Since Thailand’s military coup in 2014, the country has been plagued by human-rights violations and abuse of power, severely damaging its international reputation and economic prospects. Without a change of direction, Thailand’s future looks bleak.

Under Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, Thailand has been subject to widespread restrictions on freedom of expression, with young political activists abused, jailed and chased into asylum abroad. Ethnic minorities, including the Rohingya, and economic migrants face routine discrimination and are forced to live in dire conditions.

Moreover, income inequality and household debt levels are now among the highest in Asia. Indeed, the growth rate of Thailand’s once-thriving ‘tiger economy’ has sunk to near the bottom of ASEAN.

If elected as Thailand’s prime minister on 14 May, I will take office determined to change course. Thailand must become an exemplar of the rule of law, and, as geopolitical tensions and great-power rivalries roil the region, it must uphold the ideals of non-intervention and peace. To achieve shared prosperity, we must work towards an ASEAN region built on trust and confidence, free from corruption and suspicion.

At the heart of the Pheu Thai Party’s vision for Thailand’s future is our belief that a capitalism rooted in empathy is the only way to address the numerous socioeconomic issues and divisions that the current administration has exacerbated. To rebuild the Thai economy, we must encourage free and fair competition and promote market-driven innovation, rather than oligarchies and nepotism.

By implementing effective welfare and income-support programs, Thailand can combat rising inequality. In April 2022, I announced the One Family One Soft Power scheme, which aims to develop Thai workers’ skills. Our goal is to leverage the labour force’s untapped potential to increase employment opportunities and income for all our citizens.

Under a Pheu Thai administration, we will establish the Thailand Creative Content Agency, a one-stop institution designed to merge public- and private-sector service providers, streamline regulation and provide loans and tax incentives to boost the private sector’s competitiveness. The agency will also support research and innovation in industry and agriculture.

With effective government support, Thai goods will be reintegrated into global supply chains. Our goal is to re-establish Thailand’s standing in the world economy by leveraging the country’s strategic location and ASEAN membership (which give it access to a market of more than 660 million people) to lure foreign businesses, organisations, festivals and events.

As the daughter of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, I have had the unique opportunity to meet many world leaders and gain insights into successful diplomacy, which is never a zero-sum game. As prime minister, it would be my responsibility to restore confidence in the country’s reliability, which previous administrations’ misguided actions have eroded. I intend to engage with world leaders and investors as a trustworthy interlocutor, and I am confident that the establishment of a government that upholds the rule of law and fosters truly competitive business will stimulate economic growth.

By fostering a sustainable, inclusive economy, we will attract the new investment Thailand requires. But to fulfill our goal of becoming ASEAN’s financial hub, we must also equip Thais with the infrastructure necessary to face the challenges of today’s disruptive digital economy.

To this end, we have announced a plan to provide every citizen over 16 years of age with a 10,000 baht (US$297) digital wallet. We also plan to integrate blockchain technology into federal government systems to enhance access to public services, which would improve citizens’ lives and make Thailand more appealing to international investors.

Following the 2014 coup, many previously friendly countries imposed sanctions on Thailand and cut aid. A Pheu Thai administration will work night and day to repair the country’s damaged ties and expand its trade partnerships with the United States, Canada, South America, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, China and the rest of Asia.

In particular, we would seek to revitalise relations with Western countries, which have withered since the coup. Finalising the long-delayed Thailand–EU free trade agreement, which promises to boost Thailand’s GDP by 1.6%, is one of our top priorities, as is enabling our citizens to travel visa-free to more countries, thereby facilitating economic activity and cross-cultural interaction.

A Pheu Thai government would also be committed to strengthening relations with countries across the region, especially China. By integrating into China’s Belt and Road Initiative via the high-speed train that runs through neighbouring Laos, we could promote peace, stability and prosperity between all three countries. We would also seek to assume a leadership role in ASEAN and enhance our economic links with adjacent countries such as Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia.

To strengthen these ties and enhance trade, a Pheu Thai-led Thailand would pursue cross-border projects, standardise customs procedures, streamline regulations and create special economic zones. In this regard, finalising the joint development agreement with Cambodia could play a crucial role in boosting energy security and regional cooperation.

Thailand cannot regain its global standing and establish itself as a regional leader without protecting human rights and adhering to international law. Pheu Thai is committed to upholding the rights of all people, including ethnic minorities such as the Rohingya, both within and outside our borders.

Likewise, environmental concerns have been ignored since the 2014 coup. But carbon pricing, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture and the adoption of electric vehicles must be at the top of Thailand’s economic agenda. If elected, I am committed to upholding the COP26 agreement, which Thailand signed in 2021, and creating a sustainable economy. And, to encourage Thailand’s neighbours to adopt sustainable agricultural practices, we would consider implementing tariff barriers, such as those imposed by the EU and the US.

Since 2014, political corruption and favoritism, economic inefficiency and environmental degradation have hindered Thailand’s development and erased much of the progress our hard-working citizens had made over the past four decades. Only by boosting economic growth, restoring the rule of law and recovering democratic legitimacy will Thailand’s government regain our citizens’ trust and return the country to its rightful position on the world stage. I pledge to do just that.

In August 2013, I organised a seminar at the Australian National University titled, ‘What is the chance of a coup for Myanmar?’ At the time, some judged the discussion premature. Aung San Suu Kyi had been released from house arrest and elected to the national legislature, and the country was rapidly opening to foreign investment. Myanmar was enjoying a rare burst of good news.

At the seminar, we brought together leading analysts of Myanmar politics and other scholars with in-depth knowledge of military interventions across Asia. There was a lively debate about the structural, cultural, spatial and economic dimensions of coup-making. There was also broad agreement among the experts that the Myanmar military maintained the capabilities and mentalities required for direct intervention. But the top generals would always need to justify, to themselves, the risks of another coup, and be prepared to accept the consequences.

Back then, the overriding hope was that Myanmar’s untested constitutional framework could find the right set of compromises to end generations of interethnic warfare. Many also hoped the government would find more space for its many cultural and religious minorities, bring about the fairer distribution of wealth and, perhaps most radically, build political institutions to share power on a consistently democratic basis.

When Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won the 2015 general election, it was easy to get swept up in the new wave of exuberance among a long-oppressed people. By then, the momentum for change was undeniable. As the internet became ubiquitous, and as people learned to live without such fear of army retribution, they enjoyed the many benefits of greater freedom of movement, sustained economic growth and international connection.

Yet, it was also apparent soon after the 2015 election that the NLD’s gerontocratic team was ill-equipped to manage Myanmar’s long list of persistent challenges. One key issue is that the old systems—heavy on restrictions, surveillance and violence—never wholly disappeared. The appalling treatment of the Rohingya is the grimmest example. But plenty of journalists and activists also found themselves singled out for harsh treatment under the elected government. The shadow of military dictatorship lingered.

With these fraught conditions, it’s no surprise that the NLD struggled to handle its delicate relationship with the armed forces. Indeed, the military leadership under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing often made it impossible for the NLD team to succeed. Military legislators continually presented obstacles to more dramatic political reform and used their constitutionally defined handbrakes to frustrate the elected government’s mandate.

One consequence of the military’s meddling since the 2015 election is clear: the immediate street-level resistance to last week’s coup. Nationwide protests are now multiplying in scale and sophistication. From across the country’s political divides, protesters are understandably furious that the military sees fit to so casually discard their votes, their leaders and their electoral system. Nobody believes the military’s claims of widespread voting fraud at the November 2020 poll—it is a hollow Trumpian justification, devoid of evidence, logic or common sense.

A digitally savvy 21st-century society also offers daunting challenges to an analogue generation of military dictators. Min Aung Hlaing will now seek to imitate his counterparts in Thailand who, with their 2014 coup, managed to bring in a new, military-friendly constitution. Even after the 2019 election, General Prayuth Chan-ocha is still in charge. That must give Myanmar’s commander-in-chief some comfort in the possible path ahead.

Yet the Thai situation is illustrative for another reason. Prayuth and King Vajiralongkorn, among Thailand’s other paramount figures, are now subjected to relentless ridicule and calls for wide-ranging political reform. Street protests in Thailand have not held back in their criticism and peaceful demands for change. A new generation of Thai activists—not beholden to the norms of conservative democratisation that prevailed under King Bhumibol—are bravely confronting the established order.

And after last week’s coup, there’s talk of Myanmar’s newly emboldened anti-military campaigners benefiting from the tactics of the ‘milk tea alliance’, stretching from Hong Kong and Taiwan, across Thailand, and now to Myanmar. Whatever the tactics, taking on Myanmar’s military is never for the faint of heart. In recent days, the detention of an unknown number of politicians, activists and advisers is a very worrying start. Those who have been locked up and who have managed to send messages to the wider world are defiant, confident, unflinching.

Among the long lists of Myanmar names, there is now also one Australian, Sean Turnell. A highly regarded professor from Macquarie University, Turnell has devoted the past decade to supporting Myanmar’s democrats in their hard-won efforts to reform the economy. His detention is a damning indictment of the military’s baffling and short-sighted self-sabotage.

Yet this early round of arrests has clearly not deterred the protests. People are anxious, naturally, of the military’s capacity for crackdowns and violence. But they still flock to the streets with the three-fingered Hunger Games salute and bang kitchen pots to drive away evil spirits.

Dwelling for a moment on evil: we cannot forget that Myanmar’s flirtation with democracy also exacerbated the dire conditions facing the Rohingya. Myanmar’s democrats were mostly silent when defenceless civilians in the northern Rakhine State were treated horrendously in 2016 and 2017.

Some of these Rohingya refugees are now publicly declaring solidarity with Myanmar’s street protests. I am sure they have not forgotten Suu Kyi’s role in their expulsion from Myanmar.

Tragically for her, Suu Kyi’s glowing reputation no longer defines the country’s democratic struggle, and her failures, especially when it comes to the Rohingya, now weigh heavily on the international response to the coup. Nonetheless, there are principles at stake about how we value election results that, while recently tested even in the United States, make it impossible to ignore the destructive work of the coup-makers.

With those principles in mind, our questions now need to shift quickly. It made sense in 2013 to ask about the chance of a Myanmar coup. In the current political crisis, with Covid-19 still causing so much misery, and with the numbers of protestors growing so rapidly, what is the chance of a revolution? National disintegration? Further communal breakdown? A newly flourishing democracy? If Myanmar’s generals bunkered down in Naypyitaw don’t hear the anger, and adjust their path, the consequences are stark and unpredictable.

China’s relatively fast recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic and the reopening of its economy have posed a new dilemma to ASEAN states over whether to accept or reject Beijing’s ‘coronavirus diplomacy’ of aid and assistance.

If the 2008–09 global financial crisis enabled China’s rise, the coronavirus crisis in 2020–21 may solidify its pre-eminence as a superpower. In my new ASPI paper, Thailand’s strategic drift: domestic determinants amidst superpower competition, I explain that many countries, including Thailand, are coming around to this new geopolitical reality.

The pandemic underscored the ASEAN split over China, with the mainland countries of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand slower to impose travel restrictions on their giant neighbour than Vietnam and maritime countries, such as Indonesia and Singapore.

China has become the most divisive issue in Thai–Australian relations, fundamentally underpinned by domestic politics in the kingdom.

If Thailand takes a democratic turn away from authoritarian ways, then its geopolitical posture could shift away from Beijing up to a point. But whatever shades of democracy or autocracy Thailand ends up with, Bangkok’s drift away from Washington appears to be a longer term move. Thailand–Australia ties are largely determined by Canberra’s strategic calculations vis-à-vis Beijing.

Even before the onset of the pandemic in early 2020, Thailand’s strategic posture had been increasingly dominated by its domestic political preoccupations. The pandemic merely accentuated trends and patterns in its foreign policy and security outlook in view of the geopolitical rivalry and competition between the US and China.

As Covid-19 shows signs of slowing, and assuming that there’s no second wave of similar virulence, Thailand is set to return to its pre-virus strategic role and challenges.

Cycles of coups, constitutions and elections since constitutionalism replaced absolute monarchy in 1932 have stopped Thailand from making a break for an effective democratic future. These domestic shortcomings have also impeded Thailand’s role abroad.

After more than five years of lacklustre authoritarian government following Thailand’s 13th successful putsch in May 2014, the country’s most recent elections, on 24 March 2019, yielded a controversial parliament and a fractious post-election coalition government, headed by incumbent Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who led the junta that seized power to begin with.

Thailand’s holding pattern risks sliding into anaemic economic growth while some of its neighbours have been expanding twice as fast. The coronavirus has compounded Thailand’s headwinds, with its economy forecast to suffer a deeper contraction than its ASEAN peers.

The seemingly endless yellow versus red street protests make it tempting to write off Thailand as an also-ran. But the country is an indispensable piece of the regional strategic jigsaw puzzle in an era of global power shifts and transitions. Thailand is ultimately too central and crucial to be ignored or marginalised.

Geography makes it the economic locomotive of mainland Southeast Asia and a natural hub of ASEAN. With its 70 million people and close to US$500 billion GDP, the kingdom is ASEAN’s second largest economy.

Thailand’s history of crafty diplomacy in maintaining its independence against the odds over centuries places it in good stead with all the major powers. It is a US treaty ally and yet intimately close to China, while favoured by Japanese investors.

Despite the persistent impasse in its domestic politics, Thai economic growth stayed on a 3% trajectory, subpar but without contraction, prior to Covid-19.

Resilience, resourcefulness and joie de vivre are strands of the Thai DNA, but so are internal squabbling and power struggles. Unless they face external crises such as European imperialism, World War II and the Cold War, Thais seem unable get their act together at home.

Much will depend now on the kind of politics that unfolds under the new reign of King Maha Vajiralongkorn. Whether this leads to greater stability or to more polarisation and stagnation will determine much about the nation’s strategic role in the region.

The US and China might well have jointly led international cooperation to overcome the pandemic, but Covid-19 has merely reinforced tensions between the superpowers.

Conspicuously, Thailand was the first country outside China to register a Covid-19 case, a Chinese tourist from Wuhan on 13 January 2020. Yet Thai authorities didn’t impose travel restrictions against China until the pandemic ran amok in March 2020.

China is the constant variable in Thailand’s foreign policy mix, as Beijing deals with all regime types. As long as Thailand remains under authoritarian shadows, Bangkok will tilt towards Beijing if it can’t find acceptance and support from its ally in Washington. To the extent that China is the resident superpower, Thailand will handle and accommodate it accordingly, while relying on other middle and larger powers, such as Japan, Australia and the US, to maintain strategic balance.

Thailand, as with some of its immediate neighbours, will always be on the lookout for an autonomous space above and beyond the great powers.

Covid-19 has driven a deeper wedge between those who are ‘with’ and those who are ‘against’ China. If China maintains momentum as the first-in and first-out patient of the coronavirus ward and if it’s able to reopen its economy and regain economic dynamism while the US is mired in political polarisation amid a prolonged economic slump, then Thailand’s gravitation towards Beijing is likely to gain a corresponding pull.

Thailand’s domestic political morass and geopolitical outlook are consequential for Australia. They hold much in common as two of the five treaty allies of the US—the others are South Korea, Japan and the Philippines.

While Canberra is a major ASEAN dialogue partner, Thailand and Australia have played key roles together in architecture-building projects for regional peace and prosperity, from APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum to the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus. But notwithstanding this bilateral cooperation, Thailand’s and Australia’s geostrategic interests appear increasingly divergent.

Australia was the first Western democracy to accept Thailand’s new political realities by engaging with the coup regime as early as May 2015, even while the US and European governments gave the ruling Thai generals a cold shoulder.

Australian policymakers were spot-on in their understanding of Thailand’s political power plays and nuances. But they may have underestimated the extent to which the Bangkok–Beijing axis was deepening at the expense of the US and the EU. While the junta-backed Thai government moved closer to China from 2014 to 2019, Australia went the other way. In turn, souring Australia–China relations have impinged on Canberra’s dealings with Thailand and some other Southeast Asian governments.

Correction: An earlier version of this article gave incorrect figures of 660 million for Thailand’s population and US$2.9 trillion for its GDP. Those figures are for ASEAN as a whole, as stated in the report on which this post was based. The figures were corrected at 1130 on 19 June 2020.

Last week, a new Thai government, which had been in the making since the 24 March election, swore an oath of allegiance to King Vajiralongkorn. The new government looks a lot like the old one. General Prayut Chan-o-cha, who appointed himself prime minister after the coup in 2014, retains the office. And members of his pro-military party, Palang Pracharat, hold the most influential ministerial portfolios.

Why didn’t the election dislodge the military government? Partly because the military rewrote the rules. And partly because a decisive number of Thai voters prefer the steadiness of military governments to the volatility of civilian governments.

The military scripted a new election law. The generals wanted to prevent the resurgence of the former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. Since 2005, they had accumulated ample reasons to hate Thaksin, who won elections in 2001 and 2005. He interfered in military promotions. He curbed the military’s budget and power. And he challenged the monarchy, the ultimate legitimiser of the military’s political role.

The election law was designed to prevent Thaksin’s one-party dominance. In 2005, his party won 377 seats in the 500-seat parliament and in 2011, under his sister Yingluck’s leadership, 265 seats. For this election, the generals moved Thailand towards a mixed-member proportional voting system, which fosters smaller parties and coalitions.

As well as changing the law, the military allowed parties to campaign only three months before the election, and blitzed its opponents with lawsuits. In addition, some outspoken critics of the election’s unfairness were attacked. The military was variously blamed for orchestrating the assaults, failing to try to apprehend the assailants, and failing to protect the victims.

In its recent report, The 2019 Thai general election: a missed opportunity for democracy, the respected Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) concluded that Thailand’s election was ‘partly free, and not fair’. It criticised the military government for not establishing ‘the healthy political climate that lies at the heart of a free and fair electoral process’.

Unlike the proportional voting systems in places like Germany and New Zealand, where voters have separate ballots for constituency and party-list candidates, in Thailand voters marked only one ballot.

The best way to explain how the system was meant to work is with an example. The Thaksin-aligned Pheu Thai Party received 22% of the popular vote. In a 500-seat parliament, that would equate to 110 seats. But Pheu Thai had already secured 137 constituency seats so it wasn’t eligible for any party-list seats. The pro-military Palang Pracharat received 24% of the popular vote, equating to 120 seats. It secured only 97 constituency seats, so it was entitled to 23 seats through the party-list system.

After the party-list seats were calculated, the parties likely to form a pro-military coalition were slightly short of a majority. In what ANFREL called its ‘most flagrant misstep’, the military-appointed Election Commission, supported by judges of the Constitutional Court (whose terms had been extended by the military government), changed the distribution formula for the party-list seats. The pro-military coalition suddenly had 254 MPs—a bare majority, but a majority nonetheless.

Any reasonable analysis of the election can’t disregard the biases in the electoral system, the constrained campaign, or the post-election manipulation of the outcome. Nor can it disregard the fact that, even though the generals stacked the cards in their favour, they won only narrowly.

But, equally, any reasonable analysis can’t disregard the reality that more than 45% of Thai voters, after five years of direct military rule, still favoured parties that sympathise with, or tolerate, a military government. This reflects an enduring preference for order and a disdain for the quarrelsome, self-seeking and often corrupt conduct of many elected politicians.

Therein lies an obstacle to democracy in Thailand: the institutional weakness of elected legislatures. Since 1932, when Thailand became a constitutional monarchy, the legislature has struggled to check the power of the executive government and the military, which have mostly been able to rely on the backing of the judiciary and the monarchy.

The leader of the Future Forward Party, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, understands the problem. After the election he said, ‘We must make parliament a place of honour, not a place where people’s faith goes to die.’ His party won 18% of the popular vote, with policies aimed at weakening the political influence of the military.

Thanathorn hasn’t ruled out street protests—a favoured political tactic since 2005 of both the yellow-shirted and red-shirted sides of Thailand’s deeply polarised politics. But he will resort to the street only ‘when all options are exhausted and when parliament can’t function’.

Ironically, Future Forward’s efforts to elevate the legislature might be enabled by a champion of the Democrat Party, a party which in recent years, including through boycotting elections in 2006 and 2014, made a mockery of its own name and reneged on its commitment to democratisation in the 1990s.

Chuan Leekpai, twice prime minister in the 1990s and now an elder statesman of the Democrat Party, is the speaker of Thailand’s parliament. In the 1990s he boldly tried to reform the military. The astute Chuan knows that the legislature, responsibly led, can become a more credible institution.

If Chuan gives Future Forward a fair hearing in the parliament, the generals’ views of elections, even controlled elections, may become dimmer. And voters’ views of elected MPs and the legislature may become a little brighter.

Editors’ note: The author will be speaking about his new book at Asia Bookroom in Canberra this evening and at the Australian Institute of International Affairs in Melbourne on 24 July.