Tag Archive for: Alliances

British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS

Results snapshot

President Trump

  • Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role.
  • Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage.
  • When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine.

UK–China relations

  • Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations.
  • In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%).
  • A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment.

Defence and security

  • When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more.
  • The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%).
  • Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.

Brief survey methodology and notes

Survey design and analysis: Sophia Gaston

Field work: Opinium

Field work dates: 8–10 January 2025

Weighting: Weighted to be nationally and politically representative

Sample: 2,050 UK adults

The field work for this report was conducted by Opinium through an online survey platform, with a sample size of 2,050 UK adults aged 18 and over. This sample size is considered robust for public opinion research and aligns with industry standards. With 2,000 participants, the margin of error for reported figures is approximately ±2.3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level. Beyond this sample size, the reduction in the margin of error becomes minimal, making this size both statistically sufficient and practical for drawing meaningful conclusions with reliable representation of the UK adult population. For the full methodological statement, see Appendix 1 of this report.

Notes

  1. Given the subject matter of this survey, objective and impartial contextual information was provided at the beginning of questions. There are some questions for which fairly substantial proportions of respondents were unsure of their answers. All ‘Don’t knows’ are reported.
  2. The survey captured voters for all political parties, and non-voters; however, only the findings for the five largest parties are discussed in detail in this report, with the exception of one question (6C), in which it was necessary to examine the smaller parties as the source of a drag on the national picture. The five major parties discussed in this report are the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, Reform (formerly the Brexit Party and UKIP), and the Green Party.
  3. This report also presents the survey results differentiated according to how respondents’ voted in the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union, their residency within the UK, their age, their socio-economic status, and whether they come from White British or non-White British backgrounds. The full methodological notes are found at the end of the report.
  4. Some of the graphs present ‘NET’ results, which combine the two most positive and two most negative responses together – for example, ‘Significantly increase’ and ‘Somewhat increase’ – to provide a more accessible representation of the balance of public opinion. These are presented alongside the full breakdown of results for each question for full transparency.

Introduction

There’s no doubt that 2025 will be a consequential year in geopolitical terms, with the inauguration of President Donald Trump marking a step-change in the global role of the world’s largest economy and its primary military power. The full suite of implications for America’s allies is still emerging, and there will be opportunities for its partners to express their agency or demonstrate alignment. For a nation like the United Kingdom, whose security and strategic relationship with the United States is institutionally embedded, any pivotal shifts in American foreign policy bear profound ramifications for the UK’s international posture. The fact that such an evaluation of America’s international interests and relationships is taking place during a time in which several major conflicts – including one in Europe – continue to rage, only serves to heighten anxieties among policy-makers and citizens alike.

Public opinion on foreign policy remains an understudied and poorly understood research area in Britain, due to a long-held view that the public simply conferred responsibility for such complicated and sensitive matters to government. Certainly, many Britons don’t possess a sophisticated understanding of the intricacies of diplomatic and security policy. However, they do carry strong instincts, and, in an internationalised media age, are constantly consuming information from a range of sources and forming opinions that may diverge from government positions.

The compound effect of a turbulent decade on the international stage has made Britons more perceptive to feelings of insecurity about the state of the world, which can be transposed into their domestic outlook. At the same time, their belief in the efficacy of government to address international crises, or their support for the missions being pursued by government, isn’t guaranteed. This creates a challenging backdrop from which public consent can be sought for the kind of bold and decisive actions that may need to be considered as policy options in the coming months and years.

This study provides a snapshot of the views of British citizens at the moment at which President Donald Trump was inaugurated for a second time. It shows a nation which, overall, continues to subscribe to clear definitions of its friends and adversaries, carries a sense of responsibility to Ukraine, and greets the rise of a more assertive China with concern and scepticism. Underneath the national picture, however, the data reveals some concerning seeds of discord and divergence among certain demographic groups and political parties. The UK Government must build on the good foundations by speaking more frequently and directly to the British people about the rapidly evolving global landscape, and making the case for the values, interests, and relationships it pursues.

Sophia Gaston

March 2025

London

Reclaiming leadership: Australia and the global critical minerals race

Climate policy, geopolitics and market forces are coalescing to deliver Australia a global leadership opportunity in critical minerals. To grasp that opportunity, Australia needs both to utilise its domestic mineral endowment and its mining knowledge and technology and to leverage the global footprint of Australian companies to help build a global supply chain network.

How Australia responds will not only determine economic benefits to the nation but will also affect the world’s ability to achieve minerals security and the sustainability required for the global energy transition and inclusive economic growth.

The global energy transition and other high-technology applications have increased demand for critical minerals, particularly in countries that have strong complex manufacturing industries. At the same time, the concentration of production of many critical minerals, the dominance of China in supply chains and its actions to restrict supply and influence markets, are disrupting both minerals production and availability.

In response, developed nations have formulated critical minerals strategies and entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements, involving supplier nations and customer nations, to build alternative supply chains that are more diverse, secure and sustainable. Australia has committed in multiple agreements to work with like-minded nations to achieve this.

This report is intended to provide the government with a road map to ‘step up’ to (re)activate Australia’s global mineral leadership.

Where next for the Australia–South Korea partnership?

The strategic partnership between Australia and South Korea holds great potential in an increasingly challenging time. The two nations have many common strategic interests and both can rightly claim to be regional powers. However, the relationship remains a relative underperformer compared with other key regional relationships and has suffered from inconsistency. When Canberra’s contemporary relationship with Seoul receives attention from Australian analysts, it tends to be framed largely in the context of the threats posed by Pyongyang.

While some uncertainties remain over the long-term trajectory of South Korea’s foreign and security policy due to concerns that Seoul’s current vision is tied to the Yoon government as opposed to being embedded in longer-term statecraft, the structural basis for deeper engagement between Seoul and Canberra is sound. Investing in the relationship is in both nations’ interests. Building bureaucratic and commercial frameworks for cooperation now would help ensure that bilateral strategic alignment is less prone to future changes in government.

This paper assesses the Australia–South Korea partnership through the three-pillar structure outlined in the 2021 Australia-South Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and offers recommendations for strengthening the relationship. These recommendations include furthering strategic cooperation by incrementally aligning key trilateral formats, developing bilateral cooperation in critical technologies including those relevant to AUKUS Pillar 2, and nurturing collaboration with respect to the Indo-Pacific clean energy transition.

Building whole-of-nation statecraft: How Australia can better leverage subnational diplomacy in the US alliance

Australia and the US are both federations of states in which power is shared constitutionally between the national and subnational levels of government. However, traditionally, one domain that hasn’t been considered a shared power, but rather the constitutionally enshrined responsibility of the national governments, has been international affairs (in the US Constitution through Article I, Section 10 and other clauses and in the Australian Constitution through section 51 (xxix), known as the external affairs power). For this reason, foreign-policy and national-security decision-makers in Washington DC and Canberra have rightly seen themselves as the prime actors in the policymaking that develops and strengthens the US–Australia alliance and all global relationships, with limited power held by subnational governments.

However, in our globalised and digital world, constitutional power no longer means that subnational governments have only narrow roles and influence on the international stage. While national governments will continue having primary responsibility for setting foreign policy, subnational governments have offices overseas, sign agreements with foreign governments, and regularly send diplomatic delegations abroad. Recent events, including the Covid-19 pandemic, have highlighted subnational governments’ decisive role in shaping, supporting, adapting to and implementing national and international policy. The pandemic, including post-pandemic trade promotion, demonstrated that the relationships between layers of governments in both federations are essential to national security, resilience, economic prosperity and social cohesion.

Subnational governments have vital roles to play in helping to maximise national capability, increase trust in democratic institutions, mitigate security threats and build broader and deeper relationships abroad. At the subnational level in Washington and Canberra, people-to-people, cultural and economic links create the deep connective tissue that maintains relationships, including those vital to the US-Australia alliance, no matter the politics of the day. But that subnational interaction must be consistent with national defence and foreign policy.

Australia’s federal system should help facilitate international engagement and incentivise positive engagement while ensuring that the necessary legislative and policy levers exist to require the subnational layer to conduct essential due diligence that prioritises the national interest. In this report, the authors make a series of policy recommendations that will support the development of such a framework.

AUKUS and critical minerals: Hedging Beijing’s pervasive, clever and coordinated statecraft

AUKUS has a heavy focus on R&D of military capabilities. A number of departments, including defence, foreign affairs and prime ministerial equivalents are engaged. The science and technology to deliver those capabilities must resolve issues of insecure supply chains. Currently, supply chains for processed critical minerals and their resulting materials aren’t specifically included.

Yet all AUKUS capabilities, and the rules-based order that they uphold, depend heavily on critical minerals. China eclipses not only AUKUS for processing those minerals into usable forms, but the rest of the world combined. Without critical minerals, states are open to economic coercion in various technological industries, and defence manufacturing is particularly exposed to unnecessary supply-chain challenges.

This is where Australia comes in. Australia has the essential minerals, which are more readily exploitable because they’re located in less densely populated or ecologically sensitive areas. Australia also has the right expertise, including universities offering the appropriate advanced geoscience degrees, as well as advanced infrastructure, world-class resources technology and deep industry connections with Asia and Africa, which are also vital global sources of critical minerals.

This paper outlines why Australia offers an unrivalled rallying point to drive secure critical-mineral supply among a wide field of vested nations, using AUKUS but not limited to AUKUS partners, how WA has globally superior reserves and substantial expertise, and why northern Australia more generally has a key role to play. The paper also explains why policy action here must be prioritised by the Australian Government.

Impactful mateship: Strengthening the US–Australia defence relationship through enhanced mutual understanding

AUKUS, and the Australian Government’s release of the 2023 report of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR), reinforce to Canberra and Washington DC that there’s an urgent need to continue strengthening the US–Australia alliance. Those efforts underpin allied cooperation within the Indo-Pacific, which is an increasingly complex security environment. 
 
This report highlights 9 opportunities for both US and Australian defence decision-makers at a vital time in the relationship as it develops in complexity and builds towards the ambitions of AUKUS over the coming decade. 
 
A series of ‘quick wins’ for the US DoD are recommended, including arranging more training for inbound DoD personnel and conducting allied-centric training for relevant US-based action officers and planners at US headquarters. US DoD Funding should be provided for US action officers to visit Australia to build rapport with their counterparts and facilitate appreciation for the relationship in person. Broadly, US professional military education at every level should incorporate Australian Defence-centric views when appropriate, and the DoD can better leverage its US liaison network throughout Australia earlier in planning and when considering new initiatives. 
 
Recommended quick wins for Australian Defence to include further leveraging of US-based Australian Defence personnel and encouraging greater transparency with US counterparts regarding capacity. Enhanced transparency would provide maximum clarity on capacity challenges at all echelons, especially regarding the potential impacts of a future crisis within the Indo-Pacific. It’s also recommended that Australian Defence provide greater clarity regarding sovereignty and security concerns for the US DoD. 
 
Finally, this report also makes a major long-term recommendation that will require more resourcing, coordination and focus from US and Australian defence decision-makers, and that’s to establish and empower a US Forces Australia headquarters (USFOR-A) to synergise US DoD efforts with the Australian defence establishment. It’s inevitable that the US–Australia defence relationship will grow in scope and complexity. That will quickly outgrow and challenge the current coordination structure, which was built and implemented decades ago. This report also notes that there are lessons to be learned from the US–Japan bilateral coordination mechanisms, especially in the light of the US–Japan–Australia defence relationship, as it is set to grow in importance in the coming years.

Smooth sailing? Australia, New Zealand and the United States partnering in–and with–the Pacific islands

Australia, New Zealand and the United States should help create an ASEAN-style forum for Pacific island nations to discuss security and manage geopolitical challenges.

The call for a dialogue, modelled on the ASEAN regional forum, is one of several recommendations to improve security partnerships and coordination in the region, reducing the risk that the three countries trip over one another and lose sight of the Pacific’s own priorities as they deepen their Pacific ties out of strategic necessity amid China’s growing interest.

While focussing on those three countries, this report stresses that wider partnerships should be considered, including with France, India, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and European Union.

The report states that the three countries will have to get used to greater Chinese involvement in the Pacific, even if they don’t accept it, much less like it.

Quad Technology Business and Investment Forum outcomes report

The Quad has prioritised supporting and guiding investment in critical and emerging technology projects consistent with its intent to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Governments cannot do this alone. Success requires a concerted and coordinated effort between governments, industry, private capital partners and civil society.

To explore opportunities and challenges to this success, the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group convened the inaugural Quad Technology Business and Investment Forum in Sydney, Australia on 2 December 2022. The forum was supported by the Australian Department of Home Affairs and delivered by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).

The forum brought together senior Quad public- and private-sector leaders, laid the foundations for enhanced private–public collaboration and canvassed a range of practical action-oriented initiatives. Sessions were designed to identify the key challenges and opportunities Quad member nations face in developing coordinated strategic, targeted investment into critical and emerging technology.

Attendees of the forum overwhelmingly endorsed the sentiment that, with our governments, industry, investors and civil society working better together, collectively, our countries can lead the world in quantum technology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and other critical and emerging technologies.

This report reflects the discussions and key findings from the forum and recommends that the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group establish an Industry Engagement Sub-Group to develop and deliver a Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Forward Work Plan.

ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker

ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker – The global race for future power

The Critical Technology Tracker is a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas. It provides a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology capability.

It first launched 1 March 2023 and underwent a major expansion on 28 August 2024 which took the dataset from five years (previously, 2018–2022) to 21 years (2003–2023). Explore the website and the broader project here.

Governments and organisations interested in supporting this ongoing program of work, including further expansions and the addition of new technologies, can contact: criticaltech@aspi.org.au.

What’s the problem?

Western democracies are losing the global technological competition, including the race for scientific and research breakthroughs, and the ability to retain global talent—crucial ingredients that underpin the development and control of the world’s most important technologies, including those that don’t yet exist.

Our research reveals that China has built the foundations to position itself as the world’s leading science and technology superpower, by establishing a sometimes stunning lead in high-impact research across the majority of critical and emerging technology domains.

China’s global lead extends to 37 out of 44 technologies that ASPI is now tracking, covering a range of crucial technology fields spanning defence, space, robotics, energy, the environment, biotechnology, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced materials and key quantum technology areas.1 The Critical Technology Tracker shows that, for some technologies, all of the world’s top 10 leading research institutions are based in China and are collectively generating nine times more high-impact research papers than the second-ranked country (most often the US). Notably, the Chinese Academy of Sciences ranks highly (and often first or second) across many of the 44 technologies included in the Critical Technology Tracker. We also see China’s efforts being bolstered through talent and knowledge import: one-fifth of its high-impact papers are being authored by researchers with postgraduate training in a Five-Eyes country.2 China’s lead is the product of deliberate design and long-term policy planning, as repeatedly outlined by Xi Jinping and his predecessors.3

A key area in which China excels is defence and space-related technologies. China’s strides in nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles reportedly took US intelligence by surprise in August 2021.4

Had a tool such as ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker been collecting and analysing this data two years ago, Beijing’s strong interest and leading research performance in this area would have been more easily identified…

Had a tool such as ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker been collecting and analysing this data two years ago, Beijing’s strong interest and leading research performance in this area would have been more easily identified, and such technological advances would have been less surprising. That’s because, according to our data analysis, over the past five years, China generated 48.49% of the world’s high-impact research papers into advanced aircraft engines, including hypersonics, and it hosts seven of the world’s top 10 research institutions in this topic area.

The US comes second in the majority of the 44 technologies examined in the Critical Technology Tracker. The US currently leads in areas such as high performance computing, quantum computing and vaccines. Our dataset reveals that there’s a large gap between China and the US, as the leading two countries, and everyone else. The data then indicates a small, second-tier group of countries led by India and the UK: other countries that regularly appear in this group—in many technological fields— include South Korea, Germany, Australia, Italy, and less often, Japan.

This project—including some of its more surprising findings—further highlights the gap in our understanding of the critical technology ecosystem, including its current trajectory. It’s important that we seek to fill this gap so we don’t face a future in which one or two countries dominate new and emerging industries (something that recently occurred in 5G technologies) and so countries have ongoing access to trusted and secure critical technology supply chains.

China’s overall research lead, and its dominant concentration of expertise across a range of strategic sectors, has short and long term implications for democratic nations. In the long term, China’s leading research position means that it has set itself up to excel not just in current technological development in almost all sectors, but in future technologies that don’t yet exist. Unchecked, this could shift not just technological development and control but global power and influence to an authoritarian state where the development, testing and application of emerging, critical and military technologies isn’t open and transparent and where it can’t be scrutinised by independent civil society and media.

In the more immediate term, that lead—coupled with successful strategies for translating research breakthroughs to commercial systems and products that are fed into an efficient manufacturing base—could allow China to gain a stranglehold on the global supply of certain critical technologies.

Such risks are exacerbated because of the willingness of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to use coercive techniques5 outside of the global rules-based order to punish governments and businesses, including withholding the supply of critical technologies.6

What’s the solution?

These findings should be a wake-up call for democratic nations, who must rapidly pursue a strategic critical technology step-up.

Governments around the world should work both collaboratively and individually to catch up to China and, more broadly, they must pay greater attention to the world’s centre of technological innovation and strategic competition: the Indo-Pacific. While China is in front, it’s important for democracies to take stock of the power of their potential aggregate lead and the collective strengths of regions and groupings (for example the EU, the Quad and AUKUS, to name just a few examples). But such aggregate leads will only be fully realised through far deeper collaboration between partners and allies, greater investment in areas including R&D, talent and commercialisation, and more focused intelligence strategies. And, finally, governments must make more space for new, bigger and more creative policy ideas – the step-up in performance required demands no less.

Partners and allies need to step up and seriously consider things such as sovereign wealth funds at 0.5%–0.7% of gross national income providing venture capital, research and scale-up funding, with a sizable portion reserved for high-risk, high-reward ‘moonshots’ (big ideas). Governments should plan for:

  • technology visas, ‘friend-shoring’ and R&D grants between allies
  • a revitalisation of the university sector through specialised scholarships for students and technologists working at the forefront of critical technology research
  • restructuring taxation systems to divert private capital towards venture capital and scale-up efforts for promising new technologies
  • new public–private partnerships and centres of excellence to help to foster greater commercialisation opportunities.

Intelligence communities have a pivotal role to play in both informing decision-makers and building capability. One recommendation we make is that Five-Eyes countries, along with Japan, build an intelligence analytical centre focused on China and technology (starting with open-source intelligence).

We outline 23 policy recommendations for partners and allies to act on collaboratively and individually. They span across the four themes of investment and talent; global partnerships; intelligence; and moonshots. While China is in front, it’s important for democracies to take stock of their combined and complementary strengths. When added up, they have the aggregate lead in many technology areas.

  1. Visit the Critical Technology Tracker site for a list and explanation of these 44 technologies: techtracker.aspi.org.au/list-of-technologies. ↩︎
  2. Australian Signals Directorate, ‘Intelligence partnerships’, Australian Government, 2023 ↩︎
  3. See ‘China’s science and technology vision’ on page 14. ↩︎
  4. Demetri Sevastopulo, Kathrin Hille, ‘China tests new space capability with hypersonic missile’, Financial Times, 17 October 2021 ↩︎
  5. Fergus Hunter, Daria Impiombato, Yvonne Lau, Adam Triggs, Albert Zhang, Urmika Deb, ‘Countering China’s coercive diplomacy: prioritising economic security, sovereignty and the rules-based order’, ASPI, Canberra, 22 February 2023 ↩︎
  6. Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, Tracy Beattie, The Chinese Communist Party’s coercive diplomacy, ASPI, Canberra, 1 September 2020, online; State Department, China’s coercive tactics abroad, US Government, no date, online; Bonnie S Glaser, Time for collective pushback against China’s economic coercion, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 13 January 2021, online; Marcin Szczepanski, China’s economic coercion: evolution, characteristics and countermeasures, briefing, European Parliament, 15 November 2022, online; Mercy A Kuo, ‘Understanding (and managing) China’s economic coercion’, The Diplomat, 17 October 2022. ↩︎

ASPI AUKUS update 2: September 2022—the one-year anniversary

Introduction

Consistent with a partnership that’s focused on the development of defence and technological capability rather than diplomatic grandstanding,1 there have been few public announcements about the progress of AUKUS. That’s an observation we made in our first AUKUS update in May,2 and one we make again in this latest update, one year on from the joint unveiling of the partnership in mid-September 2021.

Periodic press releases note meetings of the three-country joint steering groups—one of which looks at submarines and the other at advanced capabilities—but provide little hint about what was discussed.3 On Submarines, we shouldn’t expect to hear anything concrete until the 18-month consultation phase concludes in March 2022.

What’s changed, however, is that the strategic environment that gave birth to AUKUS has worsened markedly, most notably in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s escalating pressure on Taiwan and other parts of the Indo-Pacific. Those developments are making the advanced technologies AUKUS aims to foster even more relevant.

Image: iStockphoto/sameer chogade

While the political landscape across the three AUKUS partners has also changed (of the three leaders that announced AUKUS just one year ago, only one, US President Biden, remains in office), bipartisan support for AUKUS appears to be undiminished in all three capitals.

In Australia, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s Labor government has made clear its commitment to AUKUS alongside the announcement of an ambitious Defence Strategic Review (DSR). Albanese has simultaneously worked to restore good relations with France, which temporarily withdrew its ambassador and some forms of cooperation because of the loss of the Attack-class submarine contract and what it said was a lack of Australian sincerity about AUKUS.

Britain’s new Prime Minister, Liz Truss, was a staunch advocate for AUKUS as Foreign Secretary, and all the signs are that she’ll continue in that vein as Prime Minister. Truss has kept Ben Wallace, a strong supporter of AUKUS, as Defence Secretary. Truss’s government has also moved former National Security Adviser Stephen Lovegrove into a new role focused on nuclear defence industry partnerships. If that becomes a permanent position, it could add capacity to deliver AUKUS over the long term.4

This update begins by reviewing the worsening strategic context one year on from the AUKUS announcement. Next, it summarises what more we have learned about progress in the nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) program, which is at the heart of AUKUS. It then assesses how think tanks across a selection of key countries are covering AUKUS to gauge trends in the public debate. The final section of the update assesses the importance of advanced technological cooperation through AUKUS to develop capability and reinforce deterrence rapidly in the face of the strategic challenges we face. The update makes some recommendations for the best way forward.

  1. Michael Shoebridge, What is AUKUS and what is it not?, ASPI, Canberra, 8 December 2021. ↩︎
  2. Marcus Hellyer, Ben Stevens, ASPI AUKUS update 1: May 2022, ASPI, Canberra, 5 May 2022. ↩︎
  3. ‘Readout of AUKUS Joint Steering Group meetings’, The White House, 31 July 2022. ↩︎
  4. ‘Sir Tim Barrow appointed as National Security Adviser’, media release, UK Government, 7 September 2022. ↩︎

Tag Archive for: Alliances

ASPI-Carnegie Endowment: What’s next for the US-Australia alliance?

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Tag Archive for: Alliances

What Donald Trump Can Learn From Allies on Foreign Aid

There are smarter and more effective ways to streamline and re-strategize U.S. foreign aid.

The Trump administration is not the first Western government to envision a stronger, safer, and more prosperous country by integrating foreign aid with strategic objectives. The experiences of America’s Five Eyes partners, particularly Australia and the United Kingdom, offer encouraging evidence for reform, having achieved tightly targeted development programs supporting diplomatic and strategic priorities. They also offer sobering lessons about implementation pitfalls, including the abrupt disruption of established programs, especially those already aligned with strategic policy, loss of critical skills among government personnel, and heightened unease among international partners. 

The logic driving aid integration is compelling. In an era of great power competition, maintaining separate tracks for diplomacy and development is an unaffordable luxury. China has harnessed development, along with trade and financial investment, as an instrument of strategic influence through both soft and hard means. Both Australia and the UK recognized this reality, merging their aid agencies (AusAID and DFID, respectively) into their foreign ministries to create more strategically coherent development policies. Having made clear its intent to fundamentally reshape USAID, the Trump administration has the opportunity to learn from its allies in the pursuit of the American national interest. 

A Unified Strategy: Australia 

The Australian government integrated the Australian Aid Agency (AusAID) with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2013 with the stated goal of better aligning Australia’s development, foreign policy, trade priorities, strategies, and objectives while bringing an enhanced focus on the Indo-Pacific. The integration accompanied a reduction of Australia’s development funding. After reaching a peak of more than AUD $5 billion in 2013–14, or .33 percent of gross national income (GNI), Australia’s development budget has progressively declined, and in 2023–2024 was AUD$4.8 billion, or .29 percent of GNI. This change is also stark in terms of the slice of the Australian budget spent on foreign aid compared to defense expenditures. 

An independent review of the integration in 2019 found that 90 percent of the Australian government’s strategic targets for the integration had been met, driving development allocations towards infrastructure and the Pacific. The review also found “examples of development goals being more strongly advanced through joined-up, whole-of-department efforts.” 

These initial efforts—such as the Pacific Seasonal Worker Scheme and the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific—have since grown to enable more ambitious and innovative integrated development and strategic initiatives. Key among these are the Falepili Union with Tuvalu (which provides Australia with strategic denial rights and Tuvalu with climate resilience monies and opportunities for migration), the agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea that encompasses development and security elements, and Telstra’s acquisition of Digicel Pacific, the largest mobile provider in the Pacific, with the Australian government’s support amid rumors of interest from China Mobile. While the review stepped carefully around the issue, it found integration had increased Australia’s ability to counter efforts to overshadow Australia’s influence, like China’s Belt and Road and Digital Silk Road initiatives.

However, the review also found several areas of concern. Early morale problems among staff arising from the abrupt way the integration was implemented had largely dissipated by 2019. However, a “pronounced deterioration in skills and systems” remained. The review found that “almost 1000 years of experience left [government service] shortly after integration.” Additionally, “estimates suggest another 1000 years of experience” left the department in the five years before 2019 due to the department underestimating the capability needed to design and deliver development programming. 

This loss of know-how continues to hamper effectiveness over a decade later. While development is now firmly accepted as a tool of statecraft, best wielded as part of a whole-of-government strategy, an article by the review’s author fifteen months ago suggests DFAT still has room to improve in terms of harnessing its development delivery to its full potential.

Strategic Prioritization: The UK

The merger between the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development occurred in 2021. The principal intention behind the merger was to better align the UK’s development activities with its wider diplomatic, trade, and geopolitical interests, both in strategic terms and in terms of in-country representation. The merger coincided with a decision to reduce the UK’s development funding commitment from the .7 percent of GDP enshrined in law to .5 percent of GDP. Notably, the integration occurred while the UK was experiencing the economic slowdown of the COVID-19 Pandemic, which resulted in a double blow to funding in absolute terms, constituting a 30 percent reduction overall.

Alongside the budget reductions, a strategic prioritization of development initiatives was pursued, in which the UK focused on bilateral funding to a smaller group of countries where measurement of effect is often easier to determine, but at the expense of some wider bilateral and multilateral commitments which were deemed to deliver less tangible value to the UK. 

In addition, the UK identified a select set of issues for its development focus, namely, climate investments, girls’ education, and global health—where the UK had demonstrated expertise and where funding would have constructive spillover effects. For example, improving girls’ education is found to reap positive dividends for local security, prosperity, and governance. These initiatives, concentrated in Africa, the Indo-Pacific, and South Asia, are all areas in which the UK’s adversaries were harnessing development as an instrument of influence, dependence, and coercion. 

The UK’s National Audit Office (NAO) review of the progress of the merger in 2024 found positive evidence “of where a more integrated approach has improved the organisation’s ability to respond to international crises and events, which has led to a better result.” 

Two such examples were the UK’s coherent humanitarian, diplomatic, and military response as the leading European power supporting Ukraine after Russia’s invasion and the joint humanitarian and political response to the Ebola crisis in Uganda. The findings supported the rationale for the merger and the modernization of the department as fit-for-purpose in sharpening the UK’s geopolitical interests. However, the NAO also noted that “the indirect costs” of the merger, “in terms of disruption, diverted effort and the impact on staff morale should not be underestimated.” 

The NAO also reviewed the effect of the overseas development aid reduction and found that while the prioritization compelled in the government’s activities had some positive dividends, “the speed and scale of the budget reduction, and the lack of long-term planning certainty, increased some risks to value for money.” 

What Can The U.S. Learn?

These cautionary tales suggest some considerations for the Trump administration:

First, pace matters more than might be immediately apparent. While decisive action has its advantages, too rapid a transformation risks institutional damage that could take years to repair. Recipient partners need to be assured about the value of the relationship, as reputation matters when development partners have the luxury of choice. A phased integration that maintains critical expertise while gradually aligning strategic direction would likely prove more effective in the long term.

Second, capability preservation requires active management. Both Australia and the UK learned the hard way that development expertise isn’t quickly or easily replaced. The technical knowledge required for effective commissioning, procuring, financing, and managing of development programs, while not unique to the aid world, is distinct from traditional diplomatic and geostrategic policy skills. Any American reforms must include concrete plans for retaining and developing each of these specialized capabilities and empowering them to work together to deliver coherent whole-of-government priorities.

Third, funding stability enables strategic coherence and builds influence with partners. The UK’s experience shows that simultaneous organizational and budgetary upheaval can undermine even well-conceived reforms. While efficiency gains are desirable, treating integration primarily as a cost-cutting exercise risks strategic self-harm. With strategic competitors snapping at our heels, such interruptions cannot always be remedied.

Fourth, clear metrics for success must encompass traditional development indicators and strategic effects. Australia’s focus on its immediate neighborhood and Indo-Pacific infrastructure and the UK’s emphasis on areas of demonstrated expertise and reputational value offer useful models for linking foreign aid and development assistance to broader national interests.

The stakes for getting this change right are immense. China has outflanked the West in harnessing foreign aid as a strategic tool of statecraft, having learned from the experiences of Western development agencies. America cannot afford to unilaterally disarm in this arena and sacrifice its many areas of retained advantage through poorly executed reforms.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s framework of strength, safety, and prosperity provides useful guideposts. Development programs should demonstrably enhance American security partnerships, expand trade relationships that benefit American workers, or strengthen allies facing authoritarian pressure. Programs that cannot should be reconsidered.

Achieving these goals requires maintaining America’s development capabilities even as they are more tightly aligned with strategic objectives. The experiences of Australia and the UK suggest this balance is achievable but demands careful attention to ensure areas of national strength and influence are strengthened, not squandered.

Why Japan-Australia alliance needs new strategic edge to do some ‘heavy lifting’

Strategically, Japan and Australia have more in common than just about any two nations – to the extent that we are allies in all but treaty status. Australia wants – and in fact needs – that relationship to get even closer.

Both nations need to be participants in the strategic competition that is firmly under way. We cannot afford to ignore it as something that is the exclusive business of the US and China. And the key foundation for the next stage of our partnership must be technology co-operation because critical technologies are fundamental to that strategic competition.

The relationship was not always on this trajectory. While for many years Japan has been finding ways to manage Beijing’s increasing assertiveness, Australia until around 2017 remained fixated on China as an economic silver bullet, taking us down a path of market concentration, economic dependency and security vulnerability. We found it easier to pursue Japanese whaling than we did Beijing’s cyber attacks, militarisation of the South China Sea or covert influence of domestic and international institutions. But partly in response to China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour across the past decade, Japan and Australia have drawn closer together.

Our shared interests and values and our strong desire to keep the Indo-Pacific free, open and resilient required nothing less. Countries – even strong economies and democracies such as Japan – cannot face and counter economic coercion, cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns alone. Hence a new phase of co-operation and partnership is under way.

Both countries have recognised the importance of India and embraced the revitalisation of the Quad grouping. When the US pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, it was our two countries that kept it together. And in Tokyo and Canberra there is a recognition that our bilateral relationship should be comprehensive: being about people, economics, security and defence.

We can continue these gains of recent years by working together on the challenge of technology co-operation. Technology sits at the heart of strategic competition in the sense that it is driving unprecedented change to economies, security, individual lives and international relations. The countries – or coalitions of countries – that gain pre-eminence in these technologies and set the international standards for these critical fields will gain an enormous strategic advantage.

Japan is a technologically advanced country that recently has unveiled plans for a 10 trillion yen ($107bn) national endowment fund to boost research and innovation through its top universities. As the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s own research has shown, it performs strongly in some key areas relevant to the AUKUS partnership, including quantum and hypersonics. Our Critical Technology Tracker also shows, however, that China is leading the world in high-impact research in 43 out of 51 technology fields relevant to defence. Beijing’s investment in critical technologies relevant to national security has been of a scale that no individual nation – not even the US – can confidently match it. This is the logic behind the AUKUS partnership. As ASPI’s tracker shows, we can remain competitive if we work together.

AUKUS pillar two – which serves as an accelerator for development of critical capabilities related to hypersonics, AI, quantum and other advanced technologies – has a much greater chance of success if we make it inclusive, not exclusive. We should therefore encourage Japan and others to participate as appropriate.

This is in fact a huge development opportunity: for partnerships, for technology, for capability, for deter­rence and for a more stable and secure world.

The Japanese government has committed to a dramatic increase to its defence spending commitments. But, as with Australia’s own investments, this increase is not about creating instability and increasing the risks of conflict; rather about bolstering deterrence to avoid war and improve regional stability. Stability doesn’t mean an absence of difference or compet­ition. It means living with and managing tension, not thinking it can be ignored.

This is why deterrence is mandatory for stability: it doesn’t prevent differences or competition or even some low-level conflict, but it does help prevent those from escalating into greater conflict or war. Technological superiority and partnerships together make the most potent recipe for deterrence based on strength.

Moreover, authoritarian regimes including Beijing are expertly filling the gap between war and peace with strategically targeted economic coercion, cyber-enabled theft and disinformation and, as we have seen this month, dangerous military intercepts on the seas and in the skies.

Democratic countries have struggled to find adequate responses, especially collective responses. We failed to join forces to increase internet safety and security. And we failed to come together to bake security into social media. This must change as we face the next leap in technology – artificial intelligence, which is shaping up to be a revolution like no other.

Japan’s recent example of leading on economic security as hosts of the G7 set an important example for others to follow in terms of how states can work together on emerging security challenges. We need more global leadership like this and we must encourage the next G7 chair, Italy, to grasp the baton, pursuing an economic security agenda and inviting nations like Australia, South Korea and India.

We can control our destiny or abdicate responsibility and hand it to the control of others who do not have our interests at heart. It’s vital that we continue to build our relationship because a stable balance of power will take effort by all. As regional powers, Australia and Japan are in the prime position to do the heavy lifting.

Tag Archive for: Alliances

Stop the World is back with a pod on the Quad

Stop the World is back from its summer hiatus and, with so many major developments already, there’s much ground to cover in 2025.  

This week, ASPI’s Raji Pillai Rajagopalan speaks to Euan Graham and Griffith University’s Ian Hall about the Quad partnership between Australia, India, Japan and the United States. They discuss the significance of the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Washington DC just days into the new Trump Administration, and the security role of the grouping in the coming years, including how – and whether – the Quad partners are thinking about deterrence.  

Guests:  

Raji Pillai Rajagopalan  
Euan Graham  
Ian Hall  

Urban warfare in Ukraine and Gaza with John Spencer

In this episode of Stop the World, ASPI Senior Analyst Alex Bristow interviews John Spencer, the Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point and host of the Urban Warfare Project podcast.   

Alex and John discuss urban warfare in the context of the conflict in Ukraine and Gaza, asymmetric capabilities and the impact of technology on warfare. 

They also talk about the laws of armed conflict and the public debate around Israel and Gaza, as well consider prospects for peace in Ukraine.   

Guests:  

Dr Alex Bristow  
John Spencer  

Stop the World: Japan in a blizzard of Indo-Pacific diplomacy with Guiborg Delamotte and Yamagami Shingo

In today’s episode, senior analyst Dr Alex Bristow is joined by Professor Guibourg Delamotte, Professor of Political Science at the Japanese studies department of the French Institute of Oriental Studies and Yamagami Shingo, former Japanese Ambassador to Australia, who is also, among several roles, Senior Fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.

They discuss this week’s “blizzard of Indo-Pacific diplomacy”, which has included the Quad Foreign Minister’s meeting in Tokyo, a US-Japan 2+2, an ASEAN meeting in Laos, and a visit by Foreign Minister Penny Wong to several countries in Asia including South Korea, where she made strong remarks about North Korea’s deepening ties with Russia.

They also cover the prospect of Japan’s joining AUKUS Pillar Two, to collaborate on cutting-edge defence technologies.

It’s a fascinating recap on some of this week’s big events with two leading experts on Japan.

By Professor Guibourg Delamotte

Stop the World: Not just another conversation on Russia, with Mark Galeotti

This week on the pod, David Wroe interviews Russia expert Mark Galeotti. Mark is a renowned author of many books, including ‘We Need to Talk About Putin’ and ‘Downfall: Prigozhin, Putin, and the new fight for the future of Russia’, and host of the podcast ‘In Moscow’s Shadows’.

David asks Mark for an update on Russia’s war on Ukraine, whether time is on Ukraine or Russia’s side, the impacts of the war on Russia domestically and Putin’s hold on power. They also discuss the increase of Russia’s sabotage activities across Europe and the potential impacts of the US elections on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Mark is a true Russia expert and he’s full of insights that you’re unlikely to have heard elsewhere.

Guests:

⁠David Wroe⁠

⁠Mark Galeotti

Stop the World: Japan’s security, partnerships and regional strategic outlook with Narushige Michishita

In this episode of Stop the World, we bring you the penultimate episode in our special series recorded from the sidelines of the ASPI Defence Conference ‘JoiningFORCES’.

This interview is all about Japan and regional security. Dr Euan Graham, Senior ASPI Analyst speaks with Narushige Michishita, professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo and Japan Scholar with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. The conversation covers Japan’s perspective on the strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific, the role of the US-Japan alliance and the evolution of the Australia-Japan relationship. Euan and Michishita also discuss Japan’s major investments in defence, including a promise to increase defence funding by 60 percent, and opportunities to increase regional cooperation on security, including through AUKUS.

Note: This episode was recorded on the sidelines of the conference, so please forgive the less than perfect audio quality.

Guests:

⁠Euan Graham⁠

⁠Narushige Michishita

Stop the World: EU security and strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific

This week on Stop the World, ASPI Senior Analyst Alex Bristow speaks to Niclas Kvarnström, Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European ExternalAction Service, to discuss the European Union’s engagement in and relationship with the Indo-Pacific.

With war in Europe and conflict in the Middle East, they discuss how much capacity the European Union (EU) has to focus on the Indo-Pacific, how Russia’s war on Ukraine has forced a rethink of the EU’s future security, as well as its relationship with China.

And in the episode’s second segment, Alex is joined by William Leben, Expert Associate at the Australian National University’s National Security College, to unpack his recent ASPI report ‘Escalation risks in the Indo-Pacific: a review for practitioners’. They discuss the main threats to strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific, how a potential crisis in the region might develop, and whether or not AUKUS will contribute to a balance of power in the region.

Mentioned in this episode:

⁠https://www.aspi.org.au/report/escalation-risks-indo-pacific-review-practitioners#:~:text=The%20outbreak%20of%20war%20in,potential%20miscalculations%20heighten%20the%20risk⁠.

Guests:

⁠Alex Bristow⁠

Niclas Kvarnström

⁠William Leben

Stop the World: Defence innovation and the pathway to Pillar 2 success

This double episode of Stop the World is all about defence innovation.

ASPI’s Director of Defence Strategy and National Security Bec Shrimpton speaks to Anduril’s Vice President of Strategy for Australia and the Asia Pacific Pete Quinn, the Executive Chairman and Chief Executive at Anduril Australia and Asia Pacific David Goodrich, as well as ASPI Visiting Senior Fellow Keirin Joyce.

They discuss the importance of autonomous systems, what role they can play in the Australian Defence Force, and how they can be used to help deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

Later in the episode, ASPI’s Strategic Communications Manager Steph Tiller speaks to Senior Defence Economist and ASPI Senior Fellow George Henneke to unpack his new report ‘AUKUS Pillar 2 critical pathways: a road map to enabling international collaboration’. They discuss the report’s findings and explore the key reforms that Australia should focus on to ensure that Pillar 2 is a success.

Mentioned in this episode:

⁠https://www.aspi.org.au/index.php/report/aukus-pillar-2-critical-pathways-road-map-enabling-international-collaboration⁠

Guests:

⁠Bec Shrimpton⁠

⁠Pete Quinn⁠

⁠David Goodrich⁠

⁠Keirin Joyce⁠

⁠Steph Tiller⁠

⁠George Henneke

Stop the World: Why auld acquaintance should ne’er be forgot

Australia and the United Kingdom have a lot of shared history and values, but not a lot of shared geography. For a long time, that left the strategic relationship feeling a little dusty—a friendship to be taken for granted. But the two countries’ security partnership has a sense of deepening urgency, with the creation of AUKUS, the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt and the recent signing of a new defence and security cooperation agreement. With Russia’s war against Ukraine and Chinese regional assertiveness, Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are increasingly seen as tied.

To unpack these developments, ASPI’s Stop the World podcast is devoting today’s episode to the Australia-UK strategic relationship.

ASPI senior analyst Alex Bristow speaks with UK High Commissioner Vicki Treadell and Alessio Patalano, professor of war and strategy in East Asia at King’s College London. And in the episode’s second session, ASPI senior analyst Euan Graham speaks with Philip Shetler-Jones, senior research fellow in Indo-Pacific security at the Royal United Services Institute.

Guests:

⁠Alex Bristow⁠

⁠Vicki Treadell⁠

⁠Alessio Patalano⁠

⁠Euan Graham⁠

⁠Philip Shetler-Jones⁠

Tag Archive for: Alliances

ASPI and STEPI sign MoU for future cooperation on technology policy

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AUKUS Messaging Roundtable

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Foursight Task Force

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Fireside chat with Pat Conroy and Bec Shrimpton

On 6 December 2023, Bec Shrimpton, ASPI’s Director of Defence Strategy and National Security participated in AMCHAM’s ‘Meet the Minister: Business Luncheon’ featuring the Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry and Minister for International Development and the Pacific.

After the Minister delivered his address at the event, Bec and Minister Conroy sat down for a fireside chat. The discussion covered a diverse range of topics including AUKUS, the upcoming Defence Industry Development Strategy and the role of Australian sovereign industry capability within it, how Australian industry can better access Defence grants and contracts, the improvements needed to achieve greater agility, certainty and performance in defence acquisition, as well as defence innovation. The Minister took a range of questions and also discussed Australia’s unique engagement advantages and responsibilities in the Pacific, including the importance of sports diplomacy.

ASPI luncheon briefing with Korean ambassador, His Excellency Mr Kim Wan-joong

ASPI’s Justin Bassi, Afeeya Akhand and Dr Alex Bristow had the pleasure of briefing the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, His Excellency Mr Kim Wan-joong, on ASPI’s report about the future of the Australia-Republic of Korea partnership. The meeting took place over lunch at the Ambassador’s residence.

Co-authored by Afeeya Akhand and Dr Alex Bristow, the report recommends ways to strengthen cooperation across the Australia-Republic of Korea Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including in defence, critical technology, clean energy and people-to-people ties.

ASPI also had the opportunity to brief stakeholders from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Defence, National Security College and Korean Institute for Defense Analysis through the report’s pre-launch event at the ASPI office.

The report can be accessed here.

Left to Right: Ms Jung Hyunjung, Ms Afeeya Akhand, His Excellency Mr Kim Wan-joong, Mr Justin Bassi, Mr Jeon Joyoung, Dr Alex Bristow

ASPI DC hosts visit from Speaker of Assembly of Tonga, Lord Fakafānua

On 12th April, ASPI DC hosted a visit with the Speaker of Assembly of Tonga, Lord Fakafānua, retired Ambassador Steven McGann and Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Cleo Paskal. During the visit Australia’s strong relationship with Tonga and diplomatic relations in the Pacific were discussed, as well as a shared love for sports diplomacy!

AUKUS Trilateral Initiative

On the 20th and 21st of March, ASPI DC convened with the Center for New American Studies (CNAS) and the Centre for Grand Strategy at Kings College London (KCL) its second trilateral AUKUS Initiative. This Track 1.5 event brought together high-ranking officials and industry representation from across the United States, Australian and UK governments to discuss the AUKUS announcement, and was concluded with a dinner attended by Australian Ambassador to the United States, Kevin Rudd, who gave a speech.

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Iain MacGillivray was interviewed by War on the Rocks

On March 14th, ASPI DC Analyst, Iain MacGillivray was interviewed by War on the Rocks on their podcast episode, Australia’s Pathway to Acquire Nuclear Submarines. Iain highlighted the immense opportunity AUKUS Pillar 1 holds for Australia and the US in pursing shared strategic interests, but also drew attention to the challenges of revitalizing Australia’s industrial base and the questions around the US’ capacity to meet their own defense at the current manufacturing rate of SSN’s and availability of skilled workers to grow this capability.

ASPI DC host Western Australian Government Delegation

On March 10th, ASPI DC hosted a delegation led by the Hon. Bill Johnston MLA, Western Australia’s Minister for Mines and Petroleum, Energy, to discuss critical minerals strategy. The discussion was key in highlighting the importance of WA to Australia’s critical mineral supply chains and potential for strong collaboration with US industry and government, and informed thinking around ASPI DC’s broader project on paradiplomacy project.