United States Archives - Page 22 of 26

Why encouraging US allies in Asia to proliferate isn’t a good idea

28 April 2014

In a recent commentary in The National Interest, titled ‘Let Asia go nuclear’, Harvey Sapolsky and Christine Leah outlined a case in favour of the US accepting nuclear proliferation by its allies in the Asia Pacific. The core of their position is that the allies have opted for US nuclear assurances and conventional protection because those are cheaper than constructing their own nuclear arsenals. They suggest that ‘tailored proliferation’ by US allies would ease US burdens and simultaneously allow the states in question to enjoy clearer protection from their own indigenous nuclear arsenals than they do under the existing ‘extended deterrence’ arrangements. And they believe such proliferation wouldn’t be destabilising, because US allies are responsible stakeholders in the regional and global order, and none would be in any hurry to lob a nuclear weapon at anyone else.

Let’s put aside the assertion that the allies chose extended nuclear assurance because it was cheaper—though I don’t believe that was the primary motive for any of the countries. And let’s assume there’s a domestic consensus in each of the allied states to move down the nuclear path—an assumption that might be a bridge too far in the case of South Korea, is a bridge too far in the case of Japan, and several bridges too far in the case of Australia and others. I’m more interested in what happens afterwards—when, say, Japan, South Korea and Australia have proliferated. Surely, the central question must be ‘Can the proliferation chain be terminated at that point?’ Thailand and the Philippines might begin to wonder if they should proliferate too, since other US allies are doing so. And Taiwan, which enjoys a security relationship governed by the Taiwan Relations Act rather than an actual treaty, might begin to harbour similar worries. As for other countries in the region, Indonesia might look askance at Australian proliferation. And Vietnam, living on China’s border, might think it should also begin considering a nuclear option. Read more

The Quadrennial Defence Review: a surfeit of rebalancing

17 March 2014

Readers of the recently released US Quadrennial Defence Review will be struck by one major characteristic: namely, a fondness for the notion of ‘rebalancing’. Asian readers looking for signals of the Obama administration’s commitment to the rebalance to Asia will be delighted to see that the QDR delivers. But they might be less delighted to see that the document uses the term with relative abandon, indeed to the point where the word ‘rebalance’ starts to lose its meaning. In the space of the executive summary, for example, the document manages to talk about ‘rebalancing and sustaining our presence and posture abroad to better protect US national security interests’, ‘rebalancing for the 21^st century’, ‘rebalancing for a broad spectrum of conflict’, ‘rebalancing our counter-terrorism efforts’, ‘rebalancing capability, capacity and readiness within the joint force’, and ‘rebalancing tooth and tail’ by reforming the US Department of Defense.

The overall effect is to create an impression that the US is attempting to walk several tightropes simultaneously. By the end of the executive summary, readers will be starting to wish the authors had been asked to redraft it without using the word ‘rebalance’ at all. I know the richness of the English language is such that if you see a new word it’s likely you’ll see it again within six days, but even by that metric, the authors’ affection for the term is hard to explain. Really, if so much rebalancing has to be done, doesn’t it imply that US global force posture is currently unbalanced, and so is its force structure, its Defense Department, its counter-terrorism efforts, and so on? And what does the word actually tell us, anyway? It’s like ‘impact’ used as a verb. Rebalancing implies a degree of acrobatic agility; a centredness that’s its own virtue. But what does it mean? The US says it’s rebalancing to Asia, but maintaining its commitments to Europe and the Middle East, and reaffirming that defence of its homeland remains its single highest strategic priority. Read more

Where are the advocates of diplomacy when you need them?

19 February 2014

Mid-way through a powerfully-written post, Elbridge Colby lays down the following challenge for critics like Jake Douglas: do we ‘think China’s behaviour in not dangerous or even troubling’?

My answer is that it’s indeed troubling to see the lack of consultation and transparency from China, or the nationalist dynamics which are being stoked by the regime. Taken in context with the maritime operations in our neighbourhood and the declaration of the ADIZ, this trajectory is obviously not what Australia would like to see from its biggest trading partner.

But is it really dangerous? That means different things to different people, and I’ve no doubt that some in Tokyo or Taipei feel threatened or insecure. But given the small stakes involved in the maritime dispute, we’re not yet at the point where any perceived danger for regional stability is worth risking more. Read more

What Beijing’s new aircraft carrier will mean for Asia

10 February 2014

The apparent confirmation that China is building its second (and first indigenous) aircraft carrier has caused quiet alarm. But it’s worth taking a ‘first principles’ look at this development, examining what China will be able to do with its new aircraft carriers. There are important limits on what Beijing would be likely to achieve with carrier-based projection of air power. But the move will provide Beijing with the ability to be more assertive, and tells us a lot about China’s sense of its role in the region.

To first get a sense of what this means for China’s future, the way the US has used their carriers in recent decades is a good place to start. Since WWII, American carriers have supported operations in larger regional wars, including Korea and Vietnam, where there was significant enemy opposition to air operations although not a huge threat to the carriers themselves. They formed an important part of the ability of the US to project hard power into heavily contested spaces. More recently they’ve been used to project air power against countries that don’t possess much in the way of either air defence and or an A2AD capability to pose a significant risk to the carriers.

They’re also been used as symbols (for domestic and international audiences) of US military power, including for intimidation. The deployment of the USS Independence and USS Nimitz in the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis is a good example. Part of the value of carriers for the United States has been the control they give Washington over escalation in these kinds of situations; the idea is that anyone who attacks as valuable an asset as a US carrier should expect a significant response. Read more

How much is enough? Why we need a more sober debate on the US pivot to Asia

6 February 2014

Jake Douglas’ recent post on The Strategist points to a serious problem for the US pivot to Asia: no matter how much Washington tries to reassure its allies and partners about its ongoing defence commitment, the widespread perception of an ‘asymmetry of resolve’ between the US and China persists. A focused Beijing is seen as increasingly able and willing to challenge the US in the Western Pacific while Washington is said to falter due to dwindling resources and domestic priorities. Perceptions are very hard to change. Even so, the empirical evidence indicates that it’s far from inevitable that the ‘balance of (military) power’ as well as the ‘balance of resolve’ will shift in China’s favour. It’s time for a more balanced discussion on this issue.

Washington has found it almost impossible to get its ‘pivot’ message through to allies and friends, notwithstanding significant changes in US military posture. No matter what the US does, analysts are quick to discount it: forward deployment of nuclear attack submarines, strategic bombers and advanced fighter aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor to the region? So what? Intensified military cooperation with key allies such as Japan? That’s not unusual! Readjustment of US military operational concepts suited to address China’s ‘anti-access/ area-denial’ challenge? The Pentagon won’t implement it! Repeated public announcements that the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands are covered by the US–Japan Mutual Security Treaty? The US isn’t serious! American B-52 bombers flying through China’s newly declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)? Yes, but… Read more

The paper tiger myth: how America is underestimating China’s resolve and power

4 February 2014

Most American policymakers are saying two things following China’s establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). (1) China’s challenge to the US-led Asian order is serious and calculated, and (2) America must get China to back down. We should be concerned, because their analysis is self-contradictory. The United States is falling prey to the ‘paper tiger myth‘—the belief that China is utterly threatening to America’s position in Asia and would retreat if we ‘pivoted’ just a bit more. This is a dangerous miscalculation of Chinese resolve and power.

In past weeks, pundits have declared that the PRC leadership is increasingly willing to risk confrontation to achieve its goals. On Wednesday, Senator John McCain (R-AR) called China ‘a rising threat’ because of its ‘profound belief… that China must, and will, regain the dominant role that they had for a couple of thousand years in Asia’. Similarly, Michael J. Green of CSIS argued in Foreign Affairs that the new ADIZ is ‘part of a longer-term attempt by Beijing to chip away at the regional status quo’. In Foreign Policy magazine, Elbridge Colby (CNA) and Ely Ratner (CNAS) claimed it amounts to an ‘expansionist strategy’. Read more

The strategic implications of China’s hypersonic missile test

27 January 2014

The defence press is reporting that on 9 January, China conducted the first test of a new hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), launched atop of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The vehicle can reportedly glide and manoeuvre at speeds between Mach 5 and Mach 10—or up to 10 times the speed of sound. While the Pentagon detected and monitored the launch, it took China’s Ministry of Defense six days to confirm the flight of a ‘new ultra-high-speed missile delivery vehicle’. It’s worth examining the significance of this test. I’ll have a look at the strategic dimension, and Andrew Davies will take a closer look on the military-technological implications.

First, the test shows that China has made significant progress towards becoming a serious military ‘space power’. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) regards the ability to operate HGVs and other highly sophisticated space capabilities, such as scramjet-powered vehicles, as a precondition to establishing China as a major military power. Importantly, the HGV test wasn’t unexpected for China watchers, as Beijing has long made the military use of space a national priority. The PLA’s goal over the next 10–15 years is to merge air and space power and to integrate future hypersonic weapons into a complex system of surveillance and targeting sensors, including over-the-horizon (OTH) radar as well as near space and satellite platforms. Operating HGVs in conjunction with warheads is a significant milestone towards reaching this objective.

The future of Sino-US strategic stability

15 January 2014

Last week I participated in a workshop on ‘Regional Views on Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future’ in Singapore, jointly organised by the National Bureau of Asian Research and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. My task was to address the potential implications of a more secure Chinese nuclear second-strike capability for its crisis behaviour and, ultimately, Sino-US crisis stability. While an argument can be made that it will enhance stability between the two major powers, it’s also important to point out some key challenges in this regard.

China has been modernising its nuclear arsenal for quite some time. Quantitatively, a conservative estimate is that China currently has about 250 nuclear warheads. However, the US intelligence community expects the number of long-range nuclear missiles capable of threatening the US homeland to more than double by the mid-2020s to over 100. China continues to replace its old liquid-fuel DF-3A Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) with solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-21 Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). Moreover, of particular interest is Beijing’s effort to develop a nuclear triad. This includes investment in the new H6-K strategic bomber as well as a new class of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to be equipped with the new Julang-2 (J-2) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). Indeed, China’s first ever sea-based nuclear deterrent could have reached ‘initial operational capability’ (IOC) late last year. Read more

Big amphibious exercise in NZ

11 December 2013

This exercise showed we have made great progress in our amphibious capability and in joint effects. I know everyone involved has gained new experiences and skills, learned much about working with our sister services, and enjoyed operating in the coalition of 10 nations.

This was the reaction of Air Vice Marshal Kevin Short, Commander Joint Forces New Zealand, after the military exercise ‘Southern Katipo 13’ concluded in New Zealand late last month.

The exercise involved the three services in New Zealand and soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen from Australia, Canada, France, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea Singapore, Tonga, the United Kingdom and the United States. France sent the frigate FS Prairial and two aircraft. Australia and Singapore both sent Super Hercules aircraft and the US sent two C-17 Globemasters. Altogether 2,200 people took part. It was the largest amphibious exercise ever held in New Zealand.

Haunting AUSMIN

28 November 2013

Hovering close to the table at the annual Australia–US ministerial were ghosts, spirits and spectres. New Zealand still qualifies as a ghost at this son-of-ANZUS feast, but in recent years the Kiwis have been edging back from the ethereal realm towards a more corporeal presence—now virtually resurrected and in good standing as a de facto US ally.

This year Japan and China were both spirits and spectres at AUSMIN. And as always at such a moment of top-level engagement with the great and powerful ally, the Australian Foreign and Defence Ministers had with them the spirit of Oz. Beyond any particular government, the spirit of Oz expresses Australia’s ardent commitment to the alliance. As with any enduring passion, the spirit of Oz has dark as well as light elements. Mark this as the divide between the pessimists and the optimists. The political class proclaim their love for the alliance, but where they sit on the pessimism/optimism scale is defined by how fears and ambitions for the future are refracted through the strategic prism. Read more

Tag Archive for: United States