Tag Archive for: Timor-Leste

Policy, Guns and Money: Timor-Leste plus protests, policing and democracy

In this episode, ASPI’s Genevieve Feely speaks to Robert Baird of Tatoli news agency in Timor-Leste about political developments in the country, including the challenges posed by a failed budget and the Covid-19 pandemic.

Senior ASPI staff Kelsey Munro and Michael Shoebridge then discuss the protests in Hong Kong and the US, noting the parallels and differences between the two movements, and what they mean in terms of the global contest between authoritarianism and democracy.

And the head of ASPI’s counterterrorism program, Leanne Close, speaks to the International Association of Chiefs of Police President Steven Casstevens, about police reform in the US in light of the protests, and how systemic issues can be addressed to rebuild trust and support between police and their communities.

The ADF’s quiet leaders

Commander INTERFET, MAJ GEN Cosgrove joins hands with the new East Timor leadership during a celebration to mark the official handover from INTERFET to UNTAETHere’s a curious fact: for the better part of two decades the ADF has been led by quiet, at times understated leaders, who put a premium on calmness and seldom raise their voices in anger. Of course that’s a generalisation, but it’s made on the basis of working closely with the last five Chiefs of Defence Force as well as the new CDF designate. More broadly—generalising again—the current ADF leadership team continues that trend. In important respects the ADF leadership model runs counter to popular views of what military leadership is supposed to be like.

Hollywood, rather than West Point or Duntroon, has shaped an image of military leaders as a band of hyper-aggressive, purple-faced screamers. Think of George C. Scott’s Patton, or Lee Ermey’s ferocious portrayal of the drill instructor Gunnery Sergeant Hartman in Full Metal Jacket. For those who don’t know the modern military, Jack Nicholson’s iconic Colonel Nathan R. Jessup in A Few Good Men exemplifies what tough leaders are supposed to be like. Perhaps that’s why Senator Stephen Conroy parsed Jessup’s ‘you can’t handle the truth’ speech in recent Estimates Committee hearings. Ironically Conroy’s target, Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, is supremely calm under fire and the least Colonel Jessup-like figure imaginable. Read more

Reader response: more force structure options

Peter Layton’s recent post raises some important questions about force structure but ultimately comes up with an overly simplified characterisation of the alternatives.

Peter describes the two ends of the force structure continuum in overly stark terms, and the reality is far more nuanced. The vast majority of Australia’s operational deployments have been multi-national activities, so describing one end of the continuum as conducting independent operations is simply not valid—especially in an increasingly networked world.

Aside from Australia’s operations in the South West Pacific during World War II, Australia’s operational deployments also tend be dominated by only one of the three services. A good example of this is the Timor-Leste INTERFET operation. As a consequence, Australia doesn’t have a tradition of deploying ‘balanced’ joint forces. To be sure, our tactical force contributions to US-led coalitions have tended to be employed under service component lines as Peter suggests. But this isn’t the other end of the force structure spectrum.

In fact, I’m not convinced that the continuum is a simple two-dimensional model and that we must once again chose a point on it to continue our force structure evolution. Given the financial constraints and competing pressures, the United States—as the pre-eminent global power—is entering a phase where it would prefer to provide support to regional coalitions rather than take the lead in every instance (Libya was an example of that). The emergence of regionally-based coalitions, in my view, presents an additional dimension to Australia’s force structure debate. Read more

A Capability of First Resort: Australia and amphibious warfare

Exercise SEA LION, conducted in waters off Townsville and Cowley Beach in North Queensland, is the second of a series of two exercises in which Australia's newest ship, HMAS Choules and HMNZS Canterbury practice humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and emergency evacuations with elements of the Australian Army. HMAS Choules delivers a significant amphibious capacity which can be used in warlike and humanitarian operations. The focus of the exercises is to work closely with Army in the lead up to the introduction of Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) Ships. During the exercise Army Landing Craft Medium (LCM8s), Navy Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) and New Zealand Landing Craft Medium (LCM6) were heavily involved in transferring equipment and personnel from and to shore.

In my previous post I discussed the broad utility of an amphibious capability and noted how its popularity has waxed and waned over the past century or so. Narrowing our gaze down to Australia, we find that since Federation these operations have even more of a vexed history.

The title of this piece is a very deliberate piece of plagiarism. ‘A Capability of First Resort’ is the name of two important pieces of writing on this topic. The first a Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper by Russell Parkin that traces the history of amphibious operations in Australia from 1901–2001. The second is a 2004 ASPI Strategic Insights paper by Aldo Borgu which discusses Australia’s Future Amphibious Requirements and assesses the decision to purchase the Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships. These are both important pieces of analysis that I highly recommend.

For both of these articles the notion of amphibious forces as a ‘capability of first resort’ for the ADF references a quote from General Peter Cosgrove during his time as Chief of Army and later as Chief of the ADF. Cosgrove’s observation was, as Borgu states, ‘unsurprising given the archipelagic nature of Australia’s region’. Yet what might have seem obvious to Peter Cosgrove, especially after his experience commanding INTERFET, has often not registered with other senior military officers and defence officials over the last 100 years or so. While this might seem strange given Australia’s status as an island nation with its northern approaches dominated by an extensive littoral region, it’s entirely consistent with the swings and roundabouts of Australia’s defence strategy and priorities over this period. Read more