Tag Archive for: WPS

Australia should lead efforts to address online gender-based violence

Since the UN Security Council adopted the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda in 2000, the world has started to facilitate women’s participation in peace and security processes while protecting them from gender-based violence. But technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) is undermining these advancements. An October report by UN Women focussing on TFBGV highlighted an intensification of online misogyny and hate speech targeting women.

Australia should address this global phenomenon with a new bill and lead international efforts to improve transparency and accountability on major digital platforms. Proposed legislation to fight disinformation presents an opportunity to do this. The country should also be looking at further measures, such as promotion of digital literacy and participation of women in policy that pertains to TFGBV.

AI-enabled TFGBV, including doctored image-sharing, disinformation, trolling and slander campaigns affected 88 percent of women surveyed in UN Women’s report, with those in public-facing jobs systematically targeted. If no steps are taken, women may be deterred from meaningfully participating in public discussions and decision-making processes, known as the ‘chilling effect’. This is especially true for female politicians, journalists and human rights defenders who often face politically motivated or coordinated attacks.

Domestically, Australia has seen a positive trend in female representation in politics, with participation in state and territory parliaments increasing from 22 percent in 2001 to 39 percent in 2022. However, in a global ranking comparing the percentage of women in national parliaments, Australia has fallen from 27th place to 57th over the last 25 years.

TFGBV poses a direct threat to women’s participation in Australian politics. A 2022 study by Gender Equity Victoria revealed the prevalence of violent rhetoric and material mostly directed at women and gender diverse people. Prominent female politicians such as Julia Gillard, Penny Wong, Sarah Hanson-Young and Mehreen Faruqi have faced relentless online abuse, often involving implied threats of offline physical harm.

The impact of such abuse is often compounded for women who are religious or culturally and linguistically diverse. This discourages marginalised communities with intersectional backgrounds from participating in democratic processes.

Such harassment is not only deeply personal but widely damaging for Australian democracy. When women face a greater risk of gendered online harassment, fewer will pursue public office or meaningfully engage in political discourse. TFGBV is effectively forcing women out of key decision-making spaces and processes, risking the regression of women’s rights and freedom of speech.

The Albanese government’s recently tabled Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation Bill would grant the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) new powers to regulate digital platforms, with the aim of addressing harmful content while safeguarding freedom of speech. This aligns with the WPS pillars of protecting the rights of women and girls.

The bill presents an opportunity to tackle TFGBV as part of a broader approach to digital safety, especially as the growth of female representation in government may be at stake. By empowering ACMA to clamp down on disinformation campaigns that disproportionately target women, the bill could provide a crucial pathway for women to engage in public life without fear of TFGBV.

Additionally, the government must build resilience against TFGBV by establishing digital literacy programs that address online safety. These programs should educate the public on identifying digital threats, navigating online harassment and reporting abuse. Integrating TFGBV prevention into educational curricula and workplace policies could equip women to protect themselves online and encourage safer, more secure digital environments.

To address TFGBV proactively, the government also needs to increase female representation in cybersecurity, policymaking and technology governance. It should invest in initiatives that offer scholarships, mentorship programs and career development for women in STEM, with a focus on digital security. This would empower more women to participate in developing cyber policies and gender mainstreaming strategies and ensure that the gendered dimensions of digital security are fully considered.

Since TFGBV also stems from AI algorithm bias on social media platforms, Australia should lead international efforts to establish transparency and accountability standards for AI applications, including through UN Secretary-General Advisory Body on AI where currently Australia does not have any representation. It should require digital platforms to disclose AI applications, detect harmful content and protect users’ data. Additionally, Australia should advocate for measures that ensure algorithms do not inadvertently target women with harmful content or amplify misogynistic narratives.

In leading these initiatives, Australia can build on its WPS National Action Plan 2021-2031, which serves as a framework for efforts to enhance women’s participation in peace and security processes.

Given the borderless nature of digital spaces, Australia needs to collaborate with other like-minded partners to address TFGBV. Regional partnerships could involve information-sharing agreements, joint training on addressing TFGBV, and collaborative research on the trends of AI-driven gendered-harms and how to counter them. A united stance by Australia and its partners would bolster digital security for women, fostering a safer environment for women in public roles.

Gender mainstreaming in UN peace operations: an unfulfilled promise?

­Despite the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in 2000, progress towards gender equality for uniformed women in UN peace operations has been exceedingly slow. The lofty aspiration of equality in peacekeeping through gender mainstreaming policies and practices remains elusive, hindered by misconceptions and entrenched systemic barriers and institutional challenges.

Gender mainstreaming is crucial, particularly in peace operations, and has dual objectives within the UN. The first is to achieve gender parity and to integrate a gender perspective across all aspects of the UN’s work. Since 2017, the UN has implemented various strategies to increase women’s representation and achieve gender balance across all peacekeeping roles. The second objective is to transform discriminatory social institutions, laws, cultural norms and community practices that limit women’s participation in all aspects of public life. However, the UN’s efforts have primarily focused on the former, neglecting the broader measures needed to address the structural barriers hindering the full, equal and meaningful participation of uniformed and civilian women.

In my ASPI report issued today, I identify four challenges to the implementation of the UN’s gender mainstreaming policies: institutional impediments for uniformed women; the fixation on the popular discourse of the ‘added value’ of uniformed women for operational effectiveness; the persistence of masculine military structures limiting women’s capacity to showcase their professionalism and competencies; and the staggering prevalence of sexual violence against women peacekeepers.

In the face of these and other persistent institutional challenges, the UN stands at a crucial juncture to reconsider its approach to gender equality within peace operations. A paradigm shift is needed in the UN’s gender mainstreaming policies, centred on redefining what constitutes an efficient and effective uniformed component. This redefinition must navigate the evolving security landscape, acknowledging and valuing contributions of women and men equally. Addressing complex gender dynamics within the work environment is the key to dismantling existing barriers and challenges for women in peacekeeping.

My report proposes three specific interventions to address these concerns and strengthen the UN’s gender mainstreaming approach in peace operations:

—Redefining peacekeeping benchmarks for an efficient and effective uniformed component. The UN must champion a paradigm shift in addressing patriarchal power dynamics in its peace and security endeavours. This approach can extend to how we perceive peacekeeping benchmarks, starting with recognising the indispensable diversity of skill sets, perspectives and approaches that are essential for fulfilling mission mandates. The UN system and member states must delve into the constructions of masculinity, consider the role of men who have traditionally dominated peace and security decision-making, and address intergenerational power dynamics. This will allow for greater value to be placed on non-traditional peacekeeping tasks with an emphasis on non-combat skills, creating peacekeeper trained for war but skilled as diplomats and scholars.

—Shifting the narrative on peacekeepers’ contributions regardless of gender. Countering the narrative of women’s ‘added value’ is crucial, as it limits recognition of the equal worth of women and men in all roles. The UN should emphasise the equal value of all skills, from combat training to community engagement, assigning roles based on individual competencies, rather than gender. Reinforcing this approach in peace operations policies and mandates would highlight how both women and men indispensably contribute to operational effectiveness. By championing this narrative of equal value grounded in the skills and capabilities of peacekeepers irrespective of gender, the UN’s gender mainstreaming strategy can maintain operational effectiveness while challenging stereotypes and promoting gender equality within the UN’s broader mission.

—Incorporating feminist voices and practices in the development of policies and practices for the deployment of peacekeepers. Prioritising diversity and acknowledging the invaluable contributions of both women and men in peacekeeping can position the UN to advance the inclusion of feminist voices and approaches. These voices can help create safe, enabling and gender-sensitive working environments that support all peacekeepers regardless of gender. Their inclusion could disrupt the status quo of gender power structures and dynamics, fostering a new era where diversity of perspectives is actively embraced in the pursuit of peacekeeping excellence.

Gender mainstreaming, a linchpin in the UN’s pursuit of gender equality within peace and security, has seen two decades of relentless effort, yet the journey towards equality for uniformed women peacekeepers remains fraught with constraints. Policies, while well-intentioned, often fixate on gender parity targets and grapple with structural barriers, sidestepping the institutional challenges thwarting women’s meaningful participation. This exposes an undeniable truth: the UN’s laudable gender mainstreaming policies fall short, failing to penetrate the deep-rooted causes of gender inequality and dismantle the pervasive patriarchal structures entrenched in peace operations.

This report advocates for several measures: recognising the diverse contributions of both women and men; shifting the narrative to emphasise the value of women and men to operational effectiveness over viewing women’s contributions as mere ‘added value’; and incorporating feminist voices in policymaking. The UN’s approach to gender equality must involve active participation of all peacekeeping actors to implement robust gender mainstreaming policies and practices. Only through collective efforts can we achieve genuine gender equality in peacekeeping, turning the promise of gender mainstreaming into a reality.

Faster action required to deal with international gender violence

More than two years have passed since Australia released its second national action plan on women, peace and security, but the government has not yet reported on its implementation.

The plan is intended to ensure that Australia’s responses to crises overseas prioritise the rights of women and girls. The Department of Home Affairs has responsibilities under the plan, but its implementation is lagging in key areas.

Ending impunity for conflict-related sexual violence is a core part of the women, peace and security agenda. It was part of Australia’s first action plan and Australia advocates internationally on this issue. Increasing access to justice for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence is one of the four priorities of the second action plan. But over the years, various Australian policies and practices have prevented access to justice, or passively got in the way.

Conflict-related sexual violence can easily be dismissed as something that happens somewhere else, perpetrated by people from another country against people there, and therefore too difficult to prosecute. But more than 200 Australians travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with the Islamic State terror group and other extremist organisations that perpetrated sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide against Yazidis and other groups.

These foreign fighters remain subject to Division 268 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, which covers genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Because Australia is a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, we are obliged to investigate and prosecute these crimes in our own court system. We have failed to do so.

Some individuals have faced terrorism charges, but not genocide or gender-based violence offences. In other cases, the Australian government revoked the citizenship of individuals, leaving them at large to continue carrying out such crimes in unstable parts of the world.

I gave testimony before the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security expressing concern about such decisions. Even some of those held in prisons in places such as Syria may have been set free during military operations.

The main reason why citizenship is a barrier to justice for conflict-related sexual violence is that for prosecution to occur, the perpetrator needs to be in the custody of the Australian Federal Police. Prosecution cannot be undertaken in absentia.

But other barriers to justice exist. Home Affairs’ implementation of the national action plan includes action to combat modern slavery. This issue overlaps with the WPS agenda. In 2016, the UN Security Council passed resolution 2331 reiterating the need to end impunity for conflict-related sexual violence. This resolution called on all member states to investigate and prosecute those responsible for human trafficking in areas of armed conflict. It recognised that such crimes ‘can be part of the strategic objectives and ideology of, and used as a tactic by, certain terrorist groups’.

The Security Council went on to note that trafficking contributes to the ‘funding and sustainment’ of these organisations. My research showed that sexual slavery, and the failure of the international community to sufficiently respond, brought Islamic State up to US$111 million.

While Australia’s criminal code does account for human trafficking, including for the purposes of sexual slavery, the Modern Slavery Act, and the plan to implement it, mostly look at slavery in manufacturing. So, when that is included in Home Affairs’ implementation of the WPS agenda, it misses a large piece of the puzzle.

When Yazidi women who were held in sexual servitude by Australian man Khaled Sharrouf sought meagre access to victims-of-crime support through the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the tribunal found against them. The ruling was based on the fact that Sharrouf’s crimes were not ‘in and of’ New South Wales. But his crimes amounted to genocide, which has universal jurisdiction under Australian law.

Other cases have highlighted the lack of capacity of Australian judicial institutions to enforce international law in our own court systems. But that is not acceptable. Both the judicial capacity and the bureaucratic capacity to share information for the purposes of criminal accountability must be remedied. Perhaps the Australian Civil-Military Centre, which has a remit from the National Security Committee of Cabinet to improve Australia’s whole-of-government responses to conflicts and disasters overseas, could assist in this regard.

The Australian Centre for International Justice recently called for the establishment of an independent unit within the Australian Federal Police dedicated solely to the investigation of international crimes. This would go some way to remedying this shortfall. But several departments need to do much more to implement the national action plan on WPS.

Where has New Zealand’s women, peace and security agenda gone?

From 2014 through to today, a commendable number of Strategist articles have focused on the women, peace and security agenda. One of those articles was mine. In 2020, I asked if New Zealand really could claim with some credibility to be a WPS champion (spoiler alert: there was much more rhetoric than reality in play). Since then, things have worsened rather than improved in New Zealand—bucking some contrastingly positive trends in the region.

Resting on assumed laurels, New Zealand had already been late to the fray in producing its first national action plan in 2015. The plan focused mainly listed achievements already made rather than identifying new areas to support, and, despite loudhailer claims that New Zealand ‘championed’ WPS, it was clear that this first NAP had some significant shortcomings. Even more embarrassing, however, is the fact that New Zealand is yet to produce a second NAP. The first ran out in 2019; it is now 2023, and New Zealand is being left behind.

Partners such as Australia and the US have upped their game in their second and third iterations, respectively. ASEAN recently moved to embrace WPS in creating its regional plan of action. Second-track diplomatic efforts have also taken up the issue of WPS in recent years, including discussion of its importance in the ASEAN Regional Forum’s work on preventive diplomacy and in a dedicated Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific study group. Some have also suggested that WPS provides a significant advantage in an era of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region, while others have noted the symbiotic relationship between healthy democracies and gender equality. As countries begin to focus on building social cohesion in a time of disinformation, paying attention to gender issues delivers exceptional value for money.

New Zealand had been scheduled to produce a new NAP in 2020. This was of symbolic importance because that year marked the 20th anniversary of the UN Security Council’s adoption of the original WPS resolution, resolution 1325. Frustratingly, too, one of the shortfalls of the first NAP had been a lack of consistent engagement with members of civil society—but in 2020 civil society was raring to go and keen to provide support.

In April 2020, representatives from 11 non-government organisations and academics from three of New Zealand’s eight universities attended a workshop to prepare submissions for the forthcoming second NAP. A representative from the government’s lead WPS agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, attended the workshop, while separate discussions between civil society representatives and representatives from MFAT, NZ Police, the NZ Defence Force and the Ministry for Women were also underway.

By June 2020, MFAT had disseminated a draft implementation report for New Zealand’s to summarise gains made under the first NAP and indicate areas for improvement. Civil society representatives provided extensive feedback that was incorporated into a chapter in the final report reflecting on the first NAP, how civil society might support the WPS agenda, and suggestions for the second NAP.

In their submissions, civil society representatives noted positive increases in the numbers of women in the NZDF and Police, including increases in the number of women deployed and promoted. Consistent advocacy for WPS objectives in international forums was also commended, as was the promotion of the agenda in the Pacific through funding programs and holding events such as the WPS summit co-hosted with Samoa in 2019.

In terms of shortfalls, civil society representatives said that the first NAP didn’t clearly articulate desired outcomes, making it difficult to identify meaningful measurements of effectiveness. A lack of structured engagement with civil society was noted, as was the absence of reference to the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi) and integration of its principles. A lack of dedicated funding was also decried, as was the lack of regular reporting.

Concerns were also expressed about the potential limitations of the institutional home of the NAP—noting that MFAT taking the lead on the NAP avoided identifying it as a ‘women’s issue rather than a peace and security issue’. Some submissions called for a broader approach that would recognise the impact of natural disasters, pandemics and economic pressures, while most noted the relevance and value of localising the NAP—building or leaning on grassroots networks in local sites.

Much work was thus underway in the NGO community to support the creation of a new NAP, but government agencies were also busy. The NZDF continued to support a position committed to implementing resolution 1325, sought to increase awareness through gender focal point and gender adviser training, and launched a gender equality charter in March 2022. The Ministry of Defence began to draft a gender and security defence assessment, and MFAT was working on a gender action plan that was launched in 2021.

Yet, although the ground was well prepared, a second NAP has not yet eventuated, and much work remains to be done. Despite other countries increasingly seeing the value of the WPS agenda, despite this agenda providing a way to ease into a range of diplomatic engagements, and despite this fitting well with the government’s foreign policy stance, New Zealand is currently NAPless. To decide to have a NAP, then to renege on that commitment, is unacceptable.

Until this is rectified, there’s a danger that New Zealand will be seen as failing to support an important security agenda that provides serious bang for the buck for a small state, and that it will miss out on the connections and opportunities that WPS provides—including being on the right side of history.

The future of UN peacekeeping and women, peace and security

To make peacekeeping safer in an increasingly dangerous world, countries contributing troops to United Nations peacekeeping efforts need to embrace emerging technology more readily, and they must involve many more women on operations.

Today ASPI’s Policy, Guns and Money podcast discusses these issues with three strong advocates for both. General Birame Diop is military adviser in the UN Department of Peace Operations , Australian Major General Cheryl Pearce headed the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, and Group Captain Jarrod Pendlebury is Australia’s defence attaché to the UN in New York.

Around 90,000 peacekeepers are currently deployed across 12 operations.

Diop, a former chief of staff of the Senegalese armed forces, says the use of technology such as small commercial drones as very effective weapons in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of protecting peacekeepers against a much wider range of threats while giving them the opportunity for increased situational awareness they need to safeguard themselves.

He says that demonstrates the need for the Strategy for the digital transformation of UN peacekeeping. ‘Peacekeeping cannot keep improving if we do not take advantage of the new technology of information and communication to improve the safety and security of our peacekeepers, and also to improve our performance.’

Peacekeepers are already using microdrones to gather intelligence on operations such as route clearance to ensure the safety of UN convoys, Diop says. ‘What is happening in Ukraine is proving to all of us that the future of peacekeeping will involve the bigger use of new technology of information and communication, and notably microdrones.’

In the strategy, the UN says its peacekeepers are confronted by technologies used to spread disinformation, misinformation and incitement to violence through hate speech, to carry out surveillance of the blue helmet forces, for recruitment into armed groups, and to launch cyber and other attacks.

Diop says that the widespread use of improvised explosive devices and the involvement of non-state groups that are often extremely violent adds to the dangers faced by peacekeepers. ‘Wearing the blue beret or wearing the blue helmet is not a guarantee of protection for peacekeepers anymore, given that many non-state actors do not recognise our legitimacy to intervene on behalf of the international community, do not recognise our impartially. So they are targeting us the same way they are targeting their adversaries and their enemies.

‘We are losing a lot of peacekeepers due to the use of IEDs,’ Diop says.

‘What we can do about that is to make sure that, within the missions, we take the necessary measures to improve the safety and the security of our peacekeepers. But also we need to train our peacekeepers better to protect themselves before they even deploy.’

More than two decades after the UN passed resolution 1325 on women peace and security, Diop, Pearce and Pendlebury say there is much more to be done to involve women more closely in peacekeeping. ‘The UN is well aware that if we do not take the necessary measures to make sure that women are part of what we are trying to achieve in peacebuilding and peacemaking, it will be extremely difficult for us to be successful,’ says Diop. The two goals are to ensure that women are part of on-the-ground operations and to make sure women are better protected from conflict-related sexual violence.

The UN aims for 25% of staff officers, military observers or other military experts and advisers to be women by 2028. The target for women in units on the ground is 15% by 2028.

Having men and women together under the right conditions will always make units on peacekeeping operations more capable, says Diop. Women who are victims in conflict are more likely to reach out to female peacekeepers, he says.

‘The more women we have in all levels of responsibility, the more efficient we will be.’

Peacekeeping relies a lot on intelligence-gathering, he says. ‘The presence of women will also facilitate the trustful interaction that needs to be there for the populations to give the information they know to the peacekeepers.’

Pearce commanded diverse UN forces in Cyprus from 2019 to 2021. The operation was complicated by the Covid-19 pandemic, which limited movement and restricted her access to her own forces. Her role was to stop a recurrence of fighting, to reduce tensions and to maintain calm and stability so that a political solution could be realised.

Soldiers from many nations acted as ‘strategic corporals’ aware that their actions on the ground could have an immediate political effect, she says.

Covid hit the peace process hard, and both sides used it for their own advantage. Crossing points over the buffer zone between the north and the south, which had been hard-fought over for a decade, were all closed. ‘We talk about the command and control. I had command of my forces in the north, but I lost control of them,’ says Pearce. ‘I couldn’t reach them, they couldn’t get back into the buffer zone. They were locked into their bases. We couldn’t get resupplies to them and so they couldn’t conduct their duties.’

The challenge then was to enable the troops to carry out their mandate while the Turkish and Greek forces used Covid for their advantage, says Pearce. There were significant violations and both sides used the opportunity to gain more presence on the ceasefire lines.

Her most important goal was to pull everyone together, working with the permanent staff of the UN to have an integrated mission. With troops from many nations operating in a very fluid environment, the creation and review of standard operating procedures was a priority to ensure they reached an agreed mission position on the ceasefire lines.

Pendlebury advocated at the Security Council last year for the effective use of strategic communication to maintain the UN’s visibility in an increasingly contested information space. That’s nowhere more evident than in peacekeeping, he says, with disinformation easily disseminated on social media. The UN can no longer rely on the competitive advantage it had in the past, which was presence and visibility.

Peacekeepers have to be able to counter claims that they are there to steal resources or to change society in malign ways. He noted that General Diop had said many times that unless the UN forces had the support of those they were there to help, ‘there is no peace to keep’.

While Australia doesn’t have large numbers of troops to commit to peacekeeping missions, its Defence Innovation Hub, for example, could help the UN deal with threats. ‘Innovation will help us think ahead, anticipate, so that we are not in a reactive mode all the time.’

Australia’s second WPS action plan: was it worth the wait?

Australia has a new national action plan (NAP) to guide its engagement on women, peace and security (WPS) over the next decade. After more than two years without an updated or revised NAP, the government has finally released its strategic plan to advance the human rights of women and promote gender equality in conflict-affected contexts.

This is a welcome move, but the timing and disconnect between this plan and the Morrison government’s approach to addressing barriers to women’s meaningful participation in political life here in Australia is likely to strike some as odd.

Australia’s second NAP draws on growing evidence that upholding human rights and advancing gender quality can break cycles of conflict and support peace. It sets out four key strategic outcomes to guide Australia’s implementation of WPS: ‘supporting women’s meaningful participation and needs in peace processes’; ‘reducing sexual and gender-based violence’; ‘supporting resilience, crisis, security, law and justice efforts to meet the needs and rights of all women and girls’; and ‘demonstrating leadership and accountability for WPS’. The plan makes clear that Australia’s efforts will be grounded in a human-rights approach. Importantly, it recognises that gender is only ‘one aspect of identity and experience’ that contributes to discrimination and inequality.

NAPs have become a tool used by governments to translate international commitments on WPS into national programs and policies. Since Denmark developed the first NAP in 2005, more than 85 countries have adopted NAPs, some of which are now on their second and third iterations. The most effective NAPs incorporate inclusive-design processes, effectively engage civil society and focus on strategic approaches to change.

The development of Australia’s second NAP has leveraged many of these strengths, facilitating consultations across government, and with civil society and academia. It recognises the value of supporting ongoing research and the role of data in anchoring the framework for monitoring and evaluation.

The NAP is only a starting point in demonstrating Australia’s ongoing political commitment to WPS. Australia’s efforts to progress the WPS agenda will be contingent on the support of implementing departments and agencies, namely the departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence and Home Affairs, the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Civil–Military Centre. They have been tasked with developing their own implementation plans every two years. The ACMC will have the lead in collaborating with civil society, although it’s unclear whether that will entail financial support. There’s no dedicated budgetary funding to implement the NAP, so it will be up to departments alone to prioritise it. This is a known shortcoming of NAPs.

The challenge for the decade ahead will be ensuring effective, funded and accountable implementation in a ‘dynamic strategic environment’. Some government departments will be tempted to prioritise ‘hard security’ issues and ignore gender-sensitive analysis and diversity, despite their value as potential force multipliers.

While DFAT, Defence, the AFP and the ACMC have considerable experience in taking forward commitments under Australia’s first NAP, Home Affairs is a new addition to the list. The department didn’t exist when the first NAP was developed. Consequently, Home Affairs has escaped scrutiny on progressing WPS since its establishment. This is despite the department’s responsibilities for a range of security issues that require attention as part of the WPS agenda, including border protection, immigration, counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity.

The extent to which Home Affairs chooses to engage on the NAP’s implementation will be important in assessing how effective the plan is in effecting change. The new NAP doesn’t assign responsibility to any departments for taking forward particular measures. While that has the benefit of allowing for flexibility and innovation in responding to our rapidly changing security environment, it may diminish accountability. The independent reviews that have been scheduled as part of the process for reporting on and reviewing the NAP are likely to highlight some of these gaps, but they will only take place every five years, reducing the time for recalibration.

Unlike Australia’s first NAP, the foreign minister (and DFAT) will have the lead, rather than the minister for women (and the Office for Women in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet). While the Office for Women will remain engaged in the interdepartmental committee that oversees the plan, responsibility for coordinating whole-of-government implementation will now rest with DFAT. There’s a certain logic behind this shift, given that DFAT leads Australia’s international WPS engagement. However, it also reinforces the view that Australia’s approach will be an externally focused one, overlooking calls for an approach that recognises what peace and security mean for Australian women.

While the NAP acknowledges the government’s domestic commitment to ‘supporting women’s economic security, leadership aspirations and taking action to ensure women and children are safe from violence’, it suggests these areas are addressed by other ‘strategies, plans and commitments’. Furthermore, although the NAP recognises women’s ‘equal right to participate in all areas of peace and security decision-making and to be active in governing their communities and societies’, there’s no acknowledgement of the domestic political climate around women’s equality and human rights or that women are still seeking to overcome hurdles to exercising those rights within our own borders. Forthright assessments of these shortcomings and barriers to women’s meaningful participation could provide a valuable platform for engaging with other countries in our region that are also struggling with these issues.

The past 18 months have highlighted many of Australia’s domestic security vulnerabilities in relation to natural disasters and pandemics. Countries with traditionally outward-facing NAPs like Canada and Ireland have started to recognise the importance of addressing ‘domestic priorities related to peace and security’. The responses to Covid-19 have highlighted yet again that many women—particularly migrant and indigenous women—are not safe at home.

For Australia, the lines between outward-facing security challenges and internal ones will continue to blur further in the decade ahead. Cyber incidents, foreign interference and disinformation will continue to have gendered impacts across Australian society. Government departments must consider how they might address these challenges in their implementation plans. This will be particularly important for Home Affairs, which has scope to shape engagement on a range of issues that are traditionally overlooked in NAPs.

It’s relatively easy to criticise a document that has been painstakingly negotiated over more than two years. And while this plan doesn’t go as far as some thought it should on issues such as disarmament, conflict prevention and domestic security, it nonetheless offers a solid framework to guide Australia’s advocacy and support for WPS in the decade ahead. This is more important than ever as some countries continue to seek to roll back gains that have been made on WPS over the last 20 years. Australia’s commitment advancing WPS—along with like-minded counterparts—will be essential to addressing the peace and security challenges of a post-Covid world.

Policy, Guns and Money: Australian special forces, climate in the Pacific, and women, peace and security

In this episode, The Strategist’s Brendan Nicholson speaks with Samantha Crompvoets, founder and director of Rapid Context, who carried out a review that uncovered claims that Australian special forces soldiers had committed war crimes in Afghanistan. They discuss the Brereton report, how a dangerous ‘warrior culture’ developed unchecked, and what needs to be done to keep it from happening again.

Strategist national security editor Anastasia Kapetas talks with Ben Bohane, communications director at the ANU’s Australia Pacific Security College, about climate initiatives and innovation in the Pacific, and disaster responses and resilience. They also discuss the regional response to Joe Biden’s election and the prospects for the US to return to a global leadership role on tackling climate change.

ASPI researcher Genevieve Feely speaks to Rachel Grimes, NATO ACT liaison officer to the United Nations, the Independent Committee of the Red Cross and NGOs, about Rachel’s experiences working in the UN, NATO and UK Defence. They discuss the importance of terminology, the progress made so far in the increasing female representation in peacekeeping operations, and the prospects for advancing the women, peace and security agenda. The views expressed in this interview are Rachel’s personal views.

The road less travelled: women and disarmament

This article is part of ASPI’s 2020 series on women, peace and security.

October will mark 20 years since the UN Security Council first recognised the links between international peace and security and the equal rights of women and girls. Landmark UNSC resolution 1325 established the right of women to engage in issues of war and peace, and recognised the role that women play in preventing, managing and recovering from conflict.

At the same time, the resolution highlighted how conflict affected women and girls differently to men and, accordingly, how crisis management, humanitarian and development responses needed to take account of the specific needs of women and girls.

This resonates in the time of the coronavirus pandemic, which has revealed both the global scale of domestic and gender-based violence and the distinct ways in which women, who dominate child, aged-care and home-care jobs, are impacted by health crises.

Yet, it’s striking that a resolution about armed conflict has little to say about weapons. Apart from two brief references to the need for gender-sensitive mine action and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs, UNSCR 1325 does not address the rights and roles of women in regulating arms.

It was not until 2013, driven by the experiences of women in civil conflicts in west and central Africa, that a connection between small arms and women’s welfare was formally made.

The Arms Trade Treaty requires states to take account of the risk of weapons being used to carry out gender-based violence. And while assistance to victims of mines and cluster munitions now incorporates gender-sensitive provisions, the role of women in disarmament is still not a mainstream part of the women, peace and security agenda.

One reason for this disconnection is the specialist and traditionally male-dominated nature of arms control. When UNSCR 1325 was adopted, women comprised only 15% to 20% of diplomats participating in arms control conferences and negotiations.

Twenty years later, women now constitute around 30% of participants in disarmament policy forums, well behind other areas of diplomacy, in a profession that often puts a premium on technical knowledge, continuity and long-term career commitment.

Gender stereotypes also play a role in casting women as peace-loving, weak and in need of protection, and men as strong, assertive and capable of negotiating arms control agreements. More fundamentally, as protests against racism and police brutality illustrate, exploring how weapons impact specific communities or groups raises challenging questions about power structures and the militarised, hyper-masculine ways in which security is defined and pursued.

Yet weapons shape how we wage war. The development, transfer and use of arms enable and drive the conflicts and violence experienced by women. If we want to reduce the impact of armed violence on women, the regulation of weapons must be part of the WPS agenda.

A sustained conversation is now underway on how to increase women’s participation in disarmament at all levels. A number of countries, including Australia, are beginning to explore how gender analyses can be incorporated into disarmament frameworks and policies. These are important first steps. But to normalise the use of gender perspectives in weapons governance and translate the WPS agenda into practical and effective arms control, further action in three areas is required.

First, the agenda must be expanded to all areas of disarmament. Demands for gender equality and analysis in arms control cannot be limited to the regulation of small arms and light weapons. The WPS agenda is equally relevant to weapons of mass destruction, for example.

With a new appreciation of the risks of biological pathogens, next year’s Biological Weapons Convention review conference will be a critical opportunity to incorporate gender considerations into bio-safety and risk management.

Gender is also missing from multilateral discussions about the security implications of technologies, particularly cyber and artificial intelligence. Promoting women’s engagement in the traditionally male fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics; addressing biases—conscious or unconscious—in data and programming; and exploring the different ways in which cyberattacks impact people can help introduce gender awareness and gender perspectives into discussions on how to regulate technologies that can be weaponised.

Second, gender expertise must be brought into disarmament discussions. Many arms control practitioners admit that they lack the expertise and tools to address the impact of weapons on women and broader gender issues. The WPS agenda has shown that gender know-how can be built in security institutions, policies and practice.

Bringing gender experts into arms control meetings and national delegations can help kick-start the process. Putting systems in place to collect gender-disaggregated data on weapons at national and international levels can provide the evidence base for targeted arms control policies.

Third, arms control must be integrated into the WPS agenda. Twenty years on, many argue that it is time for UNSCR 1325 to go beyond a focus on armed conflict to the violence faced by millions of women around the world in their homes and communities. To do so means addressing the connection between international security issues, such as illicit arms flows, and issues usually considered ‘domestic’, such as urban violence and the persistent lack of accountability for gender-based violence.

Of the 84 countries that have developed national action plans on resolution 1325, only one-third include arms control and disarmament measures. Integrating arms control issues into these plans can help translate the WPS agenda into practical domestic as well as international contexts.

Breaking down the silos between women and weapons agendas and communities will not be easy. The social, political, cultural and knowledge barriers are high, but progress in each of those areas depends on it. Now is the time to try.

Covid-19 is a test of the women, peace and security agenda in the Asia–Pacific

This article is part of ASPI’s 2020 series on women, peace and security.

With 2020 marking the 20-year anniversary of the United Nations Security Council’s adoption of resolution 1325, it had long been anticipated that this would be a pivotal year for the women, peace and security agenda. But no one could have possibly foreseen just how pivotal Covid-19 would make it. In Asia and the Pacific, the widespread use of emergency powers and security-oriented responses to control the pandemic has had negative effects on peace and security, and the human rights of women and girls, including inflaming conflict and delaying the progress of peace.

Guided by 10 Security Council resolutions and related frameworks, the WPS agenda is designed to promote the full and equal participation of women in all peace and security efforts. While progress has been made towards this goal over the past two decades, Covid-19 threatens to reverse some of the hard-fought gains of women peacemakers and gender-equality advocates by marginalising them from engaging in the peace and security dimensions of the pandemic. After two decades, the WPS agenda is facing an urgent reckoning on whether it is fit for purpose.

To date, there are already significant peace and security impacts of Covid-19 on women in the region.

Women have reported facing sexual harassment from law enforcement policing movement controls in Malaysia. In the Philippines, police have been accused of demanding sexual favours in exchange for allowing women to pass through quarantine checkpoints. Increasing incidents of intimate partner violence during lockdowns are being documented.

Communal tensions and discrimination are being fuelled by Covid-19. In Cambodia, blame has been cast on the minority Muslim community for spreading the disease. In Indonesia, land disputes between private companies and communities have escalated while the attention of government authorities is focused on the pandemic. Conflict-prevention approaches that engage women are sorely needed.

Following UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’s call for a global ceasefire on 23 March, ceasefires were declared in the south of Thailand for the first time in 17 years and in the long-running communist insurgency in the Philippines. Despite early optimism, however, fighting has since resumed. Only 11% of ceasefire agreements include gender provisions, which is half the rate found in other types of peace agreements.

The peace processes in Myanmar and Afghanistan—which women have struggled for inclusion in—have been delayed and derailed by the onset of the pandemic.

In Afghanistan, the pandemic is escalating at a critical time in the advancement of intra-Afghan dialogue, further limiting women’s opportunity to participate. The government appointed a team of 21 negotiators, originally including five women. With this lack of gender parity, the engagement of women’s civil society to influence the terms and content of the potential peace dialogues is crucial. But the restrictions on movement and physical gatherings introduced to limit the transmission of Covid-19 pose a barrier to women’s collective advocacy.

This problem is compounded by the increased reliance on technology and digital collaboration, which excludes many women from participating. Only 14% of the population in Afghanistan has access to the internet. In addition, women’s organisations are facing a lack of funding and support to deal with these new challenges. As the process towards peace dialogues moves forward, the barriers to women’s ability to meaningfully participate must be addressed.

A survey of WPS civil-society organisations in the region conducted by UN Women found that the pandemic was affecting their ability to deliver services. The majority of organisations reported that they were only partially operational. Restrictions on movement and activities; lack of access to communities and women; cancellation or delay of collaboration with donors, governments and partners; redirection of funding to Covid-19 responses; and a shift towards digital-only service delivery were cited as some of the negative impacts.

These challenges are a reminder that we can’t afford to exclude the skills and experience of women, especially in times of emergency.

The Security Council already recognises health pandemics as part of the WPS landscape. Resolution 2242, for example, highlights the need for women’s participation and leadership in all responses. In 2016 during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the Security Council adopted resolution 2177, which emphasised that responses ‘should address the specific needs of women’ and stressed the importance of women’s ‘full and effective engagement in the development of such responses’.

The Security Council is yet to produce a resolution in response to Covid-19, but Guterres has called for effective implementation of the WPS agenda throughout the pandemic. Heeding this call is vital to ensure the gendered dimensions of the crisis are not overlooked.

In Asia and the Pacific, the WPS agenda demands immediate and practical actions. This requires ensuring women’s participation in decision-making; actively investing in women-led conflict-prevention efforts to stop Covid-19 from fuelling tensions; protecting women from gender-based violence in their homes and communities; and supporting women to lead in relief and recovery efforts.

Critically, women’s civil-society organisations must be supported by establishing effective mechanisms for their policy contributions, supporting their work in communities, and allocating funding from crisis-response budgets to enable them to continue their work.

If these efforts are central to the Covid-19 response, the WPS agenda in its 20th year can play a key role.

Using regional forums to advance the women, peace and security agenda

This article is part of ASPI’s 2020 series on women, peace and security.

The advancement of women’s rights and gender equality through the United Nations is under threat. Last year, the 63rd session of the Commission on the Status of Women became highly charged and previously agreed language on sexual and reproductive rights was removed from Security Council resolution 2467 after the US threatened to veto it.

So, while continued advocacy in UN forums is crucial for both holding the line and advancing women’s rights, it’s time to look to other options such as regional forums as a way of truly embedding the women, peace and security agenda into the global peace and security architecture.

Outside of the UN, a number of regional and sub-regional organisations are actively incorporating WPS principles into their work. Creative and innovative engagement through these forums can offer complementary paths for countries and civil society seeking to advance the WPS agenda globally.

We’ve already seen 12 organisations adopt regional action plans on WPS. These sit alongside national action plans, which are currently the key tool for implementing the agenda. In his latest progress report on implementation, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres encouraged the development of regional and sub-regional action plans. He also noted the development of local action plans, which offer another layer of complementary activity for the WPS agenda.

The development of regional action plans recognises that this issue is all-encompassing and doesn’t end at any one country’s borders. In addition, a regional action plan allows a group of countries to speak with one voice, which can be a valuable tool for highlighting the WPS agenda’s value as well as saving precious resources in developing and implementing these plans.

Regional action plans can be tailored for specific contexts, adding to the broader institutionalisation of the WPS agenda across our multi-faceted peace and security architecture. An interesting model is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Given NATO’s dual purpose as both a political and a military alliance, WPS is a natural fit with the organisation’s own agenda.

NATO’s approach is operational, which allows for greater institutionalisation of the WPS agenda in the organisation’s main activities of military exercises and operations. NATO has placed an increasing emphasis on the implementation of WPS throughout its frameworks. Recent examples includes its adoption of an inaugural policy on preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse and its appointment of a special representative on women, peace and security.

By focusing on operational aspects of implementing the WPS agenda and embedding them internally in a visible way, NATO has demonstrated leadership, giving it a useful platform for further advocacy. Incorporating the agenda in its day-to-day operations—as opposed to spouting simple rhetoric—is an excellent approach to tailoring the agenda to work effectively in particular contexts.

Closer to home, Australia is in the process of developing its second national action plan. Alongside this, there are opportunities for Australia to engage on WPS with regional political alliances like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In 2017, ASEAN adopted its first statement on promoting WPS in the organisation and, in 2019, reaffirmed that commitment in a joint statement issued at the ASEAN Regional Forum, which included stronger and specific language on advancing the agenda in the region.

Australia and other external partners were included in the 2019 process, which offered an excellent opportunity to collaborate and help shape the regional consensus. Australia has also contributed through other mechanisms such as the Australia–ASEAN dialogue on WPS in 2018. The background paper released for the dialogue lays out some excellent analysis on the value of regional engagement.

Similarly, Australia should continue to work with the countries of the South Pacific to build consensus and amplify the region’s voice on WPS. Grassroots advocacy and civil society are strong forces among the island nations and form an important part of their regional approach, so this should be taken into account while engaging with them.

Building and consolidating the WPS agenda throughout our region is in Australia’s interests. The strong sense of regionalism around us makes these forums valuable avenues. Australia’s work with ASEAN on this issue so far has been promising and should be maintained and strengthened, along with our engagement in other regional groupings, such as the Pacific Islands Forum.

As we move past the 20th anniversary of the WPS agenda, there’s a need pursue innovative, complementary paths for embedding its principles in the international peace and security architecture. Regional organisations are well placed to continue pressing the WPS agenda forward.