Tag Archive for: space policy

The future of the Combined Space Operations initiative

As space becomes more contested, Australia should play a key role with its partners in the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative to safeguard the space domain.

Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States signed the CSpO initiative in 2014. It has since grown to 10 partners, adding New Zealand, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Norway.

In 2022 the partners released the CSpO Vision 2031 statement, outlining its mission to improve cooperation, coordination and interoperability to ensure freedom of action in space, enhance mission assurance and prevent conflict.

Now in its second decade, CSpO in its efforts and activities must respond to the contestation and congestion of space.

Australia and its allies confront a more challenging security outlook across all five domains of conflict. The space domain is now seen as an operational domain in its own right, rather than merely an enabling adjunct for the traditional air, sea and land domains.

The role of the initiative will become only more important new challenges emerge.

The space domain is contested as adversary states develop a full suite of counterspace (such as anti-satellite, or ASAT) capabilities to deny, degrade and disrupt access to vital space support systems which support joint and integrated military operations and the function of economies and societies.

Space is also increasingly congested as more states and non-state actors deploy large constellations of satellites across multiple orbits and space debris grows. This makes avoiding collision a key challenge.

The first objective of the vision 2031 statement is to prevent conflict, including conflict ‘extending to or originating in space.’ The starting point for this must be space domain awareness, which is an area where Australia plays a key role.

Australia occupies an ideal location for monitoring important regions of space, including low-earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO). Australia hosts several space-domain awareness sensors. For example, the 2023 announcement of a Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) at Exmouth in Western Australia, expected to be operational by 2026, will enable space surveillance out to GEO, an orbit used for satellite communications.

The collaboration that Australia and its CSpO partners undertake on space domain awareness allows the sharing of strategic and tactical intelligence across multiple classification levels. Information can be shared in real time via national headquarters for joint operations—for example between HQ Joint Operations Command near Canberra and the Combined Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Space Force Base in California.

But it also demands a robust, and interoperable space infrastructure, and the ability to ensure continued access to space support. This requires encouragement of commonality in space systems, including resilient satellite architectures and responsive space access.

The development of proliferated LEO (pLEO) satellite mega-constellations enhances space resilience by embracing a ‘small, cheap and many’ solution and avoiding large, complex and expensive satellites in GEO. CSpO partners can work together to develop such pLEO architectures to deploy lower-cost small satellites across multiple orbits and offer services in areas such as satellite communications, satellite relay, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and other specialised tasks.

Australia has redefined its JP-9102 Advanced Satellite Communications project away from ‘large, few and expensive’ satellites in GEO towards a distributed multi-orbit architecture. So CSpO collaboration on new approaches to satellite networks is an obvious step forward that could benefit all members. This would harmonise partners’ efforts, enhance information sharing through common capabilities in space and reduce a concerns of a lack of Australian government support for space initiatives.

Space mission assurance would also benefit from development of responsive space access using Australia’s advantageous geographical location for launch and returns. The north of the continent is close to the equator, maximising the energy boost from the Earth’s rotation for payloads launched from locations such as northern Queensland. The result is lower launch cost.

Additionally, launch sites in southern Australia are good for sun-synchronous and polar orbits often used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance satellites. Australia could support launch requirements for CSpO members. For example, Australia and the US already cooperate through the Technology Safeguards Agreement on launches and returns, signed in October 2023.

Finally, CSpO states need to confront challenges posed by adversary counterspace threats, including through development of credible space control capabilities to defend vital space capabilities. The National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program allude to this challenge, but the practical aspects of space control needs to be realised. It would be an opportunity for CSpO, perhaps through AUKUS Pillar 2, to start putting capability substance behind the declared requirement for such a role.

Greater transparency will enhance space governance

To solve the ongoing difficulties in framing new rules for space governance, states must revitalise existing measures and consider them in international space policy debates.

In particular, they should look at The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). The HCoC commits states to openness and transparency in space activities, helps codify responsible behaviours and, in doing so, constrains irresponsible ones.

Space governance has been under considerable stress for a while now. Growing space security threats in the form of anti-satellite weapons, cyber and electronic warfare in space have demonstrated the weaknesses of the existing outer space regime. These contemporary challenges are not effectively addressed by existing measures, which points to the urgent need for new regulations. Major powers have struggled to agree on regulation, and the war in Ukraine has made it worse.

Established in 2002, the HCoC is primarily designed to limit ballistic missile proliferation and includes only good-faith commitments to specific types of responsible behaviour. But it does contain commitments related to civil space activities, which are useful in bolstering international space governance.

For example, the 145 subscribing states agree that they will not divert space launch vehicles to the development of ballistic missiles and that they will adhere to transparency measures for space programmes, particularly in relation to space launch vehicles. States also agree to comply with international space laws such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1972 Liability Convention and the 1976 Registration Convention. Additionally, states submit an annual declaration of policies on ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles.

These measures have remained critical in maintaining the sanctity of outer space but they are proving to be inadequate in dealing with more contemporary challenges. Efforts in measured openness and limited transparency of this nature can help build confidence in the international space sector, assuming that states honour the voluntary commitments. The HCoC encourages subscribing states to become accustomed to collaboration and openness on outer space issues, which can then facilitate further dialogue and transparency.

In order to build on existing measures, states must consider the HCoC in international space policy debates and highlight its potential for advancing space governance. Given the ongoing deadlock in negotiating new mechanisms, they must focus on strengthening existing ones and encourage other countries to sign up to the HCoC, particularly China, North Korea, Pakistan, Israel and Iran.

There must also be more focus on compliance. This can be achieved through revitalising the Registration Convention and encouraging states to comply with their commitment to provide full information on their launches. This has the potential to be a huge transparency measure that helps lessen mutual suspicions and ease the security dilemma that states face when they consider each other’s actions.

The HCoC is also important as a viable transparency and confidence building measure (TCBM). TCBMs are not given much importance in international security discussions, because they are seen as weak efforts, lacking any enforcement mechanisms. While many criticisms of TCBMs are valid, they have remained an integral part of space policy conversations and should be recognised for their key strengths.

Although some states are sceptical of TCBMs because they cannot replace legal measures, pragmatism is needed in the current global landscape. Sceptical states must recognise what is feasible in the near term to address the growing threats in space, and they must pursue existing tools, such as the HCoC. States should appreciate the benefits of TCBMs, with their broad goal of improving transparency and openness and their role in reducing anxieties and concerns that states have about each other’s space agenda.

There is another advantage of TCBMs such as the HCoC. Legally binding measures such as international treaties with verification measures may be ideal, but they are not viable options within the domestic political context of many states in the Global South.

Such states view legally binding international treaties, especially those with verification protocols, as intrusive. Most have a long history of colonialism and are extremely suspicious of measures seen as threats their sovereignty, such as the Responsibility to Protect. These countries have accepted some treaties that include verification measures such as the Chemical Weapon Convention, but that was at a time when the US could persuade these countries to do so. This is no longer the case.

Cold War history also provides examples of how TCBMs can be useful when other measures are not available. During those years, there was international cooperation between adversaries on voluntary measures, particularly in the nuclear domain. At the peak of the Cold War, the US and the USSR agreed to a hot line for exchange of information in an emergency, which helped increase confidence between the two sides.

Fast forward to the present, TCBMs and other similar measures can now play a significant role in increasing confidence among global powers on issues of space management. Given the high levels of distrust, it is unlikely that they would sign on to legally binding mechanisms. Bolstering existing TCBMs such as the HCoC will provide pragmatic alternatives and offer a useful modus vivendi for building global governance measures on outer space.

How it started—Australia’s early days in space at Woomera

This is the seventh in our series ‘Australia in Space’ leading up to ASPI’s Building Australia’s Strategy for Space conference in June.

In the late 1950s, the relevance of space to many Australians was made clear by the launch of Sputnik 1 from the Soviet Union. In the next several years after the 4 October 1957 launch from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, the US and Europe developed similar space launch capabilities.

While the US created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and chose to go to the Moon, in Europe, the already active Blue Streak ICBM program was the basis for Britain and France agreeing in 1961 to join in the development of a multinational space launch program. This was known as the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO). Belgium, West Germany, Italy and The Netherlands also joined.

ELDO sought to develop a multi-stage launch vehicle, first named ELDO 1 and later renamed EUROPA-A. That vehicle consisted of the British Blue Streak first stage, a French second stage and a German third stage, with Italy developing a satellite as the payload.

The launch site for the missions was to be in Australia, at the Woomera Missile Range. Britain and Australia had used the range for military weapons testing since 1947. The EUROPA-A launch complex would be the one that had already been developed for the British Blue Streak project.

The Woomera Test Range was the only land-based test range left in the Western world capable of testing the next (or what is now termed the ‘fifth’) generation of weapons systems within a fully instrumented, land-based, specialised test and evaluation range. That redefined the future role and strategic importance of the Woomera Range Complex within Australia’s long-term Defence requirements.

ELDO began in June 1964 with the first launch of the EUROPA-A vehicle. That test successfully launched the EUROPA-A’s first stage. Two more similar launches of the first stage were completed in the next nine months.

With confidence building that a multi-stage vehicle could reach orbit, seven more launches were attempted.  Two launches in 1966 with dummy second and third stages were successful. The following year, two launches with powered second stages and dummy third stages were attempted. However, both of those launches suffered second-stage separation malfunctions.

The final three flights were carrying satellites for the first time and had all stages active. None succeeded: in the first two launches, the third stage exploded, and the final launch didn’t achieve a suitable orbit to deploy the satellite.

After that, ELDO stopped launching from Woomera and developed a new launch site in French Guiana in South America.

Other programs continued work at Woomera. One of the landmark events was the launch of an Australian satellite, WRESAT, in November 1967 using a spare Redstone vehicle.  Australia became the third country after the US and Russia to launch its own satellite.

Another success occurred in October 1971 when a UK satellite was launched from Woomera on the British Black Arrow. Weapons Research Establishment also tested the Turana target drone for the Navy out of Woomera, and also from Jervis Bay.

The global enthusiasm for satellites and the realisation that it was the lifeline to everything from weather monitoring to the emerging world of the internet led to the search for a continuing mission for Woomera.

One company that saw such an opportunity was Kistler Aerospace in the US. It had a two‑stage reusable launch vehicle in development that could be reused 100 times. However, the company had problems in securing the US$1 billion in funds it needed for the project, despite receiving US$100 million from Northrup Grumman, and didn’t set up its program at Woomera.

The story of Woomera and missed opportunities in missile testing and space initiatives can be linked to the lack of political awareness of where this technical field was headed. From the beginning, the political will to take advantage of Woomera’s potential was muted. Voters saw little reason to prioritise funding to expand the facilities at Woomera or the programs using them, or to seek out new ways to use Woomera to further Australian space activities.

However, more recently Woomera has been ‘re-discovered’ by over 60 private start-up companies eager to implement their own space launch programs. Yet Defence is resisting calls to open up Woomera to commercial space activities because of sensitive military research and development occurring at the location.

The Turnbull government announced at the International Astronautical Congress in Adelaide last year that it would again launch a national space agency. That makes Australia the second-last OECD member to have its own.

So it would seem that, belatedly, both private industry and government are realising the importance of space as a sector of national development and growth. In that regard, there are unique capabilities inherent in the Woomera Range. The challenge for the federal government is to figure out how it’s going to balance military and civilian use within the facility.

Time will tell if—this time—the opportunities are realised.

Australia’s future in space

 

Australia is about to get much more serious about its future role on the high frontier of space. Following last year’s announcement of the formation of an Australian space agency, there’s gathering momentum across government and industry to think more seriously about having an Australian sovereign space capability that’s more than just ground stations and regulatory frameworks.

Developing a sovereign space capability for Australia is the focus of my new ASPI Strategy report, Australia’s future in space, released today. It explores the case for exploiting innovative ‘Space 2.0’ technologies such as small satellites and ‘CubeSats’, as well as responsive space launch capabilities, to reduce Australia’s dependency on others and enable it to play a greater role in space alongside key allies.

Australia’s traditional dependency on others for space access to support defence and national security creates an unacceptable risk that Australia could lose access to essential services in a crisis. Australia must respond to the reality that space is no longer a sanctuary from conflict, but is becoming a contested, congested and complex operational domain.

The US intelligence community recently noted that adversary states are developing highly capable counter-space capabilities based around ‘hard kill’ anti-satellite weapons, as well as ‘soft kill’ systems such as jamming, electronic warfare and cyberattack. The assessment argues that these adversaries have every intention to use such weapons in a crisis.

For the ADF, an adversary counter-space offensive could result in a rapid and catastrophic loss of military effectiveness, and an inability to undertake modern joint operations. That could lead to military defeat.

It’s no longer necessary to accept that risk. My paper highlights the global transformation of the space sector, and the significance of cost reductions offered by Space 2.0 systems to a level far cheaper than traditional satellite and launch technologies. CubeSats offer the military useful capabilities for a few million dollars, compared to the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars for traditional communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites. They give us the option, for the first time, to build and operate our own.

The proof is in the doing. Australia recently launched the locally developed Buccaneer CubeSat to calibrate the over-the-horizon Jindalee Operational Radar Network, and is developing three more CubeSats for the RAAF to undertake ISR roles. These satellites will be launched in 2018 and 2019.

Getting satellites into orbit is also becoming much easier. Reusable rocket technology such as SpaceX promises to cut the cost of launching payloads drastically, while small, expendable satellite launch vehicles such as those developed by Rocket Lab, launching out of New Zealand, can put a small satellite into orbit for a few million dollars.

Australian company Equatorial Launch Australia is set to open a spaceport near Gove, in the Northern Territory, while Gilmour Space Technology is developing its Eris orbital-class launch vehicle. It could potentially launch Australian satellites from an Australian launch site. These developments give Australia the ability to boost its self-reliance in orbit, rather than wholly depending on allied space capabilities.

A further justification for developing our own space capability is to ‘burden share in orbit’, particularly with the United States, and to support the establishment of multilateral space consortiums. Together, these would dissuade growing adversarial threats. Space deterrence can be developed by disaggregating space systems from a smaller number of large, vulnerable, more complex and costly satellites into large, networked swarms of small satellites and low-cost CubeSats, which are much harder to attack.

All of this isn’t to argue that we should become entirely autarkic in space. Australia will continue to rely on high–end, US-provided space capability, as well as commercial space systems such as Intelsat. But I argue that Australia can add a sovereign layer missing from the current space architecture, as illustrated below in Figure 1. Tier III can complement US and commercial systems, provide niche capabilities, offer responsive reconstitution and boost space resilience. All this boosts deterrence and dissuasion by making an adversary’s counter-space campaign less likely to be effective.

Figure 1: An Australian space framework

I also argue that Australia should aim to update its approach to space in the next defence white paper to explicitly embrace an increasing degree of space self-reliance. This would be based on the Space 2.0 model of low cost and innovative technologies—including small satellites, CubeSats and responsive space launch. This should occur in lock-step with efforts to boost the Australian space industry and develop a commercial space sector locally. The commercial sector is important, and can contribute to Defence’s needs in space wherever possible.

Australia needs to recognise that the global space sector is rapidly changing. The traditional approach of government-run ‘end-to-end’ space programs (what might be called Space 1.0), epitomised by NASA in the United States, is increasingly challenged by rapidly developing commercial space companies exploiting Space 2.0 paradigms. The ‘new space’ companies embrace risk, encourage innovation, have bold visions for the future and emphasise a ‘can do’ spirit.

Australia needs to adopt this innovative and bold thinking about space, and be prepared to lift its gaze skywards. Australia can do more than just host joint facilities—what the late Des Ball often referred to as providing a ‘suitable piece of real estate’. We can develop a presence in orbit to enhance ADF operational capability and reduce risks that loom in the future.