Taiwan Strait Archives

Taiwan’s polarised politics risks undermining its resilience and security

9 May 2025

Taiwan’s opposition parties—including the once-dominant Kuomintang (KMT)—now wield real power in the legislature for the first time since 2012. But their recent actions have cast serious doubt on their commitment to Taiwan’s long-term security and its ability to withstand Beijing’s growing campaign of coercion.

In January 2024, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te won the presidency, but his party lost its legislative majority, ushering in a divided government. Since then, the opposition coalition has taken an increasingly combative stance, using its control of the Legislative Yuan to obstruct and challenge the Lai administration, including on defence and national security issues.

In early 2025, the KMT, working with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), pushed through sweeping cuts to Taiwan’s defence budget. The numbers are stark: NT$8.4 billion (A$394.8 million) was slashed from the DPP’s proposed defence budget, with another NT$90 billion (A$4.23 billion) frozen. Key deterrence programmes were hit, including Taiwan’s indigenous submarine initiative—vital to its asymmetric defence strategy—and a planned drone industry park. Cuts to basic military preparedness needs such as fuel, ammunition, and overseas training further undermine readiness at a time when Taiwan should be reinforcing its deterrence. This sends troubling signals to both Beijing and international partners.

The damage doesn’t stop at military spending. The cuts also targeted civil society initiatives vital to Taiwan’s ability to endure a potential crisis. The Kuma Academy, known for its civilian defence training, had its budget significantly reduced. Similarly, agencies responsible for cybersecurity and combatting disinformation have seen vital funding curtailed. As hybrid threats are growing, such decisions appear deeply short-sighted.

The KMT frames the cuts as a move for fiscal discipline, arguing that trimming defence and resilience budgets ensures taxpayer money is spent efficiently rather than opposing security efforts. Party leaders claim to represent a large segment of voters who favour easing cross-strait tensions and advocate for cost-effective measures that protect Taiwan without unnecessarily provoking Beijing. However, Premier Cho Jung-tai condemned the cuts as ‘suicidal’, warning they would undermine the government’s ability to meet its national security responsibilities. A piecemeal approach to defence reflects a dangerous lack of strategic foresight.

In the past year, the KMT and TPP have also pushed controversial legislative reforms to expand parliamentary powers at the expense of the executive branch. Though framed as moves to enhance accountability, these reforms amount to a power grab, aimed at fundamentally restructuring government to strip authority from the DPP-controlled executive and hand it to the opposition-led parliament. Taiwan’s Constitutional Court struck down several key provisions, including those that would have compelled the president to report regularly to the legislature and expanded lawmakers’ authority to demand sensitive information.

Rather than accept the ruling, the KMT denounced it as politically motivated, framing it as a constitutional crisis. The fallout was dramatic: physical clashes erupted in the legislature, and thousands of citizens protested in the streets in scenes not seen since the 2014 Sunflower Movement. Accusations that the KMT was aligning too closely with Beijing’s interests gained traction—a charge the party denies but has failed to convincingly rebut.

The perception of alignment with Beijing has deepened as the KMT, following the end of pandemic restrictions, resumed a series of high-profile visits to China, framing them as efforts to promote dialogue and improve cross-strait ties. As the figures below show, former KMT president Ma Ying-jeou’s private foundation has also been active, regularly sending delegations across the strait.

Direct contact between the Chinese Communist Party and Taiwan’s opposition political parties and organisations in 2024 and so far in 2025. Source: ASPI’s State of the Strait Database.

Though framed as people-to-people exchanges, these engagements highlight the KMT’s strategic focus on keeping lines open with Beijing, rekindling debate over the risks to Taiwan’s sovereignty. But with Beijing refusing to engage the DPP, there’s a real danger the KMT is offering Chinese leaders a skewed picture of DPP intentions and public sentiment. This is especially troubling given that Taiwan’s younger generations overwhelmingly support the status quo and reject Beijing’s ‘reunification’ narrative.

The KMT and TPP won a legislative majority in 2024 by tapping into economic discontent, demands for stronger oversight of the executive, and voter fatigue with the ruling DPP. While concern over China’s aggression is widespread, views on how to respond differ. DPP supporters back strengthening self-defence, deepening global ties and protecting sovereignty; KMT voters tend to blame the DPP for provoking China and favour a more conciliatory approach.

The DPP and large sections of Taiwanese society have criticised these visits for their lack of transparency and questionable timing, particularly given China’s increasing coercion campaign. In response, DPP legislators proposed a bill requiring lawmakers to disclose the details of any closed-door meetings with Chinese officials and to seek prior approval before such engagements.

At the core of Taiwan’s security challenge lies a hard truth: it faces pressure not only from Beijing, but also from deepening political polarisation. While China poses the most visible threat, opposition obstructionism and partisan dysfunction are undermining Taiwan’s ability to respond. Resilience demands that leaders on all sides put national survival above political point-scoring.

Editors’ picks for 2024: ‘Military challenges to Beijing’s South China Sea claims are increasing’

2 January 2025

Originally published on 22 October 2024.

Deployments of ships and aircraft to challenge China’s illegal claims in the South China Sea are increasing. European ships are appearing more often, while Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly conducting activities in areas that China regards as sensitive.

Several nations have claims in the South China Sea, but China’s claim is the most extensive and controversial. Beijing seeks to enforce sovereign rights and jurisdiction over all features within the nine-dash line, including the islands, rocks and atolls that make up the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China claims this territory despite a 2016 ruling that found that China’s claims had no basis in international law.

With international law doing little to curb China’s ambitions, more countries are using their militaries to challenge China’s claims. In 2024, more European navies operated in the South China Sea than previously in recent years, with Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands all sending ships to the region. Meanwhile regional counties, such as Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, stepped up their engagement, including via joint sailings with the Philippines in the South China Sea.

Different countries take different approaches to challenging China’s illegal claims in the South China Sea. Some militaries are operating within the nine-dash line. Others sail naval ships directly through the Spratly Islands. Some advertise their activities; others do not.

Only a few have conducted activities close to the Paracels, because doing so is unusually risky. A 2022 incident in which a Chinese pilot dumped chaff in front of an Australian P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft is an example of the risk.

The US is the only country to send aircraft or ships within 12 nautical miles of claimed features. By doing so, it would be entering territorial waters if China did in fact own the territory.

These military activities to challenge China’s claims have occurred since 2015:

Country	Military activities in the SCS	Challenges Spratly claims	Challenges Paracel claims	Challenges within 12nm	Publicises challenges
USA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Canada	✓	✓			✓
Australia	✓	✓*	✓*
NZ	✓	✓*
Japan	✓	✓*
UK	✓	✓	✓		✓
France	✓	✓	✓		✓
Germany	✓
Netherlands	✓
Italy	✓

*Challenges are likely but cannot be confirmed

Apart from countries around the South China Sea, which must routinely operate on or over it, the US has by far the most public and active military presence. In 2023, the US military conducted 107 activities, including six specific operations to challenge China’s illegal claims under the US Freedom of Navigation program. US activities are always accompanied by strong public statements.

France and Canada are both active in the region, including within the Spratlys. Both advertise their military presence and actions. Canada now carries journalists on some South China Sea transits. It has operated close to the Paracel Islands, but, as demonstrated when a Chinese fighter fired flares near a Canadian helicopter in 2023, doing so comes with risks. In 2015, France boldly exercised its right to freedom of navigation by sailing a task force through the Paracels.

Australia has an active military presence in the South China Sea. There’s evidence that Australia operates close to China’s illegal claims. However, the tempo and nature of its military challenges are hard to determine, because Canberra does not advertise them. China’s military has been aggressive in seeking to deter Australia from operating near the two island groups by engaging in unsafe intercepts.

New Zealand has a semi-regular presence inside the nine-dash line, commensurate with the size of its armed forces. Meanwhile, Japan has a growing military presence in the region and is increasingly working with partners, such as the US, Australia and the Philippines. As with Australia, there are signs that Japan and New Zealand operate close to, or within, the Spratly group, but neither publicise specific actions, so the nature of them is hard to determine.

Britain sent a carrier strike group through the South China Sea in 2021 and intends to do so again next year. The British military operates close to the Spratly and Paracel Islands and uses public messaging to reinforce the importance of sailing in these areas.

Signalling growing European interest in the region, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy sent navy ships to the area in 2024. But none seems to have overtly challenged China’s claims within the Spratlys or Paracels.

The most notable regional absentee is South Korea. In 2018, a South Korean destroyer, Munmu the Great, took refuge from a typhoon in the Paracel Islands. But Seoul quickly clarified that the ship was not there to challenge China’s claims. Likewise, when the littoral states of South East Asia routinely operate there, they do not directly challenge China’s claims via freedom of navigation transits.

The growing presence of European navies in the South China Sea and stepped-up activity of Asia-Pacific countries there is welcome. It’s helping to push back on China’s growing aggression and reinforce longstanding rules and norms that underpin regional prosperity.

Editors’ picks for 2024: ‘Floating piers and sinking hopes: China’s logistics challenge in invading Taiwan’

31 December 2024

Originally published on 27 August 2024.

No doubt the Chinese military was paying attention.

Last month the United States disassembled and removed the floating pier it had assembled at a Gaza beach to take aid deliveries.

Heavy seas beat it. Such a pier supposedly can be assembled in hours, but this one took almost a month. When it was operational, waves damaged it, and it repeatedly had to be pulled away from the beach to prevent its destruction. Once it had to be towed to a port for repairs. Waves drove ashore boats that serviced it.

And all that was nothing compared with the challenges that China’s armed forces would face in trying to deliver a mountain of personnel, equipment and supplies in an invasion of Taiwan. The pier’s lesson for China is that invading the island would be a doomed endeavour.

The weather of the Taiwan Strait makes the eastern Mediterranean look like a bathtub. Defenders would attack China’s piers. Almost every beach where China might want to build floating piers is overlooked by terrain that would turn the unloading zones into kill zones.

Even before those problems arise, building and installing a floating pier is a huge exercise. The US Department of Defense budgeted $230 million for the one at Gaza, called the Trident Pier. It was operational for 20 days—less than half of the time after it was positioned—and handled only about 9000 tonnes of supplies.

Logistics is almost always harder than planned, but joint logistics over the shore (JLOTS)— moving people and things from ships to land without a port—is subject to innumerable kinds of friction.

Any Chinese invasion of Taiwan would require improvised piers in many locations simultaneously. They’d be part of a logistical effort that would be enormously larger than anything the Chinese navy has attempted. Even optimistic estimates of just 300,000 personnel for an invasion force would be double the international forces fighting in Afghanistan at the height of the global war on terror.

Higher estimates suggest an invasion of Taiwan could need as many as 2 million soldiers. Few of them, and very little of their equipment and supplies, could go by air. Almost everything would have to cross the strait in ships.

Taiwan’s seven major ports would almost certainly be contested, guarded by sea drones and subject to sabotage.

The island has 14 beaches usable for military landings. All but one are surrounded by cliffs and urban jungles, perfect places for the Taiwanese army to hide forces that would attack anything coming ashore and anything used in bringing it ashore, including the piers themselves.

Mother Nature would be doing her bit, too. Indeed, her efforts may be enough to prevent using the beaches in the first place.

Also called the Black Ditch, the strait is known for ‘… strong winds, wave swells, and fog…’ half the year. The storms, heavy rain and squally winds of monsoon seasons sweep it and the coasts on either side. An average of six typhoons hit the strait each year. As Ian Easton details in his book The Chinese Invasion Threat, the weather of the strait shrinks the windows available for an invasion to just two months of ‘good suitability’: April and October. That is a narrow time constraint that worsens a vast logistics challenge.

Apart from soldiers and their equipment, the Chinese navy would need to ferry food, fuel and ammunition to them. The landing alone could require 30 million tonnes going ashore, which far outstrips the capacity of the Chinese navy’s amphibious transport fleet.

Recognising this, the navy is incorporating civilian roll-on, roll-off ferries (roros) as reinforcements. While China has fewer than 50 roros today, it could have two or three times as many by 2032.

That still leaves the problem of getting over the beach. China should view the story of the Trident Pier as a cautionary tale. JLOTS operations are technically complex, costly and risky. The security threat to the improvised pier at Gaza was hardly comparable to the one that Taiwan and its friends would present to a Chinese cross-strait amphibious operation. Nor were the weather challenges comparable, though the sea state off Gaza was still bad enough to ensure the US pier was usually not functional.

The money that the US spent on the pier also paid to show China just how hard JLOTS can be. If that lesson deters war, it was a cheap price to pay.

Military challenges to Beijing’s South China Sea claims are increasing

22 October 2024