it has the requisite expertise to expand defence industry cooperation with Vietnam. This means assigning more personnel with appropriate expertise to the defence attaches’ office at the Australian Embassy in Hanoi. The business champion for Vietnam will need to be supported by a specialist on government policy on defence exports. The landing pad in Ho Chi Minh City should have a specialist office in Hanoi dedicated to defence industry commercial sales.

Numerous observers have pointed to the cost effectiveness of diplomacy. Australia now needs to take advantage of a valuable diplomatic opening and ensure that it is fully resourced.