Tag Archive for: WPS

Security in a disrupted world

I have always believed that our institutions should seek to reflect the diversity of our community. So you might well be expecting me to bemoan the fact that there are still too few women inhabiting the secret cloisters of the national intelligence and security community, particularly in senior positions. And you might expect me to issue yet another appeal for a concerted attack on the glass ceiling.

You might also be expecting me to offer you all further encouragement in tackling the somewhat clubby character of the intelligence and security community which remains predominantly a male preserve.

There is no doubt that we need more women in the security business; equally, we need more women in leadership positions. So, more strength to your arm, collectively and individually, in your pursuit of equality. But what I want to focus on tonight is why women are so important in enabling our national intelligence and security community to meet the challenges that uncertain times bring with them.

There is a need for a careful reconsideration of what security is fundamentally about and whether our national responses to security issues are the most appropriate for uncertain times.

The paradigm change that may be necessary is only possible if the security community itself undergoes rejuvenation and transformation. One of the best ways to generate fresh thinking and innovation in any business is to ensure that gender equality and ethnic diversity are put to work to drive change.

Do we need to remind ourselves more persistently that we will not succeed or become safer by closing ourselves off from each other or from the world? Security challenges are best met working with others rather than turning inwards. And history reminds us of the risks that inward-looking, disengaged societies pose—risks of misunderstanding, tension and conflict.

Now I don’t claim expertise on these issues. What I can say, however, is that the concept of security for most Australians would also encompass economic and financial security, affordable health care, job and income security, quality childcare and the promise of a dignified retirement.

In other words, ‘security’ has a much broader connotation than the more threat-based protective and response concepts on which a lot of public policy concentrates. This in no way diminishes the work that you all do.

But what it might suggest is that a broader understanding of what security means for the general populace and where it impacts on people’s lives may in turn expand the range of tools at your disposal and the effectiveness of the programs you design and implement.

Disrupted times bring with them a raft of cares and worries. The French economist Thomas Piketty has identified economic inequality as a principal cause of the political instability currently infecting Europe—the Brexit vote and its currently unforeseeable consequences, the rise of radical parties on both the left and the right, the resurgence of nationalism in countries like Austria, Hungary and Poland, and the politics of exclusion on religious and racial grounds.

Into this mix come historical grievances driven in more or less equal parts by colonialism on the one hand and its collapse on the other. The picture becomes even more bleak when we see political leaders who reject the operating rules by which the international system has worked for the past seventy years, the emergence of new international players that want to impose new operating rules, and all of this rendered even more toxic by the emergence of nihilist ideologies that advocate death rather than tolerance.

Many of you would be familiar with the impact that discontinuity can have on complex systems. But complex systems generally have sufficient resilience to manage discontinuities, to bounce back relatively quickly. Indeed, many of the security features inbuilt into complex systems are specifically designed to deal with discontinuity.

Disruption is at the centre of the malaise that we see globally. Political and economic disruption are the main drivers of strategic disruption. It is that form of disruption that is undermining the confidence of people everywhere, generating care, worry and, more alarmingly, fear. And fear is particularly dangerous because it prompts irrational and dangerous actions.

You would all be aware of the call by many international commentators for governments to deal with the ‘root causes’ of the various forms of politically motivated violence presently affecting the global community. Of course, few of those commentators actually identify what those ‘root causes’ are.

But what we do know is that the so-called ‘root causes’ lie at the intersection of the economic, social, cultural, ethnic and ideological forces that lend movement and colour to human collective activity. And the agent who acts at the intersection of these forces is always an individual person.

In a thoughtful opinion piece published in the UK Guardian a couple of weeks ago, the novelist and former security specialist Nicholas Searle cautioned against rhetoric as a component of security policy.

Sweeping terms like ‘radical Islamic terrorism’ cannot alone explain the breakdown of law and order across the Middle East and that have spread their tentacles into Europe, North America, South and South East Asia, Africa and even Australia. It is interesting to note that the incoming National Security Advisor in the Trump administration, General H.R. McMaster, has also counselled against the use of terms such as ‘Islamic terrorism’.

Politically motivated violence is a form of criminal activity. It needs to be dealt with as such. And as an international phenomenon, politically motivated violence will best be contained and eliminated when nations, some of which are Muslim, work collaboratively to address the broad security needs of the communities in which the perpetrators live.

That kind of collaboration depends for its success on the ability to address the human security needs that condition fear and violence. That kind of collaboration will also serve to identify, detain and prosecute those who undertake politically motivated violence.

Rejuvenation and regeneration should always be front of mind for those who lead high-performing organisations. Subtlety and nuance in both policy and operations are most likely to be effective when organisations are truly representative of the communities they serve.

Open communities have the strength of inclusion. Closed communities have the spectre of fear.

How should Australia’s WPS National Action Plan tackle terrorism?

Image courtesy of Pixabay user Unsplash.

This article is part of a series on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ that The Strategist is publishing in recognition of International Women’s Day 2017.

Julie Bishop’s new aid policy framework which seeks to include countering violent extremism (CVE) programs across Australia’s foreign aid development projects is a welcome step in the right direction.

The framework directly refers to the roles women play in ‘perpetuating and/or preventing violent extremism’, after much international debate on how gender can be used to tackle aspects of terrorism (see UNSCR 2242, and the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism).

We now need to consider whether integrating counterterrorism (CT) and CVE in Australia’s forthcoming National Action Plan could add real value. The complexity of CT/CVE operations domestically and internationally and their varying objectives and practices means that a successful integration into the NAP would only be achieved through a careful, highly nuanced, approach.

A recent global study conducted by the UN indicates that development and human rights practitioners are wary about integrating WPS and CT/CVE. This stems from the hard security practices (military operations and intelligence) within which CT strategy is rooted, which some practitioners consider incongruous with the rest of the WPS strategy.

Laura Shepherd has further highlighted, the considerable challenges to successfully integrating CT/CVE with WPS. At an operational level, CVE practitioners may not have appropriate levels of gender training. At a conceptual level, incorporating CT/CVE practices within a framework to empower women within their communities might lead to contradictory practices being developed that could negatively impact the broad WPS and CVE agendas.

For example, the UN study’s recommendations on how to integrate CVE within WPS says all ‘capacity building should be through civilian agencies, far removed from military processes. This approach has been hotly debated between peacebuilding and security professionals. The latter aren’t convinced that such a soft approach is appropriate when dealing with issues of national security while the former argue that counter-terrorism frameworks are confusingly positioned somewhere between police operations and warfare, which may contribute towards compromising both women’s rights and human rights.

Clearly both arguments raise valid issues, but Bishop’s comments demonstrate that lessons should be taken from both approaches. I have argued that CVE in Australia would benefit from a re-focus that distances itself from CT operations. In the same way, I would suggest that a NAP should separate the two agendas to avoid confusing their very different objectives.

CT in the NAP should be addressed separately from CVE as it can be seen as a vehicle that uses women in international communities to advance security operations. CT operations need to be highly sensitive to situations on the ground, prioritising long-term solutions rather than immediate transformation.

CVE should be approached through a nation building agenda rather than under a CT strategy. Engaging civil society appropriately will incorporate varied strategies across sectors including development, healthcare, education and law enforcement. Women are already highly organised and engaged in these fields, and their existing participation, autonomy and leadership in such areas would greatly benefit CVE operations. The framework of the NAP would need to be able to reflect the diversity within different international communities when tackling CVE or CT.

The NAP has been criticised in the past for its approach to monitoring and evaluation processes. If CVE/CT were to be integrated, issues of accountability, transparency and efficiency with regard to WPS and CT/CVE must be adequately monitored and measured in accordance with specific guidelines and objectives. If this doesn’t happen, this could exacerbate conditions which can produce terrorism or violent extremism.

The Foreign Minister’s commitment to re-focusing CVE is welcome, and her mission to cultivate a cross-sector approach will hopefully prove beneficial. At present, ‘many initiatives incorporating women within CVE remain haphazard and simplistic, resulting in ill-equipped and poorly resourced program structures’ that neither benefit gender equality nor help counter violent extremism.

Although the NAP could be a good vehicle to help move CVE away from security-oriented policies, the challenges of untangling processes from existing CT/security led initiatives could be complex and difficult. It must be carefully thought through.

In its own words, the NAP is ‘a living document that will provide ongoing guidance to inform the work and policies of Australian Government agencies and departments.’ It would be timely to integrate CT and CVE within it, but it will take time and careful training of practitioners. Unless we get it right, it might do more harm than good.

Peacekeeping and the WPS agenda: ‘less talk and more action’

Image courtesy of the Department of Defence.

This article is part of a series on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ that The Strategist is publishing in recognition of International Women’s Day 2017.

In the Security Council debate around Resolution 2242 in 2015—which marked 15 years since the adoption of the ground breaking Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)—a key refrain was: ‘we’ve been paying lip service to the importance of this issue for 15 years. It’s now time for less talk and more action’.

Resolution 1325 has become the guide for all UN policies and programs in supporting women in conflict and post conflict societies. In this context it’s essential that our work focuses not only on protecting women but on empowering them to participate fully in all the processes that affect them. UN Peacekeeping implements this mandate primarily through gender advisers at headquarters and in the field.

Our first gender advisers were deployed to Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 and as mandated we now have them on the ground in all 16 peacekeeping missions. Their core functions, as articulated in our Gender Equality in UN Peacekeeping Operations Policy (2010) are to provide technical guidance and support to senior management of the peacekeeping mission; to mainstream gender issues into all civil, military and police components; and to build the capacity of personnel to guide the gender mainstreaming efforts.

After a recent DPKO internal evaluation of our work on WPS, it’s clear that the UN has put an impressive amount of effort into putting policies, guidance and training programs and materials in place to support implementation of this mandate. Unfortunately, what remains is a general lack of understanding of why gender mainstreaming is important and how it adds value to our broader peacekeeping mandate and responsibilities.

Firstly, there is a lack of leadership on this mandate from senior management in UN peacekeeping. This isn’t surprising given the competing priorities faced by the leaders of peacekeeping missions. Secondly, the level of gender adviser posts and their structural location within our missions have reduced the access of our Senior Gender Advisers to mission leadership and created a kind of ‘gender enclave’ rather than supporting the mainstream effort.

We have had a high turnover of gender advisers, have an under resourced Gender Unit at headquarters and had posts removed or reallocated in our missions. These factors have also led to a lack of perceived career path for gender advisers. Due in part to our inability to show the value-added of the WPS mandate to the overall mandate of the missions, it’s sometimes perceived as a technical/niche area and not the responsibility of all mission staff. This is problematic because of the positive impact that our WPS work could potentially have on issues like community access, information gathering and analysis, and early warning mechanisms.

Nevertheless, there are several examples of what we know works. All our missions now hold ‘Global Open Days’ on WPS every year, where the head of mission reaches out to local women’s groups across the country to give high level political attention to their concerns and to enhance their roles. In Darfur for example, at the most recent Open Day women from four states came together to create an institutional mechanism to support the implementation by government of Resolution 1325 and create a women’s protection network.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Forward Looking Gender Strategy (2014-2018), combined with Resolution 2242 and a series of high-level peace and security reviews have generated new momentum and strengthened the hand of those working to improve our work on gender within the Secretariat. DPKO leadership will now elevate the Senior Gender Adviser at UN headquarters to the office of our Chief of Staff to facilitate regular access to both Under Secretary-Generals. We have finalised standardised gender reporting training materials and are developing gender-based conflict analysis training for mission planners to ensure a gender lens is applied from the start-up of our missions.

In the field, our Senior Gender Advisers now report directly to our Heads of Mission. Gender targets will now be used as specific indicators of individual performance of all senior managers. Now all gender officer posts that have been mandated must be budgeted for in missions and filled with appropriate staff.

At the UN we now focus on five entry points for WPS: through policies such as one addressing gender-specific conflict analysis; through women’s participation in post conflict decision making processes; through personnel by creating an enabling environment to achieve 50-50 gender parity; through protection by ensuring that all UN action takes into account the protection of women and girls; and finally through partnership that can broaden mainstreaming efforts and make our impact more sustainable.

Achieving gender parity is as critical in the field as it is anywhere else

Image courtesy of Flickr user MONUSCO Photos.

This article is part of a series on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ that The Strategist is publishing in recognition of International Women’s Day 2017.

When delivering a speech in advance of becoming the UN’s new Secretary-General, António Guterres made it clear that gender equality was a clear priority, not only for staff appointments with the organisation, but also in in peacekeeping deployments, in peace negotiations and in peace building through economic empowerment.

The international community has long recognised that gender equality and women’s empowerment are critical elements for building sustainable peace and security locally and globally. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) affirm the importance of participation by women and the inclusion of gender perspectives in peace negotiations, peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding and governance. The resolutions further stress the importance of equal and full participation by women as active agents in the promotion of peace and security, and call for building gender responsive capabilities among all personnel involved in maintaining peace and security. Women and girls are poised to be key drivers of progress and growth, but they need to be empowered through equal rights and equal opportunities. They need to be valued as leaders, peace-builders and breadwinners in their communities and societies.

In his message to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in February 2017, Guterres decreed that achieving gender parity in all respects is as critical in the field as it is anywhere else. He also said that the UN absolutely must increase the number of civilian and uniformed women, as well as the number of women in leadership positions in peacekeeping operations, peace processes and the ranks of special envoys. Despite efforts since the adoption of Resolution 1325, the participation of women in armed forces generally hasn’t changed significantly. In 1993, only 1% of all deployed uniformed personnel were women. By 2016, women comprised less than 4% of UN peacekeepers globally, accounting for about 3% of UN military personnel and about 9.7% of UN police.

Those rates fall far short of the goals set for women’s participation in peacekeeping missions by Resolution 2242 in 2015 (which called for member states to double the numbers of women in military and police contingents of UN peacekeeping operations over the next five years). The reasons for this vary among member states, but research in 2013 offered that the state of play reflects a lack of understanding about Resolution 1325 and UN policy on gender equality in peace operations, a gap in data and analysis, and the prevalence of social norms and biases that perpetuate gender inequality within the security sector. Much work is needed, through implementation of national action plans on WPS and gender strategies, to address those barriers to women’s equal participation in national security forces.

The UN also recognises that greater numbers of women in peacekeeping have been proven to increase the UN’s credibility, its protection reach and its relationship with communities, as well as to decrease incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). SEA has become the maelstrom of modern peacekeeping. Specific investigations commissioned by the UN, for example, in the Central African Republic in 2016, identified that UN peacekeepers have been committing acts of child abuse and exploiting women, girls and boys, with much of that abuse characterised as sexual favours in return for food or cash.

Inevitably, SEA is capitalising on the vulnerability of the local population due to poverty, lack of access to resources or power, inequalities in social status, and enhancing women and girl’s exposure to sexual and gender-based violence. The UN Security Council, in building on previous efforts to address SEA, has taken steps through the adoption of Resolution 2272 in 2016 to implement better procedures for investigating such misconduct and international crimes. In addition, the Secretary-General created a high-level task force in 2017 to examine ‘outside the box’ measures to prevent, address and respond to SEA.

Research suggests that the presence of female peacekeepers will help address SEA. To promote ‘out of the box’ thinking will also require promotion of gender equality in missions and ensuring local women and girls’ equality and empowerment, in order to decrease dependency on peacekeepers. A universal response needs to address a holistic view of gender inequalities: girls’ access to a quality education, women’s economic empowerment (critical for safeguarding food security), universal access to sexual and reproductive health and rights, ending violence against women and girls, and the inclusion of women’s voices, leadership and influence in peace processes and peace building.

A gender perspective needs to be a consideration from the outset when missions are mandated through to their transition and exit, and reinforces the link between peace, security and development. Only by achieving gender parity across those important and influential factors further exacerbated in conflict, can we conclude that we’re maximising our capacity to sustain peace and security.

The role of the WPS agenda in countering violent extremism

Image courtesy of Flickr user UN Women.

This article is part of a series on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ that The Strategist will publish over coming weeks in recognition of International Women’s Day 2017.

As today marks International Women’s Day, it’s timely to reflect on the Australian government’s commitments and priorities in implementing the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda’s international policy framework of eight UN Security Council resolutions. The agenda supports the participation of women in peace and security governance, the protection of women’s rights and their bodies, and the prevention of violence.

Historically, the ‘prevention’ pillar of the agenda has been somewhat overlooked in favour of close and sustained engagement with participation activities (ensuring that women are involved in peace negotiations, for example, or that women are represented in national security organisations) and protection activities (ensuring that women are protected from sexualised and gender-based violence). Where prevention has featured, it has predominantly related to the prevention of sexual violence in conflict.

This is changing, however, as new priorities in the WPS agenda emerge. The most recent resolution, UNSCR 2242, brings counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CT/CVE) into conversation with WPS initiatives. The resolution therefore articulates violence prevention in a new and different way: the prevention of terrorism and violent extremism becomes central to the women, peace and security agenda.

Three paragraphs of UNSCR 2242 are devoted to explaining how the WPS and CT/CVE agendas could align better, with priority given to mainstreaming gender in the operations of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) (OP 11). The resolution also calls for better data collection in this sphere, and ‘the participation and leadership of women and women’s organisations in developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism’ (OP 13).

In the Australian context, we need to explore what that means both for our commitments under the WPS agenda (which are captured in the Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012–2018) and for our CT/CVE activities, not least because the government is now beginning the process of consultation around the next iteration of the National Action Plan for launch in 2019. It’s important that this next NAP reflects the integration of WPS and CT/CVE, but it’s also equally important that this integration is thoughtful, sophisticated, and informed by consultation with communities and community organisations across Australia.

There have been a number of concerns raised about the creeping integration of CVE with WPS. Those include issues with CVE strategies and initiatives articulated by many working in this field, including cases where program initiatives are poorly specified and poorly understood, addressing neither women, peace, security, nor violent extremism adequately. There’s also often a lack of appropriate gender training for practitioners engaged in CVE program delivery both within the national context and overseas, and a lack of confidence in government and a lack of trust between community groups and state actors. The government needs to state clearly what programs are intended to achieve, to ensure comprehensive gender training and to engage in extensive community consultation, such that community groups are active participants not only in delivery but also in formulation of initiatives.

A number of issues are raised within communities of scholars and practitioners about the alignment between CVE and WPS. Gender equality initiatives must be consistently applied and not bartered to appease certain political actors and to achieve specific political ends. Further, there’s often too little attention paid to the gender dynamics of radicalisation and, specifically, to the radicalisation of women and a lack of understanding of the various and often conflicted roles that women play in counterterrorism and countering violent extremism. The Australian government would do well to leverage the extensive research expertise in this sphere, both within and beyond Australia, to ensure that plans and initiatives are evidence-based and pay due attention to gender as a power dynamic as well as the roles and representation of women within the domain of CT/CVE.

It’s critical that women are neither instrumentalised, nor put at risk, in the service of CT/CVE. As advocates of the Women, Peace and Security agenda have consistently reminded us, the WPS agenda isn’t about ‘making war safe for women’. Prioritising CT/CVE within WPS in Australia, both immediately and in the next iteration of the National Action Plan, mustn’t pay lip service to the roles and representation of women but truly value women’s experiences and reflect the concerns of communities and community organisations if it is to be effective.

Women, peace and security in 2017: moving forward or edging backwards?

This article is the first in a series on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ that The Strategist will publish over coming weeks in recognition of International Women’s Day 2017.

Australia’s first National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) was launched five years ago this week on International Women’s Day in 2012. The NAP sets out how Australia will implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the broader WPS agenda, which is an approach that has also been taken by more than 60 countries around the globe. With Australia’s first NAP set to expire in 2018, discussion and debate is already underway about how the whole-of-government plan can be improved to ensure that Australia is delivering on its commitments to WPS.

Among the issues to be considered as part of the wide-ranging review will be how to address the weaknesses in the existing NAP. An independent interim review in 2015 found that monitoring and evaluation measures weren’t sufficient to measure progress and impact. That review also found that funding and resource allocations across government agencies were uneven. The next NAP needs to be strengthened in some of those areas and could draw on the examples of other countries.

The focus of Australia’s NAP is largely external, given that Australia isn’t currently experiencing armed conflict. Nonetheless, it has domestic implications in terms of the development of policy, funding and the structure of security institutions that deploy offshore (e.g. the ADF). In the five years since the adoption of the NAP, the nature of conflict and potential drivers of instability have continued to evolve and change. Discussion is already underway about the extent to which security challenges such as countering violent extremism, issues of justice and accountability, or approaches to humanitarian and disaster response may necessitate inclusion in the next NAP.

At the same time as looking forward, however, recent global developments suggest that efforts to progress WPS will need to remain on the defensive over coming years. During an address to the UN Human Rights Council last week, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres expressed concern that: ‘Hard fought gains on women’s rights are being chipped away.’ Indeed, momentum on the issue has slowed down in the UN Security Council and is likely to face further challenges.

Reforms to increase the representation of women in the ADF haven’t been immune from criticism either. The cultural reform program in the ADF—intended, in part, to increase diversity—has been labelled ‘PC rubbish’ that would detract from Defence’s core goal of ‘war-fighting’. As my ASPI colleagues Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson have previously countered, that view may be fine if you want to keep ‘the ADF as a demographic heritage theme park’. But the ADF needs to be responsive to the evolving nature of conflict. Modern conflict situations (such as Afghanistan, or peacekeeping operations) often require engagement with the local civilian population. In these contexts, female military personnel may be in a better position to engage with the local women about potential threats. Ignoring the need to increase the number of women in the ADF—or failure to do so—risks diminishing the ADF’s future capability and operational effectiveness.

The same applies to the related but different issue of integrating gender perspectives. It’s something the international community still struggles to get right—a recent report addressing the WPS implementation gap found that the Security Council has a ‘tendency to overlook gender’ in ‘emerging or drastically deteriorating’ situations. The ADF’s experience in operations in Afghanistan, providing humanitarian and disaster relief in Fiji, as well as lessons from military exercises such as Talisman Sabre, have demonstrated the importance of integrating gender perspectives as part of military operations. Considering gender—that is, the needs of women and men—as part of policy, planning, operations and intelligence will be essential if this aspect of the WPS agenda is to be fully realised.

While the NAP is an important and internationally recognised mechanism to measure Australia’s commitment to WPS, it’s not the only measure of the government’s commitment. As the UN’s 2015 Global Study on WPS noted, NAPs are ‘simply processes and facilitators of actions, not ends in themselves.’ Ultimately, the commitment is measured by what change is affected on the ground through policies and reforms. That requires more strategic direction. As I’ve argued previously, the 2016 Defence White Paper fell short in that area. We need to be asking more deliberate questions about what implementing WPS means for our approach to international defence engagement and foreign policy.

As we mark International Women’s Day this Wednesday, we need to consider how we consolidate and build on existing initiatives to progress WPS, as part of and beyond the next NAP. We’ll be continuing that debate here at The Strategist with a series of posts exploring efforts to progress WPS in the international community, as well as what that means for Australia’s defence, national security and role in the world. It’s an important discussion that we need to have.

DWP 2016: women, gender advice and future defence capabilities

Caption: Women in Army, (L-R) Corporal Amanda Wright, Corporal Cindy Veenman and Captain Karin Cann are regulars outside the wire of Multinational Base Tarin Kowt. Mid Caption: Women of the Australian military, police and civilian agencies deployed at the Multinational Base Tarin Kowt undertake a range of critical roles in support of Australia's joint agency approach in Oruzgan Province. Some of these roles include Afghan National Police development, health services, administrative support, community and political liaison, combat service and support, military transport driving, and security support. Deep Caption: Operation SLIPPER is Australia's military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism, piracy and improving maritime security. Under this operation our forces contribute to the efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) - led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF seeks to bring security, stability and prosperity to Afghanistan and aims to prevent Afghanistan again becoming a safe haven for international terrorists. Operation SLIPPER also supports the United States led International Coalition Against Terrorism (ICAT) in the broader Middle East.Today marks International Women’s Day, so it’s a pertinent time to assess how Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper addresses the issue of women, peace and security (WPS).

At first glance, the paper provides a useful snapshot of some of the valuable progress that has been made in recent years across Defence to improve the participation of women, and to integrate gender advice into its work (previously explored here). That progress is one of the reasons why a recent global study on WPS highlighted the work of the ADF on recruitment and retention of women as an example of good practice.

In this regard, the White Paper acknowledges the well-known reality that women are under-represented in Defence and reiterates existing commitments to advance a range of measures to increase the participation of women both in the ADF and the Australian Public Service (6.24 and 6.25). And for the first time, this White Paper also acknowledges the importance of gender expertise as part of Defence’s ongoing engagement in efforts to maintain peace and security (5.79 and 5.80).

The document is a marked improvement on its predecessors in the way it addresses issues related to diversity and cultural reform. Indeed, the Minister’s introduction acknowledges that a ‘more diverse and inclusive workplace, with a focus on gender equality in professional development and progression opportunities’ is important to future capability. Unfortunately, it’s on this aspect that the White Paper disappoints and under-delivers. For a document meant to provide ‘the Government’s vision to enhance Australia’s defence capability’, there’s little explanation setting out how and why the participation of women and the integration of gender advice is integral to Australia’s future defence capability.

One area where this link could’ve been drawn more readily is gender advice to military operations. The issue’s partly captured in paragraph 5.80 which notes ADF personnel have been deployed as gender advisers to the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. But that captures only part of the effort and overlooks other important benefits afforded by gender advice to military commanders, including how it can help to shape operational planning and execution. That’s somewhat surprising when you consider that WPS was an integral part of Australia’s engagement last year with the US in Exercise Talisman Sabre, the most significant bilateral military exercise between our two countries.

In Talisman Sabre 2015, the ADF worked closely with US counterparts to ensure that gender advice was considered in the lead-up to the exercise (through education and training) and throughout the planning and conduct of operations. It was an issue considered at the highest levels of government, with the 2014 AUSMIN communiqué endorsing the value of incorporating WPS objectives as part of combined planning for the exercise.

Despite those commitments and recent experience, WPS wasn’t identified in the White Paper as an important area for future cooperation between Australia and its most important ally—nor one for any other bilateral relationship explored in the DWP.

It could be argued that as a strategic document, the White Paper isn’t intended to provide that level of granularity when it comes to Australia’s bilateral relationships. But topics such as logistics, law and leadership, professional military education, English language training and the appointment of Defence advisers are all deemed important enough to be listed in the context of various bilateral relationships.

Consider the likely impact on women and girls of some of the strategic drivers the White Paper identifies as likely to shape Australia’s security environment to 2035. In October 2015, the UN Security Council adopted its eighth resolution on WPS—resolution 2242—since the issue was placed on its agenda fifteen years ago. This latest resolution recognises the importance of including gender expertise and considering the role of women in relation to global responses to terrorism and violent extremism.

Though the White Paper acknowledges that Australia’s military support is but one tool of a whole of government effort to address the threat of terrorism and foreign fighters, it nonetheless makes no specific reference to gender expertise or the need to address the disproportionate impact of those emerging security threats on women and girls. There are similar oversights in referencing gender expertise more broadly throughout the White Paper as part of Defence capability—particularly when you consider Australia’s experiences with state fragility in our immediate region, where we know that future efforts by the ADF to respond to instability and humanitarian disasters will continue to require an integrated and gender-responsive approach.

Compared with its predecessors, the 2016 DWP reflects significant progress in considering the role of women in Defence. Still, the latest White Paper missed an opportunity to shift the discussion on WPS from one of evolving numbers and accomplishments, to one that’s strategic and forward-looking and considers the participation of women as well as the integration of gender expertise as integral to Australia’s future defence capability. It’s an opportunity that shouldn’t be missed again as Defence considers its plans to implement the White Paper in order to address Australia’s future strategic defence interests.