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Being one of 121 Australians whose names have been put on a list by Vladimir Putin’s government that stops us from travelling to Russia doesn’t really affect my life. So, in a narrow, personal way, the Kremlin’s posturing doesn’t mean much.

The list itself is like an Arnott’s biscuit random assortment. Maybe this shows that Russian intelligence penetration of Australian institutions and policymaking is not as deep as we might have expected.

But it tells us one big thing about Putin and his regime: like autocrats through history, he is threatened by free speech and those who use it to expose his crimes and abuses, such as his horrific war in Ukraine and his arrests, abuses and killings of domestic critics and opponents.

The contrast between me sitting here in Canberra having my name on a list and a journalist in Russia or a political opponent like Alexi Navalny having their name appear on a Kremlin list is stark. For those brave men and women it means arrest, psychological and physical abuse, and years in a Russian jail.

For someone like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, it means Russian Speznaz death squads being sent to find him and kill him.

Thousands of Ukrainian men, women and children didn’t get put on a list but have been killed by Putin’s military since he ordered his war to begin on 24 February.

So, I think about the courage of those within Putin’s reach who still speak out—and, in the case of Ukraine, who risk their own lives in a battle that matters for all of us.

Freedom of speech and expression is what the Ukrainian people are fighting for and what Putin’s opponents within Russia want for the Russian people too. We have that here in Australia. This latest sign of anxiety from Putin is a powerful reminder of the value of our freedoms and the threat they pose to autocrats like the one in Moscow and his strategic partner in Beijing.

Putin’s barbarity and vindictiveness show why he must lose his war. And people living in freedom who share the values of the Ukrainian people must do all we can to help this happen.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will feel this personal weight if he decides to visit Ukraine when he travels to Europe later this month. I, along with everyone else on Putin’s strange list, will support him in that.

Russia has published an official executive order (ukaz) titled ‘Basic principles of state policy of the Russian Federation on nuclear deterrence’.

It entered into force on 2 June when it was signed by President Vladimir Putin. This is the first time in the almost 30-year history of the Russian Federation that an explanation of Russia’s nuclear warfighting policy has been made public.

The relatively short, six-page document sets out a series of blunt messages designed to impress on its potential enemies just where Russia stands. While it considers nuclear weapons ‘exclusively as a means of deterrence’ and characterises their use as ‘an extreme and compelled measure’, this official declaration sets out in some detail the conditions that could trigger nuclear conflict.

The clear messages are ‘the inevitability of retaliation’ in the event of nuclear attack on Russia and that Russia intends to maintain forces capable of inflicting ‘guaranteed unacceptable damage’ on a potential adversary. Precisely what such unacceptable damage might involve is not spelled out, but in the Cold War it implied that the enemy would cease to exist as a modern functioning society.

The main military risks that might evolve into direct military threats to Russia are identified as:

• build-up by a potential adversary of conventional forces that possess nuclear weapons in the territories of states contiguous with Russia and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters
• deployment, by states that consider Russia as a potential adversary, of missile defence systems, medium- and short-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons
• development and deployment of missile defence assets and strike systems in outer space
• possession by states of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction that can be used against Russia and its allies, as well as means of delivery of such weapons
• uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, and technology and equipment for their manufacture
• deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery means in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon states.

Most importantly, this document sets out publicly for the first time the situations in which Russia would contemplate using nuclear weapons as follows:

• arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of Russia and/or its allies (i.e. a launch on warning)
• use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against Russia and/or its allies
• attack by an adversary against critical government or military sites of Russia, disruption of which would undermine nuclear force response actions (i.e. a so-called decapitation strike against the political and military leadership)
• aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

The executive order also notes that the decision to use nuclear weapons is taken by the president of Russia, who might, if necessary, inform the leadership of other states and international organisations about Russia’s readiness to use nuclear weapons or about the decision taken to use nuclear weapons, as well as about the fact that nuclear weapons have been used.

This Russian statement presents welcome areas of clarification. But some of them are distinctly worrying: especially the clause that confirms Russia’s declaratory nuclear doctrine is one of launch on warning. This has always been recognised as a very risky concept because it is crucially dependent upon early warning systems not malfunctioning, which might not be a dependable basis on which to go to nuclear war.

Nuclear attack indicators are likely to face even shorter warning times in the future with the deployment of hypersonic manoeuvrable glide vehicles, as well as such devices as directed-energy weapons. Strategic warning is already being complicated by the deployment by the US of prompt global strike ballistic missiles with conventional warheads, which makes the task of differentiating between conventional and nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missiles in a crisis practically impossible.

The other issue of concern surrounds Russia’s declaratory policy that it will consider using nuclear weapons against a conventional attack ‘when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy’. This is the so-called escalate to de-escalate element of Russian nuclear strategy involving the threatened use of tactical nuclear weapons against an overwhelming NATO conventional attack. This, of course, is the mirror image of NATO’s own Cold War nuclear policy of deterring an overwhelming Russian conventional attack on Europe. An interesting question here is what constitutes Russian territory, given Putin’s attitudes to what he terms ‘the near abroad’—the territories of former Soviet republics, such as the Baltic countries, where there are large numbers of ethnic Russians.

It is probably not a coincidence that the release by Moscow of this unprecedented public document about Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy and its war-fighting implications comes at a time of the complete breakdown in talks between the US and Russia about nuclear arms control and verification. Both sides have stopped talking to each other about this central issue to global nuclear security. By comparison, in the Cold War, crucial nuclear arms control treaties were signed and resulted in agreed verification and inspection measures that were quite intrusive.

Now, such important arms control treaties as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Treaty on Open Skies have all been terminated by the US, in 2011, 2019 and 2020, respectively. In addition, New START, the treaty between the US and Russia that limits each side to 1,500 deployed nuclear warheads (although both have total deployed and non-deployed nuclear warheads in excess of 6,000 each), is due for extension early next year.

Washington is insisting that China be included in any such strategic nuclear treaty, but China has resolutely refused. The bets are that New START also will be terminated, especially if President Donald Trump is re-elected. That would herald the way to a full-blown strategic nuclear arms race.

The Kremlin is on a roll. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has replaced the United States in Syria, continues to intervene in Eastern Ukraine, and recently hosted an African summit in Sochi. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. True, Russia retains a vast nuclear arsenal, equal in size to that of the US, and it used force effectively against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, provided military assistance to save Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and has used cyber means to disrupt US and other elections. But Russia can only be an international spoiler. Behind the adventurism, it is a country in decline.

In 1959, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev famously boasted that the Soviet Union would overtake the US by 1970 or 1980. Instead, in 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving a significantly shrunken Russia, with three-quarters of the USSR’s territory, half its population, half its economy and one-third of its military personnel. Its GDP is only US$1.7 trillion, compared with US$21 trillion for the United States. In 1989, the Soviet economy was twice the size of China’s; today, Russia’s GDP is one-seventh that of China. Moreover, Russia is heavily dependent on energy exports; high-tech products account for only 11% of its manufactured exports (compared with 19% for the US).

While language, history and labour migration provide Russia with some soft power in its near-abroad, few foreigners elsewhere watch Russian films, and Russian universities aren’t ranked among the global top 100. The political institutions for an effective market economy are largely missing, and robber-baron state capitalism lacks the kind of effective regulation that creates trust. The public health system is weak, and average Russian life expectancy, at 72 (male and female), is five years shorter than in Europe. United Nations demographers project that Russia’s population may decline from 145 million today to 121 million by mid-century.

Many futures are possible, but at this point, Russia is a ‘one-crop economy’ with corrupt institutions and serious demographic and health problems. Former President Dmitri Medvedev laid out plans to surmount them, but little was implemented and pervasive corruption has made modernisation difficult. While Putin has been a successful tactician in restoring Russia’s presence on the world stage, he has not been a skilful strategist in addressing the country’s long-term problems.

One of Putin’s successful tactical manoeuvres has been an alignment with China. After incurring Western sanctions for his attack on Ukraine, Putin declared China ‘our key strategic partner’. In return, President Xi Jinping declared Putin ‘my best friend and colleague’.

Traditional balance-of-power politics would predict such a response to US power. In the 1950s, China and the Soviet Union were allied against the US. After Nixon’s opening to China in 1972, the US and China cooperated to limit Soviet power. That alignment ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992, Russia and China declared their relations a ‘constructive partnership’. That became a ‘strategic partnership’ in 1996, and in July 2001 they signed a treaty of ‘friendship and cooperation’. They have cooperated closely in the UN Security Council, taken similar positions on international control of the internet, and used various diplomatic frameworks such as the BRICS grouping and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to coordinate positions. They now share non-nuclear military technology and conduct serous joint exercises.

Nonetheless, there are serious obstacles to a close Sino-Russian alliance that goes much beyond tactical coordination. Residual mistrust persists. In the 19th century, no country took more land from China than Russia did, and the current demographic situation in the Far East—where Russians number 6 million, and the population on the Chinese side of the border is up to 120 million—is a source of anxiety in Moscow.

Russia’s economic decline has increased its concern about the rise of China. While trade has increased, investment lags, and Russia ranks only 10th among China’s export markets. As The Economist recently reported, Russia worries about becoming the alliance’s junior partner—more dependent on China than China is on Russia. According to Feng Yujun of Fudan University, ‘The most important relationship for us is the one with America. We don’t want to repeat the mistakes of Stalin and Mao.’

America, however, must not take comfort in the decline of Russia and treat it like a second-rate power. After all, declining powers tend to be less risk-averse, as was true of Austria–Hungary in 1914. They have less to lose than rising powers. Russia still poses a potential threat to the US, largely because it’s the one country with enough missiles and nuclear warheads to destroy it. And Russia’s relative decline has made it more reluctant to renounce its nuclear status.

Even a declining Russia possesses enormous scale, an educated population, skilled scientists and engineers, and vast natural resources. It seems unlikely that Russia will again possess the resources to balance US power in the same way that the Soviet Union did during the four decades after World War II. But, because of its residual nuclear strength, its oil and gas, its skills in cyber technology, its proximity to Europe and the potential of its alliance with China, Russia will have the ability to cause problems for the US, and Putin’s reliance on populist nationalism provides an incentive. Declining powers merit as much diplomatic attention as rising ones do. At some point after President Donald Trump leaves office, the US will need to develop the serious Russia strategy that it now lacks.

Donald Trump is now expected to hold a summit meeting with Vladimir Putin possibly as early as next month. His self-assessment of the success of his meeting with Kim Jung-un is probably a factor. President Putin has said that he’d be open to a meeting ‘whenever Washington is ready for such a summit’. Trump’s presence at the upcoming NATO gathering in Brussels over 11–12 July might provide a good opportunity for the summit meeting, which could be held in Vienna or Helsinki. There are many important issues that would under normal circumstances warrant such a summit.

Summits are generally arranged to address problems in bilateral relations that only national leaders have the authority to resolve, or common threats to their security that require an agreement on the way forward at the highest level. In the 23 Cold War–era summits between 1953 and 1991, US presidents and Soviet leaders dealt with issues ranging from German reunification and proxy wars to nuclear and chemical arms control—all against the background of potential nuclear conflict.

It’s easy to see why Trump met with Kim. North Korea’s prospects were bleak under sustained sanctions and the accelerating economic gap with the South would eventually have undermined the Kim regime. The US faced an unpredictable nuclear-armed state with a growing capability to target the US mainland. The Trump administration’s security and defence policy documents outline a more dire threat from Russia.

The US sees Russia’s international activities being designed ‘to shape a world antithetical to US values and interests’ and ‘to undermine the legitimacy of democracies’. The December 2017 US National Security Strategy also declares, ‘Russia is using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.’

Moreover, the Trump administration says that Russia ‘interferes in the domestic political affairs of countries around the world’. Russia’s ‘ambition and growing military capabilities’ are creating ‘an unstable frontier in Eurasia, where the risk of conflict due to Russian miscalculation is growing’. Through its invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia ‘demonstrated its willingness to violate the sovereignty of states in the region’.

The 2018 US National Defense Strategy claims that Russia aims ‘to shape a world’ consistent with its ‘authoritarian mode’ and that it ‘pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbours’. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis depicts an ideological struggle where Putin desires to ‘diminish the appeal of the western democratic model’ and ‘undermine America’s moral authority’. All very disquieting for the Americans.

Among other topics Trump could explore is the Russia–China relationship. The NSS labels the two states as strategic competitors of the US, noting that ‘China and Russia aspire to project power worldwide’. Indeed, Russia’s growing closeness with China, especially in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, is of geopolitical concern to many observers.

This SCO bloc now includes India and Pakistan as well as the Central Asian ’stans. Iran and Mongolia have observer status. Its membership now covers the Eurasian continent from the Pacific to the Black Sea and the Eastern border of Europe, plus South and West Asia. Bolstered by China’s Belt and Road Initiative, it is an emerging geostrategic presence that’s committed to, among other things, ‘practical interaction in the political, security, trade and economic areas’. Given the pace of geopolitical transition, the US president should be trying to gauge the ambitions of this organisation.

In normal times and under previous administrations, these alarming assessments—which the presumably the administration accepts—would be sufficient for a president to want to personally confront a counterpart and make clear that this behaviour can’t continue. Any former president would make clear to Putin that Russia’s foreign policy aims and its strategic objectives, as understood in these policy documents, are inimical to the US and its allies and therefore unacceptable.

However, the prospect of a Trump–Putin summit comes with a number of apprehensions. Foremost must be the capacity of Trump to conduct such complex business with the experienced, subtle and capable Putin. The Russian president has flagged that he wishes to discuss the ‘renewed arms race’, a subject in whose details he is undoubtedly steeped.

Trump’s inability to speak on complex issues in a coherent, connected and logical way has been patently clear over his time in office. Even if he did comprehend the ins and outs of the issues, his clumsy syntax and limited vocabulary would test any interpreter over an extended period. The geopolitical, strategic and security issues that might come up between Putin and Trump will be technical and complex with broad implications.

Also worrying, especially for the US’s European allies, will be Trump’s utterances on the justification of Russia’s annexation of Crimea on the basis of linguistic affinity, and his expressed desire for Russia to be readmitted to international forums before any withdrawal from the Ukraine.

What he might concede to Putin inadvertently through ignorance, incompetence or lack of preparation is frightening. Furthermore, Trump’s predilection for playing to his domestic political base could mean that he’ll be more focused on leveraging the outcomes of the meeting to discredit the Mueller investigation.

In modern times, a number of US presidents—Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan and George H.W. Bush—have employed summits to manage strategic relations with their Russian counterparts. Between them they managed to avoid a conventional war in Europe, prevent global nuclear war, and shape much of the contemporary world.

It remains to be seen what the current president might achieve. But the contemporary interests of the NATO allies that stood with the US through those years may not command his attention at any summit.

Over 108 million voters are eligible to have their say in Russia’s presidential election on Sunday. As the outcome seems clear well in advance, many will focus on the voter turnout instead of speculating on the winner. The turnout will show how tired Russians are of being under the direct or indirect rule of the same man for 18 years. And it will show whether the main opposition leader, Alexey Navalny—who was barred from running—was successful in convincing his fellow citizens to boycott the election.

The golden number (from Vladimir Putin’s viewpoint) is 70: 70% of all eligible Russians casting a ballot, with 70% of them putting Vlad first. For the first time, the current president is standing as an independent candidate rather than running for the United Russia party. He seems confident enough that he’s not really bothered campaigning much. Should the holy grail of 70/70 be reached on Sunday, the Kremlin will be happy, and will claim that it confirms Russians’ backing of Putin’s policies.

But the Russian populace isn’t interested in politics—not surprisingly, with the same program on repeat since 2000. Just 47% of the country’s eligible voters trotted out to the 2016 parliamentary elections. Participation in major cities was particularly low. For example, only 28% of eligible Muscovites bothered to vote.

The voters haven’t forgotten the street protests following the 2012 presidential election, when hundreds of thousands of Russians voiced their discontent with the government and questioned the legitimacy of the election. They also remember the Kremlin’s crackdown in response.

Putin’s administration would prefer not to repeat 2012 and is trying to create a different image. It’s especially cautious about rigging the turnout. Consequently, volunteers are in the streets trying to convince as many Russians as possible to vote on Sunday, preferably for the current occupant of the Kremlin. They’ve been getting creative, including offering free iPhones for the best polling-station selfies.

To help create an image of ‘fair and democratic’ elections, the administration allowed seven other candidates to appear on the ballot—similar to prior elections. But the fact that state-owned pollsters ascribe support of less than 10% to some of these other candidates speaks volumes.

In the run-up to Sunday’s elections, Russians saw new candidates enter the race and (many) others drop out. The drop-outs included journalist Yekaterina Gordon and Gennady Zyuganov, the long-time leader of Russia’s Communist Party. In a surprise move, Zyuganov was replaced by Pavel Grudinin, the CEO of the Lenin Sovkhoz farm. He’s a businessman, a capitalist who allegedly has millions of roubles in foreign bank accounts, and a former member of United Russia.

He offers his experience from his business enterprises to appeal to the party’s supporters, with a platform of economic success benefitting the people, a focus on rural areas, more money for children, families and pensioners, fighting oligarchs, and ensuring affordable housing.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, something of an institution in Russian politics and sometimes referred to as the ‘Russian Trump’, is the far-right nationalist Liberal Democratic Party candidate. He advocates for imperial symbols and a return to the Russian borders of 1985. Other than that, his program is all over the place, including limiting migration, fighting obesity, offering free health care, a minimum wage and a state-regulated economy.

Then there’s Maksim Suraikin, the leader and candidate of the Communists of Russia party. A Stalin fan and would-be restorer of the Soviet Union, he criticised Grudinin’s nomination as a business man unfit to be the Communist Party’s candidate.

The Russian All-People’s Union candidate, Sergey Baburin, has a nine-point plan, including calls for government reform and more authoritarian rule (!), strengthened border controls and controlled immigration.

There are liberals (by Russian standards) too, such as Ksenia Sobchak, the only female candidate and much younger than most of the field. The 36-year-old socialite and TV anchor is the daughter of the first democratically elected mayor of St Petersburg, the late Anatoly Sobchak, and Putin’s mentor until his death. Because of that, many question Sobchak’s independence and see her as a tool put in place by the Kremlin, which she denies. Her campaign line is running ‘against all’—all of the other candidates and everything that previous politics stands for. Her positions have a very liberal touch, including LGBTIQ rights.

Finally, there are a couple of candidates with economic platforms. Boris Titov, a politics newcomer for the Party of Growth, is a businessman, who targets corporate leaders and advocates for a free market economy. Grigory Yavlinsky, the Jabloko (Apple) party candidate, is an economist with a program strongly focussed on economics.

Earlier this month, Putin gave his state-of-the-nation address (see commentary by Paul Dibb and Michael Shoebridge), which was also somewhat of an election pitch. He showed what Russians voting for him (and the rest of the world) could expect for the next six years, regardless of how many turn up on Sunday. A 70/70 result would just boost his confidence.