Connecting the Indo-Pacific: The future of subsea cables and opportunities for Australia
This report examines the role of hyperscalers as drivers of the subcable market and the geostrategic context of subcable systems; it highlights the significance of these developments for Australia, exploring both the potential benefits and challenges.
Submarine cable networks are critical infrastructure; they carry nearly all public internet and private network data traffic, facilitating global economic and financial activity as well as government and military communications and operations.
The submarine cable landscape has entered a new era and is now shaped by the rising participation of hyperscalers—hyperscale cloud and content providers— as well as the strategic actions of major powers and minilateral groups. The report examines the significance of this for Australia and explores how Australia can capitalise on these evolving dynamics to solidify its position as a regional digital hub in the Indo-Pacific by improving regional subcable resilience and digital connectivity, including its own.
This report makes five key recommendations, including that the Australian Government supports and strengthens regional repair and maintenance capabilities, ensuring that the management and protection of cables remains best practice, while continuing to work with regional partners to shape the regulatory norms and standards of the region. Additionally, to manage risks to Australia’s data security and digital economy ambitions, this report recommends that the Australian Government engages more closely with industry, makes potential regulatory adjustments, and maintains strategic oversight and vigilance to digital supply-chain dependency risks and anticompetitive behaviour.
Not only will those measures build connectivity and resilience domestically and regionally, but they align with Australia’s foreign-policy, development, security and cyber objectives, and will also support Australia’s growth and attractiveness as a subcables hub.
The future of intelligence analysis: US-Australia project on AI and human machine teaming
Dr Alex Caples is Director of The Sydney Dialogue, ASPI’s annual summit for critical, emerging and cyber technologies.
Previously, she was Director of Cyber, Technology and Security at ASPI.
Alex is a former diplomat and national security official whose career spans over 20 years’ in Defence, the Office of National Intelligence, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Department of Foreign Affairs, including postings to Canada and Afghanistan.
Between 2019-2023, Alex was an Associate Director, Operations Advisory and Director, Policy Evaluation and Public Impact at professional services firm KPMG, supporting Commonwealth and State Governments on policy and program design and implementation.
Prior to this, Alex held various senior policy advisor roles in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s National Security Division, including Director of Law Enforcement and Border Security, Director Cyber Security Policy and Director Crisis Management. In this capacity Alex provided advice to Government on a wide range of security legislation, policy and operations, including critical infrastructure security, foreign interference, cyberspace, telecommunications security, digital identity management, intelligence and border security.
During 2011-2012, Alex was a Senior Analyst for Transnational Issues at the Office of National Intelligence, where she provided senior executives and Ministers with all-source analysis on people smuggling, regional law enforcement and transnational crime.
Alex is an Australian Defence Force Academy Graduate. She holds a PhD in International Relations from Monash University (2007).
ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker: The rewards of long-term research investment
The Critical Technology Tracker is a large data-driven project that now covers 64 critical technologies spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas. It provides a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology capability.
It first launched 1 March 2023 and underwent a major expansion on 28 August 2024 which took the dataset from five years (previously, 2018–2022) to 21 years (2003–2023). Explore the website and the broader project here.
Governments and organisations interested in supporting this ongoing program of work, including further expansions and the addition of new technologies, can contact: criticaltech@aspi.org.au.
Executive Summary
This report accompanies a major update of ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website,1 which reveals the countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—leading scientific and research innovation in critical technologies. It does that by focusing on high-impact research—the top 10% of the most highly cited papers—as a leading indicator of a country’s research performance, strategic intent and potential future science and technology (S&T) capability.
Now covering 64 critical technologies and crucial fields spanning defence, space, energy, the environment, artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, robotics, cyber, computing, advanced materials and key quantum technology areas, the Tech Tracker’s dataset has been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)2 to 21 years of data (2003–2023).3
These new results reveal the stunning shift in research leadership over the past two decades towards large economies in the Indo-Pacific, led by China’s exceptional gains. The US led in 60 of 64 technologies in the five years from 2003 to 2007, but in the most recent five years (2019–2023) is leading in seven. China led in just three of 64 technologies in 2003–20074 but is now the lead country in 57 of 64 technologies in 2019–2023, increasing its lead from our rankings last year (2018–2022), where it was leading in 52 technologies.
India is also emerging as a key centre of global research innovation and excellence, establishing its position as an S&T power. That said, the US, the UK and a range of countries from Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East have maintained hard-won strengths in high-impact research in some key technology areas, despite the accelerated efforts of emerging S&T powers.
This report examines short- and long-term trends, to generate unique insights. We have updated the recent five-year results (2019–2023) to show current research performance rankings (top 5 country results are in Appendix 1). We have also analysed our new historical dataset to understand the country and institutional trends in research performance over the full 21-year period. In select technologies we have also made projections, based on current trends, for China and the US to 2030.
The results show the points in time at which countries have gained, lost or are at risk of losing their global edge in scientific research and innovation. The historical data provides a new layer of depth and context, revealing the performance trajectory different countries have taken, where the momentum lies and also where longer term dominance over the full two decades might reflect foundational expertise and capabilities that carry forward even when that leader has been edged out more recently by other countries. The results also help to shed light on the countries, and many of the institutions, from which we’re likely to see future innovations and breakthroughs emerge.
China’s new gains have occurred in quantum sensors, high-performance computing, gravitational sensors, space launch and advanced integrated circuit design and fabrication (semiconductor chip making). The US leads in quantum computing, vaccines and medical countermeasures, nuclear medicine and radiotherapy, small satellites, atomic clocks, genetic engineering and natural language processing.
India now ranks in the top 5 countries for 45 of 64 technologies (an increase from 37 last year) and has displaced the US as the second-ranked country in two new technologies (biological manufacturing and distributed ledgers) to rank second in seven of 64 technologies. Another notable change involves the UK, which has dropped out of the top 5 country rankings in eight technologies, declining from 44 last year to 36 now.
Besides India and the UK, the performance of most secondary S&T research powers (those countries ranked behind China and the US) in the top 5 rankings is largely unchanged: Germany (27), South Korea (24), Italy (15), Iran (8), Japan (8) and Australia (7).
We have continued to measure the risk of countries holding a monopoly in research for some critical technologies, based on the share of high-impact research output and the number of leading institutions the dominant country has. The number of technologies classified as ‘high risk’ has jumped from 14 technologies last year to 24 now. China is the lead country in every one of the technologies newly classified as high risk—putting a total of 24 of 64 technologies at high risk of a Chinese monopoly. Worryingly, the technologies newly classified as high risk includes many with defence applications, such as radar, advanced aircraft engines, drones, swarming and collaborative robots and satellite positioning and navigation.
In terms of institutions, US technology companies, including Google, IBM, Microsoft and Meta, have leading or strong positions in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and computing technologies. Key government agencies and national labs also perform well, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which excels in space and satellite technologies. The results also show that the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—thought to be the world’s largest S&T institution5—is by far the world’s highest performing institution in the Critical Tech Tracker, with a global lead in 31 of 64 technologies (an increase from 29 last year, see more on CAS in the breakout box on page 19).
The results in this report should serve as a reminder to governments around the world that gaining and maintaining scientific and research excellence isn’t a tap that can be turned on and off. Too often, countries have slowed or stopped investing in, for example, research and development (R&D) and manufacturing capability, in areas in which they had a long-term competitive advantage (5G technologies are an example6). In a range of essential sectors, democratic nations risk losing hard-won, long-term advantages in cutting-edge science and research—the crucial ingredient that underpins much of the development and advancement of the world’s most important technologies. There’s also a risk that retreats in some areas could mean that democratic nations aren’t well positioned to take advantage of new and emerging technologies, including those that don’t exist yet.
Meanwhile, the longitudinal results in the Critical Tech Tracker enable us to see how China’s enormous investments and decades of strategic planning are now paying off.7
Building technological capability requires a sustained investment in, and an accumulation of, scientific knowledge, talent and high-performing institutions that can’t be acquired through only short-term or ad hoc investments.8 Reactive policies by new governments and the sugar hit of immediate budget savings must be balanced against the cost of losing the advantage gained from decades of investment and strategic planning. While China continues to extend its lead, it’s important for other states to take stock of their historical, combined and complementary strengths in all key critical technology areas.
This report is made up of several sections. Below you’ll find a summary of the key country and institutional findings followed by an explanation of why tracking historical research performance matters. We then further analyse the nuances of China’s lead and briefly explain our methodology (see Appendix 2 for a detailed methodology). We also look more closely at 10 critical technology areas, including those relevant to AI, semiconductors, defence, energy, biotechnology and communications. Appendix 1 contains visual snapshots of top 5 country rankings in the 64 critical technologies.
We encourage you to visit ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker website (https://techtracker.aspi.org.au) and explore the new data.
What is ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker?
ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker is a unique dataset that allows users to track 64 technologies that are foundational for our economies, societies, national security, defence, energy production, health and climate security. It focuses on the top 10% of the most highly cited research publications from the past 21 years (2003–2023).9 The new dataset is analysed to generate insights into which countries and institutions—universities, national labs, companies and government agencies—are publishing the greatest share of innovative and high-impact research. We use the top 10% because those publications have a higher impact on the full technology life cycle and are more likely to lead to patents, drive future research innovation and underpin technological breakthroughs.10
Critical technologies are current or emerging technologies that have the potential to enhance or threaten our societies, economies and national security. Most are dual- or multi-use and have applications in a wide range of sectors. By focusing early in the science and technology (S&T) life cycle, rather than examining technologies already in existence and fielded, the Critical Technology Tracker doesn’t just provide insights into a country’s research performance, but also its strategic intent and potential future S&T capability. It’s only one piece of the puzzle, of course: it must be acknowledged that actualising and commercialising research performance into major technological gains, no matter how impressive a breakthrough is, can be a difficult, expensive and complicated process. A range of other inputs are needed, such as an efficient manufacturing base and ambitious policy implementation.
The Tech Tracker’s dataset has now been expanded and updated from five years of data (previously, 2018–2022)11 to 21 years of data (2003–2023). This follows previous attempts to benchmark research output across nations by focusing on quality over quantity, key technology areas and individual institutions, as well as short-term, long-term and potential future trends. This update continues ASPI’s investment in creating the highest quality dataset of its kind.12
Both the website and two associated reports (this one included) provide decision-makers with an empirical methodology to inform policy and investment decisions, including decisions on which countries and institutions they partner with and in what technology areas. A list of the 64 technologies, including definitions, is on our website.13 Other parts of this project include:
- the Tech Tracker website: ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker14 contains an enormous amount of original data analysis. We encourage you to explore these datasets online as you engage with this report. Users can compare countries, regions or groupings (the EU, the Quad, China–Russia etc.) and explore the global flow of research talent for each technology.
- the 2023 report: We encourage readers to explore the original report, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power.15 In addition to analysing last year’s key findings, it outlined why research is vital for S&T advances and it examined China’s S&T vision. The report also made 23 policy recommendations, which remain relevant today.16
- visual snapshots: Readers looking for a summary of the top 5 countries ranked by their past five years of performance in all 64 technologies (see example below) can jump to Appendix 1.
Data source: ASPI Critical Technology Tracker.
Full Report
For the full report, please download here.
- Critical Technology Tracker, ASPI, Canberra. ↩︎
- Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, ASPI, Canberra, 1 March 2023. ↩︎
- 21-year dataset with improved search terms and institution cleaning, see Methodology for more details. ↩︎
- In the early years, such as 2003–2007, some of the 64 technologies have not yet emerged and the credits assigned to top countries or institutions are too low to be statistically significant. Where this is the case we have avoided pulling key insights from the rankings of countries and institutions in these technologies. ↩︎
- Bec Crew, ‘Nature Index 2024 Research Leaders: Chinese institutions dominate the top spots’, Nature, 18 June 2024. ↩︎
- Elsa B Kania, ‘Opinion: Why doesn’t the US have its own Huawei?’, Politico, 25 February 2020. ↩︎
- See, for example, Zachary Arnold, ‘China has become a scientific superpower’, The Economist, 12 June 2024.
‘China’, Nature, 9 August 2023, https://www.nature.com/collections/efchdhgeci ;
‘China’s science and technology vision’ and ‘China’s breakout research capabilities in defence, security and intelligence technologies’ in Gaida et al.
ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 14–20; Tarun Chhabra et al., ‘Global China: Technology’, Brookings Institution, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/global-china-technology/ ;
Jason Douglas and Clarence Leong. “The U.S. Has Been Spending Billions to Revive Manufacturing. But China Is in Another League”, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/the-u-s-has-been-spending-billions-to-revive-manufacturing-but-china-is-in-another-league-75ed6309 . ↩︎ - Eva Harris, ‘Building scientific capacity in developing countries’, EMBO Reports, 1 January 2004, 5, 7–11. ↩︎
- These technologies were selected through a review process in 2022–23 that combined our own research with elements from the Australian Government’s 2022 list of critical technologies, and lists compiled by other governments. An archived version of the Australian Government’s list is available: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 28 November 2022.
In May 2023, the Australian Government revised their list: Department of Industry, Science and Resources, ‘List of critical technologies in the national interest’, Australian Government, 19 May 2023, https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/list-critical-technologies-national-interest .
A US list is available from National Science and Technology Council, ‘Critical and emerging technologies list update’, US Government, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf .
On our selection of AUKUS Pillar 2 technologies, see Alexandra Caples et al., ‘AUKUS: three partners, two pillars, one problem’, TheStrategist, 6 June 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-three-partners-two-pillars-one-problem/ . ↩︎ - Felix Poege et al., ‘Science quality and the value of inventions’, Science Advances, 11 December 2019, 5(12):eaay7323;
Cherng Ding, et al., ‘Exploring paper characteristics that facilitate the knowledge flow from science to technology’, Journal of Informetrics, February 2017, 11(1):244–256, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joi.2016.12.004 ;
Gaida et al., ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, 9. ↩︎ - Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power. ↩︎
- See more details in the full methodology in Appendix 2. ↩︎
- ‘List of technologies’, Critical Technology Tracker. ↩︎
- Critical Technology Tracker ↩︎
- See Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power. ↩︎
- Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin, Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: the global race for future power, 44. ↩︎
Australia’s new digital ID system: finding the right way to implement it
This report reviews the Australian Government’s proposed plans for establishing a digital ID, and the ways the new system is expected to work. It explores the planned digital ID system, the key features of the approach, and the privacy and security protections that have been built into the proposals.
Australia has had a long and troubled history with national ID systems, dating back to the mid-1980 when the government failed to introduce the Australia Card. Since then, Australia has ended up with a clunky and inefficient process to identify peoples’ identities online. It has led to an oversharing and storage of sensitive personal data. As the Medibank and Optus data breaches has shown, this creates serious cybersecurity risks.
Now that Parliament has passed the Digital ID legislation, it’s critical that government gets the implementation right.
The report outlines that, although the proposed federated model for a digital ID system is commendable and a needed step-forward, there is a need to still address a range of policy issues that – if left unresolved – would jeopardise trust in the system.
Stop the World: Explainer: A quick dive into subsea cables with Jocelinn Kang and Jessie Jacob
Subsea cables have been a major focus in the media lately. Just last week at the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Tokyo, Australia announced the launch of its new Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre—its contribution to the Quad Leaders’ Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience.
So, what are subsea or undersea cables and why are they important? In this short explainer, Olivia Nelson speaks with ASPI experts Jocelinn Kang and Jessie Jacob about this vital strategic asset, where their vulnerabilities lie, and their role in Australia’s resilience.
Transcript:
Dave: Welcome to stop the world. The ASPI podcast on security and International Affairs. I’m David Wroe
Liv: and I’m Olivia Nelson.
Dave: Now, first of all, Liv, how did I not know that Tassie was completely cut off for a while in 2022?
Liv: Well you aren’t alone there, Dave. I’m embarrassed to admit that I also missed that.
Dave: Now I’m choosing not to believe that we just weren’t paying attention to our beloved southern state, but rather, there was just a lot going on that year. But thankfully, to explain all of this issue with subsea cables, we’ve got a short treat for our listeners ahead of our regular Friday programming. Liv, you’ve spoken with two of our experts here at ASPI, Jocelinn Kang and Jesse Jacob.
Liv: That’s right, Dave, I asked Jo and Jess to give us a crash course on the infrastructure we all take for granted, but about which most of us know very little. What are subsea cables? Why are they important, and what are their vulnerabilities?
Dave: So Liv, I’ve got to tell you, Jo actually explained to me the other day how the internet works, and it was bloody useful. Now you’ve done the same for subsea cables today, which I’m very grateful for, and it’s done quickly, which is just what our busy listeners need. So with no further ado from us, let’s dive into the conversation.
Liv: We’re hearing more and more about subsea cables, their strategic importance and vulnerabilities. So today, I’m pleased to be joined by ask these Jocelinn Kang and Jessie Jacob to provide a bit of an overview for our listeners. Jo, I might turn to you first, what are submarine cables and why are they important?
Jo: Thanks, Liv. Submarine cables are the conduit that carries almost all the world’s international data traffic. So if you’re listening to this podcast and you don’t live on the Australian mainland, I can almost guarantee that it traveled via a submarine cable to get to you. Now they’ve always been a strategic asset because they’ve enabled communications to far off lands, but today they’re even more critical because of how much we rely on the data that they transport for businesses, financial markets, military and civilian comms. And of course, things like Facebook and Tiktok and Google search. Submarine cables represent the most cost effective high speed way to transport massive amounts of data.
Liv: So not satellites, Jess? Isn’t that how information is communicated globally?
Jess: No, not really, and it’s really common to think that, but the vast majority is through these subsea cables. Now, this isn’t to say that satellites don’t get used. They certainly are. And they’re good for remote areas with no cable connectivity. But they don’t carry nearly the same amount of data, nor at the same speeds. They’re certainly better than nothing, and they have been used as communication backups recently in places like the Ukraine and in Tonga when they lost their subsea cable connectivity. But they don’t sort of kick in like a one to one backup like a power generator would if the mains go out. So in that regard, it’s better to focus on the resilience of sub cables themselves, rather than satellites.
Jo: To give you an example of the consequences of losing your submarine cable access, we just need to look at Tasmania in 2022 when both the main submarine cables were cut within hours of each other. This caused a widespread outage, and it meant flight delays, loss of access to ATMs and EFTPOS facilities, and that forced businesses to close.
Liv: So Jo, what do these cables look like? Well, I was fascinated to discover that, believe it or not, when they’re lying on the seabed, deep in the ocean, they’re only about the size of a garden hose. Other parts that are closer to shore, they’re a bit thicker because they have more protective armour around them. But the part that actually carries the data, they’re thin strands of fibre optic cable, and the rest of the cable, it’s actually just to give it structure, power and protection. So the power is for repeaters on the cable, so that they can amplify the light signal down the line.
(Jo misspoke here. It’s not structure, but rather insulation)
Liv: And what is the armour for? Am I right to assume that sharks are a threat to national resilience
Jo: In the very early days of having communication cables under the sea, unfortunately, whales used to get entangled in the cable lines, and sharks did actually bite the cables. But since the 1950s the industry started burying the cables in shallower areas to protect them from more frequent bits of anchors and bottom trawling fishing gear. Now, as a result, whales no longer become entangled, and shark bites have reduced. But it really should be said that shark bites, or fish bites, they only made up about 0.1% of cable faults, and since 2006 they’ve actually been no reported shark related cable faults.
Liv: It’s a pretty tiny figure. So what are the biggest threats to the cables?
Jo: Humans.
Jess: –but not humans biting cables. So the most likely cause of damage to cables is actually fishing related. As Jocelinn mentioned earlier, a boat anchor can be dragged across a line, trawling activities and that sort of thing. It’s often done by accident, but of course, could be done on purpose, and it would be pretty hard to prove.
Liv: I’m trying to visualise what happens when a cable gets damaged. Say, I’m watching Netflix and a cable gets cut, does my internet suddenly go out and my Sunday night is ruined?
Jess: Well, whether or not your night was ruined kind of depends on what you’re watching. But seriously, though, if we remove from this scenario any caching or local data storage aspects and focus on how data moves globally, the data gets rerouted away from the damage cable to a different one. And this is why redundancy is so important and a big part of resilience.
Liv: There’s that R word again, resilience. What does resilience look like when it comes to sub cables?
Jo: Well, the way I see it, a resilient submarine cable system is one that operates with minimal disruption and ideally no disruption. But that’s in a perfect world. And the reality is, cable disruptions happen, and they will continue to happen. So, resilience means we need to protect the system to try and avoid disruptions, and then in the event a disruption occurs, that we can be in a place where we can quickly recover.
Liv: So how can we do that? Jo?
Jo: There are a few ways we can protect and try to prevent disruptions, physical security for one of the cables themselves, such as putting armour around them. But even more important is protecting the areas where cables are concentrated, so the areas of ocean where they come up to landfall, and the cable landing stations where these cables are connecting to terrestrial networks. We’ve also mentioned redundancy previously. This is another way, which is about having alternate paths for the data to use in the event of a disruption. So this could mean alternate cable pathways, but also alternate modes of transport, like terrestrial fibre or satellite links. The other element of protection is cybersecurity. So protecting the cable management networks, these are the ones that control the data flows across the submarine cable network. Then, of course, in the event that a disruption occurs, we would want to be able to quickly recover, and this means having an effective and efficient repair capability. So, repair ships to restore that connectivity.
Liv: Okay, so because we don’t have major disruptions, I assume that Australia has all of these elements of protection in place?
Jess: Well, more can be done to protect cable landing stations, and I think there’s a bit of a choke point, so a clustering of cables in Sydney, but in many other areas, Australia is in a relatively good spot. We have multiple cables, and they generally land in geographically diverse locations. And Australia legislates for the protection of several areas for cables. They’re called protection zones. Now, I would say the more problematic issue is the cable repair industry. It’s kind of barely hanging on. There are a limited number of repair ships. Those are surprisingly hard to pin down, but out of about 70 cable ships worldwide, about a third of those are designated repair it’s an aging fleet and an aging workforce getting a cable repair quickly has a worrying amount of luck involved. You want to have a repair ship nearby and be high on the repair priority list.
Liv: And what about using the other ships you mentioned?
Jo: They’re busy and set up to lay new cables as we transition more to cloud and AI and then 6g and everything that enables that’s going to mean more data traffic. Now, if all that data traffic wants to move across oceans, that’s going to mean more cables
Jess: Mmm exactly, and more cables require more repair ships and a solid cable repair industry. It’s the biggest gap Australia has in the resilience piece.
Jo: It’s one of those things that when it works, it works, and you won’t even know about it, but when it doesn’t…
Liv: …everything grinds to a halt?
Jess: Yeah, I think it’s customary in the sub cables field, to quote the US Federal Reserve’s Stephen Malphrus here, who spoke in reference to the financial sector and said when the communications networks go down, it doesn’t grind to a halt. It snaps to a halt. And he said that nearly 15 years ago.
Liv: Scary stuff. Thanks Jo and Jess for explaining the importance and vulnerabilities of subsea cables to our listeners. I look forward to having you back on the podcast soon.
Jo: Thanks Liv.
Jess: Thanks.
Guests: