The ‘official’ histories of Australian and British intelligence: lessons learned and next steps

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Unclassified, official histories of ‘secret’ intelligence organisations, for public readership, seem a contradiction in terms. These ‘official’ works are commissioned by the agencies in question and directly informed by those agencies’ own records, thus distinguishing them from other, outsider historical accounts. But while such official intelligence histories are relatively new, sometimes controversial, and often challenging for historians and agencies alike, the experiences of the Australian and British intelligence communities suggest they’re a promising development for scholarship, maintaining public trust and informed public discourse, and more effective functioning of national security agencies. Furthermore, these histories remain an ongoing project for Australia’s National Intelligence Community (NIC).

Gender mainstreaming in United Nations peace operations: an unfulfilled promise?

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The principle of gender equality is a cornerstone of the United Nations (UN). Centred on equal access to rights, opportunities, resources and decision-making powers irrespective of gender, it’s embedded within the UN Charter and championed in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Mechanisms such as the inaugural resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agreed to in 2000 by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and the adoption of an additional nine WPS resolutions, further represent the critical intent to achieve this goal. The purpose of such WPS mechanisms is to cultivate gender balance, foster diverse leadership and champion gender equality in a global effort to establish sustainable peace after conflict.

Yet, as we stand on the threshold of the 25th anniversary of UNSC resolution 1325, the UN’s stride towards gender equality for uniformed women in peace operations has been ‘exceedingly slow’. The lofty aspiration of ‘equal opportunity peacekeeping’ through gender mainstreaming policies and practices remains elusive, entangled in a web of misconceptions and entrenched systemic barriers and institutional challenges.
The purpose of this ASPI report is threefold.

First, it examines the blocks to implementation and the effects of gender mainstreaming strategies.
Second, it advances three strategic interventions for the UN system and its global peace and security community:

  • redefining peacekeeping benchmarks for an efficient and effective uniformed component
  • shifting the narrative on peacekeepers’ contributions regardless of gender
  • incorporating feminist voices and practices in the development of policies and practices for the deployment of peacekeepers.

These proposed interventions offer a unique prospect for the final section of this report: encouraging Australian Government departments and agencies that have responsibilities for and commitments to execute the Australian National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS. Those commitments extend to fostering gender equality in both domestic and international WPS endeavours, thereby strengthening Australia’s position as a proactive UN member state.

Full tilt: The UK’s defence role in the Pacific: Views from The Strategist

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Britain has a new prime minister, Keir Starmer, leading its first Labour government in 14 years. Key questions for us now are how Britain under Labour will approach the security partnership with Australia and whether London will remain committed to investing defence resources in the Indo-Pacific.

This report provides vital context for addressing these questions. In this series of articles, originally published in ASPI’s The Strategist this year, ASPI authors review the historical underpinnings and future course of Britain’s strategic recoupling with Australia and this region, especially the Pacific Islands, from perspectives ranging from deterrence to climate resilience.

The report makes some recommendations for how to strengthen the Australia-UK defence partnership and shape Britain’s approach to our region.

A national strategic warning intelligence capability for Australia

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Australia’s strategic warning time has collapsed—in response to profound geopolitical shifts. As the ADF is adapting to the hard implications of this change, so must the national intelligence community (NIC).

Australian Government decision-makers need time and insight to identify and prioritise threats (and opportunities) and devise effective responses. Strategic warning intelligence enables and empowers them to do so. But it must be done in a way that keeps up with the rapid pace of geopolitical and technological change, and a widening array of non-traditional strategic threats, and in a fashion best suited to Australia’s circumstances.

To meet this need the NIC should develop a discrete, institutional strategic warning intelligence function—an Australian Centre for Strategic Warning (ACSW). This would recognise the distinct skills, analytical focus and interface with decision-making entailed—and the vital national interests at stake. In implementing an ACSW, much can be learned from our own and other intelligence communities’ ongoing efforts to adapt to threats other than invasion—notably terrorism and pandemics. This will be especially pertinent in its application to grey-zone threats such as economic coercion.

Done right, an ACSW would be an important addition to the suite of Australia’s statecraft tools.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9

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The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months.

Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include;

1. Defence in the North,

2. Developing Northern Australia,

3. Northern Australia and the Indo-Pacific

4. Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities,

5. Space, Food Security and Climate Trends

As in previous editions, Volume 9 contains a range of expert opinions across these varied topics.

Volume 9 also features a foreword by the Hon. Eva Lawler, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Lawler calls readers attention to the relevance of northern Australia in light of the National Defence Strategy and updated Integrated Investment Program as well as Australia’s economic ambitions, stating “the strategies in this volume can inform our efforts to unlock northern Australia’s full potential and build a stronger, more resilient nation.”

The 36 articles discuss practical policy solutions for decision makers facilitating development, prosperity and security of northern Australia. These policy solutions tackle both the challenges and opportunities present in the north, and reflect the potential of the north to increasingly contribute to Australia’s national security and economic prosperity.

Switzerland summit should give peace a chance, but only on Ukraine’s terms

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This weekend’s Summit on Peace in Ukraine is a misnomer. It’s not about an immediate end to the war but about finding ways to strengthen Ukraine’s hand so that it heads to the negotiating table on its own terms and timing, and that we have a reasonable chance of a peace that is both acceptable and durable.

Hosted by Switzerland, it will bring together leaders from about 100 countries ranging from Germany and France to Japan and Southeast Asian nations.

Russia has not been invited and has said it wouldn’t attend anyway. That’s good, because the goal cannot be to seek agreement on a ceasefire just to stop the fighting by any means. As with Crimea in 2014, a confected outcome would enable Russia simply to ease off until it feels confident to resume its invasion.

Instead, the conference should rally behind the Ronald Reagan doctrine of peace through strength. As Reagan told the 1980 Republican party convention—in remarks that some of today’s Republicans might usefully heed: ‘War comes not when the forces of freedom are strong but when they are weak. It is then that tyrants are tempted.’

This will likely require a willingness to escalate the conflict in the short term to ensure de-escalation can happen on Ukraine’s terms and to all of our long term benefit.

The conference attendees cannot allow—perfectly legitimate—humanitarian concerns, short term economic challenges or disinformation peddled by regimes propping up the Russian war machine to distract from the harsh reality—Ukraine has chosen as a nation to fight bravely at great human cost. Given they are fighting for basic values that keep the rest of us safer—as Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said as he increasingly desperately seeks continued international support—we owe the nation a post-war reconstruction and political plan that enables them to live with some confidence as Russia’s neighbour. This means not only helping Ukraine with the capabilities to fight against Russia but to help give them something to fight for.

No one would deny that this is a tough road for Ukraine and, in different ways, for its supporters internationally. But the price of allowing Russia to win or to enjoy impunity for the most flagrant violation of international rules in decades is incalculable for global security and stability.

That is the case for countries as geographically distant as Australia. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is not attending, and nor is any other minister on the National Security Committee of Cabinet.

This is disappointing for a democracy such as Australia, which enjoys security and prosperity because of support from other democracies in times of war—both hot and cold. True, China’s Premier Li Qiang is visiting in the coming days, but the Peace Summit is too important a gathering for not one of our key ministers to attend—and it would be deeply worrying if any senior government ministers and officials undervalue Europe’s importance to Australia and view the war as being fought a long way from our shores.

That said, it is positive that the minister attending, National Disability and Insurance Scheme Minister Bill Shorten will be viewed internationally as a former leader of the opposition—a very senior figure in the mould of Kim Beazley—with orthodox views on security.

As a former party and union leader, Shorten will take with him the experience that any type of negotiation—whether employment, trade, political or peace—is a contest in which the respective strength of each party is vital to the outcome and its lasting nature.

A favourable outcome to the war is not just a regional dilemma for Europe but is important for Australia and the Indo-Pacific, and any Russian ‘win’ would translate into insecurity for us.

There are no perfect analogies between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The European theatre is predominantly land, while the Indo-Pacific is maritime, which means lessons at the operational level must be carefully interpreted. However, the strategic and political parallels are clear, from the global trust in liberal democracies and the US alliance system to confidence in effective constraint of aggressive authoritarian regimes and longstanding nuclear deterrence. A future in which Russia cannot be beaten back and deterrence effectively re-established in Europe automatically means deterrence is immeasurably weaker everywhere else, including in our region.

As Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida consistently states, ‘today’s Ukraine could be tomorrow’s East Asia’.

Indeed, the likely reason China is skipping the summit is that Beijing correctly judges it will not further Russia’s, and therefore its own, war aims. A Russian victory would recalibrate expectations about authoritarian aggression being held to account, and this would clearly benefit Beijing.

China is supporting Russia economically and materially, propping up its industrial capacity and supplying dual use goods that enable Russia to restock weapons and parts of weapons. Throughout history, wars have most often been won by out-producing the enemy.

This should be called out through a joint statement at the conference. A declaration that condemns countries such as North Korea and Iran for supporting Russia but stays silent on China would represent an appeasement that would only embolden Beijing to dig its heels in to help a Russian victory.

Prominent opponents of support for Ukraine tend to be isolationists or to be narrowly China-focused. The latter claim that the US and allied effort must not be distracted by Europe and should be aimed only at countering China as the pacing and long-term threat. They’re right that Beijing is the more enduring challenge, but they are wrong to think that tolerating Russia’s onslaught against its neighbour would better place us to tackle China’s own malign activity.

To deter all of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, none can be ignored or tolerated. Freedom and sovereignty are not protected by picking and choosing which international rules are enforced and which regimes are appeased.

Australia and our region depend on the rules-based order even though some loud voices criticise the concept as increasingly quixotic. A world without rules such as the observance of other states’ territorial integrity and freedom of navigation at sea is worse than anarchy—it would mean aggressive authoritarian states such as Russia and China are free to achieve their strategic goals at the expense of others’ freedom and sovereignty while the rest of us live in hope that our silence and passivity means we are not next.

This means Australia should be firmly in the camp of helping Ukraine to determine any peace agreement to end the war. It cannot be resolved by other countries—or individual leaders—negotiating with Putin without Ukraine.

Given the relatively small cost of supporting Ukraine, Beijing would only interpret our giving up Ukraine as a sign of general western weakness, indifference, short-sightedness and self-absorption. It would be emboldened.

The argument that supporting Ukraine amounts to an opportunity cost to more important  priorities just doesn’t add up, considering the cost of Ukraine support is actually very mild. Indeed some might argue it is the bargain of a lifetime—as the Ukrainians are doing the fighting.

The objective for this conference must be peace through strength—both Ukraine’s and our own.

Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence

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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is delighted to share its latest report – the result of a multi-year project on Artificial Intelligence (AI), technical standards and diplomacy – that conducts a deep-dive into the important, yet often opaque and complicated world of technical standards.

At the heart of how AI technologies are developed, deployed and used in a responsible manner sit a suite of technical standards: rules, guidelines and characteristics that ensure the safety, security and interoperability of a product.

The report authors highlight that the Indo-Pacific, including Australia and India, are largely playing catch-up in AI standards initiatives. The United States and China are leading the pack, followed by European nations thanks to their size, scope and resources of their national standardisation communities as well as their domestic AI sectors.

Not being strongly represented in the world of AI governance and technical standards is a strategic risk for Indo-Pacific nations. For a region that’s banking on the opportunities of a digital and technology-enabled economy and has large swathes of its population in at-risk jobs, it’s a matter of national and economic security that Indo-Pacific stakeholders are active and have a big say in how AI technologies will operate and be used.

Being part of the conversations and negotiations is everything, and as such, governments in the Indo-Pacific – including Australia and India – should invest more in whole-of-nation techdiplomacy capabilities.

Authored by analysts at ASPI and India’s Centre for Internet and Society, this new report ‘Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence: A techdiplomacy playbook for policymakers and technologists in the Indo-Pacific’ – and accompanying website (https://www.techdiplomacy.aspi.org.au/) – explains the current state of play in global AI governance, looks at the role of technical standards, outlines how agreements on technical standards are negotiated and created, and describes who are the biggest ‘movers and shakers’.

The authors note that there are currently no representatives from Southeast Asia (except Singapore), Australia, NZ or the Pacific Islands on the UN Secretary-General Advisory Body on AI – a body that’s tasked to come up with suggestions on how to govern AI in a representative and inclusive manner with an eye to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The capacity of the Indo-Pacific to engage in critical technology standards has historically been lower in comparison to other regions. However, given the rapid and global impact of AI and the crucial role of technical standards, the report authors argue that dialogue and greater collaboration between policymakers, technologists and civil society has never been more important.

It is hoped this playbook will help key stakeholders – governments, industry, civil society and academia – step through the different aspects of negotiating technical standards for AI, while also encouraging the Indo-Pacific region to step up and get more involved.

The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence budget brief 2024-2025

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Australia needs to spend more on defence—and it needs to do so immediately. The strategic imperative has been firmly established in the government’s own major defence documents.

The Albanese government and the Coalition opposition agree that we are in the gravest geopolitical period in generations and this is only going to intensify.

But as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s latest Cost of Defence report finds, the rhetorical urgency is not being matched by action in the form of defence investment. The May budget is the latest demonstration of this mismatch, lacking spending for swift increases in capabilities that the Australian Defence Force would need if our region were to deteriorate quickly.

In particular, this year’s budget priorities are not directed towards strengthening the Australian Defence Force’s ability to fight in the next decade.

This is not doom-mongering; the government has acknowledged that the warning time before any conflict, which had long been set at 10 years, has shrunk to effectively zero time.

We have war in Ukraine and the Middle East, aggression and increasingly dangerous and unprofessional behaviour from China causing instability and confrontation in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait, erosions of the rule of law and revisionist agendas from authoritarians. Instability is heightened by foreign interference, economic coercion and artificial intelligence-enabled dangers such as cyber attacks and disinformation.

If war were to break out at any time in the next 10 years, our military would essentially fight with the force it has today. Based on current resourcing, nothing significant will change over the decade.

Most of the major new capabilities in the government’s defence investment blueprint are two decades away from being fully fielded. That blueprint does contain some shorter-term enhancements, but these will not be fielded until the 2030s.

The welcome $5.7 billion in new defence spending over the four-year forward estimates period is devoted to just three priorities: the AUKUS submarines, the next fleet of surface warships and investment in long-range strike, targeting and autonomous systems. But two thirds of this funding doesn’t arrive until 2027-28. The relatively impressive longer term plan leaves us vulnerable in the immediate period ahead. More money immediately is not a silver bullet, and ambition must be balanced with how much Defence can actually spend each year. But the nation’s security requires a two-pronged strategy of enhancing our existing force to meet threats within the decade while investing in long term capabilities.

Other countries are furiously pursuing new capabilities that can be put into action quickly—such as creating masses of small drones and prototyping and developing new technologies.

We talk about technology and asymmetric advantage—playing to your strengths and finding effective means to exploit an opponent’s weaknesses–yet we lack a credible pathway to bring them into operation to bolster the force we have today.

Over the longer term, the picture starts gradually to improve. The $50 billion in additional spending over the next decade is an important commitment, even if far away. The plan for a complete recapitalisation of the surface combatant fleet will eventually give us the biggest and most capable navy Australia has had since World War Two.

But, so far, we are failing to grasp the opportunity to link our traditional large platforms such as submarines and warships to more modern developments in warfare—drones and various small uncrewed and smart capabilities. AI, robotics, electronic warfare and space capabilities remain aspirational, without any pathway for inclusion and integration into a truly focused force capable of meaningful deterrence and warfighting. That is why it is so important to realise AUKUS Pillar II, which is dealing with these capabilities.

It’s easy to criticise; harder to do. All governments are grappling with tight budgets amid competing demands and the unremitting expectations of voters and taxpayers. As a nation, we need to accept the need for higher defence spending. Hoping that conflict won’t come is not a viable strategy. If we are prepared for war, we have a better chance of deterring and hence averting it.

Europe is living that lesson now, having put all hope in the judgment that global trade and economic entanglement would bring security. Now it is clear that military investment is imperative to deter war or best prepare nations for it.

The government has a vital responsibility to speak plainly to the nation about the geopolitical risks and the possibility of conflict.

We need to grasp the challenge that is in front of us today, not in three or five years’ time. Otherwise, we risk delivering on Macarthur’s famous two word warning: “The history of failure in war can almost always be summed up in two words: “Too late.” Too late in comprehending the deadly enemy. Too late in realizing the mortal danger. Too late in preparedness. Too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance.”

Why take the risk of only acting after a crisis and saying better late than never? The world in turmoil demands we act in real time to both deter crises and be best prepared for them.

Nobody wins unless everybody wins: The Coles review into the sustainment of Australia’s Collins-class submarines

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In 2003, Australia became the proud owner of the last of six new-build Collins-class submarines. Less than a decade later, the fleet was in a poor state of repair, and at times only one or two of the boats were available to the Royal Australian Navy. This account by Andrew Davies explains how the situation was remediated by bringing in a team of highly experienced naval professionals to take an uncompromising look at the arrangements in place to manage a vital national defence asset.

Despite a public perception that the submarines were inherently defective, the problems were in fact almost entirely due to dysfunctional and often rancorous organisational dynamics between the key players. In the space of just a few years, and with remarkably little required in the way of additional funding, the situation took a dramatic turn for the better.

As with earlier ASPI case studies on defence projects, Nobody wins unless everybody wins is designed to help those in Defence, industry and parliament and other interested observers to better understand the complexities of the business, all with the aim of improving how Australia equips and sustains its defence force.

Other monographs in this series:

Deterrence, escalation and strategic stability: rebuilding Australia’s muscle memory

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To build an effective deterrence strategy, Australia needs urgently to improve its skills and understanding of deterrence, and raise the topic’s profile in our public and policy discussions. Despite having previously been a global thought leader on nuclear weapons and deterrence half a century ago, Australia today doesn’t have a strong grasp of the basics of modern deterrence.

Knowledge of and literacy in deterrence are vital for adapting and applying such concepts to meet today’s extraordinarily complex, multidomain and multidimensional requirements. A lack of understanding of deterrence can critically undermine the ability to get strategy and policy right. The implications for Australia’s national interests are urgent and serious. The limited debate in Australia about what good deterrence strategy looks like and its key components can’t be advanced without better understanding of key terms and ideas that are fundamental to deterrence theory and practice.

There are, of course, obvious limits to what Australia can achieve alone. Our ability to integrate and combine our military capabilities with those of the US and other critical partners is fundamental to our ability to achieve our security objectives, but some of our partners are working more closely together on building deterrence strategies. We have some catching up to do.

This report explains what deterrence is and why it matters. It looks at Australian deterrence policy in practice and at deterrence efforts by some of our partners and allies and it highlights a number of gaps in Australia’s strategic and deterrence planning.

The report makes a series of policy recommendations for government, and especially for the Department of Defence, to rebuild Australia’s position as a thought leader on deterrence.