When Prime Minister Abbott addressed the Boao Forum in China in early April, he told his audience that ‘Australia is not in China to do a deal, but to be a friend’. Actually, since he was towing behind him one of the largest business delegations ever to leave Australia, perhaps he should have said Australia is in China not only to do a deal, but to be a friend.

I take the prime minister’s statement as a sign that the Abbott government is determined to build upon the recently-agreed strategic partnership between Australia and China. But if we’re going to do that, then both countries need to speak candidly about their shared and non-shared interests in the strategic field. If our shared interests are thin, so too will be our relationship; if they’re thick, our relationship will similarly be thick. Australia and China have many interests in common, and there’s much more they could do together if they wished. But there’s also a list of topics on which they disagree—and glossing over those doesn’t help. Read more

Given the intensity of media focus on a series of crises this year—Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Ebola, and the South China Sea to name just a few—readers may be forgiven for having failed to notice that another important, though more incremental, development has also occurred. With each passing month it becomes clearer that a mood of nuclear realism is unfolding in US strategic policy. While President Obama is still remembered most clearly in the public mind for the anti-nuclear language in his Prague speech of 2009, a string of events in 2013–14 suggest that a shift of emphasis is occurring in relation to nuclear weapons.

First, the administration has committed to the long-overdue modernisation of the US nuclear arsenal. True, the initial funding decisions are merely the opening salvoes of a program that will take decades to unpack, and key decisions about the shape and size of the arsenal remain unresolved. But the administration has signalled a commitment to renovate the strategic triad, and even to modernise its principal tactical weapon, the B-61 bomb. Read more

The first week of August marks not only the centenary of the guns of August 1914, but also the fiftieth anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was as near as the United States ever came to a declaration of war in Vietnam. It’s worth reflecting on why the events of August 1964 still remain the subject of intense controversy.

The root of the matter was the US constitution, which designates the president as commander-in-chief but requires congressional approval for the country to wage war. Conflict between the executive and legislative branches over war powers has been a feature of administrations from Woodrow Wilson to Barack Obama.

On 4 August 1964, President Lyndon Johnson announced that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had made two unprovoked attacks, on 2 and 4 August, on the USS Maddox patrolling in international waters around the Gulf of Tonkin. The Administration immediately sought a congressional resolution which, in sweeping terms, gave the president the right to commit American forces to the defence of any Southeast Asian nation threatened by communist aggression or subversion. Based on the reports of the two attacks, Congress passed the resolution on 7 August by overwhelming majorities, 88–2 in the Senate and 416–0 in the House of Representatives. Read more

Rod Lyon presents a refreshingly sophisticated case against a no-first-use or sole purpose declaration being made by the United States. In particular, he highlights the need for America to reassure East Asian allies in order to prevent nuclear proliferation—an important issue often overlooked by disarmament proponents.

Rod appears to overstate the case though, and to explain why it’s worth unpacking some of the detail.

First, the debate about sole purpose occurs in the context of current declaratory policy. America’s Negative Security Assurance (NSA), announced in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, presently reads as follows:

The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

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Earlier this week, the US Department of Justice indicted five People’s Liberation Army officials for hacking into the computers of US companies to steal trade secrets. The indictment alleges that the PLA Five stole information that would be useful to the companies’ competitors in China, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is a significant development, as the US is directly accusing China of stealing information and using it to undermine the competitiveness of US companies. The charges signal that the US sees the theft of intellectual property as a national security threat and is resolved to hold those responsible to account. It also reaffirms a distinction the US makes between spying for profit, which is wrong, and spying for political purposes, which is acceptable.  Ultimately, the indictment is aimed at influencing China’s behaviour in cyberspace. It’s unlikely to prove effective.

The fifty-six page indictment (PDF) is backed by substantial evidence and describes the methods and motives behind the hacks. In the case of nuclear power plant manufacturer Westinghouse, the company was negotiating in 2010 to build four power plants in China when conspirator Sun Kailiang stole design specifications for pipes, pipe supports, and pipe routing. That information would enable a Chinese competitor looking to build a similar plant to save on research and development costs. In a global market that injures Westinghouse’s competitiveness and, consequentially, weakens the US economy. Read more