Tag Archive for: UCAS

These are the droids you’re looking for

Image courtesy of Flickr user Hideto KOBAYASHI

A recurring objection to the use of unmanned combat air systems (UCAS) for any role currently filled by fighter or attack aircraft is that robots can’t replace human fighter pilots. It’s probably a bit optimistic to say that humans will always be more capable pilots than computers, but robots don’t have to replace pilots to be useful. A fun way to stimulate thinking about unmanned systems is to look at how robots (aka droids) are used in the Star Wars movies.

Starting with the Original Trilogy (as one should), droids are mostly seen in non-combat roles. R2-D2 is essentially Luke’s Skywalker’s co-pilot, and his best real-world analogue is the growing computerisation of military systems. The original Star Wars movie was released in 1977, a year before the USAF introduced the F-16. The F-16’s successor, the F-35, doesn’t exactly have an R2-D2 sitting behind the pilot, but its sophisticated sensor systems and data fusion capabilities aren’t that different to having a robot co-pilot.

In The Empire Strikes Back, probe droids are used for ISR ops on a galactic scale, leading the Empire to the Rebels on Hoth. Most modern unmanned air systems are primarily ISR platforms, like the RQ-7 Shadow the Australian Army operates. ISR drones are cheap to operate and take boring tasks away from humans—the more automated the better.

The Prequel Trilogy really embraced the concept of weaponised robots. The secessionist Confederacy was able to prosecute a war against the Republic using a military comprised almost entirely of droids. In this war among the stars, as in real wars, numbers matter. Unless you’re a Jedi, your odds of survival in combat probably diminish as the number of enemies increases. The ethos of the Confederacy military was therefore to manufacture as many killer robots as possible.

Unmanned systems offer other advantages—like endurance. The Republic military relied mostly on cloned human soldiers and pilots, and the logistics of a human military are complicated. They need food and rest, and they need medical attention when injured (although being clones probably makes it easy to find organ donors). The decision to make the B-21 long-range strike bomber ‘optionally manned’ reflects the benefits of autonomy and remote piloting for long-endurance missions.

The clones and the Republic’s platforms were arguably more capable than their robotic counterparts, but the sheer number of enemies resulted in a years-long war. Similar dynamics can be seen in Western militaries since the start of the Cold War. There’s been a trend toward reduced numbers of more capable (and more expensive) platforms to ‘offset’ the adversary’s superior numbers. Just after the Korean War (PDF) the USAF inventory included more than 10,000 fighter and attack aircraft. Today, the total USAF inventory is roughly 5,000 operational aircraft, including about 1,400 fighter jets. Of course, the Empire continued that trend to its logical conclusion: the Death Star.

The RAAF currently has fewer than 100 Hornet and Super Hornet fighter jets, and it plans to replace the 71 Hornets with 72 F-35s, each of which is likely to cost about US$90m. A UCAS like the X-47B, nEUROn or Taranis could be less than half that cost, although no production-type currently exists to make any qualified estimates.

The USAF also has a deficit of 500 trained fighter pilots, which could  become a shortage of 700 pilots in the next year alone. UCAS can fill that gap, transforming squadrons into a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft. Imagine if the Rebels’ assault on the first Death Star has included dozens of droid fighters to keep the enemy busy—they mightn’t have lost 90% of their pilots.

The F-35 is already being discussed as a possible command and control platform for multiple UCAS, and this has the added benefit of shoring up numbers. That style of UCAS is borne of the ‘loyal wingman’ model, but the relationship is more likely to resemble that between a military working dog and its handler than that of a wingman. Rather than being a replacement for fighter pilots, UCAS can further expand the capabilities of each pilot.

The concept of large, production-type UCAS is still hampered by the existing paradigm of fewer, more expensive aircraft. An interesting new development is the USAF’s effort to develop a cheap target drone-style UCAS. A contract for a ‘low-cost attritable unmanned aerial system demonstration’ (LCASD) was recently granted to Kratos Defense, a target drone manufacturer. The demonstrator is expected to operate at high-subsonic speeds, with a 2,800km range and 225kg of payload capacity. Best of all, the targeted unit cost is just US$2–3m—now we’re in Confederate Space.

The possibilities of UCAS are far more diverse than a simple choice between human pilots and droid pilots. That’s a false dichotomy, and it does no service to the capabilities of our air forces. It’s time to stop building Death Stars and start making droids.

Unmanned air combat—how soon is too soon?

Image courtesy of US Navy

After the Abbott government approved the purchase of 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the RAAF, its fast jet capability was locked in for years to come. From around 2020, the F-35s will join 24 Super Hornets (delivered from 2010) and 12 Growler electronic attack aircraft (delivered from 2015). Project AIR 6000, under which the F-35s are being acquired, still has one squadron of aircraft to acquire in the future, but the RAAF will have one of the youngest fast jet fleets in the world from the early 2020s.

As a result, the RAAF should be well placed to take a relaxed approach to the final tranche of fast jets, allowing it to monitor developments in new technologies, including unmanned combat aircraft. So we were surprised to hear the RAAF’s Chief list only manned aircraft as future possibilities during Q&A at his recent ASPI address. His shortlist included more Super Hornets, more conventional take-off F-35As or (interestingly) the F-35B ‘jump jet’ version.

His reasoning was one of timing—since we have to make a decision by 2022 or 2023, it’s unlikely that unmanned systems would be good enough for air combat in time. We’re not sure, for two reasons. First, we don’t see why a decision is required that early. Second, we think there’s enough recent progress in unmanned systems to seriously challenge the notion that an all-manned fleet is the only viable solution from 2030.

Let’s start with the timing. The Super Hornet is nominally a 6,000 hour airframe, though the USN has plans to extend their flying lives. According to Defence’s budget papers, Australia’s Super Hornets will clock up 4,800 hours in 2015–16 and about 4,000 hours a year for the next three. They flew 4,369 hours in 2013–14. Even at the tempo of 4,800 hours, that’s 200 annual hours per airframe—which could be sustained out to 2040 if necessary. And Australia’s aircraft aren’t subjected to the rigors of catapult launches and arrested landings on an aircraft carrier deck, so airframe fatigue won’t be an issue.

More importantly, the Air Force should provide the government with advice about the most cost effective capabilities to meet future needs. A mix of manned and unmanned aircraft could be the way of the future, even at the top end of air capabilities. One of the most significant shortcomings of manned aircraft is their endurance, which is much less of a problem with unmanned aircraft. A recent study from the Center for a New American Security showed that a manned-unmanned mix could result in very substantial savings, partly due to that endurance advantage, and partly because of a reduced need for aircraft for training.

It’s often argued that keeping a human in the cockpit is needed for the flexibility in decision making required for air combat. But even that’s looking shaky. An artificial intelligence program has already beaten an experienced fighter pilot in a simulated dogfight. It’s becoming increasingly illogical to ignore the revolutionary potential of Uninhabited Combat Air Systems (UCAS). A manned fighter that hangs back, while commanding swarms of UCAS to operate forward for beyond visual range air-to-air, strike or ISR roles, is a concept for future air operations gaining currency in the US and Europe. Britain and France’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project is based around replacing both the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon with UCAS as early as 2030. And the Northrop Grumman X-47B (and here) is currently demonstrating perfect carrier landings and take offs, and airborne refuelling, at a level of precision beyond human capability.

No one is (yet) advocating replacing manned combat aircraft entirely. Legal and ethical dilemmas over lethal autonomous weapons mean that there’ll probably be a sixth, and maybe even a seventh generation fighter in the future. The RAAF will still have its 72 F-35As at the core of its force well after 2030. And it could acquire more manned aircraft as well as UCAVs if government voted the required resources.

UCAS could be upon us within the timeframe of AIR 6000 Phase 2C. The UCAS option would allow the ADF to fully benefit from dramatically reduced life cycle costs, and from the superior endurance and persistence of unmanned systems. A best of both worlds approach of a manned-unmanned mix would see Australia remain at the forefront of future air combat capabilities.

Australia should be participating in UCAS development, including by opening Australian testing facilities for existing and future UCAS, and exposing ADF personnel to their potential benefits. The RAAF has the luxury of time. It should use it to take a hard look at some promising new technologies.