Tag Archive for: Turkey

France is prominent in efforts to shape Syria’s future, again

As Syria and international partners negotiate the country’s future, France has sought to be a convening power. While France has a history of influence in the Middle East, it will have to balance competing Syrian and international interests.

After the fall of Damascus on 8 December 2024, Paris moved rapidly to personalise ties with factions in Syria that it wants to see accepted and engaged in Syria’s national reunification and reconstruction.

On 11 December, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot held talks outside Syria with the Syrian Negotiation Commission. The commission was set up in 2015 by Syrian opponents to Bashar al-Assad’s regime and was recognised by the United Nations as the official opposition and responsible for negotiating a political resolution in Syria, but it has since been largely sidelined.

On 17 December Paris followed up with a diplomatic mission to Damascus to meet the real figures of power in Syria: senior Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leaders, notably former al-Qaeda operative and jihadist Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, president of the interim government, who now goes by the name of Ahmed al-Sharaa. This French delegation was the first in 12 years to visit Syria.

Then on 13 February France convened an international conference to discuss Syria’s situation and outlook. Representatives of 20 countries, the European Union, the UN, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council attended.

Previously, France sought to shape the situation in Syria through its firm support through UN General Assembly Resolution A/71/248 for the 2016 creation of the International Impartial and Independent Mechanism. This mechanism supports justice by collecting evidence of war crimes and during the Syrian civil war was assisted by 28 Syrian civil-society organisations. It has been supported by funding from the UN and 32 countries.

France’s interest in the Levant dates back to its historical competition with Britain over access to the Red Sea through the Suez Canal and overland trade from Antakya on today’s Turkish coast to Baghdad, Basra and the Indian Ocean. France tussled with Britain over the status of Antakya until Turkey annexed the region in 1939, generating a flight of Christians and local Alawites into Syria.

France also considers protection of Christians as part of its residual influence in the region. This is especially true in Lebanon, but francophone Christianity extends into Syria and remains a social and economic current with subsurface political links.

So, Paris convening of the 13 February summit is no surprise, as there’s currently no other high-level international activity on Syria other than by the UN Security Council.

But with several countries and international groups pushing their interests in Syria, France faces an uphill battle to set the agenda.

EU states are concerned that the potential loss of Kurdish control of foreign-funded camps housing thousands of Islamic State (ISIS) adherents may allow detainees to walk free and spread their destructive ideology across Europe and the Middle East. There are 800 Swedish citizens in detention as ISIS supporters, 6000 ISIS family members from 51 countries in al-Hol camp and 10,000 ISIS combatants in 28 prisons in northeast Syria.

Such detainment centres are controlled by the US-backed Syrian Defence Force, so the EU can’t suppress ISIS without full cooperation, if not leadership, from Washington.

The EU has some ability to influence the Syrian interim government led by al-Sharaa. The EU can use its sanctions-lifting power and aid delivery as tools to shape Syria’s approach to governance and the facilitate the return of Syrian refugees. Given the opportunities available in Europe and continuing instability in Syria, few Syrian refugees will rush to return. So, the EU must not lift sanctions without a significant deal with the new government.

Turkey wants to limit Kurdish organisations and military formations. Skirmishes continue between Ankara and the largely Kurdish Syrian Defence Force. Ankara sees the force as a cover for the Kurdistan Workers Party, which the EU, Turkey and the US consider a terrorist organisation. Limiting Kurdish power would grant Turkey full control along and inside Syria’s northern border. Al-Sharaa has agreed with Turkey, his major backer, that Kurdish separatism has no place in the new HTS-run Syria.

The United States supports Kurdish forces, whom it pays to keep ISIS-linked families and others in camps and to control captured Syrian territory. US bases such as al-Tanf in eastern Syria have acted as tripwires against Iranian efforts to supply weapons to Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. But US President Donald Trump may withdraw US troops. This would reduce US influence, strengthening Turkey’s position.

Religion plays a deep and unavoidable role in Syria. The EU has partially linked sanctions relief to al-Sharaa’s promise of freedom of worship for minority religions. The EU has also promoted the importance of women’s rights, freedom of expression and due legal process. Delayed lifting of sanctions and aid delivery threaten domestic upset, so HTS is under pressure to meet Western expectations.

Lifting sanctions too quickly may disincentivise HTS from maintaining engagement with international partners and instead allow it to suppress religious expression, squash political debate, shut down human rights organisations and reduce regime transparency.

However, Washington’s early easing of sanctions against certain HTS leaders made diplomatic talks possible.

It’s clear that few Syrian representatives reflect the kaleidoscope of interests in the country. The Turkish-backed National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, a cluster of players who aimed to rid Syria of Assad, is no longer visible; nor are its members. Turkey may back the new HTS regime at the cost of dialogue and the risk of reigniting civil war.

The fight for Syria

The collapse of Syria’s al-Assad dynasty, which had ruled for more than a half-century, was always going to represent a daunting challenge for the country and its neighbours. But the escalating conflict over Syria’s future between Turkey and Israel compounds the risks considerably.

In Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s view, Syria could not have emerged from its ‘dark era’ had he not lent support to the militias that brought down Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Now, Erdogan sees himself as the patron of Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), and he is eager to shape the new ‘bright’ Syria in Turkey’s image—and promote Turkey’s interests along the way.

For Erdogan, one of those interests is to repatriate the three million Syrian refugees currently in Turkey. Another key priority is preventing Kurdish nationalism from spilling over in Turkey, even if that means taking military action against Kurdish forces in Syria. Moreover, Erdogan is reportedly negotiating a defence pact with Sharaa, which would allow Turkey to establish air bases in Syria and provide training to Syria’s military. As Iranian and most Russian military forces are pulling out, Turkey’s are moving in.

But Israel believes that it, too, deserves credit for Assad’s fall, which probably would not have happened if Israeli military action had not weakened Iran—including by degrading its air-defense capabilities—and devastated its Lebanon-based proxy, Hezbollah. So, why should Turkey be permitted to use the regime change to become the Levant’s new hegemon and attack Israel’s and the United States’ traditional Kurdish allies in northern Syria?

Already, Israeli forces have seized territory in Syria’s south, supposedly to secure the area temporarily. Meanwhile, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar has pledged to ‘reach out and strengthen our ties’ with the Kurds. And the Committee for the Evaluation of the Defense Establishment Budget and the Balance of Power has recommended that Israel prepare for a possible military confrontation with Turkey in the Kurdish regions of Syria’s north, where Turkey has long supported local armed groups.

In the wake of Assad’s ouster, Israel clearly sees Turkey’s rising regional clout as a threat. But whether Israel likes it or not, Turkey is better positioned to dominate in Syria. And if it succeeds, the implications will reverberate well beyond both countries’ borders.

Napoleon said that a state’s policy ‘lies in its geography’. For Erdogan, this means historical geography: his foreign policy has Turkey straddling the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans, which were once largely under Ottoman rule. After the June 2011 parliamentary election, Erdogan boasted, ‘Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul. Beirut won as much as Izmir. Damascus won as much as Ankara.’

Now, Erdogan has a chance to realise his long-standing dream of using Turkey’s model of Islamic democracy as a vehicle for diplomatic outreach across the region and positioning the country as a key intermediary between East and West. But he is likely to take a calibrated approach in pursuing his neo-Ottoman ambitions, not least because they have historically drawn bitter opposition from other Sunni powers in the region, especially Egypt.

For Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, containing the Muslim Brotherhood—which led the government that Sisi ousted in 2013—is a matter of existential importance. It was differences over the Muslim Brotherhood that drove him to collaborate with Cyprus, Greece and Israel in 2019 to exclude Turkey from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum. So, Sisi was hardly pleased to witness Assad’s fall, fearing that it might open the door for the Muslim Brotherhood’s resurgence in Egypt.

Rather than jeopardise the nascent thaw in bilateral relations, Erdogan met with Sisi in December to underscore his commitment to supporting Syria’s reconstruction and reconciliation, while allowing Syrians to decide their own future. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was even more explicit, noting that the new Syria should be pluralistic, with all ethnic and religious groups—including Alawites, Christians, and Kurdish minorities—represented.

This is what Sharaa is apparently trying to build. Seeking to position himself as a moderate leader of a multiethnic country, he has severed all ties with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and declared that all rebel groups that fought against Assad would be dissolved and integrated into state institutions. This vision cannot work without the Kurds. Even if it could, Sharaa, who has been working hard to amplify his international legitimacy, would not want to target US allies who played a decisive role in the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Overcoming the legacy of centuries-long colonial rule, decades of brutal dictatorship, a civil war and the risk of state failure would be a daunting challenge for Syria’s new rulers even under ideal conditions. But the geopolitical ambitions of Syria’s neighbours risk making a difficult task impossible. Adding to the list of regional powers with such ambitions, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, representing two irreconcilable political visions, also aspire to influence the outcome.

In any case, Syria’s stability is in Turkey’s best interest. The Syrian state’s collapse would mean a new influx of refugees and the emergence of a Kurdish proto-state along the Turkish border, with the likely backing of Israel and the US. Turkey could not tolerate a Kurd-controlled statelet in northern Syria, but it could live with a semi-autonomous Kurdish region fully integrated into a unified Syrian state.

A stable Syria is also in Israel’s best interest. In lieu of a Western-style democracy—which is not in the offing anywhere in the Arab world—an Islamist regime whose leader has announced the disbanding of 18 armed militias and called for peace with Israel is about the best outcome Israel could hope for. Instead of encroaching on Syrian territory and cultivating potentially self-fulfilling prophecies about war with Turkey, it should be doing everything it can to support this outcome.

The way forward in Syria

The collapse of Syria’s Assad regime—with President Bashar al-Assad not even informing his closest associates before fleeing to Moscow—has left regional and international players scrambling to stabilise the country.

Of course, there have been numerous attempts to restore stability to Syria ever since the start of its civil war in 2011, after Assad brutally repressed peaceful Arab Spring demonstrations. Despite the many failures, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, adopted unanimously in December 2015, remains the cornerstone of international diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syrian conflict. It provides a clear roadmap for a Syrian-led political transition under a new constitution, with UN-supervised elections and measures to ensure inclusive governance.

True, there has been little progress on any of these fronts. The Constitutional Committee, the body charged with implementing Resolution 2254, exemplifies both the potential and the limitations of the UN process. Comprising representatives of the Assad regime, the opposition, and civil society, it was supposed to draft a new constitution that could serve as the foundation for a political settlement. But the committee has achieved little of substance after numerous rounds of meetings in Geneva, owing to obstruction by the regime’s delegation.

The regime faced no consequences for derailing the process, because the UN Security Council itself was deeply divided. Russia’s status as a permanent, veto-wielding member allowed it to shield Assad from more forceful international action, and its 2015 military intervention saved his regime and fundamentally altered the balance of power on the ground. While UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen tried to break the impasse by enticing the regime with the prospect of sanctions relief, such proposals had no effect.

Now, suddenly, everything is different. While the first foreign dignitary to travel to Damascus after the fall of the regime was Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin, the second (from what we know) was Pedersen. Moreover, many governments say they are in contact with the lead rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and its interim government. The fact that the United States, the United Kingdom, and others still officially designate HTS as a terrorist organisation has not been an issue.

Although much is up in the air, the 2015 UN roadmap remains the best option for ensuring inclusive governance, which is a precondition for stability in Syria. The question, however, is whether all domestic and regional players will go along with the process.

Israel has not hesitated to advance its forces beyond the Golan Heights, throwing out an arrangement that had prevailed since the 1973 Yom Kippur War (when even the minimal gains that it made in the area inflamed passions across the Arab world). It has also been carrying out preemptive air strikes against what is left of Syria’s military hardware and weapons facilities.

For Turkey, the biggest question is whether it can accept a Syrian governance framework that includes the Kurds. The Turkish government’s priority is to marginalise any elements associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it regards as a terrorist group (as do the US and the European Union). Ideally, a new settlement in Syria could even help to defuse the Kurdish issue in Turkey itself.

One obvious risk is that remnants of the Islamic State (ISIS) will exploit the new uncertainty to strengthen their own position. But both HTS and various Kurdish groups have fought ISIS for years, and they will now be even more determined to resist it. A key strength of the UN process is the absence of favourable alternatives; were it to collapse, the outcome would be catastrophic for all concerned. The victorious rebels’ focus on building and maintaining state institutions shows that they are well aware of the dangers.

To succeed, the process must be carried out by Syrians for Syrians, but with external assistance. The humanitarian situation is dreadful and requires immediate attention. The EU and the US should make it clear to all relevant actors that they are ready to lift the economic sanctions on Syria in support of a political transition.

The stakes are especially high for Europe, whose politics are still haunted by the 2015 refugee crisis. Repeating that episode would be a nightmare. And Turkey, of course, has a vital interest in stability on its border. It has long hosted millions of Syrian refugees whom it would love to return home, and many are now expressing a readiness to go.

The process that lies ahead will be long and complicated, though. Syrian governance has never been a simple affair. If any of the key players starts pursuing their own agenda unilaterally, conditions could deteriorate rapidly. Nonetheless, the UN process represents the best way forward, giving the organisation a chance to show the world that it remains indispensable for situations such as these.

Re-election doesn’t mean smooth road ahead for Erdogan

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the controversial but democratically elected Turkish president, will continue at the helm of his country for the next five years. Last weekend’s electoral victory puts him in a stronger position than ever in shaping Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy settings as he deems desirable. Yet he is unlikely to have a free ride, given his polarising personality and Turkey’s fragile economic situation and complex foreign relations.

No matter what, Erdogan is the man of the hour. He has risen from a humble background, with strong Islamic convictions, to lead Turkey since 2003. Incrementally, he shepherded his country away from its secularist foundation, laid down by its all-powerful founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a century ago, to what is now a mixture of modern Islamist political culture and some secularist social freedoms within an increasingly authoritarian democratic framework. In the process, he has built an expanding popular power base, elevating him from a political streetfighter and elected reformist mayor of Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city and bridge between East and West, in the 1990s to become the leader of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AK) that won the 2002 general election.

It was the first time that a religiously rooted party ended the secularist dominance of Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party in Turkish politics. Erdogan himself was convicted and imprisoned for inciting religious hatred in 1998. He was released the following year, but was banned from politics when AK won in 2002. However, his colleague Abdullah Gul kept the seat warm for him until AK used its parliamentary majority to overturn his conviction and enabled him to be elected in a by-election and assume AK’s leadership. After more than a decade as prime minister, he changed the parliamentary system of governance to a presidential one, scoring three consecutive election wins since then.

Erdogan has tirelessly sought to position himself as a strong, modern Turkish Islamist nationalist leader in the Muslim world and powerbroker between East and West. While maintaining Turkey’s membership of NATO, he has cosied up to Vladimir Putin’s Russia and nurtured good relations with Xi Jinping’s China. He has been critical of the US and some of its European allies for berating his authoritarian tendencies, which has gained him the title of ‘Sultan’ in the tradition of the Ottoman emperors. At the same time, he has derived economic, technological and strategic advantages from keeping a fairly firm foothold in the Western camp.

He has admonished the US and European allies for not strongly supporting his harsh crackdown on the opposition, especially in the wake of the aborted coup against him in 2016 and his handling of the Syrian refugee crisis. Meanwhile, he has used Turkey’s possession of the second largest military in NATO and the Russia card to deflect any major US and European allied retaliation. Similarly, while backing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, he has maintained good relations with Putin and sought to act as a peacemaker, which hasn’t paid dividends so far and positioned Turkey to benefit from Western sanctions imposed on Russia.

Erdogan has emerged as not only a powerful national actor, but also an icon of modern political Islamism and an influential player on the world stage.

However, the road from here is not necessarily going to be all that easy for him. In the recent election, he beat his main secularist rival, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who stood for the restoration of Turkey’s democracy, by a small margin—52% to 48%. The Turkish electorate is extremely polarised, with nearly half of the population wanting to see the end of Erdogan’s rule. The opposition has been driven by the deteriorating economic situation. Turkey is suffering from hyperinflation, high unemployment and the virtual collapse of its currency, and what is regarded as an erosion of its democracy.

Erdogan’s opponents are also troubled by the degree of Islamism he has injected into Turkish politics and the complications he has generated in relations with Turkey’s traditional Western allies by leaning towards autocratic regimes in Russia, the Muslim Middle East and beyond.

Erdogan is now certainly positioned to keep steering Turkey in the direction that he has been going. But he also faces such serious challenges that he may not be able to overcome in the way that he has done in the past. Turkey is now in urgent need of national unity, economic and financial repair, and a foreign policy path that puts more emphasis on domestic stability and less on foreign policy adventures that could negatively affect its internal settings. Erdogan is a very seasoned politician and perfectly capable of doing that—if he wishes.

Turkey’s democratic future hangs in the balance

This year’s presidential and parliamentary elections on 14 May mark one of the most critical moments for Turkey in the past 100 years. Turkey is currently dealing with the aftermath of the devastating February earthquakes while simultaneously experiencing a massive economic crisis due to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s bizarre economic theories. It is a moment for the democratic soul of the country, but the mood is hopeful for political change. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Erdogan have been in power for over 20 years. But for the first time in many decades, it appears that Erdogan, the AKP and their political allies under the People’s Alliance (Cumhur Ittifaki) might lose the election.

The opposition parties have united in the Nation Alliance (Millet Ittifaki). Despite their ideological differences, the opposition is in with a chance for the first time in over two decades according to polls. More importantly, the opposition’s presidential candidate from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kemal Kilicdaroglu, looks to have a lead over Erdogan.

In Turkey’s competitive authoritarian regime, questions remain about whether this will be a free and fair election. Erdogan will likely try to win by ‘hook’ or ‘crook’. To secure power he has jailed opposition members like Kurdish-dominated Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) leader Selahattin Demirtas and sentenced Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), to two years in prison, banning them both from politics. The AKP’s control of the media and vast resources of the Turkish state puts them at an obvious advantage. AKP control over the judiciary and the Supreme Election Council (YSK) means that institutionally the AKP can tip the scales in its favour as it did in 2017 when the YSK made the last-minute decision to include unstamped ballots as valid.

While the AKP may have institutional dominance and control over most of the state’s essential functions, it would be unwise to say this is a sure win for the AKP and Erdogan. It may benefit the opposition that Erdogan’s campaign has lacked his usual vigour due to his age, health issues and the inevitable disconnect from voters, especially when one occupies the throne for too long. Erdogan has dialled up cultural, ethnic and sectarian polarisation as the AKP’s attempts to dampen the effects of inflation have failed. With the economic crisis, rallying around the flag operations and polarising rhetoric may not bring the votes the AKP desires. Flashy new projects such as the first Turkish-developed automobile are being eclipsed by the opposition’s focus on the problems of everyday people like the price of onions. Erdogan is old and tired, and seems to be out of good ideas, particularly on how to fix the mess that his rise to power has created. Despite all the pressure put upon it, the opposition’s campaign has maintained a positive message.

The Turkish public takes voting very seriously, and despite minor irregularities, the turnout on average elections sits around 80%. Voting has always been a way for the Turkish public to voice grievances against centralised authority during the AKP rule and throughout Turkish history. During the 2019 Istanbul elections, Erdogan used the YSK to overturn the opposition win and re-run the poll. Turks then voted in droves to re-elect Imamoglu by a staggering amount, denying the AKP the city of Istanbul and the vast coffers that running this municipality offered.

Now it appears that the bureaucracy the AKP government has spent the last two decades undermining and filling with loyalists is starting to hedge its bets. The YSK has rejected a AKP motion to remove the Nation Alliance’s name from the ballot. Turkey’s highest court, the Constitutional Court, reversed its decision to block state funding to the HDP for its electoral campaign despite AKP protests. Signs like this indicate that bureaucrats may be considering a possible AKP loss and where their futures may lie in a post-Erdogan Turkey. This could be because the vast economic strain on the country is starting to affect those who’ve benefited from the system for so long.

Unsurprisingly, the new executive presidential system that concentrated power in Erdogan’s office has also been highly inefficient. The AKP government’s response to the earthquake in February is a prime example. This all means that the institutions of state the AKP has aimed to control for so long may not be as tied to the regime as the AKP thinks. Patrimonialism tends to disintegrate when the money is no longer there.  The opposition has focused on the economic cost of a continued Erdogan government and stated that the country would return to a parliamentary system if it’s elected.

Questions remain about the security services. The AKP’s purging of the Turkish Armed Forces may have created a more pro-AKP military, but it’s still not guaranteed that the military would back Erdogan if he lost the election. The AKP has emboldened other security organs instead such as the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) and Gendarmerie and created alternative pathways for its military power through non-state actors and private military organisations like SADAT Inc. How these other institutions will respond if Erdogan loses is uncertain.

Despite these factors, it’s still difficult to assess whether there’ll be a power transfer if the opposition wins. Besides the political cost for Erdogan, there’s a real chance that he and his family will end up in prison if he loses power. That makes it unlikely that he’ll go without a fight. Moreover, the AKP and its networks have entrenched themselves so deeply within the state’s economic, social and political institutions that the opposition will have a difficult challenge ahead of them. There’s been little discussion of what necessary state re-building will be needed if the AKP loses. In its current presidential form, the Turkish state cannot deal with the economic and political challenges that await it in the coming years. The Kurdish issue will need a resolution if a new government wins.

Regardless of the election’s outcome, there’ll not be much change in foreign policy. Although the opposition wishes to diffuse tensions in existing alliances, Turkey’s push for an independent foreign policy is part of a longer historical tradition across the political spectrum. While there may be some reorientation back towards NATO and the EU, given the shifting multipolar dynamics of the region and global system, it’s likely that Turkey’s new managers would try to hedge between its relationships with the US and NATO and its developed relationships with the Middle East, China and Russia.

It is apparent after 20 years that the AKP can no longer run Turkey effectively. The country is in crisis and a win for Erdogan will only prolong these issues. An AKP win is not inevitable and we shouldn’t discount the forces and headwinds the AKP faces, but it is also not wise to count out Erdogan and the AKP. Erdogan’s ministers are already setting up a narrative that an unfavourable election result would be part of a planned coup to topple the Erdogan regime.

Turkey has always been an imperfect democracy and, like most countries, has contended with authoritarianism throughout its history. The election will be a critical moment for Turkey. If Erdogan wins, there’ll be a shift to a more authoritarian state that will make the lives of Turkish citizens more miserable.

Geopolitically, Turkey will remain a destabilising force in the Middle East and the wider region. This would also lead to further erosion of the Eastern flank of NATO as Erdogan deepens his relationship with Putin’s Russia. But they say it’s always darkest before dawn and the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic may see a shift to a more revisionist and authoritarian nation—or hopefully, a ‘Third Republic’ that is more democratic, open and inclusive will emerge.

What’s behind Turkey’s new charm offensive in the Middle East?

Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has embarked on what he calls ‘a new era in foreign policy’. He has lately made strenuous efforts to mend relations with a few Middle Eastern countries with which he has been at odds for some years. One of those states is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. What has motivated him in this direction?

Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia have been strained for most of Erdogan’s nearly two decades in power. Although the two countries share a common allegiance to the Sunni sect of Islam and Western-oriented foreign policy postures, their histories, national identities and geopolitical dispositions have led them to be wary of each other more often than not.

Erdogan’s early attempts, especially during his prime ministership (2003–2014), to expand Turkey’s role in the Middle East caused concern for many of its regional neighbours. Saudi Arabia and its fellow Arab states, including those in the Gulf Cooperation Council, except for Qatar, perceived the Turkish leader’s move as part of a foreign policy offensive to revive the Ottoman empire, which once ruled most of the Arab domain, and to capture the leadership of Sunni Islam, which Riyadh has always sought to champion.

The crunch came in a downward spiralling of relations after the brutal killing by Saudi agents of dissident and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. The event shocked the world, and Erdogan accused the ‘highest levels’ of the Saudi government of ordering the gruesome assassination. Erdogan pointed his finger at the controversial Saudi crown prince and de facto ruler, Mohammad bin Salman. Riyadh’s denial and assertion that it was carried out by ‘rogue’ Saudi elements didn’t ring true with Ankara or, for that matter, many Western sources, including US intelligence findings that President Joe Biden released in early 2021.

However, after months of turning to a rapprochement, involving Ankara dropping its request for the trial of Khashoggi’s killers in Turkey, Erdogan made a two-day official visit to the kingdom in late April, where he held talks with not only King Salman bin Abdulaziz, but also his son, Mohammad bin Salman. Upon his return, in an appraisal of his visit, Erdogan said, ‘We agreed with Saudi Arabia to reactivate a great economic potential through organisations that will bring our investors together.’ Although no specific projects were announced, the Turkish leader declared his support for the kingdom’s bid to host Expo 2030 in Riyadh and for the acceleration of economic, trade and investment relations as important for regional cooperation, peace and security.

Erdogan’s charm offensive to improve relations with Riyadh comes in the wake of similar efforts with the United Arab Emirates and Israel. He has also said that he would like to see a turn in relations with Cairo. Ankara–Cairo ties were soured over Erdogan’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood’s government that electorally came to power following the Egyptian pro-democracy uprisings but was deposed by general-cum-president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2013. They have also been affected by the two sides backing rival groups in the long-running power struggle in Libya.

Three factors seem to be at work in motivating Erdogan. The first is that Turkey is faced with a dire economic situation, marked by soaring inflation, declining currency value and investment, and growing unemployment. Any inflow of cash and investment from the wealthy, oil-rich Saudi Arabia and some of its equally rich Arab partners could help alleviate some of Turkey’s economic troubles.

The second is that Erdogan faces an election next year amid increased opposition to his rule at home. Although he still enjoys considerable support from his ruling Justice and Development Party, he no longer maintains the popularity that he once enjoyed before his very heavy-handed crackdown on the opposition in the wake of the failed 2016 coup against him.

The third factor is the war in Ukraine. Erdogan’s friendship of the last many years with Russian leader Vladimir Putin has come under question since the invasion, and he also has maintained close ties with Kyiv.

Erdogan has good reason for turning to the Middle East to improve strained ties, as he has also mellowed his criticism of Turkey’s US-led NATO allies. Whether this is likely to help his chances for re-election remains to be seen. But he should never be underestimated.

Erdogan faces mounting discontent amid economic turmoil in Turkey

By a range of measures, democracy is under pressure around the globe. Not only is democracy failing to make inroads in states long dominated by authoritarian regimes, but it is in retreat in some places where it was thought to be established or consolidating.

Turkey offers a salient example of the latter. In the early 2000s, Turkish politics appeared to come of age. Under the direction of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won power in 2002, Turkey entered a period of political and economic reform.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, appointed prime minister in 2003, moulded a new political environment, pushing for EU membership, negotiating with Kurdish militants and overseeing stellar economic growth. The AKP and Erdogan were lauded as demonstrating a model combining Islamic observance with democratic legitimacy and reformist intent that—theoretically—could be replicated across the Middle East.

Appraisals of Erdogan are less effusive these days. The figurehead of the AKP, in power for almost 20 years, he has come to dominate politics in Turkey unlike any personality other than founding president Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

Since a constitutional referendum in 2017, Erdogan has been ensconced as president in a system of his own design. With the role of prime minister abolished, he enjoys virtually untrammelled power. This presidency alla Turca is often referred to as a tek adam (one-man) system. Yet, as Erdogan has cemented himself in the presidential palace, Turks have experienced an alarming decline in political freedoms.

From this perspective, Turkey displays the trappings of ‘new authoritarianism’: a political system where the ruling party, and its leader, pay lip service to democracy but hollow out the very institutions that allow them to claim the mantle of democracy.

‘New authoritarians’ hold regular elections and permit opponents to operate but they skew the political arena to their own advantage. The media, the judiciary and the bureaucracy are co-opted into the incumbent’s corner. Claiming popular legitimacy won through purportedly free elections, such regimes stifle civil society and ensure oppositions have little room to move. This model is associated with Vladmir Putin’s Russia, but it has proliferated elsewhere in recent years.

Erdogan may have spent years accumulating power, but not everything is going his way these days. Turkey is enduring an economic crisis. Inflation is rising and the Turkish lira is crashing. This year alone, the lira has lost half of its value against the US dollar; last week it reached a new low of 15.5 to the dollar. Turks are seeing the value of their savings plummet; for many, previously attainable goods are unreachable.

Crucially, the crisis is largely of Erdogan’s making. He has repeatedly leaned on the central bank to lower interest rates in order to combat persistent inflation. This approach defies economic orthodoxy, which holds that raising interest rates slows inflation. As all-powerful president, Erdogan can impose his will on the central bank, but that doesn’t mean his ‘Erdoganonomics’ have the impact on markets that he envisions. The result is bread lines in Istanbul.

Erdogan argues a declining lira will attract foreign investment, while also claiming this is part of a long-term economic plan. His political ally, Nationalist Action Party leader Devlet Bahceli, using another ploy common to new authoritarians, blames external forces—so-called ‘foreign currency sabotage’—for the crisis.

Most Turks are not falling for it. A November poll saw Erdogan’s approval rating fall to an all-time low of 39%. Another poll shows only 34% of Turks support his executive presidential model. Meanwhile, some have taken to the streets in Istanbul demanding that the government resign.

This is uncharted territory for Erdogan, who has long enjoyed popular approval or at least been able to manipulate the landscape to his advantage. One Turkish academic notes that the AKP came to power during the political crises of the early 2000s and suggests that the current economic crisis may lead to its demise. Sensing political opportunity, Turkey’s famously fractious opposition is coming together to present a united front, and Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the largest opposition party, is calling for elections, scheduled for 2023, to be brought forward.

These developments echo those elsewhere, such as recent elections in the Czech Republic, where opposition figures devised new strategies to unseat the illiberal-populist regime of Andrej Babis. Still, it’s too early to write off Erdogan and the AKP. Erdogan is nothing if not a survivor. He has proven willing to throw his weight around when things don’t go his way. When the AKP candidate narrowly lost the 2019 Istanbul municipal election, he pressured the electoral council to annul the result and call a follow-up election. But in an ominous development for the AKP, the opposition candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu, convincingly won the re-run.

An opposition victory in Turkey’s next general election appears increasingly likely. If that happens, the consequences are difficult to predict. At the very least it will test the resilience of Turkey’s democratic institutions and traditions. It may also provide another case study on how to circumvent the ‘new authoritarianism’.

Biden’s recognition of Armenian genocide and the slippery slope of US–Turkey relations

On 24 April, Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day, which commemorates the massacre of Armenians during the last years of the Ottoman Empire, President Joe Biden announced that the US now recognises the massacre as genocide. The announcement followed the passage of a resolution by the US Congress in December 2019 recognising Armenian genocide.

Commentators have attributed the decision to Biden’s intention to signal clearly his administration’s commitment to making protection of human rights an important part of his foreign policy. However, retroactively declaring that a massacre that took place more than a century ago was genocide while not using the same term to describe the ongoing massacre of the Rohingyas in Myanmar or the mass killings that took place a few decades ago—for example, in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) by the Pakistani military in 1971 or of the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 by the Hutu-dominated government—pours doubt on this explanation.

In the first case, it was the Nixon administration’s close relationship with Islamabad, which had facilitated Washington’s contact with Beijing, that led to the US turning a blind eye towards the atrocities committed by the military on hapless Bengali citizens. In the second, the Clinton administration made a deliberate decision not to use the term genocide because that could have increased domestic and international pressure on it to intervene.

Just as in those case, there were other factors that influenced Biden’s decision and it was not merely about correcting a historic wrong and promoting human rights. Primary among these was the strong Armenian lobby, especially in the crucial Democratic state of California, which had been agitating for such an announcement for a long time. There was and is no Bengali, Hutu or Rohingya lobby in the US comparable to the Armenian one, which helps to explain Washington’s relative indifference towards the plight of these people.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, had asserted that during his years in Washington he found the three most effective lobbyers in the US were the Israeli-Americans, Cuban-Americans and Armenian-Americans. The strength of the Armenian lobby is derived from the concentration of the Armenian-American population in a few congressional districts, such as California’s 28th district, which is represented by the powerful Democratic member Adam Schiff, a leading champion of Armenian causes. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Armenian speakers live in California and about two-thirds of them live in Los Angeles County explains in great part House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s enthusiastic advocacy of the Armenian genocide argument.

But, foreign policy decisions based primarily on domestic political considerations can have major negative consequences. The full impact of Biden’s decision on US–Turkey relations is still to be assessed. However, given the deterioration of the relationship in the past few years over several unrelated issues, the Biden administration must have calculated that this decision wouldn’t have much additional negative impact on Washington’s relations with Ankara. Now that the US is drawing down its military commitments to hotspots in the Middle East, Turkey is seen as a dispensable ally. This is why Biden didn’t call his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for three months after taking office while he made calls to other heads of state and government, both important and unimportant. He finally called Erdogan on 23 April to break the news that he was going to make the announcement on Armenian genocide the next day.

For its part, Turkey has also thumbed its nose at the United States on several occasions. It decided to buy the S-400 air-defence system from Russia despite America’s strident objections and threat of sanctions. Turkey even sacrificed its participation in the US F-35 joint strike fighter program at the altar of the S-400. Ankara also defied American wishes when it intruded into Syria to clear the Kurdish allies of the US, who had played a crucial role in defeating Islamic State, from areas bordering Turkey. While Turkey did curtail its purchases of oil from Iran under threat of American sanctions, it continued to support Tehran on many regional issues because of shared interests vis-à-vis the Kurds, and in opposition to Saudi Arabia’s claims for pre-eminence in the region.

Ankara’s response to Biden’s announcement has so far been rather muted and it appears that Turkey has decided to soft-pedal the issue for the time being. The Turkish foreign minister tweeted: ‘Words cannot change or rewrite history. We have nothing to learn from anybody on our own past. Political opportunism is the greatest betrayal to peace and justice. We entirely reject this statement based solely on populism.’ The deputy foreign minister told the US ambassador, ‘The statement does not have legal ground in terms of international law and has hurt the Turkish people, opening a wound that’s hard to fix in our relations.’ Erdogan denounced the decision in a televised address and urged Biden to reverse it.

These official statements are relatively mild given the wave of resentment the announcement has unleashed in Turkey. However, it was bound to provide ammunition to the strong anti-American sentiment already existing in Turkey at the popular level. This sentiment is widespread in large part because of the perception that the US and the West in general are bent on obstructing Turkey’s rise to major-power status because it is a Muslim country.

The pejorative use of the term ‘neo-Ottomanism’ by Western commentators to describe Turkey’s independent foreign policy in the Middle East, which at times has run against American and European preferences, has already raised hackles among political commentators in the country. The Turkish government argues that the charge of Armenian genocide doesn’t take account of the fact that it was a time of war and 2.5 million Ottoman Muslims also died in Anatolia during that period.

Taken together, policies perceived by Turks as anti-Turkish are attributed to Islamophobia in the West, including in the US. Biden’s decision to label the Armenian massacre as genocide feeds into that narrative and is likely to negatively impact Turkey’s relations with the US in the long run even if a dramatic downturn isn’t immediately visible.

EU engagement gives Turkey a free pass on human rights violations

It’s said that politics makes for strange bedfellows. In diplomacy, it would seem that it’s seating arrangements that can be tricky. At a 6 April meeting of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council head Charles Michel with Turkey’s famously combative President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, von der Leyen was left, for one uncomfortable moment, without a chair.

Footage has emerged of the meeting in Ankara as Erdogan and Michel take up seats while von der Leyen is left to hover awkwardly. She was eventually ushered to a nearby sofa, but according to protocols, she, at equivalent rank to Michel, should have been afforded the same status—in this instance, a chair.

EU–Turkey relations have lately been tetchy, not least due to Turkey’s confrontational foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean. But speaking after meeting with Erdogan in Ankara, von der Leyen applauded Turkey for demonstrating an interest in ‘re-engaging with the European Union in a constructive way’ and highlighted a desire to ‘give our relationship a new momentum’.

There was an outpouring of indignation at von der Leyen’s relegation—accusations flew about who was responsible for the faux pas that led to ‘sofagate’. But this distracts from another controversy: the EU’s decision to engage with Erdogan at a time when Turkey’s authoritarian drift is accelerating. A US State Department report from 2020 outlines a litany of human rights transgressions and restrictions on political freedoms in Turkey. In deciding to visit Ankara, the EU turned a blind eye to democratic backsliding and human rights violations, effectively letting Erdogan get away with it.

The timing of the EU visit was particularly questionable coming only two weeks after Erdogan’s snap decision to withdraw from a Council of Europe accord that protects women’s rights. Turkey signed the treaty in 2011—it’s known as the Istanbul Convention, no less—but Erdogan bent to local critics who claim the accord undermines traditional Turkish values. And he did it at a time of rising violence against women in Turkey, and apparently against the wishes of many Turks. International observers met the decision with dismay: the secretary-general of the Council of Europe, Marija Pejcinovic Buric, called it a ‘huge setback’ and US President Joe Biden said he was ‘deeply disappointed’.

EU officials have long stressed that any resumption of talks with Turkey would be ‘phased, proportionate and reversible’. EU Council President Charles Michel has previously stated, ‘Rule of law and democracy are absolutely key to any dialogue we have with Turkey.’

Erdogan has appeared at times to be playing ball. In March, he announced a new human rights action plan to protect freedom of expression and enshrine the right to a fair trial by 2023, the centenary of the Turkish Republic. The declaration was met with scepticism from some quarters. An obvious question arises: Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has governed Turkey since 2002, so why has it not already been able to protect human rights and the rule of law?

According to a Turkish proverb, it’s easy to make commitments but harder to deliver. Erdogan is big on promises, but doubts remain over his willingness to deliver human rights protections and political freedoms, particularly to his opponents. Recent weeks have seen court proceedings brought to dissolve the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), on allegations that it colludes with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the revocation of the seat of, and subsequent arrest of, HDP parliamentary member Omer Faruk Gergerlioglu.

Accusing pro-Kurdish parties of PKK sympathies and broad-brush allegations of terrorist complicity are tried-and-tested tactics in Turkish politics, but Gergerlioglu, who isn’t even Kurdish and was previously president of a leading human rights organisation, appears to have run afoul of prosecutors for relentlessly highlighting rights abuses.

As with leaving the Istanbul Convention on women’s rights, proceedings against the HDP and the pursuit of Gergerlioglu have attracted a chorus of criticism from international bodies, including the European Parliament.

Turkey and Erdogan, in particular, don’t take kindly to criticism. With disagreements mounting in recent years, Erdogan has increasingly taken Turkey in new foreign policy directions, including military interventions in Syria, northern Iraq, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. He has overseen resurgent, exclusivist nationalism and fostered the idea that Turkey should reclaim its earlier position as regional leader. As a result, some view Turkey as a troublesome international actor.

Erdogan, however, realises that isolation is not in his or Turkey’s best interests—hence the attempt to resuscitate relations with the EU. For its part, the EU understands the vital role Turkey plays in housing enormous numbers of Syria refugees who would otherwise head for European shores. So, for now, rapprochement may be the order of the day—as long as the seating arrangements can be sorted amicably.

The beginning of the end of Erdogan?

It was some years ago that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reportedly said: ‘Whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey.’ His words must have come to haunt him on 23 June when Ekrem Imamoglu, the opposition Republican People’s Party nominee, easily defeated the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) candidate, Binali Yildirim, for the city’s mayoralty.

What must have added insult to injury was the fact that Imamoglu garnered over 54% of the votes, increasing his vote share by 6% compared to the 31 March result when he barely managed to defeat Yildirim. Under pressure from Erdogan and his party, Turkey’s electoral council annulled the March election results on flimsy technical grounds. It’s clear that last month many AKP supporters switched to supporting Imamoglu, thus punishing Erdogan and his party for this subterfuge.

If one accepts the fact that the Istanbul verdict could be a bellwether for what happens in the rest of the country when national elections are held, then it’s good news for the opposition. The Istanbul verdict is very important because one-fifth of the Turkish population lives in Istanbul and the city contributes more than 30% of Turkey’s GDP.

Istanbul is not alone in sending the signal that large segments of the population are disenchanted with Erdogan and the AKP. The second- and third-largest cities in the country, Ankara and Izmir, also elected opposition candidates in the 31 March elections, as did several other urban centres. The conservative and religious Anatolian heartland has so far stood by the AKP.

But even in the Turkish heartland, Erdogan’s popularity seems to be waning. One of the main reasons for this is the very visible downturn in the economy and the fall of the Turkish currency during the past year. The lira’s value against the US dollar is almost half what it was a year ago. Erdogan’s continuing feud with the United States has hurt the Turkish economy badly.

More important, the AKP government has grossly mismanaged the economy, in part by spending unwisely on giant and prestigious projects like a new airport in Istanbul, which is slated to be the world’s largest, and construction of bridges and gigantic mosques that have depleted resources and driven the government even deeper into debt. Now that the building boom has turned into bust and inflation is rising, it’s hit the average voter hard. It has also begun to alienate the religiously observant bourgeoisie in the towns and cities of interior Anatolia who had formed the financial backbone of the AKP.

Simultaneously, Erdogan has alienated a section of his Islamist base by his running feud with Fethullah Gülen. Gülen and his hizmet organisation were declared terrorists following the abortive military coup of July 2016. Thousands of Gülen supporters, the most educated and skilled among the religiously observant population, are in jail, and tens of thousands of others were sacked from their jobs on suspicion of being Gülenists. Several universities and schools run by the Gülen movement have also been closed.

Two additional factors have eroded Erdogan’s popularity. His recently cultivated hypernationalism, which used to placate his allies in the Nationalist Movement Party, seems to have backfired, driving many moderates to side with the opposition. This is particularly true of the Kurdish population—and Istanbul with about 3 million Kurds is the largest Kurdish city in the world—that has been alienated by Erdogan’s stridently anti-Kurdish rhetoric and the resurgence of conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. Erdogan’s military campaign against the Syrian Kurdish enclave has added to Kurdish disenchantment.

Ankara’s ill-conceived involvement in the Syrian civil war has cost Turkey hugely as a result of a massive inflow of refugees and increased defence spending that has added to the country’s economic woes. At the same time, the Turkish government has been engaged in a series of disputes with the US over trade issues and differences regarding the Syrian Kurds. The US has supported the Kurdish militia in Syria, the YPG, as crucial allies against the Islamic State, while Turkey considers the YPG as an extension of the secessionist PKK that has been battling the Turkish state for decades.

The Turkish decision to buy the S-400 missile defence system from Russia has led to US threats of economic sanctions. Turkey has been defiant on this issue, and the first S-400 deliveries are scheduled for this month. Experts believe that these sanctions will kick in automatically under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, legislation penalising any country that has purchased military equipment from an American foe.

While all these factors point to a gradual but certain erosion of Erdogan’s hold on power, it’s too early to say that it will lead to his unseating at the next elections. Parliamentary and presidential elections are more than four years away and much could happen in that time to reverse the Istanbul verdict, especially given the way Erdogan has concentrated power in his hands and misused it to muzzle the media and harass opponents of all hues. He has also mastered the art of political manipulation, a skill he’s likely to put to good use in the next few years.

While Erdogan’s time may not yet be up, his grip on power will never be the same again.