Tag Archive for: United Nations Security Council

The world can still keep Trump in check

US President Donald Trump has shown a callous disregard for the checks and balances that have long protected American democracy. As the self-described ‘king’ makes a momentous power grab, much of the world watches anxiously, aware that his administration’s growing illegality and corruption is eroding not only the US Constitution but what remains of the post-1945 international order. A return to great-power spheres of interest looks increasingly likely.

But foreign governments, businesses and civil-society groups have more power than they think in the face of a revisionist United States. They can take five steps to create external checks and balances on the Trump administration and on anti-democratic forces more broadly. Anti-democratic forces around the world cast a long shadow, but with a boost of courage and the strength of solidarity, pro-democracy coalitions can come together to fight for the light.

The first step is to unite and make as much noise as possible. Would-be autocrats depend on divide-and-rule tactics, maximising fear by convincing individuals and governments that they alone are on the chopping block. Imagine if all governments in the Americas (with a few exceptions, such as Argentina) denounced Trump’s designs on the Panama Canal and Canada, loudly and repeatedly, and refused to refer to the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America. Indeed, they could collectively rename it the Gulf of the Americas.

Another option is for all the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and European Union governments to issue a joint statement repudiating Trump’s claim that Ukraine started the war with Russia, instead insisting on the truth: Russia violated Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s 57 members could collectively introduce a censure resolution in the United Nations General Assembly condemning any suggestion of expelling all Palestinians from Gaza, as Trump casually suggested last month, while reaffirming a collective commitment to a Palestinian state.

It may prove even more consequential if European countries (EU members plus Switzerland, Britain and Norway) joined strategic partners such as Canada, Japan, South Korea and Australia in outlining the global chaos that Trump will unleash if he tries to take Greenland by force, thereby legitimising war as a foreign-policy tool. These denunciations should be issued repeatedly in all appropriate international forums.

The second step is to push back hard on Trump’s provocations, escalating to absurdity. If the US raises tariffs from 100 percent to 200 percent, governments should announce that they are raising them to 400 percent. This is a game of chicken, not a negotiation. The US may be the world’s largest economy, with a GDP of nearly US$28 trillion, but the combined economies of the EU member states, Britain, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Mexico, Japan, South Korea and Australia are 25 percent larger, totalling nearly US$35 trillion. Instead of coming to the White House with hat in hand and flattery at the ready, hoping to get an exemption from the coming trade wars, world leaders would be better off presenting a united front.

Third, use law to counter Trump’s lawlessness. The rule of law is not simply a code of conduct approved by duly constituted authorities. It is an entire system designed to channel dispute away from the battlefield and into the courts, to replace armed combat with legal jousting before an impartial referee. To the extent that the Trump administration ignores or rejects national and international law, foreign governments, businesses and civil-society groups should use their own courts to make their case and enforce their rights.

Lawfare could be especially useful for fighting corruption and economic malfeasance. When the actions of US officials violate cross-border contracts or give illegal advantage in international business deals, local prosecutors should apply their national law. This could help create a ‘zone of law’ for global commerce. But under no circumstances should they engage in vendettas or politically motivated prosecutions.

The fourth step other countries must take is to create a thriving domestic tech sector. This requires time, but few things are more important over the longer term. Governments and citizens should have options other than US or Chinese tech, particularly in the AI phase of the digital revolution. Moreover, as the EU well knows, competing with the existing tech giants requires the removal of trade barriers and the integration of capital markets, both important steps toward enhancing regional power on the global stage.

Lastly, the Trump administration has made clear its disdain for multilateral institutions, having rejected the UN’s sustainable development goals and questioning whether UN agencies’ projects ‘reinforce US sovereignty by limiting reliance on international organizations or global governance structures.’ Other countries—especially rising middle powers—should seize this moment to take over these institutions and make them their own.

It is time, for example, to give up on the UN Security Council. The permanent members will never agree to reform it and will continue to veto resolutions affecting their own interests, as the UN’s founders expected. Russia’s veto in the Security Council means that the General Assembly has already become the primary forum for addressing issues regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Rising middle powers such as India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia should seize the opportunity of great-power deadlock or collusion to align global institutions with the actual configuration of power in the world. They should insist on equal representation and promote decision-making based on weighted majority rule, which would give every country a genuine voice. The EU would have much to gain by supporting such reforms, but even if it does not, an international system designed by the victors of World War II must either change or sink into irrelevance.

These are radical moves. But the leader of the world’s most powerful country is implementing a radical agenda. The US system of checks and balances is the primary means of protecting democracy. The world can help.

The United Nations and a world out of balance

See the sad, stressed state of the world when Australia’s prime minister goes to a Quad summit in the US but doesn’t bother going to the United Nations.

Anthony Albanese went to the Quad last month seeking balance of power, while the UN confronted a world out of balance.

The UN leaders’ week got off to an ambitious start with the Summit of the Future on 22 and 23 September, which produced the Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and the Declaration on Future Generations. In the effort to reboot multilateralism, the UN gets an A for ambition. Unfortunately, that doesn’t necessarily translate to A for able, achievable or attainable.

The procedural blocks Russia kept throwing at the pact supported such scepticism. The absence that mattered at the UN gathering wasn’t that of Albanese, but of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

The leaders of China and Russia don’t have to attend because they have the power that trumps all else in the UN: they wield the veto held by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The veto can block any attempt to restructure the Security Council, despite calls for change.

The US supports new permanent seats on the Security Council for Germany, India and Japan, plus two African nations. The new members would not get the veto power. In his UN speech, France’s President Emmanuel Macron proposed major limitations on the veto:

Reform of the composition alone of the Security Council is not sufficient to make it more effective. I also wish for reform to change the operational methods to limit the right to a veto in case of mass crimes.

Translation: Russia should not be able to veto resolutions condemning its mass crimes in Ukraine. The day the veto power is reformed, however, we really will have a world body showing an ability to change the world.

The need for change was captured in a New York Times headline previewing the leaders’ week: ‘United Nations meets as growing chaos and violence spread across the world’. The UN’s own people pay part of the price of a world locked in a ‘purgatory of polarity’—220 of its staff have been killed in the Israel-Hamas War.

The ‘purgatory’ line is from UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in his annual statement to the General Assembly, decrying the ‘whirlwind’ of out-of-control geopolitical divisions in an ‘era of epic transformation’.

Guterres pointed to three major drivers of the unsustainable whirlwind:

—A world of impunity, where violations and abuses threaten the very foundation of international law and the UN Charter.

—A world of inequality, where injustices and grievances threaten to undermine countries or even push them over the edge.

—A world of uncertainty, where unmanaged global risks threaten our future in unknowable ways.

Following the secretary-general to the podium, Joe Biden delivered one of the last foreign policy speeches of his presidency by surveying the 52 years since he became a senator. His poetic version of what he sees today drew on lines from Yeats: ‘Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world’.

Seeing an inflection point in world history, Biden called on the UN to hold the centre:

There will always be forces that pull our countries apart and the world apart: aggression, extremism, chaos, and cynicism, a desire to retreat from the world and go it alone. Our task, our test is to make sure that the forces holding us together are stronger than those that are pulling us apart, that the principles of partnership that we came here each year to uphold can withstand the challenges, that the centre holds once again.

Biden’s quote was highlighted in a commentary by Richard Haass, the veteran diplomat and analyst who is one of my go-to guides for following US international policy.

Haass described the speech as being ‘reminiscent of the book that influenced me most on international relations, The Anarchical Society, by the Australian academic Hedley Bull. For Hedley, the state of the world reflects the relative balance between forces of order and disorder, or in his terminology, “society” and “anarchy”.’

Haass wrote that order is not the natural way of the world—entropy and disorder is what happens in systems unless they are influenced by benign actors:

Several trends have moved things towards disorder of late. There is the proliferation of power (above all military, but also economic) that ensures the United States and its partners will encounter increasingly strong opposition from China, Russia, and others when they seek to expand their influence and promote their interests. There is as well the emergence of global issues—above all climate change—for which it has become impossible to forge a common approach.  And there is another factor adding to disorder: the eroding commitment within the United States to play the sort of leading international role that has characterized our foreign policy approach for the past 75 years.

This sentiment was echoed in most leaders’ speeches throughout the week of high diplomacy. Beyond the words, the hard question facing the UN is what weight it can muster to deal with a world out of balance.

Women, peace and security: defending progress and responding to emerging challenges

Today, ASPI launched its third annual Strategic Insights paper on women, peace and security. As this publication has evolved, we have seen a shifting focus in the themes covered by contributors. The articles in this year’s series have a strong focus on Australia’s engagement in the Pacific and emerging security challenges such as cyber security, health security, climate instability and resource management.

Considering Australia’s endeavours to ‘step up’ in the Pacific and an increasingly uncertain and contested strategic environment, articles like these provide insightful guidance for policymakers.

Writing for this year’s series, NATO Secretary-General’s Special Representative for WPS Clare Hutchinson looked to Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass to find an explanation for why gender equality has never been achieved—‘It’s jam every other day: to-day isn’t any other day’. It’s never jam (or gender equality) today. Other articles have sought to unpack how to make sure we get jam today.

Alison Davidian put our region’s approach to managing natural resources and the effects these industries have on women in the spotlight. She suggests that mining companies can do better when negotiating access to land and that a more equitable distribution could be achieved by rooting policies and development programming in the WPS agenda.

The role of women in conflict was also examined further in this year’s series, with debate over how best to deal with the return of female combatants and supporters. Helen Stenger and Jacqui True unpacked this issue, saying there’s a need to recognise women’s agency in supporting terrorist groups but also to understand that women’s roles can’t simply be reduced to the choice between victim and perpetrator. As the Australian approach continues to evolve, they argue it requires a more nuanced understanding and response.

On the operational side, Australian Navy captain Stacey Porter looked at how and why it’s important to operationalise WPS in combat zones and offered real, pragmatic examples of gender integration boosting military effectiveness. Vanessa Newby similarly looked at how WPS is operationalised through the deployment of female peacekeepers, highlighting the vital role women can play in making operations more effective, but also noting that UN peacekeeping is the sum of its parts and that changing its culture requires a change in the military culture in contributing countries.

Elsewhere, we turned to more emerging security trends. Betty Barkha looked at the nexus of the youth, women and climate agendas, highlighting the increasingly important role of youth in implementing and fighting for these agendas. Jacqueline Westermann looked at the intersection between gender and climate insecurity in the Pacific, arguing that Australia needs to more meaningfully engage on this issue and support local initiatives.

The consideration of health security and cybersecurity was new this year. Sara E. Davies analysed how lessons from the implementation of the WPS agenda in local communities could be adapted to global health governance for more equitable changes to hierarchical health security structures. ASPI’s Lisa Sharland and Hannah Smith delved into the cyber sphere, arguing that not only do Australia’s security agencies and the private sector need to increase the number of women working in cybersecurity, but they also need to ensure they are integrating gender perspectives and more diverse thinking into the design and development of technology.

At the end of last year’s series, Lisa Sharland looked at four ways Australia needed to improve its approach to and implementation of the WPS agenda: an increased focus on the domestic dimension of the WPS agenda; sustainable funding and accountability; inclusion of WPS at the core of formulating foreign affairs and defence policy on international security; and greater recognition of the need for a diversity of voices on this issue. Australia will be releasing its second NAP on WPS in the coming months. In this context, these four suggestions continue to offer valuable guidance.

Building on these suggestions, in this year’s series, Miki Jacevic offered detailed advice on the creation and implementation of effective national action plans for WPS, emphasising the importance of inclusiveness in developing these plans. Sue Harris Rimmer looked specifically at the opportunities for Australia’s second NAP in the context of the Pacific pivot. She considered how to best align our actions in the region with our commitments to the agenda while pursuing our engagement there in the spirit of true partnership and respect.

Next year, the 20th anniversary of the first UN Security Council resolution on WPS will be a key milestone for taking stock of the achievements that have been made and what still needs to be done. Louise Allen traced key moments in the development of the agenda over the past two decades, but noted that the current lack of political will presents a significant obstacle to the WPS agenda. Elise Stephenson analysed the representation of women in international affairs in Australia’s public sector, noting that we have never had gender equality in this field, and that as we draw closer to this key anniversary we need to question whether the structures in the current system are truly conducive to achieving parity.

Importantly, the series this year reminded us that we can’t afford to be complacent. Negotiations at both the Commission on the Status of Women in March and at the Security Council in April reflect some of the challenges facing the agenda, with efforts to roll back previously agreed language and wavering support among some traditional allies. In the face of these normative challenges, there’s an ongoing need to share lessons and to analyse and understand how women contribute to peace and security and why diverse gender perspectives need to be factored into Australia’s approach to foreign policy, defence operations and national security.

Revolt of the plebs

Like the uprising of the ‘deplorables’ against globalisation that accounts for Donald Trump’s election and Brexit, are ‘peasant states’ now rebelling against the geopolitical heavyweights? The former dominate the 193-member UN General Assembly (UNGA), while the latter are the five permanent members (P5) of the 15-member UN Security Council (UNSC). Connecting the dots across three recent events allows us to discern what’s possibly one of the most significant structural shifts in world politics in decades.

In 2016, UNGA claimed a role in selecting the secretary-general (SG) for the first time. On all previous occasions it had simply rubber-stamped the UNSC choice. On 11 September 2015, UNGA adopted a resolution incorporating key reforms to the selection procedure. In 2016, UNGA arranged public sessions for all member states with potential SG candidates, believing that the UNSC couldn’t completely ignore the international community’s wishes. After six rounds of informal polls and the most transparent and inclusive selection process in UN history, on 5 October all UNSC members together announced their agreement on António Guterres as the new SG.

Denmark’s Mogens Lykketoft, the 2015–16 UNGA president, initiated most of the key innovations. He believes it was a game-changing process that will prove difficult to reverse. It allowed member states to learn about the candidates’ personalities and their priorities. The general sentiment in UN circles afterwards was that without the UNGA-driven innovations, Guterres would not today be the ninth SG.

The second example is the nuclear ban treaty adopted on 7 July by 122 states despite a boycott of the negotiating conference and fierce lobbying against it by the P5 nuclear powers. The latter warned that the ban treaty would damage the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which embeds their preferences in creating a world of nuclear haves and have-nots. The ban treaty was an assertion of normative leadership by the majority of states and thus also a declaration of independence by UNGA.

The treaty stigmatises and prohibits the bomb for all countries, even though only the bomb-possessing states can take practical measures to eliminate nuclear warheads and terminate their nuclear-weapon programs. Thus the NPT and the ban treaty embed the geopolitical and normative balance of power—49 years apart—of the nuclear haves who control the UNSC and the majority have-nots. The latter have the numbers in UNGA in today’s multipolar world to reframe the challenge, set the agenda and control the narrative.

In the most recent example, six candidates contested five vacancies on the International Court of Justice (ICJ), whose 15 judges serve renewable nine-year terms. The procedure requires a majority vote in both the UNSC (without veto) and UNGA. India had re-nominated sitting judge Dalveer Bhandari, who was expected to face off against Lebanon’s Nawaf Salam in the Asia group. But in the fifth round of voting on 9 November, to general surprise, candidates from Lebanon, France, Somalia and Brazil received majority support in both chambers and were duly elected. That left Bhandari in an unprecedented runoff with the UK nominee, Sir Christopher Greenwood, who too was seeking re-election.

Every P5 country has always had one judge on the ICJ. In self-interested solidarity with a ‘humiliated’ UK, they swung behind Greenwood. He had received majority support in the UNSC but had fallen short of the two-thirds threshold in UNGA. Part of his baggage is his legal justification for the 2003 Iraq war, which in 2017 wasn’t helpful.

Six rounds of a Bhandari–Greenwood contest confirmed their respective support: with 121 votes (and rising) in UNGA, Bhandari was close to the two-thirds threshold (128), against only 68 votes for Greenwood (and falling). But Greenwood was supported by nine of the 15 UNSC members (P5, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Ukraine).

Thus Greenwood’s support base was the geopolitical heavyweights and the global north in the UNSC, and Bhandari’s the rest who have numerical preponderance in UNGA. India capitalised on the resentment that 29 countries of the Europe group hold five judgeships but Asia and Africa, with 54 countries each, have only three judges each. A vote for Bhandari, India argued, would help redress the north–south imbalance.

On 20 November, the UK formally withdrew Greenwood’s candidacy. British Permanent Representative Matthew Rycroft explained that, as the deadlock was unlikely to be broken in further rounds of voting, it would be wrong ‘to continue to take up the valuable time’ of UNGA and the UNSC. Bhandari was then elected unanimously by the UNSC and by 183 of 193 votes in UNGA. Rycroft congratulated Bhandari and said the UK looked forward to cooperating closely with India at the UN and also globally: ‘If the UK could not win in this run-off, then we are pleased that it is a close friend like India that has done so instead.’

Where once the sun never set on the British empire, slowly but surely it may be setting on the era of P5 privileges. Good night the P5, good morning the world.

Nikki Haley and the Trump administration’s UN policy

The Trump administration’s evolving UN policy is a case study in how policymaking in the administration remains a work in progress amid competing worldviews, absent or unclear guidance, and an idiosyncratic president. There are deep ideological divisions within the White House about America’s role in the world. America’s withdrawal from the Paris climate accord and the Trans-Pacific Partnership demonstrates the prominence of the ‘America firsters’ in the White House—not least the president himself.

However, other administration figures such as Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, and also UN Ambassador Nikki Haley are notably closer to the Republican mainstream on the importance of American global engagement and leadership. And while America’s UN policy is still taking shape, it’s possible—though far from certain—that Ambassador Haley could slightly moderate Trump’s scepticism about the UN and broader multilateral arrangements.

As an initial Trump critic and foreign-policy novice, Haley was a surprising choice for UN ambassador. But the former South Carolina governor has developed a high public profile among Trump’s foreign-policy team for her political dexterity and effectiveness as a communicator. In stark contrast to the president, she has voiced strong opposition to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Crimea and Syria, and promoted the issues of human rights and humanitarian assistance. Haley has indicated a preference for strategic UN reform rather than the slash-and-burn budget cuts the White House has proposed, and acknowledged the UN’s value in addressing global challenges such as nuclear proliferation, refugee crises, and health pandemics. She has also demonstrated a readiness to negotiate with fellow UN diplomats behind closed doors if she can still achieve political wins.

As a result of the White House’s and State Department’s deprioritising of UN issues, Haley has had a fair degree of latitude, though both the White House and State have latterly sought to impose some oversight. On some UN matters, such as the response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea, there has been a fair amount of continuity with the Obama administration’s approach. However, Haley’s efforts at the UN defy easy classification, as on other issues—including her strong pro-Israel stance—her positions are squarely in line with Trump’s.

While Haley’s long-term policy influence is still unclear—she’s not at the epicentre of foreign-policy formation and has less access to Trump than Secretary of State Rex Tillerson—it is notable that Trump met with the UN secretary general and the 14 other UN Security Council diplomats just a few months into his administration. In what might be a sign of Haley’s impact, Trump declared a belief in the UN’s potential as a crisis-management body and suggested that budget cuts would be less pressing if broader security objectives were achieved. Haley is also using key levers of influence: she is engaging with Congress (which has a critical appropriations power) as she crafts her UN reform strategy, and with Ivanka Trump on UN issues such as combating global famine.

America’s UN policy could potentially evolve under Haley’s stewardship to focus on the parts of the UN that the administration finds useful to advance US interests. The administration has already recognised the UN Security Council’s convening power and diplomatic role during the North Korea crisis (while aware of its limitations). Haley used a Security Council emergency session to press China and Russia to increase pressure on Pyongyang and successfully negotiated with Security Council counterparts (including China and Russia) to pass a tough new sanctions resolution. Another crisis elsewhere—in Syria, for example—could force the administration to become even more aware of the UN’s value as a crisis-management framework.

All of this is a long way from the White House embracing the UN as an integral part of the post-1945 international order. But while Haley might not be able to fundamentally reshape the president’s preference for unilateralism, she might just help to work the UN into the administration’s modus operandi.

It is in Australia’s interests to nourish this more mainstream view of the UN and multilateralism within the administration, as the White House approach to global engagement could run counter to Australia’s active multilateral agenda. And once Australia joins the UN Human Rights Council in 2018, even sharper policy divergences could open up.

Canberra’s support for global institutions such as the UN, regional institutions such as the East Asia Summit, and multilateral trade initiatives such as the TPP is based on the assessment that multilateral initiatives are important vehicles for middle powers like Australia to advance their interests. There’s also wide acknowledgement that having a seat on the UN Security Council in 2013–14 significantly enhanced Australia’s diplomatic reputation as a pragmatic problem-solver—and Canberra has launched another Security Council bid for 2029–30.

Canberra should continue to promote to Washington the benefits of multilateral institutions as cost-effective instruments that can advance US and allied interests by complementing bilateral efforts to tackle critical global challenges. Washington should also be reminded that it is not in US or allied interests for it to cede influence to powers such as China or Russia by pulling back from the UN and other multilateral bodies.

The challenge for Canberra will be to manage possible policy divergences while maintaining a robust Australia–US alliance, which remains critical to Australia’s security.

Women, Peace and Security: a century-long battle for peace

Image courtesy of Flickr user Global Panorama.

This article is part of a series on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ that The Strategist is publishing in recognition of International Women’s Day 2017.

For over a century, the international women’s civil society movement has advocated for the conviction that lies at the heart of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325: that peace is only sustainable if women are fully included, and that peace is inextricably linked with equality and collaboration of men and women.

Ever since 1915, when 1,200 women met at The Hague to discuss proposals to end World War One, the Women, Peace and Security Agenda has been a symbol of solidarity, tenacity and partnership at the international, regional and national levels. Australia has taken a leadership role on the WPS Agenda in our region. The Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012–2018 (NAP) is the first outward-looking NAP in the Asia–Pacific, which focuses on work in conflict-affected countries. This NAP also shares a journey of collaboration and open discussions with civil society. As a result of these discussions, shadow report cards are written to inform the government about gaps in the implementation of the NAP.

There are “push-backs” from men and women. Most are due to the limited understanding of the context and essence of the Agenda or a perspective that these principles are only relevant to those in conflict zones.  A common assumption is that this Agenda is restricted to addressing “women’s issues” advocated by women. For organisations such as the military or the police, the ‘practical application’ of the Agenda isn’t always apparent at first glance and therefore it’s hard to conceptualise what this looks like on the ground.

Australia has made positive progress as a result of these push-backs. We have seen the ADF ‘test and adjust’ the Agenda in the operational planning process. We saw this in Exercise Talisman Sabre 15 where it was the first time that UNSCR 1325 was integrated into a major combined exercise, helping to build understanding of how the military can operationalise WPS. Operation Fiji Assist showed that the ADF has adopted a growing awareness and understanding of women’s unique experiences and contributions in humanitarian assistance and disaster response as part of whole-of government response. DFAT’s tremendous work in promulgating the Agenda in our region through series of excellent programs is also a good example.

The challenge for the unconverted is seeing these positive changes because they are subtle, and not immediate. It takes many years to benefit from the Agenda and this is true not only for beneficiaries in conflict or post-conflict areas, but for us in Australia. The difference is, in Australia we can discuss and debate the Agenda’s relevance and importance, and how it’s applied in a non-conflict context. This is a vital contribution to our region.

These opportunities and solutions can always be shared. This doesn’t mean dictating Australia’s solution to our regional partners, but is reciprocal learning of how the Agenda is interpreted and applied in different environments, cultures and norms.

The ACMC was fortunate to experience some of the positive outcomes of the Agenda first hand. We found that Australia’s approach to the constant consultative process with civil society was unique. Australia shared the journey of our NAP at the Asia-Pacific Regional Symposium on National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security in Bangkok last year, highlighting the important role of civil society in monitoring and sharing best practices and lessons learned. The Australian civil society report card was shared amongst colleagues who were present from the region, and there was a collective expression of praise for Australia.

Domestically, we saw the value of sharing knowledge through our own WPS workshops. We learned that members of different government agencies and civil society have much to share through discussions, application methodologies and thinking. As with all civilian-military-police engagements, many return to their agencies understanding the importance of the Agenda. We have also seen similar experiences with international engagements. The International Policy Division-run WPS workshop between TNI and ADF last year contributed to preparations for the Australia-Indonesia co-chairing of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus Experts Working Group Meeting on Peacekeeping Operations, which commences this year. This workshop indicated that Australia isn’t only willing to learn from regional nations, but is open to sharing ideas and solutions.

There is much work to be done to pursue implementation of the WPS Agenda in our region and we are in a special position to do this through engagement and collaboration with our partners. Not simply for the sake of pursuing the WPS Agenda, but in pursuit of durable solutions in our region through effective regional civilian-military-police engagement with the collaboration of civil society.

The WPS Agenda is a tool that may pave the way for that change.

Race for UNSC seats heats up (part 2)

Image courtesy of Flickr user United Nations Photo

As we saw in part one of this series, this year’s UN Security Council (UNSC) elections are earlier than usual (28 June), candidates have presented their platforms in historic public debates, and two of the five seats are uncontested. Of the three remaining seats, one will go to the Asia–Pacific Group and three candidates are vying for two Western European and Others Group (WEOG) seats.

Asia–Pacific Group: Kazakhstan vs. Thailand

The Asia–Pacific Group doesn’t have any established practices for filling its UNSC seats, and this year Kazakhstan and Thailand are competing for one seat to replace Malaysia. As the only candidate this year that has never served on the Council, Kazakhstan is arguing that it deserves a turn, especially given that Central Asia has never held a seat on the Council. Meanwhile, Thailand has reminded member states that it put forward its candidacy before Kazakhstan and has only served as a Council member once 30 years ago (1985–86). Bangkok, however, may not be able to overcome concerns about its rule by military junta since its 2014 coup. During the debate on 23 May, both Kazakhstan and Thailand discussed their commitment to addressing thematic issues such as climate change; conflict prevention; non-proliferation; and women, peace, and security.

Kazakhstan has a website dedicated to its bid and has listed four priorities based on its own experiences: water security, food security, energy security, and nuclear security. In particular, Astana has highlighted its experience with non-proliferation, touting its voluntary dismantlement of the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal after gaining independence in 1991, leadership in facilitating the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Central Asia, and role in hosting negotiations related to the Iran nuclear agreement.

Thailand, endorsed by ASEAN, has stated its commitment to improving the transparency and efficiency of the UNSC and to serving as a bridge-builder between developed and developing member states and between Asia and the rest of the world. Thai Ambassador Virachai Plasai’s performance was particularly impressive during the debate—he flipped back and forth between English and French and demonstrated energy, passion, and expertise on a wide range of subjects.

WEOG: Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden compete for two seats

WEOG elections often are highly competitive, and this year is no different. Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden are competing for two seats, leading the UK Ambassador to the UN to describe WEOG as the ‘Group of Death’ on Twitter. The victors will replace New Zealand and Spain. Italy has served on the Council six times, the Netherlands five times, and Sweden three times. During their debate on 24 May, the three ambassadors acknowledged the many similarities among their platforms, including a focus on conflict prevention; women, peace, and security; climate change; a holistic approach to sustainable development; and increased transparency in the Council.

Italy in its campaign pamphlet touts its role in peacekeeping and its position at the forefront of combatting terrorism and violent extremism. At the debate, Italian Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi differentiated his country by stressing that as the only Mediterranean candidate, it’s at the crossroads of east, west, north and south and is ideally placed to deal with the peace and security challenges of today.

The Netherlands claims on its website to be ‘your partner in peace, justice, and development’. Dutch Ambassador Karel van Oosterom emphasised that the Netherlands’ structure as a kingdom with territories in Europe and the Caribbean gives it a unique perspective, including an understanding of climate change and other issues affecting small islands. Van Oosterom also stressed his country’s goal to strengthen the international legal order and to improve cooperation between the UN and international courts based in The Hague.

Sweden notes on its website that it submitted its candidacy first, back in 2004, and hasn’t served on the Council in 20 years. While all the ambassadors gave solid performances in the debate, Swedish Ambassador Olof Skoog really shone by using stories and personal experiences to demonstrate his expertise and through his emphasis on listening and being accessible to the rest of the membership. He differentiated Sweden by arguing that it’s militarily nonaligned with a small country perspective and a voice of integrity. He also highlighted the utility of his recent experience chairing the Peacebuilding Commission.

Placing bets

As an outsider looking in, I’d hypothesise that Kazakhstan’s claim that Central Asia has never been represented coupled with concerns over Thailand’s domestic politics may tip the scales in Kazakhstan’s favour. In WEOG, if Ambassador Skoog’s performance in the debate was any indication of his lobbying skills, Sweden looks like a strong contender for one of the WEOG seats. The second seat feels like a toss-up, though the Netherlands may have an edge if it can get small island states on its side. As previously mentioned in part one, however, these races are often wildly unpredictable, and we won’t know the outcome for certain until 28 June.

Australia will have lessons to learn from this year’s elections, particularly as a member of the hotly contested WEOG. While its next bid for a seat in 2029–2030 is still a long way off, it will be important for Canberra to consider how the changes to the elections this year affect the campaign process and outcomes going forward as well as how countries leverage the extra preparation time before assuming their seats.

Race for UNSC seats heats up (part 1)

Image courtesy of Flickr user Zack Lee

Each year, five seats on the UN Security Council (UNSC) are up for grabs, and with them come an annual tradition of horse-trading, lobbying, and ‘swag bag’ gifting. This year is no different, though the elections have been moved up in the calendar and are somewhat more public than previously. Voting is scheduled for 28 June, and three of the five seats are contested:

  • Bolivia and Ethiopia are each running uncontested
  • Kazakhstan and Thailand are competing for one Asia–Pacific seat
  • Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden are competing for two seats allocated to the Western European and Others Group

To win a seat, a country must secure votes from two thirds of UN member states present and voting (129 if all 193 members vote). The winners will join the Council on 1 January 2017 for a two-year term. With the vote coming up next week, let’s take a look at the UN’s shifting election procedures and how the races are shaping up.

Unpredictability and evolving election procedures

Successful UNSC bids often require intense and long-term diplomatic lobbying, and the results of contested elections are notoriously unpredictable for a variety of reasons. First, voting is conducted by secret ballot, leaving ambassadors unaccountable to both their pledges and their capitals. Australia’s former UN ambassador Richard Butler famously attributed Canberra’s loss in 1996 to the ‘rotten lying bastards’ phenomenon. Second, UN delegates regularly base their votes on exchanges of support or personal ties rather than on political issues. Finally, current events or shifting geopolitical realities can at times influence the outcome, which was most likely the case in Turkey’s surprising defeat in 2014.

This year’s elections may be even more unpredictable than usual, given the new dynamics related to timing and transparency. Elections have traditionally taken place in October, but in an effort to provide newly elected members with more time to prepare for their new role, the General Assembly decided to move the elections up to June. The move will also serve to improve the UN’s ability to respond to unexpected circumstances, such as Saudi Arabia’s withdrawal after its election in 2013. In the past, UNSC candidates have capitalised on the ‘high-level week’ in September to lobby heads of state and government attending the UN’s General Debate, raising questions about whether the timing change has impacted campaign strategies or possible outcomes.

Additionally, candidates for the first time have participated in public debates hosted by the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA). In a similar vein to the push for a more transparent UN secretary-general race, last month the five UNSC candidates involved in contested elections presented their platforms and answered questions from member states and civil society groups. Some observers have hailed the debates as a step forward for transparency and accountability while others have suggested that the voting was locked up long before the debates and that the UN’s tentative efforts at transparency risk ‘giving the surface appearance of change while allowing business as usual to continue in the shadows’. It remains to be seen whether countries will incorporate the debate results into their decision-making for the vote or if they’ve already been swayed during the years of campaigning and horse-trading in advance.

Clean slate elections for Bolivia and Ethiopia

Bolivia and Ethiopia are running unopposed for seats on next year’s Council with the backing of their regional groups. Both countries have served on the UNSC twice in the past—Bolivia in 1964–1965 and 1978–1979 and Ethiopia in 1967–1968 and 1989–1990. Unlike their counterparts in the contested races, neither Bolivia nor Ethiopia has had to provide specifics on their goals for their tenure on the Council. Both, however, have also been invited by WFUNA to publicly present their candidacies, so we may still learn more.

UNSC seats for the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) have been uncontested since 2008 based on an informal understanding developed among its members following 47 rounds of inconclusive voting between Guatemala and Venezuela in the 2006 elections. Bolivia is emphasising the promotion of human rights, the protection of vulnerable people, and the need to address root causes of conflict. It’s interested in addressing environmental sustainability issues around peace and security and ensuring that the Council takes the priorities of all stakeholders into account. This seat is currently held by Venezuela.

African seats on the Council often are uncontested because the African Group maintains a tradition of rotation among its five subregions. Ethiopia is highlighting its long track record of peacekeeping, from its first contribution in 1950 to its standing as of April as the single largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. Addis Ababa’s general priorities for its term on the Council include enhancing peacekeeping effectiveness, promoting greater cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, advancing disarmament and arms control initiatives, and promoting the link between development and international peace and security. This seat is currently held by Angola.

With those races locked up, part 2 will address the contested races and handicap the field.

The UN Security Council takes up policing

AFP Officer Greg Hinds, Police Commissioner of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), addresses the Security Council meeting on the role of policing in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.Last week the UN Security Council adopted its first resolution focused on policing issues. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop presided over the meeting as part of Australia’s presidency of the Council for November and declared the meeting and adoption of resolution 2185 ‘landmark steps’. It wasn’t an overstatement.

Police peacekeepers perform critical roles in assisting host states to reform policing and law enforcement institutions. Those efforts are essential to establishing the rule of law in post-conflict societies and supporting the eventual transition and drawdown of the mission.

The number of police peacekeepers has grown significantly over the last two decades (previously outlined here). Of the 103,952 uniformed personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions as of October 2014 (PDF), nearly 12% (12,331) are police. The role of police peacekeepers has evolved and expanded as peacekeeping missions have become multidimensional, but political discussions in New York have taken some time to catch up.

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Let’s not succumb to nuclear defeatism

At U.N. Security Council, Warren Austin, U.S. delegate, holds Russian-made submachine gun dated 1950, captured by American troops in July 1950. He charges that Russia is delivering arms to North Koreans.North Korea’s most recent nuclear test has provoked some extraordinary reactions from media commentators in the past few weeks, some of which suggest a somewhat one-dimensional view of the nature of nuclear decision-making and the role of UN sanctions and a flawed understanding of the goals of US non-proliferation policy. Setting the record straight is an important task, because it has implications for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and for international security more generally.

Let’s start by setting out a couple of points that are hard to deny. First, the test—Pyongyang’s third and most successful—has reinforced the fact that international efforts to prevent North Korea developing and retaining a nuclear weapons capability have so far failed. This is widely recognised and is deeply troubling. Second, the test showed that many analysts and policymakers have underestimated the regime’s determination to maintain a nuclear deterrent (PDF). The contention that successive North Korean leaders have been pursuing nuclear weapons purely as a bargaining chip, to be relinquished when the price is right, looks weaker today than ever before. This is equally disturbing, as it reduces the leverage of international negotiators who still hope that North Korea can be peacefully disarmed.

For sure, it’s a bleak picture but in their commentary, some influential voices seem to be succumbing to nuclear defeatism. Hugh White, for example, recently asserted in The Age that ‘nothing short of a full scale invasion’ can persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. This might be overstated for the sake of eye-catching journalism, but contrary to his argument, nuclear decision-making isn’t a linear process and doesn’t follow a pre-determined path. Nuclear policy is affected by domestic and international events and by ideas. Read more