Tag Archive for: US Marines

Bookshelf: the evolution and future of amphibious warfare

2027 may still not be the year of war it’s been prophesised as, but we only have two years left to prepare. Regardless, any war this decade in the Indo-Pacific will be fought with the equipment already in hand. The most impactful thing we can do now is educate the minds of those who will be called upon to fight in it.

The second volume of On Contested Shores, on the history and future of amphibious operations, arrived last year early enough to make such an impact. Edited by Timothy Heck, Brett Friedman and Walker Mills, this work builds off the goals of the previous volume: broadening the knowledge of amphibious operations beyond just such famous landings as Gallipoli or Normandy. The editors and chapter authors cover a breadth of both time and geography and also cover the various forms of amphibious operations and dive deeper into critical, but often overlooked, aspects to each.

The structure is an improvement on the previous volume, organised this time by themes instead of chronologically. It is also more readable than the first collection, which on occasion drifted into the familiar problem of historians writing for historians. This volume is aimed squarely at operational units, with professional military students also in mind. The thematic focus helps the reader and enables the strongest chapters to hit harder. Some chapters offer long-winded prose, but most of the work is focused on educating marines, sailors, soldiers and airmen.

Perhaps one of the most important themes in the book is the repeated insistence that logistics matters. As Walker Mills argues in his chapter, ‘logistics in the Pacific define what is possible’. Both his and Christopher Menking’s chapters remind us that while the movie reels focus on the rifles and raising the flag, wars are fights of logistics. The fact we now hear the phrase ‘contested logistics’ bandied about so frequently suggests just how lazy and comfortable we have become. Perhaps this is why the United States Marine Corps (USMC), accustomed to scraps and doing more with less, seems further ahead than the other services in recognising the problem.

Anyone who has struggled against the military acquisitions process will recognise echoes in Jerry Strahan’s chapter on the ordeal of developing the Higgins landing boat and Douglas Nash’s chapter discussing how the alligator tracked vehicles were first married up with the landing ship tank. Both chapters illustrate the challenges in turning good ideas into a real platform, but also the innovation and doggedness with which designers and commanders have always met these obstacles.

The First Island Chain, an archipelago of reefs and jungles which runs through Japan to Indonesia, can be notoriously brutal. But Lance Blyth’s chapter on polar operations comes with the stark reminder that the chain extends well into the high north, where specialised training and equipment are critical to success. In a similar vein, Evan Ota’s chapter reminds us that the residents of the Indo-Pacific are unmatched sources of intelligence and support. As China continues to expand its influence in areas once thought of almost as Western protectorates, it is an overdue reminder that ‘… the cooperation of local security forces on key terrain yielded a decisive advantage for the Allies in the early and uncertain days of the [Pacific] war.’

And perhaps most critically, the volume corrects the oversight of its predecessor with chapters on China. Xiaobing Li provides a focused account on how the Chinese armed forces retook some of Taiwan’s islands in the mid-20th century. Edward Salo, meanwhile, details how the Chinese navy’s marines are equipped and structured, highlighting similarities with and differences from the USMC. We should remember, however, that the Chinese army would carry most of the load in an invasion of Taiwan.

Premature claims of the end of large-scale amphibious operations are cited in both volumes of On Contested Shores. Flag officers and statesmen alike have repeatedly dismissed them as too costly, and yet marines, armies and naval infantry continue to be called upon to fight ashore from the sea. This is because regardless of how bloody amphibious operations have and will always be, they are a military necessity.

One of the more enjoyable moments in my career came years ago when, as a major, I got to correct a deputy commander at then Pacific Command. He was expounding on the nature of operations in the region when he misspoke, ‘You have to remember, 70 percent of Asia is water’.

‘Actually, sir, 100 percent of Asia is land,’ I said.

He didn’t enjoy being corrected, but the fact remains: planes have to land and ships have to port somewhere. People live on the land, and politicians will continue to call upon their militaries to fight to protect or to dominate them there. And so, the latest work edited by Heck, Friedman and Mills is a welcome addition to the study of anyone who needs to prepare to execute amphibious operations.

The dangerous collapse of US strategic sealift capacity

The US Transportation Command’s Military Sealift Command (MSC), the subordinate organisation responsible for strategic sealift, is unprepared for the high intensity fighting of a war over Taiwan.

In the event of such a war, combat commanders would look to MSC’s approximately 125 ships to transport about 90 percent of US Army and Marine Corps equipment into the Western Pacific for combat operations: fuel, ammunition, vehicles, missile launchers, spare parts and more.

MSC readiness levels have dropped to 59 percent, due mostly to vessel material condition and age. Most of its sealift ships are reaching an age at which maintenance and repair costs are ballooning, and service-life extensions won’t improve readiness.

Most alarmingly, current estimates indicate that the sealift fleet will lose 90,000 to 180,000 square metres (1 million to 2 million square feet) of capacity each year as ships reach the end of their useful life. That compares with the current capacity of about 840,000 square metres (9 million square feet).

Recent fleet exercises also indicate that most of MSC’s vessels cannot complete long voyages or are completely non-mission-capable. Without immediate investment, sealift will remain largely incapable of supporting major sustained combat operations.

US planning takes for granted that sea lines of communication will be contested from homeport in the United States to theatre in the western Pacific. Contested logistics add an additional layer of complexity for war planning, specifically because MSC’s strategic sealift fleet, already stretched thin and atrophied, would be subject to attack. Ships and their cargoes would be lost.

The US Transport Command will likely have to activate its Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), which allows access to civilian commercial shipping to supplement military sealift capacity. While VISA enables increased lift capacity on paper, that comes with an implied trade-off: every commercial vessel seconded to military service is lost to US commercial capacity and revenue. There is also a risk that commercial shippers will suffer grievous losses in maritime combat. The government could compensate them, but their businesses would be badly damaged.

In 2017, the US Maritime Administration estimated that US civilian merchant shipping was 1800 qualified mariners short of requirements. Since then, that number has almost certainly increased. Obviously, in the event of a major mobilisation, the US will need sailors for its merchant ships.

The MSC’s strategic sealift fleet is woefully inadequate. While VISA may ease some of the inadequacy, it is unclear how effective civilian vessels would be in wartime. Moreover, even if the transport command activated VISA, the civilian merchant fleet would likely be crippled by a potentially fatal lack of interoperability among crews for want of shared experience. The US also faces a critical shortage of trained personnel.

The US Transport Command must take immediate steps to mitigate US sealift’s capability and capacity gaps. Failing this, the US and its regional allies and partners that also rely on US sealift face defeat. This is not because the US military cannot fight and win, but because the US military cannot support and sustain itself at scale on the other side of the Pacific.

Recapitalising the sealift fleet must be the MSC’s primary focus. The US needs to breathe new life into its domestic industrial base and revitalise its ability to rapidly construct ships. Fleet modernisation will obviously require building ships, but the US should also consider buying foreign vessels to bolster its merchant fleet until production capacity improves.

The US Merchant Marine must improve mariner recruitment and retention. No amount of new shipping or industrial capacity will make up for a lack of qualified sailors. The maritime administration should consider new incentive programs to bring talent to crews and vessels.

While it is vital to reinvigorate the US shipbuilding industry, and to attract and retain qualified sailors, these actions alone are not enough. The MSC must also conduct regular theatre-level exercises to train the sealift force and develop interoperability in the event VISA is activated. Fleet exercises lay bare problems in peacetime, providing the advantage of time to think through those problems.

In a war, any level of sustained attrition would quickly turn catastrophic without sufficient sealift. Underpinning all of this is the need to develop a comprehensive national maritime strategy. Such a strategy must align US policy objectives with resources and reality in the Pacific. This process is likely to be uncomfortable and require trade-offs, but it is fundamentally necessary. The alternative is almost certainly humiliating defeat for want of weapons, ammunition, fuel and equipment.

General John J Pershing, himself keenly aware of logistics, said ‘infantry wins battles, logistics wins war’. His axiom has likely never been truer. It is time to recognise that the US maritime logistics problem must be solved.

Small, agile, deadly: the US Marine Corps and future war

The US Marine Corps is dramatically increasing its relevance to the war fighting capability of the United States. As the world lurches into an age of renewed strategic competition, the Marine Corps understands that it must be at the forefront of innovation in high-intensity warfare.

In 2020, it announced Force Design 2030, a major initiative for this decade. The initiative anticipates future war and forces the Marine Corps to restructure itself, placing a deliberate emphasis on expeditionary warfare.

A central concept in the reorganisation is moving small, hard-to-detect units rapidly by sea to islands—or small parts of islands—that are close to the enemy. Those highly mobile units, requiring little support, would use advanced weapons to challenge the enemy’s use of nearby sea and air space.

Beyond becoming a more capable and lethal fighting force, the Marines get a new sense of strategic relevance from the new ideas. As the US shifts to confront newly emergent peer threats, such as China, the need for a rapid-reaction aggressive Marine Corps will only grow, especially when one considers how quickly adversaries can aggregate force and execute operations. The Marine Corps must be agile and deadly.

New ideas about the structure of the force and force employment point to a healthy evolution of Marine Corps thinking around future wars and what will be essential to fight them. These innovations are aimed at enhancing operational agility and multi-domain capabilities to bolster the Marine Corps’ lethality and provide the US with a menu of combat options in an unpredictable threat ecosystem.

The Marine Corps is responding to shifting US strategic priorities in four main ways. First, it is working towards returning to its traditional mission set and enhancing its ability to execute naval expeditionary missions. For the past three decades, Fleet Marine Forces have acted as a second army and moved away from their traditional amphibious missions.

Second, competition is driving the Marine Corps to innovate and adapt its operational concepts, as shown by the emergence of expeditionary advanced base operations—sending forces to temporary locations close to the enemy.

Third, strategic competition necessitates rapid global engagement and presence. The Marine Corps plays an important role in establishing forward bases and conducting joint exercises with allies and partners to deter aggression and reassure friendly nations.

Fourth, realignment prioritises capabilities that are essential for success in high intensity engagements, such as anti-ship operations and expeditionary advanced base operations. Because it understands these dynamics, the Marine Corps can effectively prepare for the challenges posed by great-power rivals.

Transforming the Marine Corps is making it much more technologically capable and lethal while divesting it of old categories of equipment. Planning guidance emphasises capability development and pushes the service to invest in unmanned systems, advanced air defence and long-range precision strike.

These capabilities are intended to increase the range and lethality of deployed Marine combat units while enabling dispersal and distributed operations. The enemy isn’t presented with a large formation as a target.

Advanced technologies will enhance the capability of the units, and the overall concept reflects the need for constant adaptability in future war. This is a challenge that an already innovative force is well placed to meet.

A principal element of this evolution is the development of Marine Littoral Combat Regiments (MLR). MLRs are designed to fight and win against a major enemy in a littoral environment. Unlike a traditional rifle regiment, an MLR incorporates an anti-air battalion, a combat logistics battalion and a marine rifle battalion; it’s also reinforced with an anti-ship missile battery.

The transformation of the Marine Corps underscores its role as the US’s premier rapid-reaction force and enhances its ability to cope with and defeat unpredictable modern threats, military or otherwise.

In addition, new MLRs help the Marine Corps to execute operations in a more agile and modular way. They are designed so constituent units as small as platoons—hard to detect and requiring modest supply volumes—can be deployed separately. Commanders can use units with such small footprints more flexibly. This optimises the strengths of the Marine Corps and its new weapons systems while mitigating the potential weaknesses of larger formations.

The Marine Corps is breathing new life into its operational concepts and technologies. The force design initiative emphasises operational agility and multi-domain capabilities, ensuring that the Marine Corps can contribute strongly to defeating a major adversary.

USMC chief says marines operating concepts a natural fit for Australia

A more agile and capable US Marine Corps will be well placed to work closely with the Australian Defence Force to protect sensitive areas such as maritime choke points in the region, says its commandant, General David Berger.

Berger is overseeing sweeping changes to the marines under the ‘Force Design 2030’ program to prepare the corps for a rapidly changing strategic environment. He is in Australia for talks with Australian commanders.

Speaking at ASPI on Thursday, he said that for almost 20 years the marines invested heavily for operations in the Middle East. ‘That’s what our country needed us to do. And we’re very good at that. And because the Marine Corps has all of the air and ground and logistics—the whole package— it’s a natural fit for that.’

But in the long term, the marines’ value to the US military joint force was as an expeditionary element that was forward all the time and which could gather information while preventing an adversary from doing the same. That presence could ‘open the door to places’, Berger said.

‘Some of it is back to our roots where we came from.’

The marines have had to adjust their structure and posture, how they train and manage their people, their warfighting concepts, what platforms they use and what capabilities and weapon systems they need wherever they operate to make sure they stay ahead of change happening around the world, Berger said.

‘As a service chief, we have two responsibilities to make sure we provide the forces today for a conflict, but also to make sure that five, 10 years from now we’re in the right spot. We have made the investments in the right places so that the future is in a good place.’

A likely challenge for the marines and for allies such as Australia would be to keep maritime choke points open to allow commerce to flow freely and they would need to develop the tools to do that.

‘You have to be able to monitor that, to engage an adversary who wants to close it down. So, we need things like anti-ship capabilities, the surveillance, the collection capabilities in the maritime domain that we don’t have right now. We need the ability to move laterally, both by air and on the surface at a tactical level, with greater frequency and in smaller numbers than we do right now.

‘But I would say, beyond a piece of hardware, the most important part is that human part of operating in an austere, expeditionary, maritime environment without any developed infrastructure, but getting a job done. And being able to transition quickly if there’s a crisis.’

Berger agreed with ASPI Executive Director Peter Jennings that similarities between the Marine Corps and the ADF meant the two could operate well together.

‘It’s easy for us to work alongside somebody who’s working to figure, to develop, to refine the tactical and operational concepts that bring together the different capabilities from silos into a whole. This is what we do every day as a marine corps. So it’s a natural fit for us to work alongside.’

Explaining the concept of the marines’ ‘expeditionary advanced base operations’, Berger said that involved the deployment of ‘stand-in’ forces where a stand-off approach—staying outside the range of an adversary’s intelligence-collection and weapon systems—was not enough.

‘The stand-in role for the US Marine Corps is to remain forward persistently, all the time with the partners that we have in the face of an adversary to collect against them. To prevent them from collecting against us and other friendly nations. To be in a posture basically, so that if something were to heat up, you’re in the right position already. You’re not fighting your way in.’

This posture would add to the stand-off capability of the entire force and increase its depth and breadth. ‘This is a sweet spot, a natural role for the Marine Corps moving forward. We are expeditionary, we’re amphibious. It builds on the competencies we already have.’

Australia’s expanding amphibious capability would work well with the US Marines, Berger said, so the stand-in force would be alongside an ally in a crisis, ready to help.

Facing a competitor intent on expanding and disrupting the region’s security framework, the marines had to be able to operate from advance bases they would set up, tear down and move on from. ‘You need to have that agility,’ Berger said.

Berger said he would not ask Australia to adjust its forces to fight with the US, but instead would listen to what the ADF wanted to do. ‘First step, where do they want to go?’

‘My purpose in spending all day today with the ADF is where are they going, and how can we be a partner?’ He said he’d received great advice from ADF chief Angus Campbell.

To drive the sort of changes he was bringing to the Marine Corps and to find and develop the ideas that would provide an edge over adversaries, Berger said personnel at all levels must be empowered to embrace risk. Once that began to produce results, Congress tended to support that process.

‘Two things I have going for me. One is really smart people around us that are willing to understand risk and take it. Second, I have a boss, bosses, in our Department of Defense who are taking the risk alongside of me. Third, I have Congress. Congress historically looks at the military as wasteful, slow to change, so they are not rewarding, but they’re acknowledging the move that the Marine Corps is making and the associated risk, and are giving us the resources to do it.

‘My payback to them is I’ve got to keep them informed, I’ve got to tell them the things we’ve learned in the past six months, year. “These things are not working; we’re going to shift over here.” But I have to keep them informed all the way, or they may think I’m going off the reservation somewhere.

‘My obligation to my boss and to Congress, keep them informed all the time. And be honest, be open. Tell them what’s not working. So far, it’s worked.’

Asked what lessons from the war in Ukraine might be relevant to the Indo-Pacific, Berger said that while he was cautious about drawing conclusions when a conflict was still underway, proper logistics planning was vital and that was relevant to the partnership between Australia and the US.

‘Logistics, logistics, logistics. That is the limiting factor. That’s the driving factor in how far and how fast you can go. It can’t be the last thing that you plan. Whoever’s handling logistics, they’d better be in the room from minute one.’

A second factor was the incredible, rapid progression of the power of information—from use of smartphones to the strategic release of information. He pointed to the power of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s tailored messaging to his people, to Russia and Russians, and to the wider world.

And while it was possible to compare the sizes and ranges of opposing forces, a more telling factor in warfare was human endeavour. Why did the Russian plan not go the way it was laid out on paper and what role did the human part play in that, from conscript to senior leader?

And the Ukrainians? ‘They’re defending their home turf. Their backs are against the wall. Their families are in the basement. I mean there’s a huge element there that goes beyond the six-month to two-year conscript from Russia that’s, “I don’t know why I’m down here. I don’t know what we’re doing here. I’m cold. I’m out of food.” The human element is incredible. We should never underestimate that. We have a lot to learn on the human factor.’

The Ukrainians knew it would be a huge mistake to take Russia on symmetrically force-on-force, head-to-head, so they wisely chose not to do that. ‘They’re operating as asymmetric as you can imagine—and it’s working.’

China would be watching closely and trying to figure out what in Europe applied in the Indo-Pacific. ‘I don’t know what lessons they will learn, but I would bet everything, every dollar that I have in my bag that they’re focused on learning … because they’ve been doing that for the last 15 years.’

In terms of deterring China from invading Taiwan, Berger said there was a lot to learn or relearn about deterrence.

‘I would say first you make it really difficult for them.’ Coalitions, networks, alliances, partnerships were a problem for Beijing. ‘We need to make that iron clad. We need to make that indivisible.’ The Taiwanese had to be provided with enough to make themselves defendable in terms of arms and other capabilities so that it became a very difficult problem for China to invade.

Berger said the sharing of information and intelligence between the US and Australia was the gold standard, and it was important to paint a clear picture of Beijing’s intentions and thinking.

On the marines’ rotational presence in Darwin, Berger said: ‘I think the limits of that will be as far as Australia wants to go, will allow us to go.’

Darwin allowed the marines to train at scale, alongside a partner at a high end. ‘You can use every tool in the toolkit and press things to the limits in terms of realism. It’s awesome.’

If the ADF thought bases in the Northern Territory were worth utilising for training or operating, the marines would be right there alongside it, Berger said. ‘This is expeditionary advanced based operations. How do you move in, set up shop quickly, defend it and then break it down 96 hours later? This is what we do.’

Pests slowing the Marine’s Darwin advance

Plans to rotate a potent 2,500-strong US Marine Air-Ground Task Force through Darwin for six months at a time may fall foul of Australia’s tough biosecurity regulations.

A new report by the US Government Accountability Office reveals that it takes two months out of their six-month deployment in the Top End for the Marines to dismantle, thoroughly clean and reassemble vehicles and other equipment they’ll bring to Australia to be sure they’re not carrying weeds, pests or diseases. That’ll likely affect the Marines’ capabilities and increase their costs, the GAO says.

The GAO also says the US Defense Department hasn’t worked out where the Marines should be based during the Northern Australian rainy season when, it notes, flooding’s a significant issue. ‘DOD officials are considering multiple options for the Marines’ location during the rainy season, but no decisions have been made and the options being considered will take years to implement,’ the GAO report says.

In November 2011, the US and Australian governments announced that Marines would come to train in Northern Australia as a key part of the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and, over time, the numbers would build up to a full task force.

Of the 2,500 marines, 1,300 would come from Okinawa, where the US military presence is being reduced. They’d train in Australia during the dry season, from April through to September or October. So far there have been five six-month rotations which began in 2012 with an infantry company of 200 marines. In 2016 the marines sent a 1,250-strong infantry battalion. It’s not yet clear where the balance of the 2,500 marines will come from.

At this stage, the marines from Okinawa are to be gradually relocated to Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Hawaii and elsewhere in Japan, along with the rotational presence in Australia. The Pentagon officials told the GAO they prioritised planning for Guam over Hawaii or Australia, as the DOD was using money from the Japanese government for the relocation to Guam.

The 2017 Darwin deployment began last week, and this time the Marine battalion brought its versatile Osprey troop carriers and a fleet of helicopters. The task force is designed to allow the rapid deployment of a self-contained Marine force by air, land, or sea on a wide range of missions. It provides its own air and ground support and logistics backup. The size of the force can be tailored for specific operations.

According to the GAO, the US Department of Defense hasn’t resolved what to do about the unavailability of the marines’ equipment while Australia’s biosecurity requirements are met. ‘According to officials at Pacific Command, the biosecurity requirements could result in some Marine Corps equipment being nonoperational for approximately 2 months out of the 6-month rotation,’ the report says. ‘Marine Corps officials stated that, during the approximately 2 months it generally takes to break down, clean, and reassemble the Marine Corps equipment, the equipment is not functional and this hinders capability and training. Officials with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that the biosecurity requirements are a risk to the Marine Corps units’ capability.’

To get around the problems triggered by Australia’s biosecurity concerns, an option would be for the Marines to buy a full additional set of heavy equipment that they’d station in Australia, the US officials said. Marine Corps officials told the GAO that was one option being considered. But senior officials from US Pacific Command and the Marine Expeditionary Force said that’s an expensive option and also means that storage facilities had to be found. They told the GAO they’d identified a set of additional equipment that could be left in Australia to minimise biosecurity inspection requirements–‘but challenges remain to fund and source this equipment.’

The GAO observes that: ‘the Marine Corps risks not having the equipment needed to conduct its mission since, depending on the course of action, it could take years to allocate resources to mitigate this issue.’

Marines training this year will include bilateral and multilateral exercises with the Australian Defence Force and some unilateral training at Defence facilities around Australia. While they’re in Australia, the Marines will conduct about ten major exercises, some with Indonesia, Japan, and New Zealand, for operations ranging from counter-terrorism to humanitarian and disaster relief. The Marine rotation is part of the US Force Posture Initiative, which also includes air force collaboration, which saw 12 US Air Force F-22 Raptor fighters visit Northern Australia for exercises in February.

Whatever US military build-up takes place in Australia under the Trump administration, it’s all moving very slowly at present. The GAO says the Pentagon has completed two infrastructure studies that identify Marine Corps’ requirements for housing and for aircraft support for an expansion of Marine rotations in Darwin. ‘Moreover, DOD officials told us that they began developing a master plan for the infrastructure that will support Marine rotations to Australia.’ But the GAO notes that planning’s still in the early stages for both Hawaii and Australia.

The JSF: time for a reality check (part 2)

Image courtesy of Flickr user AereiMilitari.org.

Perhaps apocryphal, the story goes that a senior US Air Force officer on the Joint Strike Fighter Program found himself sitting next to a Chinese general. ‘I like your aeroplane,’ the General said. That’s nice,’ said the American, How many would you like?’ The general smiled and raised a single finger. ‘Just one,’ he said.

While China has long been concerned enough about the JSF’s capabilities to have plundered its plans in cyber files in the hope of reverse engineering it, critics in Australia have created the broad impression that the aircraft, now officially named the F-35 Lightning ll, is a ‘dog’. That criticism was loud enough to trigger a parliamentary inquiry into whether the RAAF should buy the JSF.

The Senate inquiry, concluded that ‘… the F-35A is the only aircraft able to meet Australia’s strategic needs for the foreseeable future, and that sufficient progress is being made in the test and evaluation program to address performance issues of concern.’ Its report also said that ‘in light of the serious problems that led to a re-baselining of the F-35 program in 2012, and the ongoing issues identified by the US Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the committee retains a healthy scepticism towards assurances by Defence regarding cost, schedule and capability outcomes of the F-35A.’

That reflected the long held view of the director of ASPI’s defence and strategic program, Dr Andrew Davies, that while the early years of the JSF program were plagued by cost overruns and schedule slippages it had performed much better since action was taken to tighten it up. Costs were now coming down and the production schedule was stabilising.

The committee gave little credence to more extravagant assertions the JSF was outdated and would be outperformed by potential rivals.

It’s often claimed that the RAAF would be better off with the US F-22 Raptor, a bigger, twin-engine cousin of the F-35 produced in the 1990s. In reality, the F-22 is an air superiority fighter very good at clearing the skies of enemy aircraft but not designed to do other tasks as well as the JSF can. It was expensive to buy and operate and the assembly line closed years ago.

The JSF is a multi-purpose aircraft, designed for many roles, from achieving air superiority to sinking enemy warships, attacking targets on the ground and providing close air support for troops. It is, in the words of Group Captain Glen Beck who heads the RAAF’s Air Combat Transition Office, an all rounder—‘a flying batsman/bowler’. The head of the RAAF’s JSF Capability and Sustainment Group, Air Vice Marshal Leigh Gordon, says the Raptor is ‘a wonderful, dated aeroplane which we couldn’t have even if we wanted it.’ The JSF is much more sophisticated with about 8.5 million lines of computer code compared to fewer than 2 million in the F-22.

Donald Trump caused consternation by suggesting that, to wind back Lockheed-Martin’s cost overruns, he’d ask Boeing if it could produce an alternative. But within days, the new Defence Secretary, James Mattis, told a US Senate hearing ‘the JSF is critical for our own air superiority’ because of the jet’s electronics which magnifies its capability. Mr Trump just wanted to bring the price down to get ‘best bang for the buck’, General Mattis said. In truth, the decisions needed to reduce the price were made years ago.

Various prices have been claimed for the RAAF’s JSFs, ranging up to $300 million each. The head of the Pentagon’s F-35 Joint Project Office, US Air Force Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan, said in Australia this week that he was confident the price of each jet—we have 72 on order—would come down to $80 million each. That’s close to the price tag of a much-less sophisticated fourth-generation fighter.

In 2010, alarms rang in the US bureaucracy because the project was running well over budget and two years late. It was ‘rebaselined’ and largely brought under control.

The project is staggeringly complex and it is still having issues but the Americans and the RAAF are confident the fighter will work very well. One recent problem was that the designers had to abandon the guided weapon intended to hit moving ground targets because it was a form of cluster munition which the US no longer uses. A replacement is being worked on.

As well, there’s a delay in producing a suitable anti-ship missile for Australia’s needs. One is being worked on by the Norwegians and Australian defence scientists are developing a sensor for it.

Gordon says the problems are being solved as they emerge and he’s confident the RAAF’s JSFs will meet the new schedule, with the first aircraft arriving in December 2018 and three squadrons and a training unit fully operational in 2023.

It was suggested recently that women (or slighter men) won’t be able to fly the JSF because the helmet was so heavy it would break their necks if they ejected. The RAAF says that’s been resolved by making the helmet lighter, modifying the ejector seat head support panel and slightly slowing the opening of the parachute.

Several countries have increased their JSF orders in recent months after thoroughly examining its capabilities. Israel, which spends defence dollars very carefully, says it’s very pleased with its purchase and it could buy 75 aircraft.

The US Marines say their pilots love the JSF and want them as fast as they can be delivered.

One of Australia’s most experienced military aviators, Squadron Leader Andrew Jackson, is a RAAF instructor teaching pilots from a range of nations, including the US, to fly the JSF. Jackson is one of two Australians who are flying the F-35s from the US to the Avalon air show in Victoria over the coming days. He says it’s vastly better than any fighter he’s flown. ‘This aircraft will give fighter pilots a level of situational awareness that far exceeds legacy platforms,’ Jackson says. ‘Experiencing this level of capability first hand is something every pilot dreams of.’

Australia on Asian catastrophe and the zero impact of the US marines

The Minister for Defence, Senator David Johnston speaking during the Third Plenary Session, on Managing Strategic Tensions at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. The Australian Defence Minister thinks Asia’s security situation is potentially ‘dire’ even ‘catastrophic’. But David Johnston twice assured his Shangri-La audience that the regional impact of the US marines rotating through Darwin on the strategic balance is ‘zero’. Strange times, indeed.

The Senator’s prepared text saw Australia stand shoulder to shoulder with the US and Japan on the threat to law and regional order posed by China. Yet his tone and some of his positioning—especially on the US marines—had a distinctly ASEAN flavour. In culinary terms, this was roast beef and veg served with soy and chilli sauce.

Australia has sent its Defence Minister to every Asia Security Summit (sharing that honour with Japan). I’ve heard most of those speeches and read them all and Johnston’s effort had some of the darker and sharper edges; the 13th Shangri-La dialogue prompts some superstitious reflections on that unlucky number.. Read more