Tag Archive for: United States

The pivot: a complication for Europe, not a game-changer

USA and Europe comparisonIt makes sense to think of Europe’s response to the United States pivot towards Asia as an episode in Europe’s continuing preoccupation with retaining US commitment, rather than as a moment of epiphany. That preoccupation has a long history, starting decades before the 2010 ‘pivot speech’ and the later ‘rebalancing clarification’.

It remains to be seen how European anger with the US over spying allegations made by Edward Snowden will affect EU–US relations. It’s a reasonable bet that the eventual conclusion will be that whatever the Americans do, everyone still needs them. Read more

Vietnam’s foreign policy tightrope

Nguyen Tan Dung, Prime Minister of Vietnam

Vietnam’s new foreign policy approach, which some analysts have labelled ‘more friends, fewer enemies’, reflects its precarious position as a bird on the wire caught between China and the United States.

In the past few months, Vietnamese officials have held a number of high-level meetings with leaders of both states. At the end of July, President Truong Tan Sang travelled to Washington to discuss the Trans-Pacific Partnership with President Barack Obama, highlighting the improved relations between the former foes under America’s increasingly Asia-focused strategy. A little over a month later, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung met with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and reiterated the Vietnamese Party and State’s long-lasting and consistent policy of consolidating and strengthening neighbourliness and cooperation with China. Read more

Asia Essentials: the US military chameleon

chameleonThe Asia security system is to be constructed atop the foundations of the US hub-and-spokes of alliances in Asia—the San Francisco system, which is enjoying a burst of health and regional affection in its seventh decade.

The longevity of the US alliance system is a tribute to its ability to change colour and form according to the needs of the Asian ally. Similarly, the US military guarantee to Asia has vitality and endurance because it has a chameleon capacity—adjusting colour, weight and contours to suit different Asian partners.

Envisage the US alliance system as three layers. The top layer holds the formal alliances expressed by treaty. Below the formal layer sits the de facto or virtual alliances. And in the lowest layer sit the partial or quasi-military relationships. In this lowest level are the partnerships or relationships, but it’s no stretch to call them quasi alliances. This is the beauty of the US military chameleon, adapting as it shifts through the different layers and colours. If the champion chameleon is one that can merge while walking across a kilt, then the US military can just about do tartan. Read more

Should the US forgo its primacy to accommodate China?

Professor Hugh White, a respected Australian academic and strategist, has long argued that as China has emerged as a great power in the Asia Pacific, it’s time for the Middle Kingdom to play a greater role in the regional order, to the extent that the United States should forgo its long-standing primacy and share its regional leadership with China. Whether the US comes to terms with this fact, White contends, has far reaching implications for the region, as the US insistence on its primacy will inevitably lead to China’s growing grievances. As a consequence, US–China strategic rivalry will intensify and regional peace and stability will suffer in the long run.

White’s argument is valid with respect to China’s impressive economic and military rise over the last three decades, which brings it greater respect and influence in regional affairs. However, whether China should enjoy a greater regional status rests not only on its growing power, but also its moral authority and regional acceptance. The region’s future peace and stability, therefore, is not determined by whether the US forgoes its primacy or not, but primarily by how China behaves to prove it deserves such a concession from the US. Read more

Attacking Syria: should emotion or reason prevail?

President Barack Obama talks on the phone with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany in the Oval Office, Aug. 29, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) of Germany in the Oval Office, Aug. 29, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

Call me a bleeding heart, but I don’t think I’m the only one who feels that something simply must be done about the Syrian chemical weapons attacks. I’m not the only normally peaceful soul who hopes that in the next few days the United States will lead a very short and limited military strike against Syrian military facilities. I say those words ‘feel’ and ‘hope’ deliberately because these are largely emotional responses borne of the images and stories of what happened in Ghoula to hundreds of civilians. Indeed, a fair bit of a similar emotional dread was behind the banning years ago of chemical weapons in an international convention that Syria refuses to sign. And US Secretary of State John Kerry’s description of the gas attacks as a ‘moral obscenity’ seems spot on in this context. As a way of venting of that moral outrage, a small volley of cruise missiles sent off by the United States would make it clear that this sort of action, even in the midst of an already barbaric civil war, simply won’t be tolerated. Read more

The pivot and the red line: the Syrian Civil War and US credibility in the Asia–Pacific

National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice briefs President Barack Obama during his Presidential Daily Briefing in Chilmark, Mass., Aug. 12, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

Called a ‘War Speech’ by the Washington Post’s Max Fisher, Secretary of State John Kerry dispelled all doubt at his Monday evening press conference over the Obama administration’s consideration of military action against Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad regime. Almost a year to the day since President Obama made his ‘red line’ comment regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria, its most recent (and visible) use on the outskirts of the Syrian Capital of Damascus has forced the President and his administration into the awkward position of preparing for another Middle Eastern conflict at a time they’d promised to be thinking about the Asia-Pacific.

Despite the words of key administration officials  and even its unveiling as the Administration’s foreign policy blueprint by President Obama before the Australian Parliament in 2011, doubt over the US ‘Rebalance to Asia’ formed unsurprisingly quickly. At the core of these doubts, even prior to current issues related to sequestration, stood the tall order of US disengagement from combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Due in part to the considerable investment of the Administration’s early energy into reducing the visible presence of the US in the Middle East, it seemed inevitable to some that the region would reemerge as the primary focus of the Administration as unaddressed issues would build critical mass and become too large to ignore. Read more

The US–Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership: what’s in a name?

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang toast the U.S.-Vietnam relationship during their working lunch at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., on July 24, 2013.

In July 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton journeyed to Hanoi and proposed that bilateral relations be raised to a strategic partnership. Negotiations became bogged down by late 2011 when the two sides disagreed how human rights should be treated. It therefore came as a surprise last week when US President Barack Obama and his Vietnamese counterpart announced they’d decided to form a U.S.–Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership to provide an overarching framework for advancing the relationship’.

Vietnam has long sought to diversify and multilateralise its foreign relations but, in the process of expanding its foreign relations, has had to treat some countries as more equal than others. Vietnam has applied the term ‘strategic partner’ to single out these twelve special states. The first eight were the Russian Federation, Japan, India, People’s Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Spain, United Kingdom, and Germany. Italy, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia were added this year. Vietnam’s partnerships with Russia and China were later further raised to ‘comprehensive strategic partner’ and ‘strategic cooperative partner’, respectively. Read more

The sun never sets on the Anglosphere

Sunrise in Singapore

Jousting with Hugh White on international structures is both fun and a deeply Anglospheric thing to do, but I make no concessions about the longevity of the Anglosphere. That’s because I see the term as largely synonymous with the accepted global international order. The term Anglosphere is no more about the English than the Panama Canal is about hats. Rather it points to the historic origins of many of the rules of the road that structure international society. One thinks of the Monty Python sketch asking ‘what have the Romans ever done for us’? The list of what the Anglosphere has delivered includes the UN, Bretton-Woods, NATO, ANZUS, the English language, international law, support for human rights, the internet, fast food and precision-guided munitions. Oh yes, and they brought peace after World War II, which is the basis for—among many other benefits—economic growth in Asia.

Hugh asks: ‘whether this grouping will do much for us in the future when wealth and power will no longer be so strongly concentrated in Anglo-Saxon hands,’ but the critical point is not ethnicity but rather the framework of international rules. The willingness of the group of nations that subscribe to those rules to intervene in conflicts to protect international order is, however, an important feature of the broader Anglospheric approach to international society. No other combination of states is likely to provide such an international order-setting orientation any time soon. This is a much broader point than simply acknowledging the military capabilities of the five eyes countries and their like-minded friends—as both Hugh and I do. Read more

Sunset for the Anglosphere?

Sunset on the Anglosphere?

Peter Jennings has sprung to defend the Anglosphere from my disparagement. But before battle begins, let’s clarify what exactly he’s defending, because Peter uses the term ‘Anglosphere’ in several rather different ways. Some of them I wouldn’t dream of disparaging, and others I suspect he wouldn’t really want to defend.

The sense of ‘Anglosphere’ that I would least want to disparage is what we might call the Tennysonian one. This sense clearly looms large for Tony Abbott. In the Heritage Foundation speech mentioned in my column, Abbott quoted lines from Tennyson that I’ve always loved, which describe Britain [or perhaps England] as ‘a land of just and old renown/ where freedom broadens slowly down/ from precedent to precedent’. If the Anglosphere means nothing more than reverence for Britain’s deep-rooted legal and constitutional traditions then I wouldn’t disparage it for a moment.

Nor do I disparage the second sense which Peter attributes to the Anglosphere when he identifies it with the ‘five-eyes’ Anglo-Saxon intelligence sharing arrangements from which Australia benefits so handsomely. I’m all for that. Read more

The US–Australian joint facilities and the invention of General Knowledge

Bob Hawke with US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in the Anzus Corridor in the Pentagon, June 1983.In a Ministerial Statement late last month, Defence Minister Stephen Smith outlined and explained the Australian government’s principles of ‘Full Knowledge and Concurrence’ in relation to American defence activities in Australia. This statement merits greater attention than it has received, not least because it’s an important contribution to making our defence activities with the US more transparent. But I want to take issue with some of the claims in the statement, particularly the claim that Full Knowledge and Concurrence didn’t exist in relation to the joint facilities before the prime ministership of Bob Hawke in the 1980s. And I want to cast Hawke’s contribution to the whole issue of the joint facilities in a different light.

Let me begin by briefly summarising how Smith defined his key principles:

Full Knowledge equates to Australia having a full and detailed understanding of any capability or activity with a presence on Australian territory or making use of Australian assets.

Concurrence means Australia approves the presence of a capability or function in Australia in support of its mutually agreed goals. Concurrence does not mean that Australia approves every activity or tasking undertaken. Read more