‘Re-education’, forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang.

What’s the problem?

The Chinese government has facilitated the mass transfer of Uyghur and other ethnic minority¹ citizens from the far west region of Xinjiang to factories across the country. Under conditions that strongly suggest forced labour, Uyghurs are working in factories that are in the supply chains of at least 82 well-known global brands in the technology, clothing and automotive sectors, including Apple, BMW, Gap, Huawei, Nike, Samsung, Sony and Volkswagen.

This report estimates that more than 80,000 Uyghurs were transferred out of Xinjiang to work in factories across China between 2017 and 2019, and some of them were sent directly from detention camps.² The estimated figure is conservative and the actual figure is likely to be far higher. In factories far away from home, they typically live in segregated dormitories,³ undergo organised Mandarin and ideological training outside working hours,⁴ are subject to constant surveillance, and are forbidden from participating in religious observances.⁵ Numerous sources, including government documents, show that transferred workers are assigned minders and have limited freedom of movement.⁶

China has attracted international condemnation for its network of extrajudicial ‘re-education camps’ in Xinjiang.⁷ This report exposes a new phase in China’s social re-engineering campaign targeting minority citizens, revealing new evidence that some factories across China are using forced Uyghur labour under a state-sponsored labour transfer scheme that is tainting the global supply chain.

What’s the solution?

The Chinese government should uphold the civic, cultural and labour rights enshrined in China’s Constitution and domestic laws, end its extrajudicial detention of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, and ensure that all citizens can freely determine the terms of their own labour and mobility.

Companies using forced Uyghur labour in their supply chains could find themselves in breach of laws which prohibit the importation of goods made with forced labour or mandate disclosure of forced labour supply chain risks.⁸ The companies listed in this report should conduct immediate and thorough human rights due diligence on their factory labour in China, including robust and independent social audits and inspections. It is vital that through this process, affected workers are not exposed to any further harm, including involuntary transfers.

Foreign governments, businesses and civil society groups should identify opportunities to increase pressure on the Chinese government to end the use of Uyghur forced labour and extrajudicial detentions. This should include pressuring the government to ratify the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention on Forced Labour, 1930 (No. 29) and Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention.⁹ Consumers and consumer advocacy groups should demand companies that manufacture in China conduct human rights due diligence on their supply chains in order to ensure that they uphold basic human rights and are not complicit in any coercive labour schemes.

Executive summary

Since 2017, more than a million Uyghurs and members of other Turkic Muslim minorities have disappeared into a vast network of ‘re-education camps’ in the far west region of Xinjiang,¹⁰ in what some experts call a systematic, government-led program of cultural genocide.¹¹ Inside the camps, detainees are subjected to political indoctrination, forced to renounce their religion and culture and, in some instances, reportedly subjected to torture.¹² In the name of combating ‘religious extremism’,¹³ Chinese authorities have been actively remoulding the Muslim population in the image of China’s Han ethnic majority.

The ‘re-education’ campaign appears to be entering a new phase, as government officials now claim that all ‘trainees’ have ‘graduated’.¹⁴ There is mounting evidence that many Uyghurs are now being forced to work in factories within Xinjiang.¹⁵ This report reveals that Chinese factories outside Xinjiang are also sourcing Uyghur workers under a revived, exploitative government-led labour transfer scheme.¹⁶ Some factories appear to be using Uyghur workers sent directly from ‘re-education camps’.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has identified 27 factories in nine Chinese provinces that are using Uyghur labour transferred from Xinjiang since 2017. Those factories claim to be part of the supply chain of 82 well-known global brands.¹⁷ Between 2017 and 2019, we estimate that at least 80,000 Uyghurs were transferred out of Xinjiang and assigned to factories through labour transfer programs under a central government policy known as ‘Xinjiang Aid’ (援疆).¹⁸

It is extremely difficult for Uyghurs to refuse or escape these work assignments, which are enmeshed with the apparatus of detention and political indoctrination both inside and outside of Xinjiang.¹⁹ In addition to constant surveillance, the threat of arbitrary detention hangs over minority citizens who refuse their government-sponsored work assignments.²⁰

Most strikingly, local governments and private brokers are paid a price per head by the Xinjiang provincial government to organise the labour assignments.²¹ The job transfers are now an integral part of the ‘re-education’ process, which the Chinese government calls ‘vocational training’.²²

A local government work report from 2019 reads: ‘For every batch [of workers] that is trained, a batch of employment will be arranged and a batch will be transferred. Those employed need to receive thorough ideological education and remain in their jobs.’²³

This report examines three case studies in which Uyghur workers appear to be employed under forced labour conditions by factories in China that supply major global brands. In the first case study, a factory in eastern China that manufactures shoes for US company Nike is equipped with watchtowers, barbed-wire fences and police guard boxes. The Uyghur workers, unlike their Han counterparts, are reportedly unable to go home for holidays (see page 8). In the second case study of another eastern province factory claiming to supply sportswear multinationals Adidas and Fila, evidence suggests that Uyghur workers were transferred directly from one of Xinjiang’s ‘re-education camps’ (see page 18). In the third case study, we identify several Chinese factories making components for Apple or their suppliers using Uyghur labour. Political indoctrination is a key part of their job assignments (see page 21).

This research report draws on open-source Chinese-language documents, satellite imagery analysis, academic research and on-the-ground media reporting. It analyses the politics and policies behind the new phase of the Chinese government’s ongoing repression of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities. It provides evidence of the exploitation of Uyghur labour and the involvement of foreign and Chinese companies, possibly unknowingly, in human rights abuses.

In all, ASPI’s research has identified 82 foreign and Chinese companies potentially directly or indirectly benefiting from the use of Uyghur workers outside Xinjiang through abusive labour transfer programs as recently as 2019: Abercrombie & Fitch, Acer, Adidas, Alstom, Amazon, Apple, ASUS, BAIC Motor, Bestway, BMW, Bombardier, Bosch, BYD, Calvin Klein, Candy, Carter’s, Cerruti 1881, Changan Automobile, Cisco, CRRC, Dell, Electrolux, Fila, Founder Group, GAC Group (automobiles), Gap, Geely Auto, General Motors, Google, Goertek, H&M, Haier, Hart Schaffner Marx, Hisense, Hitachi, HP, HTC, Huawei, iFlyTek, Jack & Jones, Jaguar, Japan Display Inc., L.L.Bean, Lacoste, Land Rover, Lenovo, LG, Li-Ning, Mayor, Meizu, Mercedes-Benz, MG, Microsoft, Mitsubishi, Mitsumi, Nike, Nintendo, Nokia, Oculus, Oppo, Panasonic, Polo Ralph Lauren, Puma, SAIC Motor, Samsung, SGMW, Sharp, Siemens, Skechers, Sony, TDK, Tommy Hilfiger, Toshiba, Tsinghua Tongfang, Uniqlo, Victoria’s Secret, Vivo, Volkswagen, Xiaomi, Zara, Zegna, ZTE. Some brands are linked with multiple factories.

The data is based on published supplier lists, media reports, and the factories’ claimed suppliers. ASPI reached out to these 82 brands to confirm their relevant supplier details. Where companies responded before publication, we have included their relevant clarifications in this report. If any company responses are made available after publication of the report, we will address these online.

ASPI notes that a small number of brands advised they have instructed their vendors to terminate their relationships with these suppliers in 2020. Others, including Adidas, Bosch and Panasonic, said they had no direct contractual relationships with the suppliers implicated in the labour schemes, but no brands were able to rule out a link further down their supply chain.

The report includes an appendix that details the factories involved and the brands that appear to have elements of forced Uyghur labour in their supply chains. It also makes specific recommendations for the Chinese government, companies, foreign governments and civil society organisations.

Citations and notes

Readers are encouraged to download the PDF to access the full and extensive citations and notes that accompany this report.

Forced Uyghur labour

The ILO lists 11 indicators of forced labour.²⁴ Relevant indicators in the case of Uyghur workers may include:

• being subjected to intimidation and threats, such as the threat of arbitrary detention, and being monitored by security personnel and digital surveillance tools
• being placed in a position of dependency and vulnerability, such as by threats to family members back in Xinjiang
• having freedom of movement restricted, such as by fenced-in factories and high-tech surveillance
• isolation, such as living in segregated dormitories and being transported in dedicated trains
• abusive working conditions, such as political indoctrination, police guard posts in factories, ‘military-style’ management, and a ban on religious practices
• excessive hours, such as after-work Mandarin language classes and political indoctrination sessions that are part of job assignments.²⁵

Chinese state media claims that participation in labour transfer programs is voluntary, and Chinese officials have denied any commercial use of forced labour from Xinjiang.²⁶ However, Uyghur workers who have been able to leave China and speak out describe the constant fear of being sent back to a detention camp in Xinjiang or even a traditional prison while working at the factories.²⁷

In factories outside Xinjiang, there is evidence that their lives are far from free. Referred to as ‘surplus labour’ (富余劳动力) or ‘poverty-stricken labour’ (贫困劳动力), Uyghur workers are often transported across China in special segregated trains,²⁸ and in most cases are returned home by the same method after their contracts end a year or more later.²⁹

Multiple sources suggest that in factories across China, many Uyghur workers lead a harsh, segregated life under so-called ‘military-style management’ (军事化管理).³⁰ Outside work hours, they attend factory-organised Mandarin language classes, participate in ‘patriotic education’,³¹ and are prevented from practising their religion.³² Every 50 Uyghur workers are assigned one government minder and are monitored by dedicated security personnel.³³ They have little freedom of movement and live in carefully guarded dormitories, isolated from their families and children back in Xinjiang.³⁴ There is also evidence that, at least in some factories, they are paid less than their Han counterparts,³⁵ despite state media claims that they’re paid attractive wages.³⁶

The Chinese authorities and factory bosses manage Uyghur workers by ‘tracking’ them both physically and electronically.³⁷ One provincial government document describes a central database, developed by Xinjiang’s Human Resources and Social Affairs Department and maintained by a team of 100 specialists in Xinjiang, that records the medical, ideological and employment details of each labourer.³⁸

The database incorporates information from social welfare cards that store workers’ personal details. It also extracts information from a WeChat³⁹ group and an unnamed smartphone app that tracks the movements and activities of each worker.⁴⁰

Chinese companies and government officials also pride themselves on being able to alter their Uyghur workers’ ideological outlook and transform them into ‘modern’ citizens, who, they say, become ‘more physically attractive’⁴¹ and learn to ‘take daily showers’.⁴²

In some cases, local governments in Xinjiang send Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres to simultaneously surveil workers’ families back home in Xinjiang⁴³— a reminder to workers that any misbehaviour in the factory will have immediate consequences for their loved ones and further evidence that their participation in the program is far from voluntary.

A person with knowledge of a Uyghur labour transfer program in Fujian told Bitter Winter, a religious and human rights NGO, that the workers were all former ‘re-education camp’ detainees and were threatened with further detention if they disobeyed the government’s work assignments.⁴⁴ A Uyghur person sent to work in Fujian also told the NGO that police regularly search their dormitories and check their phones for any religious content. If a Quran is found, the owner will be sent back to the ‘re-education camp’ for 3–5 years.⁴⁵

The treatment of Uyghurs described in this report’s case studies is in breach of China’s Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on ethnicity or religious belief,⁴⁶ as well as international law. While we are unable to confirm that all employment transfers from Xinjiang are forced, the cases for which adequate detail has been available showcase highly disturbing coercive labour practices consistent with ILO definitions of forced labour.

Case study 1: Uyghur workers making Nike sneakers in Qingdao

Figure 1: Uyghur workers at Taekwang Shoe Manufacturing waving the Chinese flag, October 2019

Source: ‘Strengthening patriotism education and building a bridge of national unity’ (加强爱国主义教育搭建民族团结连心桥), China Ethnic Religion Net (中国民族宗教网), 7 November 2019, online.

In January 2020, around 600 ethnic minority workers from Xinjiang were employed at Qingdao Taekwang Shoes Co. Ltd (青岛泰光制鞋有限公司).⁴⁷ Taekwang’s primary customer is the American multinational company Nike Incorporated.⁴⁸ The Xinjiang workers are mostly Uyghur women from Hotan and Kashgar prefectures, which are remote parts of southern Xinjiang that the Chinese government has described as ‘backward’ and ‘disturbed by religious extremism’.⁴⁹

At the factory, the Uyghur labourers make Nike shoes during the day. In the evening, they attend a night school where they study Mandarin, sing the Chinese national anthem and receive ‘vocational training’ and ‘patriotic education’.⁵⁰ The curriculum closely mirrors that of Xinjiang’s ‘re-education camps’.⁵¹

The sprawling Taekwang factory compound is located in Laixi City, to the north of Qingdao in China’s Shandong province, and is owned by the Taekwang Group, a South Korean chemical and textile conglomerate (chaebol). Taekwang’s Laixi factory is one of the largest manufacturers of shoes for Nike,⁵² producing more than seven million pairs for the American brand annually.⁵³

Figure 2: Taekwang supply chain

Source: A Laixi government committee press release stated that 9,800 Uyghur workers were transferred to Qingdao Taekwang Shoes in ‘more than 60 batches’ since 2007. ‘Strengthening patriotism education and building a bridge of national unity’ (加强爱国主义教育搭建民族团结连心桥), China Ethnic Religion Net (中国民族宗教网), 7 November 2019, online.

In June 2019, at the opening ceremony of the Taekwang night school, a government official from the local United Front Work Department⁵⁴ office called on Uyghur workers to strengthen their identification with the state and the nation.⁵⁵ The school is called the ‘Pomegranate Seed’ Night School (Figure 3), referencing a speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping in which he said ‘every ethnic group must tightly bind together like the seeds of a pomegranate.’⁵⁶

Figure 3: Opening ceremony of ‘Pomegranate Seed’ Night School for ethnic minorities at Taekwang factory, June 2019

Source: ‘Municipal United Front Work Department’s “Pomegranate Seed” Night School: a look into Qingdao Taekwang’s Mandarin classes’ (市委统战部’石榴籽’夜校 走进青岛泰光举办普通话培训班), Laixi United Front (莱西统一战线), WeChat, 1 July 2019, online.

The Washington Post has reported that Uyghurs working at the factory were not allowed to go home for holidays.⁵⁷

The newspaper also reported that Uyghur workers at the factory were sent there by the Xinjiang government, they did not choose to come to Qingdao, and that they were unable to practice their religion.

Photographs of the factory in January 2020 published by the newspaper show that the complex was equipped with watchtowers, razor wire and inward-facing barbed-wire fences. Uyghur workers were free to walk in the streets around the factory compound, but their comings and goings were closely monitored by a police station at the side gate equipped with facial recognition cameras.

The Uyghur workers at the Taekwang factory speak almost no Mandarin, so communication with locals is largely non-existent, according to the newspaper. They eat in a separate canteen or a Muslim restaurant across the road from the factory, where the ‘halal’ signs have been crossed out. They live in buildings next to the factory that are separate quarters from those of the Han workers.⁵⁸

ASPI found evidence that inside the factories, the workers’ ideology and behaviour are closely monitored. At a purpose-built ‘psychological dredging office’ (心理疏导室), Han and Uyghur officials from Taekwang’s local women’s federation conduct ‘heart-to-heart’ talks, provide psychological consulting and assist in the uplifting of the ‘innate quality’ (素质) of the Uyghur workers—in order to aid their integration.⁵⁹ Those offices and roles are also present in Xinjiang’s ‘re-education camps’.⁶⁰

Figure 4: A study room called ‘Home of the Youth’ for ethnic minority workers at the Taekwang factory

Source: ‘Blessed are those who work here in Laixi!’ (在莱西这里上班的人有福了!), In the palm of Laixi (掌上莱西), WeChat, 21 July 2019, online.

Top Chinese government officials see the use and management of ethnic workers at Taekwang as a model worth emulating. Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Yang and China’s Minister for Public Security, Zhao Kezhi, sent a commendation memo to the management, according to a local media report in late 2019.⁶¹ From 2017 to 2018, according to official statistics, 4,710 Uyghur workers were transferred from Xinjiang to Shandong (almost double the government’s own target).⁶²

The workers are closely monitored by party authorities. Officials from the local offices of the Public Security Bureau and United Front Work Department hold regular meetings with Shandong companies that hire “Uyghurs” to discuss the workers’ ‘ideological trends and any issues that have emerged’.⁶³

Those agencies also have representatives stationed inside factories like Taekwang to report daily on the ‘thoughts’ of the Uyghur workers, manage any disputes and guard against spontaneous ‘mass instances’.⁶⁴ In 2018, a recruitment notice said that Qingdao was looking for auxiliary police who are fluent in minority languages.⁶⁵ In Xinjiang, auxiliary police officers are responsible for bringing people to detention camps and monitoring them when they are in detention.⁶⁶

Figure 5: A July 2018 ‘farewell ceremony’ before 176 Uyghur workers left Qira county, Xinjiang for Qingdao to work at Taekwang Shoes Co. Ltd and Fulin Electronics Company

Source: ‘Qira county organises 176 labourers for stable employment at Shandong enterprises’ (策勒县组织176名务工人员赴山东企业稳定就业), Pomegranate Garden (石榴园), WeChat, 5 July 2018, online.

In January 2018, local Hotan media published a ‘letter of gratitude’ from 130 Uyghur workers at Taekwang to the Hotan Prefecture government.⁶⁷ In the letter, which was written in Mandarin, the Uyghur workers described themselves as being mired in poverty before being sent to Qingdao and express gratitude that they were now able to earn a monthly salary of Ұ2,850 (US$413, above the minimum wage in China).⁶⁸ ASPI could not verify the wages received by the workers or the authenticity of the letter. The letter goes on to say that, since arriving in Qingdao, the workers had learned the dangers of religious extremism and now see a ‘beautiful life ahead of them’.⁶⁹

Rendering ‘Xinjiang Aid’ (援疆)

Working arrangements that uproot Uyghurs and place them in factories in eastern and central China are not new. Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government has mobilised wealthier coastal provinces and cities to develop frontier regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet, and actively encouraged the movement of workers in the name of promoting ‘inter-ethnic fusion’ (民族交融) and ‘poverty alleviation’ (扶贫).⁷⁰

Uyghur workers’ participation in those programs is rarely voluntary. Even in the 2000s, well before the ‘re-education camp’ system was created, working and living conditions for transferred Uyghur workers were often exploitative, if not abusive.⁷¹ Rights groups criticised the programs as coercive, highlighting how they intentionally removed Uyghurs from their homes and traditional way of life, only to force the workers to endure the long working hours, poor conditions, predatory bosses and discriminatory attitudes of their Han co-workers.⁷²

Concerned factory bosses significantly reduced the use of Uyghur labour after violent clashes between Han and Uyghur workers in a Guangdong factory led to a deadly riot in Xinjiang’s regional capital of Urumqi in July 2009.⁷³

In response to the unrest, the Chinese government began holding regular national ‘Xinjiang Aid’ conferences in 2010.⁷⁴ Financial subsidies and political inducements were offered to mobilise wealthier provinces and cities to pair up with cities and prefectures in Xinjiang in order to ‘aid’ the region’s development and stability.⁷⁵

Provinces have since been encouraged to contribute to the aid scheme in various ways: “‘medical Xinjiang Aid’ (医疗援疆), ‘technology Xinjiang Aid’ (科技援疆), ‘educational Xinjiang Aid’ (教育援疆) and ‘industrial Xinjiang Aid’ (产业援疆).⁷⁶

Following further violence and the mass detention of Uyghurs in early 2017,⁷⁷ the ‘Xinjiang Aid’ agenda became a top political priority.⁷⁸ Local governments and corporations were strongly encouraged to find employment opportunities for newly ‘re-educated’ Uyghurs, under a policy termed ‘industrial Xinjiang Aid’.⁷⁹

‘Industrial Xinjiang Aid’ seeks to assign work to ‘idle’ Uyghurs in the name of poverty alleviation, but it also shares the same indoctrination aims as the ‘re-education camp’ system: factory bosses are expected to fundamentally alter Uyghur workers by reforming their ‘backward qualities’ and sinicising them.⁸⁰ In exchange, Uyghur workers are required to show ‘gratitude’ to the Communist Party and their Han ‘elder sisters and brothers’.⁸¹

Companies across China can participate in industrial ‘Xinjiang Aid’ in two ways:

• opening up ‘satellite’ factories (卫星工厂) or workshops inside Xinjiang to absorb ‘surplus labour capacity’ (富余劳动力).⁸² According to China’s Xinhua News Agency, in the past few years, ‘Xinjiang Aid’ has seen some 4,400 enterprises set up in Xinjiang, providing nearly a million local jobs.⁸³
• hiring Uyghur workers for their factories elsewhere in China through a range of labour transfer schemes.

Some companies, such as Hao Yuanpeng Clothing Co. Ltd (浩缘朋服装有限公司)—a garment company headquartered in Anhui province that claims to supply Fila (Italy/South Korea) and Adidas (Germany)—are engaged in both those forms of industrial aid.⁸⁴

By late 2018, cheap labour emerging from the ‘re-education camps’ had become an important driver of Xinjiang’s economy, according to an official statement by the Xinjiang Development and Reform Commission.⁸⁵ There is now a direct pipeline of Uyghur workers from ‘vocational training’ and political indoctrination in Xinjiang to factory work across China. ‘For every batch (of workers) that is trained, a batch of employment will be arranged and the batch will be transferred’, a 2019 government work report from Karakax county reads.⁸⁶ In some cases, labour transfers outside of Xinjiang are organised even before vocational training and political indoctrination start—to ensure ‘100% employment rate’ for the ‘trained’ Uyghurs.⁸⁷

Xinjiang’s labour transfer program

Data collected from Chinese state media and official government notices indicates that more than 80,000 Uyghur workers were transferred out of Xinjiang between 2017 and 2019. ASPI has mapped the available data on these transfers. The larger the arrow in Figure 6, the greater the number of people being transferred. Dotted lines represent known direct county-to-factory transfers. The diagram shouldn’t be considered comprehensive, but gives a sense of the scale and scope of the program.⁸⁸

Figure 6: Uyghur transfers to other parts of China from 2017 to 2020

Source: ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre, which used a range of data sources, including local media reports and official government sources.

The Chinese government’s official data on labour transfer includes transfers from southern Xinjiang to northern Xinjiang, transfers from Xinjiang to other provinces, and transfers to local factories. Depending on the county, labourers sent outside Xinjiang count for anywhere between 10%⁸⁹ to 50%⁹⁰ of all Xinjiang transfers.

In recent years, transfers from Xinjiang to other parts of China have increased steadily. In 2017, according to state media reports, 20,859 ‘rural surplus labourers’ from Xinjiang were transferred to work in other provinces.⁹¹ Based on ASPI’s analysis of published data, an estimated 28,000 people were transferred for employment in 2018.⁹² In 2019, an estimated 32,000 people were transferred out of the region.⁹³

Xinjiang authorities also claim to have repeatedly exceeded their labour transfer targets.⁹⁴ The 2017 target was set at 20,000 and exceeded by 4%.⁹⁵ In 2019, the target was set at 25,000 and reportedly exceeded by about 25%.⁹⁶

ASPI analysed the volume of results returned by the Chinese search engine Baidu⁹⁷ when we searched for keywords related to labour transfer schemes. Figure 7 illustrates a steady increase since 2014 (the year in which the so-called ‘Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Extremism’ was launched in Xinjiang), and an even more dramatic increase from 2017 as the ‘re-education’ process ramped up. This is a further suggestion that the labour transfer program has become an increasingly important political priority for the Chinese government in recent years.

Figure 7: Number of Baidu search results for a variety of keywords relating to Xinjiang labour transfers, 2005 to 2019

Source: ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre

Aside from political incentives, the business of ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ Uyghur labour can be quite lucrative for local governments and commercial brokers. According to a 2018 Xinjiang provincial government notice, for every rural ‘surplus labourer’⁹⁸ transferred to work in another part of Xinjiang for over nine months, the organiser is awarded Ұ20 (US$3); however, for labour transfers outside of Xinjiang, the figure jumps 15-fold to Ұ300 (US$43.25).⁹⁹ Receiving factories across China are also compensated by the Xinjiang government, receiving a Ұ1,000 (US$144.16) cash inducement for each worker they contract for a year, and Ұ5,000 (US$720.80) for a three-year contract.¹⁰⁰ The statutory minimum wage in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s regional capital, was Ұ1620 (US$232.08) a month in 2018.¹⁰¹

In recent years, advertisements for ‘government-sponsored Uyghur labour’ also began to appear online. In February 2019, a company based in Qingdao published a notice advertising a large number of ‘government-led … qualified, secure and reliable’ Uyghur workers for transfer to some 10 provinces in China (Figure 8).¹⁰²

Figure 8: Advertisement published by Qingdao Decai Decoration Co. claiming to supply government-sponsored Uyghur workers from Xinjiang to other provinces.

Note: The ad features a caricature of two dancing Uyghurs in traditional clothing.
Source: ‘Our company provides a large number of government (sponsored) Xinjiang workers – labour dispatching company’ (我司提供大量政府新疆工人劳务派遣公司), Qingdao Human Resources Website (青岛德才人力资源网), online. Translated from Chinese by ASPI.

Another new advertisement claimed to be able to supply 1,000 Uyghur workers aged 16 to 18 years. It reads: ‘The advantages of Xinjiang workers are: semi-military style management, can withstand hardship, no loss of personnel … Minimum order 100 workers!’. The advertisement also said that factory managers can apply for current Xinjiang police to be stationed at their factory 24 hours a day, and that the workers could be delivered (along with an Uyghur cook) within 15 days of the signing of a one-year contract (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Labour-hire advertisement offering young Uyghur workers under ‘semi-military style management’

Source: ‘1,000 minorities, awaiting online booking’ (1000少数民族,在线等预约), Baidu HR Forum (百度 HR吧), 27 November 2019, online. Translated from Chinese by ASPI.

Case study 2: From ‘re-education camps’ to forced labour assignments

New evidence indicates that ‘graduating’ detainees from Xinjiang’s ‘re-education camps’ have been sent directly to factories to work in other parts of China. In such circumstances, it is unlikely that their work arrangements are voluntary.

The Haoyuanpeng Clothing Manufacturing Co. Ltd (浩缘朋制衣有限公司, HYP) participates in ‘Xinjiang Aid’ both through its satellite factory¹⁰³ in Xinjiang (established in 2018) and by exporting Uyghur workers to Anhui province, where it is headquartered. On HYP’s corporate website, it advertises strategic partnerships with the Italian–South Korean fashion label Fila, German sportswear companies Adidas and Puma, and Nike.¹⁰⁴

In February 2018, HYP transferred 63 workers from Xinjiang to its Anhui factory in eastern China with plans to eventually transfer 500 in total.¹⁰⁵ The transferred workers were all ‘graduates’ of the Jiashi County Secondary Vocational School (伽师县中等职业学校), according to a government report.¹⁰⁶

ASPI’s analysis of satellite imagery and official documents suggest the ‘school’ had operated as a ‘re-education camp’ since 2017. The compound increased in size, adding new dormitories and factory warehouses while significant security features were added through the introduction of secure ‘military-style management’ (see Figure 10).¹⁰⁷

Figure 10: Satellite image of Jiashi Vocational School, January 2018, with security infrastructure added since 2017 highlighted in orange.

Note: Multiple dormitory buildings and a teaching building appear to be completely fenced in and isolated in a style that resembles other political indoctrination camps. Additionally, five small factory warehouse buildings have been constructed in the enclosed area. Source: ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre.

A spokesperson from Adidas said the company does not have an active relationship with HYP and that they will further investigate the use of the Adidas signage.

The transfer of Uyghur labour to Anhui was part of a ‘Xinjiang Aid’ project organised by the Guangdong government, which also involved HYP setting up a highly secure factory in Xinjiang’s Shule (Yengixahar) county (Figure 11).¹⁰⁸

Figure 11: Satellite image of HYP’s factory in Shule (Yengixahar) county, Xinjiang

Note: The factory is fully enclosed by perimeter fencing and has several residential dorm buildings further isolated by fencing. In addition there are several security posts throughout the facility. Source: ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre.

In a recent interview, HYP President Zeng Yifa (曾亿法) told state media that he established a factory in Xinjiang because it was difficult to find young workers in other parts of China, or even abroad, concluding that: ‘Although the quality of North Korean workers is good, I’m reluctant to spend money on foreign workers. In the end, I chose Xinjiang.’¹⁰⁹

HYP’s factory in Xinjiang, which has a large Adidas billboard on its facade (Figure 13), is surrounded by a 3-metre-high fence. The two entrances to the factory are guarded by security checkpoints, and at least five more security posts monitor the rest of the facility’s perimeter. It is unclear whether HYP’s factory in Anhui province has similar security features.

Figure 12: HYP’s supply chain

Source: ASPI ICPC. See Appendix for supply chain information.

Figure 13: Hao Yuanpeng’s Kashgar, Xinjiang factory.

Source: Photos of company(企业展示), Hao Yuanpeng Clothing Co. Ltd (浩缘朋服装有限公司)’, online.

Case study 3: ‘Re-educating’ Uyghur workers in Apple’s supply chain

In December 2017, Apple’s CEO Tim Cook visited one of the company’s contractors—O-Film Technology Co. Ltd (欧菲光科技股份有限公司)¹¹⁰—and posted a picture of himself at the company’s Guangzhou factory on the Chinese social media platform Weibo.¹¹¹

O-Film manufactured¹¹² the ‘selfie cameras’ for the iPhone 8 and iPhone X. The company also claims on its website to manufacture camera modules and touchscreen components for a number of other well-known companies including Huawei, Lenovo and Samsung.¹¹³

Figure 14: Tim Cook’s Weibo post from O-Film’s Guangzhou factory in December 2017

Tim Cook’s post on Chinese social media: ‘Say cheese! Getting a closer look at the remarkable, precision work that goes into manufacturing the selfie cameras for iPhone 8 and iPhone X at O-Film’. Source: online.

Prior to Cook’s visit, between 28 April and 1 May 2017, 700 Uyghurs were reportedly transferred from Lop county, Hotan Prefecture, in Xinjiang to work at a separate O-Film factory in Nanchang, Jiangxi province.¹¹⁴

As with other labour transfers from Xinjiang described in this report, the work assignments for the Uyghurs sent to Jiangxi were highly politicised. The workers were expected to ‘gradually alter their ideology’ and turn into ‘modern, capable youth’ who ‘understand the Party’s blessing, feel gratitude toward the Party, and contribute to stability,’ a local Xinjiang newspaper wrote.¹¹⁵ Once in Jiangxi, they were managed by a few minders sent by Lop county who were ‘politically reliable’ and knew both Mandarin and the Uyghur language.¹¹⁶

According to a now deleted press release,¹¹⁷ Cook praised the company for its ‘humane approach towards employees’ during his visit to O-Film, asserting that workers seemed ‘able to gain growth at the company, and live happily.’¹¹⁸

Five months later, in October 2017, the Hotan government in Xinjiang contacted O-Film, hoping to supply another 1,300 workers.¹¹⁹ On 12 December 2017, a Uyghur worker who claimed to have worked at O-Film said that there were more than a thousand Uyghur workers at the O-Film factory in Jiangxi.¹²⁰

Figure 15: O-Film Supply Chain

Source: ASPI ICPC. See appendix for supply chain source information.

O-Film is not the only Chinese factory using Uyghur labour to make parts for Apple and its suppliers.

This report identifies three other factories in Apple’s supply chain.

A local government document from September 2019 said that 560 Xinjiang labourers were transferred to work in factories in central Henan province—including Foxconn Technology (Foxconn)’s Zhengzhou facility.¹²¹ Foxconn, a Taiwanese company, is the biggest contract electronics manufacturer in the world, making devices for Apple, Dell and Sony, among others.¹²² The Zhengzhou facility reportedly makes half of the world’s iPhones and is the reason why Zhengzhou city is dubbed the ‘iPhone city’.¹²³

It is unclear how the Uyghur workers are treated at the Zhengzhou facility. However, a September 2019 report by New York-based China Labour Watch said contract workers at Foxconn’s Zhengzhou factory—which includes Uyghur workers—put in at least 100 overtime hours a month.¹²⁴ Over the past decade, Foxconn has been marred by allegations of worker exploitation and even suicides, including recently at its Zhengzhou facility.¹²⁵ The company has also actively participated in the ‘Xinjiang Aid’ scheme.¹²⁶

Figure 16: Uyghur workers arriving at Hubei Yihong Precision Manufacturing Co. Ltd

Uyghur workers with Hubei Yihong Precision Manufacturing Co. Ltd on their transfer between Xinjiang and Xianning, Hubei. This photograph was taken outside of Wuchang train station in Wuhan, Hubei’s provincial capital, in May 2018. Source: online.

On 17 May 2018, 105 Uyghur workers were transferred from Keriya county, Xinjiang, to Hubei Yihong Precision Manufacturing Co. Ltd (湖北奕宏精密制造有限公司, Hubei Yihong) in Xianning, Hubei province.¹²⁷ Upon the workers’ arrival, a senior communist party official visited the Hubei Yihong factory. In a speech, he put forward three demands: for the workers to exercise gratitude to the Communist Party, for the managers to increase surveillance and intensify patriotic education, and for the workers to quickly blend in.¹²⁸

Hubei Yihong makes backlights and battery covers¹²⁹. It is a subsidiary of Dongguan Yidong Electronic Co. Ltd (东莞市奕东电子有限公司), whose website claims that its end customers include Apple and Huawei¹³⁰. While neither Hubei Yihong nor its parent company is included in Apple’s supplier list, Hubei Yihong’s website lists GoerTek, which directly supplies Apple with AirPods, as one of their customers¹³¹.

Figure 17: Hubei Yihong Supply Chain

Source: ASPI ICPC. See appendix for supply chain source information.

In 2017, another electronics company that claims to make components for Apple’s supplier, Hefei Highbroad Advanced Material Co. Ltd (翰博高新材料（合肥）股份有限公司, Highbroad) signed a contract with the Hotan government to take in 1,000 Uyghurs each year for the next three years, according to the company’s vice president.¹³² Later that year, more than 500 Uyghurs from rural Guma county in Hotan Prefecture were transported to Hefei in Anhui province to begin work in Highbroad’s electronics factory.¹³³

In 2018, 544 Uyghurs were transferred from Guma county to a Highbroad subsidiary, also in Hefei, called Fuying Photoelectric Co. Ltd (合肥福映光电有限公司).¹³⁴ At Fuying, according to state media, Aynur Memetyusup, a young Uyghur woman, learned to improve her Mandarin and workplace discipline and to take daily showers that made ‘her long hair more flowing than ever.’ She is quoted as saying, ‘Like President Xi has said, happiness is always the result of struggle.’¹³⁵

Figure 18: A picture of Aynur Memetyusup (first from left) in an after-work Mandarin class at Highbroad Advanced Material Co. Ltd in Hefei, Anhui province

Source: ‘Uyghur girl helps her mom’s big dream come true’, China Daily, 6 August 2019, online.

According to the company’s 2018 annual report,¹³⁶ Highbroad’s main products are components for flat panel displays—the LCD and OLED screens used in many smartphones, tablets and computers. Highbroad notes that 79.19% of its operating revenue comes from sales to the Beijing-based multinational company BOE Technology Group Co. Ltd (京东方), which is one of the world’s largest producers of electronic displays. BOE is currently a major screen supplier to Huawei¹³⁷ and is set to become Apple’s second-largest OLED screen supplier by 2021.¹³⁸ BOE is currently listed on Apple’s supplier list.¹³⁹

According to Highbroad’s website their customers include Japan Display Inc. and LG Display.¹⁴⁰ Highbroad’s hiring ads¹⁴¹ and a Chinese LCD industry directory¹⁴² also claim that Highbroad’s end customers include other well-known companies including Dell, Lenovo, Samsung and Sony, and automobile manufacturers such as BMW, Jaguar, Land Rover, Mercedes-Benz and Volkswagen (Figure 18). Jaguar Land Rover says it investigated its supply chain and found it does not source directly from Highbroad, and was assured by its suppliers they do not source from the company.

Figure 19: Highbroad supply chain

Source: ASPI ICPC. See Appendix for supply chain information.

Implications for the global supply chain

The rapid expansion of the nationwide system of Uyghur labour presents a new challenge for foreign companies operating in China. How do they secure the integrity of their supply chains and protect their brands from the reputational and legal risks of being associated with forced, discriminatory or abusive labour practices? Interwoven supply chains and the mixed nature of their workforces, which draw on both Han and Uyghur workers, make it particularly difficult for companies to ensure that their products are not associated with forced labour. These labour transfer schemes also present a challenge to the reputation of Chinese brands overseas.

In all, ASPI’s research has identified 82 foreign and Chinese companies potentially directly or indirectly benefiting from the use of Uyghur workers outside Xinjiang through abusive labour transfer programs: Abercrombie & Fitch, Acer, Adidas, Alstom, Amazon, Apple, ASUS, BAIC Motor, Bestway, BMW, Bombardier, Bosch, BYD, Calvin Klein, Candy, Carter’s, Cerruti 1881, Changan Automobile, Cisco, CRRC, Dell, Electrolux, Fila, Founder Group, GAC Group (automobiles), Gap, Geely Auto, General Motors, Google, Goertek, H&M, Haier, Hart Schaffner Marx, Hisense, Hitachi, HP, HTC, Huawei, iFlyTek, Jack & Jones, Jaguar, Japan Display Inc., L.L.Bean, Lacoste, Land Rover, Lenovo, LG, Li-Ning, Marks & Spencer, Mayor, Meizu, Mercedes-Benz, MG, Microsoft, Mitsubishi, Mitsumi, Nike, Nintendo, Nokia, Oculus, Oppo, Panasonic, Polo Ralph Lauren, Puma, SAIC Motor, Samsung, SGMW, Sharp, Siemens, Skechers, Sony, TDK, Tommy Hilfiger, Toshiba, Tsinghua Tongfang, Uniqlo, Victoria’s Secret, Vivo, Volkswagen, Xiaomi, Zara, Zegna, ZTE. Some brands are linked with multiple factories.

The data is based on published supplier lists, media reports, and the factories’ claimed suppliers. ASPI reached out to these 82 brands to confirm their relevant supplier details. Where companies responded before publication, we have included their relevant clarifications in this report. If any company responses are made available after publication of this report, we will address these online.

A further 54 companies are implicated in what could be forced labour schemes within Xinjiang itself (see appendix)—some of which overlap with the 82 companies linked to forced Uyghur labour outside of Xinjiang. It is important to note that not all companies have the same levels of exposure to Uyghur forced labour. Some finished products are directly manufactured by these workers, while others pass through complicated supply chains.

The appendix to this report lists 35 documented labour transfer programs under ‘Xinjiang Aid’ since 2017. The table includes the following information:

• transfers to factories in central and eastern provinces of China
• transfers to purpose-built factories within Xinjiang
• the number of people moved to the factories
• the products they make
• the companies the factories claim they supply.

In the past three years, the ‘re-education camp’ system in Xinjiang has drawn international condemnation. Now the culture and ethos of ‘re-education’ is being exported well beyond Xinjiang and married with practices that likely amount to forced labour.

This report establishes that some workers employed through labour transfer schemes at factories across China are sourced directly from the ‘re-education camps’ in Xinjiang. Ethnic minority workers from Xinjiang who are not known to be former detainees may also be forced to work under threat of detention, the intimidation of family members and a range of restrictions on their freedom. The tainted global supply chain that results from these practices means that it is now difficult to guarantee that products manufactured in China are free from forced labour.¹⁴³

We have found that a large number of Chinese and multinational companies are sourcing components or products from factories that proudly boast about their Uyghur workers, such as Taekwang¹⁴⁴ and HYP.¹⁴⁵ This situation poses new risks—reputational and legal—for companies and consumers purchasing goods from China, as products made in any part of the country, not just in Xinjiang, may have passed through the hands of forced labourers. This situation also creates new risks for investors in those companies—from private investors to wealth management funds—who may now find themselves indirectly linked to forced labour practices.

Recommendations

The response to the abuses identified in this report should not involve a knee-jerk rejection of Uyghur or Chinese labour. The problem is the policies that require Uyghurs to work under duress in violation of well-established international labour laws. It is vital that, as these problems are addressed, Uyghur labourers are not placed in positions of greater harm or, for example, involuntarily transferred back to Xinjiang, where their safety cannot necessarily be guaranteed. In light of this report’s findings, we make the following recommendations.

The Chinese government should:

• give multinational companies unfettered access to allow them to investigate any abusive or forced labour practices in factories in China
• uphold the rights of all workers in China, especially those from vulnerable ethnic minorities, to determine how their labour is deployed and the conditions under which they leave their place of residence
• ratify the ILO International Labour Standards; structure a comprehensive grievance mechanism, including for the investigation of alleged cases of forced labour; provide victims with protection and remedies; and prosecute perpetrators
• uphold the legitimate rights of China’s citizens, including by protecting ethnic and religious rights enshrined in the Chinese Constitution.¹⁴⁶

Companies using forced Uyghur labour in their supply chains could find themselves in breach of laws which prohibit the importation of goods made with forced labour or mandate disclosure of forced labour supply chain risks.¹⁴⁷

Each company listed in this report should: 

• conduct immediate and thorough human rights due diligence on its factory labour in China, including robust and independent social audits and inspections. The audits and inspections should include a stocktake of the conditions and current and ongoing safety of vulnerable workers
• if it finds that factories are implicated in forced labour, seek to use its leverage to address improper labour practices. In all cases where harm has occurred, it should take appropriate and immediate remedial action. Where it cannot, it should cease working with those factories
• ensure that it is fully transparent as it seeks to address all potential harms, including by reporting its due diligence and audit findings publicly.

Foreign governments should:

• identify opportunities to increase pressure on the Chinese government to end the use and facilitation of Uyghur forced labour and mass extrajudicial detention, including through the use of targeted sanctions on senior officials responsible for Xinjiang’s coercive labour transfers
• review trade agreements to restrict commodities and products being produced with forced labour
• identify opportunities to pressure the Chinese government into ratifying the Convention on Forced Labour, 1930 (No. 29),¹⁴⁸ Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No.105)¹⁴⁹ and the Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention.¹⁵⁰

Consumers and civil society groups, including NGOs, labour unions and consumer advocacy groups, should:

• demand that companies that manufacture in China conduct due diligence and social audits to ensure that they’re not complicit in forced labour practices
• advocate for the recognition of continual, multilayered surveillance and monitoring of workers and their digital communications—both in and outside work hours—as an emerging and under-reported indicator of forced labour and an important human rights violation
• push brands to be more transparent about the make-up of their supply chains and the preventative measures they have put in place to ensure forced labour does not occur
• demand that companies make new public commitments, uphold current commitments, or both, to not use forced and coerced labour in their global supply chains and that they act quickly and publicly when such cases are identified.

Appendix

Appendices, Citations and Notes

Readers are encouraged to download the PDF to access the appendix, full and extensive citations and notes that accompany this report. (See link at top of this page). 

Document History

First published 1 March 2020. The text on page 5 and in the appendix was updated on 3 March 2020 to reflect responses from some of the companies named in the report. The text on pages 5 and 24, Figure 17 on page 24, and the text on page 34 of the appendix were amended on 6 March to reflect responses from a company named in the report. The appendix on p39 was updated on 19 March to reflect a response from a company named in the report. The appendix on p31 was updated on 14 April to reflect a response from a company named in the report. The text in Figure 17 on page 24 and the appendix on pages 34, 36, and 39 was amended on 5 June to reflect a response from a company named in the report. The report was amended on 28 July 2020 to remove The North Face from the list of brands, given their association with the relevant factory had ceased before the evidence indicates the factory had received Uyghur workers on a transfer scheme. The text on p37 was amended on 13 August 2020 to reflect a response from a company named in the report. Endnotes from number 257 on pages 52 and 53 are re-numbered. The report was amended on 24 August 2020 to reflect a statement by a company named in the report; and to correct a broken web link. The text on page 32 and 39 was amended on 21 September 2020 to reflect a statement by a company named in the report. The text on page 38 and 39 was amended on 30 September 2020 to reflect a statement by a company named in the report. Figure 17 on page 24 and text on pages 5, 27 and 34 were updated on 20 October 2020 reflect a response from a company named in the report. The text on pages 5, 27, 36 and 52 was updated on 19 November 2020 to correct a translation error in a subsidiary company name. The text on page 31 and page 34 was changed on 18 December 2020 to reflect responses from companies named in the report. The text on page 25 and page 33 was changed on 11 January 2021 to reflect responses from companies named in the report. The text on page 42 was amended on 25 February 2021 to add cross-referencing between endnotes. The text on page 33 was amended on 16 March 2021 to reflect a response from a company named in the report. The text on page 34 was amended on 5 August 2021 to reflect a response from a company named in the report. The text on page 31 was amended on 20 October 2021 to reflect a response from a company named in the report. The text on page 37 was amended on 21 June 2022 to reflect a response from a company named in the report.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank researchers Daria Impiombato, Sarah O’Connor and Emily Weinstein. A special thanks to Stephanie Zhang who spent an enormous amount of time on this project. We would like to thank all peer reviewers including Darren Byler, labour specialists and anonymous reviewers. Finally, we would like to thank ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre Director Fergus Hanson for his support and guidance.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office provided ASPI with funding of £10,000, which was used towards this report.

What is ASPI?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally.

ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber and emerging technologies and their impact on broader strategic policy. The ICPC informs public debate and supports sound public policy by producing original empirical research, bringing together researchers with diverse expertise, often working together in teams. To develop capability in Australia and our region, the ICPC has a capacity building team that conducts workshops, training programs and large-scale
exercises both in Australia and overseas for both the public and private sectors. The ICPC enriches the national debate on cyber and strategic policy by running an international visits program that brings leading experts to Australia.

Important disclaimer

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional.

© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2020

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First published February 2020.

ISSN 2209-9689 (online),
ISSN 2209-9670 (print)

1. The Chinese government’s ‘re-education’ policies have mainly targeted the Uyghurs but also other Turkic speaking Muslim minorities such as the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tartars, Tajiks, Kyrgyz and Hui. This report refers to them collectively as ‘Uyghurs’ or ‘ethnic minorities’ for brevity. ↩︎
2. ‘Detention camps’ and ‘re-education camps’ are used interchangeably in this paper. ↩︎
3. ‘Xinjiang Aid, to the hearts of the masses’ (对口援疆，做到群众心坎上), Anhui Guoyuan Financial Holdings Group Co. Ltd (安徽国元金融控股集团有限责任公司), 26 July 2018, online; ‘Hotan migrant workers find employment in Jiangxi Nanchang’s high-tech enterprises’ (和田外出务工人员在江西南昌高新企业就业掠 影), Hotan People’s government (和田市人民政府), 8 April 2019. ↩︎
4. Yu Mingtong (于明彤), ‘Guangdong industry Xinjiang Aid: Helping Kashgar ethnic women find employment’ (广东产业援疆 助力喀什少数民族妇女就业), International Online (国际在线), 9 November 2018, online; “Xinjiang Aid”, to the hearts of the masses’ (对口援疆，做到群众心坎上), Anhui Guoyuan Financial Holdings Group Co. Ltd (安徽国元金融控股集团有限责任公司), 26 July 2018. ↩︎
5. ‘Nilka, Xinjiang: Multiple measures to explore for improving model of organised rural labour transfer employment outside of Xinjiang’ (新疆尼勒克：多措并举探索提升农村劳动力疆外有组织转移就业新模 式), Xinjiang Public Employment Net (新疆公共就业服务网), 25 June 2019. ↩︎
6. Guidelines for Guangdong enterprises to hire Xinjiang workers (trial) (广东企业招用新疆籍劳动者指引 (试用), Guangdong Employment Service Administration (广东省就业服务管理局), 18 January 2019, online. For additional details on the security measures and government minders, see section ‘Forced Uyghur Labour’. ↩︎
7. Rick Noack, ‘In a first, 22 nations condemned China’s repression of Uigher Muslims. Without the US’, The Washington Post, 12 July 2019 ↩︎
8. See the United State’s Tariff Act of 1930, online, and Australia’s Modern Slavery Act 2018. ↩︎
9. Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930. ↩︎
10. Adrian Zenz, ‘Brainwashing, police guards, and coercive internment: evidence from Chinese government documents about the nature and extent of Xinjiang’s “vocational training internment camps”‘, Journal of Political Risk, July 2019, 7(7), online; Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave and Nathan Ruser, Mapping Xinjiang’s ‘re-education’ camps, ASPI, Canberra, 1 November 2018. ↩︎
11. James Leibold, ‘Despite China’s denials, its treatment of the Uyghurs should be called what it is: cultural genocide’, The Conversation, 24 July 2019. ↩︎
12. Rob Schmitz, ‘Ex-detainee describes torturer in China’s Xinjiang re-education camp’, NPR, 13 November 2018. ↩︎
13. Mu Xuequan, ‘China Focus: Xinjiang determined in counter-terrorism, deradicalization, maintaining development’, Xinhua Net, 10 December 2019. ↩︎
14. ‘Trainees in Xinjiang education, training program have all graduated’, Xinhua, 9 December 2019. ↩︎
15. In 2019, investigations conducted by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre revealed that Australian companies Cotton On and Target were at risk of using forced labour in their supply chains. Sophie McNeill, Jeanavive McGregor, Meredith Griffiths, Michael Walsh, Echo Hui, Bang Xiao, ‘Cotton On and Target investigate suppliers after forced labour of Uyghurs exposed in China’s Xinjiang’, Four Corners, ABC News, 17 July 2019, online; Nathan Ruser, ‘What satellite imagery reveals about Xinjiang’s ‘re-education’ camps and coerced labour’, The Strategist, 16 July 2019, online; Adrian Zenz, ‘Xinjiang’s new slavery’, Foreign Policy, 11 December 2019, online; Amy Lehr and Mariefaye Bechrakis, ‘Comnecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labour, Forced Assimilation and Western Supply Chains,’ A Report of the CSIS Human Rights Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2019. ↩︎
16. Steve Hess, ‘Dividing and conquering the shop floor: Uyghur labour export and labour segmentation in China’s industrial east’, Central Asian Survey, December 2009, 28(4), 404. ↩︎
17. The appendix lists all Chinese and global brands implicated, as well as the cities and provinces in China where the factories are known to be using Uyghur labour. ↩︎
18. This estimate is based on data collected from Chinese state media and official government notices. ↩︎
19. ‘Xinjiang Human Resources and Social Security Department: Strengthening labour cooperation in the region to promote long-term stable employment’ (新疆自治区人力资源和社会保障厅：强化区内劳务协作 促进长期稳定就业), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, People’s Republic of China (中华人 民共和国人力资源和社会保障部), 11 January 2019. ↩︎
20. Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, ‘Inside China’s push to turn Muslim minorities into an army of workers’, New York Times, 30 December 2019. ↩︎
21. Interim measures for the management of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’s rural surplus labour forces to transfer employment to reward funds (新疆维吾尔自治区农村富余劳动力转移就业以奖代补资金管理暂 行办法), online. ↩︎
22. Bill Birtles, ‘China defends “vocational training centres” amid international pressure over mass Uighur detentions’, ABC News, 17 October 2018. See also endnotes 160, 207, 222, 223. ↩︎
23. Work report of the People’s government of Moyu county in 2019 (2019年墨玉县人民政府工作报告), Moyu county government Network (墨玉县政府网), 12 November 2019. ↩︎
24. Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour, ILO indicators of forced labour, International Labour Organization, 1 October 2012. ↩︎
25. Under the 1930 Forced Labour Convention, forced labour is ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily’. The 2014 Forced Labour Protocol, Article 1(3), reaffirms the 1930 convention’s definition. See Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 1930 (No.29), online, and Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930. ↩︎
26. ‘Xinjiang Lop county: Leave as industrial workers, return as excellent public speakers’ (新疆洛浦县：外出 成产业工人 返乡是优秀宣讲员), Phoenix News (凤凰新闻), 12 December 2017, online. In March 2019, the press office of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government told AFP that there was ‘no labour contract between education and training centres and enterprises’ and that ‘no enterprise obtains labour from training centres’; Agence France-Press, ‘China turns Muslim ‘re-education’ camp detainees into cheap labour force, human rights group claims’, South China Morning Post, 4 March 2019. ↩︎
27. Darren Byler, ‘How companies profit from forced labour in Xinjiang’, supchina, 4 September 2019, online; Ye Ling, ‘Released from Camps, Uyghurs Subjected to Forced Labor’, Bitter Winter, 23 December 2019. ↩︎
28. Zhu Yongfeng (朱勇峰), ‘The first batch of 50 workers from Nilka county goes to Jiangsu KTK Group’ (尼勒克 县首批50名赴江苏今创集团务工), China Labour and Social Security News (中国劳动保障新闻网), 15 May 2019. ↩︎
29. Yu Tao (于涛), ‘Xinjiang workers depart to return home to Xinjiang for the first time this winter’ (新疆今 冬首趟进疆务工人员返乡专列发车), Xinhua News (新华网), 7 November 2019, online. Before the 2017 crackdown, ‘surplus labour’ mostly referred to rural labour, but in recent years different types of labour transfer, including of rural labour and former detainees, have often been lumped together as ‘surplus labour’ to meet bigger targets. ↩︎
30. Simaier Human Resources (斯麦尔人力), ‘Important notice’ (重要通知), Labour Dispatch Forum (劳务派遣 吧), Baidu, 27 October 2019, online; ‘1,000 minorities, awaiting online booking’ (1000少数民族，在线等预 约), Baidu HR Forum (百度 HR吧), 27 November 2019. The first batch of rural surplus workers from Bagqi Village in Aksu was transferred for employment’ (阿克苏巴格其村首批农村富余劳动力转移就业), Xinjiang News Online Network (新疆新闻在线网), 8 March 2018, online. [https://archive.fo/BcU4l#selection-431.3-431.10] See also endnote 28. ↩︎
31. ‘Strengthening patriotism education and building a bridge of national unity’ (加强爱国主义教育搭建民族 团结连心桥), China Ethnic Religion Net (中国民族宗教网), 7 November 2019. ↩︎
32. Nilka, Xinjiang: Multiple measures to explore for improving model of organised rural labour transfer employment outside of Xinjiang’ (新疆尼勒克：多措并举探索提升农村劳动力疆外有组织转移就业新模 式), Xinjiang Public Employment Net (新疆公共就业服务网), 25 June 2019. ↩︎
33. Xinjiang Autonomous Region Human Resources and Social Security Department: Strengthening labour cooperation in the region to promote long-term stable employment (新疆自治区人力资源和社会保障厅：强 化区内劳务协作 促进长期稳定就业), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国人力资源和社会保障部), 11 January 2019, online; ‘Guidelines for Guangdong Enterprises to hire Xinjiang Workers (Trial)’ (广东企业招用新疆籍劳动者指引 (试用)), Guangdong Employment Service Administration (广东省就业服务管理局), 18 January 2019. See also endnotes 5, 171 and 248. ↩︎
34. ‘To change a family’s destiny, these rural women workers from Xinjiang came to Qingdao. What did they experience?’ (伟改变家庭命运 这些新疆农村女工来到青岛 她们经历了什么？), CCTV News Public Account (央视新闻公众号) Sina Finance (新浪财经), 21 September 2016. The Suzhou Chamber of Commerce in Xinjiang has faced the difficulties and persisted in paving the way for poor areas in Xinjiang to become rich’ (新疆苏州商会 迎难而上 坚持不懈 为新疆贫困地区铺就致富之路), China’s Social Organisations (中国社会组织), online [https://archive.vn/0Qt4g]. See also endnotes 3, 6. ↩︎
35. According to a report by CSIS, the Chinese government permits factories to pay Uyghur workers in Xinjiang significantly lower than minimum wage. In some instances they’re not paid at all. Amy K. Lehr & Mariefaye Bechrakis, ‘Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains’, A Report of the CSIS Human Rights Initiative, 16 October 2019. ↩︎
36. Cao Siqi, ‘Vocational centers in Xinjiang will disappear when society no longer needs them: official’, Global Times, 12 March 2019. ↩︎
37. ‘Hotan Prefecture’s innovative mechanism promotes labour transfer employment’ (和田地区创新机制助推 劳动力转移就业), Xinhua News (新华网), 23 May 2017. ↩︎
38. ‘Hotan Prefecture’s innovative mechanism promotes labour transfer employment’ (和田地区创新机制助推 劳动力转移就业), Xinhua News (新华网), 23 May 2017 ↩︎
39. A Chinese messaging app. ↩︎
40. The language used in the Xinjiang Human Resources and Social Affairs Department document appears to be intentionally vague. The smartphone app used to record information about Uyghur workers is unnamed, and ASPI hasn’t been able to find relevant information to identify the app. ↩︎
41. ‘To change a family’s destiny, these rural women workers from Xinjiang came to Qingdao. What did they experience?’ (伟改变家庭命运 这些新疆农村女工来到青岛 她们经历了什么？), CCTV News Public Account (央视新闻公众号) Sina Finance (新浪财经), 21 September 2016. ↩︎
42. ‘Four prefectures in southern Xinjiang press the fast-forward button to fight poverty’ (南疆四地州按下脱贫 攻坚快进键), Smart Farm 361 (智农361), 20 September 2018. ↩︎
43. Nilka, Xinjiang: Multiple measures to explore for improving model of organised rural labour transfer employment outside of Xinjiang’ (新疆尼勒克：多措并举探索提升农村劳动力疆外有组织转移就业新模 式), Xinjiang Public Employment Net (新疆公共就业服务网), 25 June 2019. ↩︎
44. Ye Ling, ‘Released from Camps, Uyghurs Subjected to Forced Labor’, Bitter Winter, 23 December 2019. ↩︎
45. Ye Ling, ‘Released from Camps, Uyghurs Subjected to Forced Labor’, Bitter Winter, 23 December 2019. ↩︎
46. Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution states: ‘All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops the relationship of equality, unity, and mutual assistance among all of China’s nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited; any acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or instigate their secession are prohibited. The state helps the areas inhabited by minority nationalities speed up their economic and cultural development in accordance with the peculiarities and needs of the different minority nationalities.’ The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 4 December 1982. ↩︎
47. ‘Strengthening patriotism education and building a bridge of national unity’ (加强爱国主义教育搭建民族团结连心桥), China Ethnic Religion Net (中国民族宗教网), 7 Nov 2019. According to state media, by the end of 2019, there were around 800 Uyghur workers at Taekwang. According to the Washington Post, by January 2020, there were 600 Uyghur workers there. ↩︎
48. ‘Group profile’, Jeongsan International, no date, online; ‘Nike Global Manufacturing data export—filters applied: ((none))’ Nike, August 2019. ↩︎
49. ‘From here to a brand new life—Xinjiang Hotan, Kashgar Vocational Skills Education and Training Center’ (从这里，走向崭新生活—新疆和田，喀什职业技能教育培训中心见闻), Xinhua News (新华网), 5 November 2018. ↩︎
50. ‘Strengthening patriotism education and building a bridge of national unity’ (加强爱国主义教育搭建民族团结连心桥), China Ethnic Religion Net (中国民族宗教网), 7 November 2019. ↩︎
51. ‘Muslim minority in China’s Xinjiang face ‘political indoctrination’: Human Rights Watch’, Reuters, 10 September 2018. ↩︎
52. Lauren Thomas, ‘70% of shoes sold in the US come from China. With new tariffs, the industry braces for a hit’, CNBC, 2 August 2019. ↩︎
53. Nike has published policies prohibiting forced labour at its supplier facilities. In a 2019 company statement on forced labour and modern slavery it says it requires suppliers to address key risks of forced labour and lays out what it says are ‘minimum standards we expect each supplier factory or facility to meet’. ‘Company introduction’ (公司简介), Qingdao Taekwang Shoes Co. Ltd (青岛泰光制鞋有限公司), online; Nike, ‘Human Rights and Labor Compliance Standards’, online; Nike, ‘Statement on Forced Labor, Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery for fiscal year 2019’. Nike responded to the allegations in this report in a media statement, https://purpose.nike.com/statement-on-xinjiang ↩︎
54. A department under the CCP’s Central Committee. ↩︎
55. ‘Municipal United Front Work Department’s “Pomegranate Seed” Night School: a look into Qingdao Taekwang’s Mandarin classes’ (市委统战部’ 石榴籽’ 夜校 走进青岛泰光举办普通话培训班), Laixi United Front (莱西统一战线), WeChat, 1 July 2019, online. ↩︎
56. ‘Xi Jinping: China’s ethnic groups should closely embrace one another like pomegranate seeds’ (习近平：各民族要像石榴籽那样紧紧抱在一起), China Communist Party News (中国共产党新闻网), 28 September 2015, online. ↩︎
57. Anna Fifield, ‘China compels Uighurs to work in shoe factory that supplies Nike’, Washington Post, 29 February 2020, online. ↩︎
58. Isolation of workers and abuse of their vulnerabilities (such as a lack of knowledge of the local language) are two indicators of forced labour, according to the ILO; International Labour Office, ILO indicators of forced labour, International Labour Organization, Geneva, 1 October 2012, online. ↩︎
59. ‘Let the seeds of national unity be rooted in the heart—The Women’s Federation of the Municipality truly cares for minority female workers’ (让民族团结的种子根植心–市妇联真情关爱少数民族女工侧记), Discover Qingdao (发现青岛), Sohu, 9 October 2019, online. ↩︎
60. Recruitment advertisements for staff in the internment camps reportedly state that experience in psychological training is a plus. Sigal Samuel, ‘China is treating Islam like a mental illness’, The Atlantic, 28 August 2018, online. ↩︎
61. ‘The Party Committee of the Municipal Public Security Bureau organised a joint activity of the educational branch with the theme of ‘Don’t forget the original heart and keep the mission in mind’’ ((学习) 市公安局党委组织开展 ’不忘初心、牢记使命’ 主题教育支部联建活动), Laixi News (莱西新闻), WeChat, online. ↩︎
62. ‘Interview with Yang Guoqiang, Chief Commander of Shandong Province and Deputy Secretary of Xinjiang Kashgar Party Committee’ (国家援疆新闻平台专访山东省援疆总指挥、新疆喀什地委副书记杨国强), China Development Network (中国发展网), 27 April 2018, online. ↩︎
63. ‘Outstanding humanistic care, strengthening employment security; Qingdao’s Laixi county steadily carrying out service management work for Xinjiang ethnic minorities’ (突出人文关怀 强化就业保障 青岛莱西市扎实开展新疆籍少数民族人员服务管理工作), Qingdao Ethnicity and Religion Bureau (青岛市民族宗教局), 19 April 2017, online. ↩︎
64. ‘Mass instances’ generally refers to any spontaneous or organised acts of unrest or rioting in Chinese. ‘Outstanding humanistic care, strengthening employment security; Qingdao’s Laixi county steadily carrying out service management work for Xinjiang ethnic minorities’ (突出人文关怀 强化就业保障 青岛莱西市扎实开展新疆籍少数民族人员服务管理工作), Qingdao Ethnicity and Religion Bureau (青岛市民族宗教局), 19 April 2017, online. ↩︎
65. In China, auxiliary police are unarmed officers hired through contracts. Since 2017, Xinjiang has filled a large number of security-related positions, including auxiliary police officers. Gan, ‘Xinjiang’s police hiring binge comes from party boss’s Tibet playbook’; ‘Shandong Qingdao recruits 40 auxiliary policemen with a monthly salary of 4500, can sign up for specialized training’ (山东青岛招聘40名辅警月薪4500 专科就可以报名), Auxiliary Police Officers (警务辅助人员), WeChat, 19 January 2018, online. ↩︎
66. Austin Ramzy, ‘He needed a Job. China gave him one: locking up his fellow Muslims’, New York Times, 2 March 2019, online. ↩︎
67. ‘A letter of gratitude from Hotan workers: We are doing well in Shandong!’ (一封内地和田籍务工人员的感谢信：我们在山东挺好的!), NetEase (网易), 29 January 2018, online. ↩︎
68. Alexander Chipman Koty, Qian Zhou, ‘A guide to minimum wages in China’, China Briefing, 2 January 2020, online. ↩︎
69. The letter also mentions a ‘leading cadre’—likely a minder—who translates instructions and teaches the workers the spirit of the 19th Communist Party Congress after work. It appears that the minder was responsible for teaching Mandarin before the establishment of the Pomegranate Seed Night School. ↩︎
70. James Leibold, ‘Ethnic policy in China: is reform inevitable?’, Policy Studies, 2013, no. 68, East–West Center, online. ↩︎
71. According to the 2008 annual report of the US Congressional Executive Commission on China, ‘local officials, following direction from higher levels of government, have used ‘deception, pressure, and threats’ toward young women and their families to gain recruits into the labour transfer program.’ Congress-Executive Commission on China (CECC), 2018 Annual Report, 10 October 2018, online. ↩︎
72. Steve Hess, ‘Dividing and conquering the shop floor: Uyghur labour export and labour segmentation in China’s industrial east’, Central Asian Survey, December 2009, 28(4), 404, online. ↩︎
73. Tania Branigan, ‘Ethnic violence in China leaves 140 dead’, The Guardian, 6 July 2009, online. ↩︎
74. ‘Successive ‘Xinjiang Aid’ conferences evidence of changes in Xinjiang’s governance strategy’, (历次援新疆会议 见证治疆政变迁), Sohu, 24 July 2014, online. ↩︎
75. Li Yuhui, China’s assistance program in Xinjiang, Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, 2018. ↩︎
76. Four years before the 2017 crackdown in Xinjiang, terms such as ‘vocational training’ and ‘strengthening and improving ideological and political education’ began appearing in ‘Xinjiang Aid’ conference materials. ‘Fourth National ‘Xinjiang Aid’ Conference held in Beijing’ (第四次全国对口支援新疆工作会议在北京召开), Central government Portal (中央政府门户网站), 24 September 2013, online; Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, Nathan Ruser, ‘Mapping Xinjiang’s ‘re-education’ camps’, ASPI, Canberra, 1 November 2018, online. ↩︎
77. James Leibold, ‘The spectre of insecurity: the CCP’s mass internment strategy in Xinjiang’, China Leadership Monitor, 59 (Spring 2019), online. ↩︎
78. See, for example, ‘‘Six batches’ boosted employment of 100,000 people in Kashgar’s Hotan in three years’ ( ’六个一批’ 助推喀什和田地区三年就业十万人), Xinhua News (新华网), 11 May 2017, online. ↩︎
79. ‘Xinjiang focuses on 22 deeply impoverished counties (cities) planning to transfer 100,000 jobs in 3 years’ (新疆聚焦22个深度贫困县（市）计划3年转移就业10万人), Xinhua News (新华网), 10 January 2018, online. ↩︎
80. Yan Hailong (闫海龙), Thoughts and suggestions on human resources development in the three regions of southern ‘Xinjiang Aid’ work (关于对口援疆工作中南疆三地州人力资源开发的思考与建议), Institute of Economic Research of Xinjiang Development and Reform (新疆维吾尔自治区发展和改革委员会经济研究院), 22 May 2012, online. ↩︎
81. ‘Xianning opens ‘green channel’ for Xinjiang’s organised labour export’, (咸宁为新疆籍有组织劳务输出开辟’ 绿色通道’ ), United Front of Jingchu (荆楚统战), Headlines Express (看点快报), 18 May 2018, online. ↩︎
82. Satellite factories are subsidiary company factories established in Xinjiang by parent companies throughout China. This paper will refer to them just as factories for brevity. ↩︎
83. Han Qinyan (韩沁言), ‘Industry aids Xinjiang for development’ (产业援疆促发展), Xinhua News (新华网), 3 January 2020, online. ↩︎
84. ‘Company introduction’ (公司简介), Hao Yuanpeng Clothing Co. Ltd (浩缘朋服装有限公司), online. ↩︎
85. Autonomous region’s economic structure is stable and has good development (自治区经济结构稳中有活 发展良好), Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Development and Reform Commission (新疆维吾尔自治区 发展和改革委员会), 5 December 2018, online. ↩︎
86. Work report of the People’s government of Moyu county in 2019 (2019年墨玉县人民政府工作报告), Moyu county government Network (墨玉县政府网), 12 November 2019, online. ↩︎
87. A 2017 report from local media in Kashgar stated that officials from the county’s bureau of human resources travelled to other Chinese provinces to negotiate employment placements prior to months of ‘Winter Youth Education and Training’—a form of re-education including political indoctrination and militarised discipline that usually lasts a few months. See ‘High level collaboration in Winter Youth Education and Training in Kashgar’ (高位推动 通力协作 喀什地区冬季青年教育培训工作如火如荼), Kashgar Zero Distance (喀什零距离), 16 February 2017, online. ↩︎
88. Our research relied on publicly available notices of labour transfers reported by government sources and local media. Not all labour transfers are reported in media sources, and available numbers suggest that this map is incomplete. The actual numbers are likely to be far higher. ↩︎
89. ‘Xinjiang’s Kashgar and Hotan Prefectures’ rural surplus labour transfer employment project has been implemented for two years now’ (新疆喀什和田农村富余劳动力转移就业工程实施两年来), Ningxia News (宁夏新闻网), 15 November 2018, online. ↩︎
90. ‘Transfer employment 2,410 labourers in poverty from Southern Xinjiang’ (南疆2410名贫困劳动力转移就业), China Western Development Promotion Association (中国西部开发促进会), online. ↩︎
91. ‘In 2017, 2.75 million rural surplus labourers were transferred for employment’ (2017新疆农村富余劳动力转移就业275万人次), Xinjiang Daily (新疆日报), 9 January 2018, online. ↩︎
92. According to state media, by November of 2018, Xinjiang transferred 25,378 people to other provinces for employment that year. Extrapolating this figure for the full calendar year, ASPI estimates that 28,000 people would have been transferred out of Xinjiang in 2018 in total. ‘2.8 million rural surplus labor transfers for employment in the first 11 months (of the year) in Xinjiang’ (前11月新疆近280万人次农村富余劳动力转移就业), Xinjiang Daily (新疆日报), 26 December 2018, online. ↩︎
93. According to state media, in the first half of 2019, the Xinjiang government organized transfers of 15,459 people to ‘Xinjiang Aid’ areas in eastern and central China. ASPI estimates that this puts the whole year’s figure at around 32,000. Xinhua (新华网), ‘Nearly 1.76 million Xinjiang rural surplus labour transfers in the first half of the year’ (新疆上半年农村富余劳动力转移就业近176万人次), China News (中国新闻网), 19 July 2019, online. ↩︎
94. Information on targets and transfers for the years before 2017 is scarce. However, the limited data suggests that there’s been significant growth in recent years. From 2014 to mid-2018, Nilka, a small county in Xinjiang, reportedly transferred 390 people to work in other provinces of China. In the first six months of 2019, the county transferred 551 people outside of Xinjiang. ‘Transfer employment ‘transfers’ to a new life’ (转移就 业’ 转’ 出生活新气象), Nilka county government (尼勒克县政府网), 20 June 2019, online. ↩︎
95. ‘In 2017, 2.75 million rural surplus labourers were transferred for employment’ (2017新疆农村富余劳动力转移就业275万人次), Xinjiang Daily (新疆日报), 9 January 2018, online. ↩︎
96. ‘Multiple employment ‘dividends’ in Xinjiang help fight poverty’ (新疆多项就业 ’红利’ 助力脱贫攻坚), Xinhua News (新华网), 4 March 2019, online. ↩︎
97. A Chinese search engine. ↩︎
98. The labour transfer programs that have included former detainees have also been referred to in official sources as ‘rural surplus labour’. ‘The maximum salary is over 5,000 yuan, with a deposit of 30,000 a year. Jiashi students’ employment in the mainland shows results’, Foshan News Network, 25 April 2019, online. ↩︎
99. ‘Interim measures for the management of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Autonomous Region’s rural surplus labour forces to transfer employment to reward funds’ (新疆维吾尔自治区农村富余劳动力转移就业以奖代补资金管理暂行办法), online. ↩︎
100. ‘‘Six batches’ boosts employment of 100,000 people in Kashgar Prefecture and Hotan Prefecture in three years’ ( ’六个一批’ 助推喀什和田地区三年就业十万人), Xinhua News (新华网), 11 May 2017, online. The policies discussed in this notice include the ‘Organised transfer for employment for surplus labour in Kashgar and Hotan regions’ (喀什和田地区城乡富余劳动力有组织转移就业) and ‘Three-year poverty alleviation plan for poverty-stricken areas in four south Xinjiang prefectures’ (南疆四地州深度贫困地区就业扶贫三年计划) labour transfer initiatives, both of which include transfers inside and outside Xinjiang. ↩︎
101. Chipman Koty, Zhou, ‘A guide to minimum wages in China’. ↩︎
102. ‘Our company provides a large number of government workers to dispatching companies in Xinjiang’ (我司提供大量政府新疆工人劳务派遣公司), Qingdao Human Resources Network (青岛德才人力资源网), online. ↩︎
103. Companies working with the Chinese government under the ‘Xinjiang Aid’ program receive incentives to open up ‘satellite factories’ (卫星工厂) or workshops inside Xinjiang to absorb ‘surplus labour capacity’ (富余劳动力). ↩︎
104. ‘Despite earning a lot of money elsewhere, why did he travel so far to South Xinjiang to start a business?’ (在别处赚的盆满钵满，为何他要遣赴南疆开荒创业?), Hao Yuanpeng Clothing Co. Ltd (浩缘朋服装有限公司), 15 October 2019, online; ‘Cooperative Brands’ (合作品牌), Hao Yuanpeng Clothing Co. Ltd (浩缘朋服装有限公司), online. ↩︎
105. ‘Guangdong’s aid to Xinjiang actively promotes the transfer of labour from the aided places to other provinces of China’ (广东援疆积极推动受援地劳动力向内地转移就业成效明显), Voice of Guangdong Aid (广东援疆之声), 23 June 2018, online. ↩︎
106. ‘Guangdong’s aid to Xinjiang actively promotes the transfer of labour from the aided places to other provinces of China’ (广东援疆积极推动受援地劳动力向内地转移就业成效明显), Voice of Guangdong Aid (广东援疆之声), 23 June 2018, online. ↩︎
107. Enrolment in the ‘vocational’ facility has had an abnormally rapid increase since 2017. Official figures show that the school went from 500 students in 2013 to more than 7,000 in 2019; ‘Thanks to Foshan’s ‘Xinjiang Aid’ team, this girl from Payziwat county, Xinjiang, who wanted to drop out of school, is now a university student’ (因为佛山援疆干部，这位曾想辍学的新疆伽师姑娘成了大学生), Tencent (腾讯网), online. A mobile police station was set up at the entrance and 11 additional security checkpoints were built around its perimeter, which is fully enclosed by a tall fence and solid brick walls. Beginning in early 2017, seven new dormitory-style buildings were constructed alongside five prefabricated factory buildings, strongly suggesting that the former school was converted into a re-education camp where ethnic minorities are arbitrarily detained and politically indoctrinated. In August 2018, the school advertised for new officials to oversee the implementation of ‘military-style management’ (军事化管理) at the school, as it sought to ‘foster discipline and more closely watch over students’. Recruitment brochure of Jiashi Secondary Vocational Technical School (伽师县中等职业技术学校招聘简章), Payziwat county Human Resources Service Centre (伽师人力资源服务中心), Sohu, 9 August 2018, online. Satellite image collection and analysis conducted by Nathan Ruser, researcher at ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre. ↩︎
108. In its 2016–17 budget, the Guangdong government promised Ұ960 million for ‘Xinjiang Aid’ to bring 47,800 jobs to Xinjiang. The following year, the government brought in a number of companies, including HYP, to assist in opening satellite factories in Xinjiang. ‘Guangdong aids Xinjiang: letting people live and work in peace is most important to people’s livelihood’ (广东对口援疆：民生为重让百姓安居乐业), Xinjiang Morning Newspaper (新疆晨报), Sina Xinjiang (新浪新疆), 2 November 2018, online. ↩︎
109. ‘Despite earning a lot of money elsewhere, why did he travel so far to South Xinjiang to start a business?’ (在别处赚的盆满钵满，为何他要赴南疆开荒创业?), Hao Yuanpeng Clothing Co. Ltd (浩缘朋服装有限公司), 15 October 2019, online. ↩︎
110. Apple supplier responsibility: supplier list, Apple, 2019, online. ↩︎
111. ‘Apple CEO Cook tours O-Film Technology Co. Ltd: iPhone X/8 selfie screams “cheese”‘ (‘苹果CEO库克参观欧菲光科技：iPhone X/8自拍大喊’茄子’), IT Home (IT之家), 6 December 2017, online; The original Weibo post can only be accessed with a Weibo login, online; ‘Apple CEO Cook visits and praises the technical level and cultural environment of our company’ (苹果CEO库克来访 点赞我司技术水平和人文环境), O-Film Technology Co. Ltd, 7 December 2017, online. ↩︎
112. Apple supplier responsibility: supplier list, Apple, 2019, online. ↩︎
113. ‘About us’, O-Film Technology Co. Ltd, online; ‘CMOS camera module’, O-Film Technology Co. Ltd, online. ↩︎
114. ‘Over 1200 surplus labourers from Lop county heads to mainland China for work’ (洛浦县1200余名城乡富余劳动力赴内地务工), Hotan Daily Newspaper (和田日报) via China Xinjiang, 11 May 2017, online. ↩︎
115. ‘Over 1200 surplus labourers from Lop county heads to mainland China for work’ (洛浦县1200余名城乡富余劳动力赴内地务工), Hotan Daily Newspaper (和田日报) via China Xinjiang, 11 May 2017, online. ↩︎
116. ‘Over 1200 surplus labourers from Lop county heads to mainland China for work’ (洛浦县1200余名城乡富余劳动力赴内地务工), Hotan Daily Newspaper (和田日报) via China Xinjiang, 11 May 2017, online. ↩︎
117. ‘Apple CEO Cook visits and praises the technical level and cultural environment of our company’ (苹果CEO库克来访 点赞我司技术水平和人文环境), O-Film Technology Co. Ltd, 7 December 2017, online. ↩︎
118. ‘Apple CEO Cook visits and praises the technical level and cultural environment of our company’ (苹果CEO库克来访 点赞我司技术水平和人文环境), O-Film Technology Co. Ltd, 7 December 2017, online. ↩︎
119. ‘Hotan migrant workers find employment in Jiangxi Nanchang’s high-tech enterprises’ (和田外出务工人员在江西南昌高新企业就业掠影), Hotan People’s government (和田市人民政府), 8 April 2019, online. ↩︎
120. ‘Xinjiang Lop county: Leave as industrial workers, return as excellent public speakers’ (新疆洛浦县：外出成产业工人 返乡是优秀宣讲员), Phoenix News (凤凰新闻), 12 December 2017, online. ↩︎
121. Henan aids Hami City, Xinjiang in advancing poverty alleviation’ (河南援疆助力哈密固提升脱贫攻坚), Hami City Party Building Net (哈密市党建网), 6 September 2019, online; David Barbosa, ‘How China Built ‘iPhone City’ With Billions in Perks for Apple’s Partner’, The New York Times, 29 December 2016, online. ↩︎
122. Jamie Condliffe, ‘Foxconn Is Under Scrutiny for Worker Conditions. It’s Not the First Time.’, The New York Times, 11 June 2018, online. ↩︎
123. ‘Demystifying Zhengzhou’s Apple City: Half of the world’s iPhones are made here’ (揭秘郑州苹果城：全球一半iPhone产自这里), Tencent Technology (腾讯科技), 18 September 2017, online. ↩︎
124. Phoebe Zhang, ‘Apple iPhone 11 launch marred by claims Foxconn factory broke labour laws’, South China Morning Post, 9 September 2019, online. ↩︎
125. Jamie Fullerton, ‘Suicide at Chinese iPhone factory reignites concern over working conditions’, The Telegraph, 7 January 2018, online; Yuan Yang, ‘Apple’s iPhone X assembled by illegal student labour’, Financial Times, 21 November 2017, online. ↩︎
126. ‘Precision poverty assistance, the Group enters Xinjiang’s Kashgar’ (助力精准扶贫集团走进新疆喀什地区), Foxconn, 5 December 2018, online. In 2018, a Foxconn media release claimed that the company had donated 15 televisions to an army unit in Xinjiang and money to a Kashgar hospital. Foxconn’s company Communist Party branch also established a ‘joint development’ relationship with a border checkpoint in Xinjiang. ↩︎
127. ‘Xianning, Hubei, opens up a ‘green tunnel’ for Xinjiang’s organised labour export’ (咸宁为新疆籍有组织劳务输出开辟’ 绿色通道’ ), United Front of Jingchu (荆楚统战) via Headlines Express (看点快报), 18 May 2018, online. ↩︎
128. ‘Xianning, Hubei, opens up a ‘green tunnel’ for Xinjiang’s organised labour export’ (咸宁为新疆籍有组织劳务输出开辟’ 绿色通道’ ), United Front of Jingchu (荆楚统战) via Headlines Express (看点快报), 18 May 2018, online. ↩︎
129. ‘Yidong Overview’ (奕东简介), Dongguan Yidong Electronic Co. Ltd (东莞市奕东电子有限公司), online. ↩︎
130. ‘Collaborative customers’ (合作客户), Dongguan Yidong Electronic Co. Ltd (东莞市奕东电子有限公司), online. ↩︎
131. Lauly Li and Cheng Tingfang, ‘Exclusive: Apple turns to China to double AirPods Pro production’, Nikkei Asian Review, 27 November 2019, online. ↩︎
132. Ainur helps family realise ‘supermarket dream’ (阿依努尔助力家人实现’超市梦), Hotan government (和田政府网), 31 July 2019, online. ↩︎
133. Xinhua (新华网), ‘Uyghur Hefei—Ainur: Wishes come true 3,500 kilometres away’ (维吾尔族合肥-阿依努尔：愿望实现于3500公里之外), Chongqing News (重庆第一眼), 3 August 2019, online. ↩︎
134. ‘Happiness is earned through struggle: girl from Pishan wants to stay in Hefei as a blue-collar worker’ ([幸福是奋斗出来的] 皮山姑娘要留在合肥当蓝领), Tianshan Net (天山网), 19 March 2018, online. ↩︎
135. The report also says that she was a student in Guma majoring in food processing. ↩︎
136. Annual report (年度报告), Highbroad Advanced Material (Hefei) Co., Ltd. (翰博高新才科（合肥）股份有限公司), 2018, online. ↩︎
137. Huawei has a group-wide policy, signed in 2018, that acknowledges ‘the risk of modern slavery due to the complexity of global supply chains within the ICT industry’ and says it ‘will not tolerate forced, bonded (including debt bondage) or indentured labour, involuntary prison labour, slavery or trafficking of persons.’ The statement says that it audits its suppliers’ performance annually and discloses ‘records of all forced labour noncompliances’. Minglu Zhao, Statement on modern slavery, Huawei, 26 June 2018, online. ↩︎
138. William Gallagher, ‘China’s BOE set to become Apple’s second-largest OLED screen supplier in 2021’, Apple Insider, 30 December 2019, online. ↩︎
139. Apple supplier responsibility: supplier list, Apple, 2019, online. In its Supplier Responsibility Policy, online, Apple says it has ‘zero tolerance’ for bonded labour, conducts investigations where it is discovered and has instituted other programs designed to improve protections for at-risk workers in its supply chains. ↩︎
140. ‘Highbroad Advanced Material (Hefei) Co. Ltd’ (翰博高新才科（合肥）股份有限公司), online. ↩︎
141. ‘Highbroad Advanced Materials (Hefei) Co., Ltd.’ (翰博高新材科（合肥）股份有限公司), 51Job, online. ↩︎
142. ‘Highbroad Advanced Material (Hefei) Co., Ltd’ (翰博高新才科（合肥）股份有限公司), China LCD Network (中华液晶网), online. ↩︎
143. ‘Xinjiang Human Resources and Social Security Department: Strengthening labour cooperation in the region to promote long-term stable employment’ (新疆自治区人力资源和社会保障厅：强化区内劳务协作 促进长期稳定就业), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国人力资源和社会保障部), 11 January 2019, online. ↩︎
144. ‘Let the seeds of national unity be rooted in the heart—a note on the true love and care among minority women workers’ (让民族团结的种子根植于心——市妇联真情关爱少数民族女工侧记), Laixi government Net (莱西政府网), 9 October 2019, online. ↩︎
145. Lv Nanfang (吕楠芳), ‘Industry supports Xinjiang in ‘making blood’; women hold up half the sky!’ (产业援疆来’ 造血’ ，妇女撑起半边天！), From Guangzhou (羊城派), Sina (新浪网), 30 December 2019, online. ↩︎
146. The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 4 December 1982, online. ↩︎
147. See the United State’s Tariff Act of 1930, online, and Australia’s Modern Slavery Act 2018, online. ↩︎
148. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 1930 (No.29), online. ↩︎
149. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957 (No.105), online. ↩︎
150. Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, online. ↩︎