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As we enter US President Barack Obama’s second term, one of the key strategic questions for Australia is what happens to America’s ‘pivot’ towards the Asia–Pacific. Announced in late 2011, it signalled a renewed US commitment to the region by strengthening and diversifying US military presence in the region. Later rebranded ‘rebalancing’, it was largely a reaction to allies and partners worrying about a more assertive China and about the possibility of Washington becoming more isolationist in the face its looming economic crisis.
Over the course of 2012, the US moved from rhetoric to incremental implementation. Apart from the announcement of plans to rotate US Marines through Darwin, Washington initiated similar discussions about greater rotational access with the Philippines. The Obama administration agreed to increase the number of forward deployed US Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) by basing four in Singapore. It called for a US–Vietnamese strategic partnership and conducted joint naval training with its former enemy. It even strengthened defence cooperation with Cambodia, which was thought to be in the ‘China camp’. Moreover, the US strengthened its posture in Japan and South Korea. Finally, the Pentagon pushed a new ‘AirSea Battle’ doctrine designed to counter a growing ‘anti-access/area-denial challenge’ in the Western Pacific, for which read: Chinese military systems. Read more
A recent Strategist post suggested that Canberra should take a closer look at ‘80-20’ solutions in the forthcoming Defence White Paper. In essence, it argues that Canberra should consider simple and cheap technologies which provide similar military capabilities in lieu of the more expensive and technologically complex options. This is sage advice, to which I would add that talk is cheap—literally. One of the most effective (and most affordable) ways that Australia can protect its strategic interests is to increase its investment in defence diplomacy.
Australia is already involved in a constellation of security-focused dialogues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. However, if Australia is serious about promoting its interests and engaging the region it should intensify its involvement in track II, or informal, dialogues. Track II dialogues are ‘unofficial’ meetings which bring together academics, think tank scholars, non-governmental organisations, policy experts and officials in their unofficial capacities. These gatherings provide a political space for them to exchange policy ideas, identify emerging security concerns, and communicate with other countries regarding their strategic interests. The ‘informal’ nature of these meetings means they are relatively free of diplomatic constraints; thus, participants can trade information, test new ideas, and most importantly, confront sensitive security matters before they require an official or military response. Much to the detriment of Australian security diplomacy these processes are currently underutilised and underappreciated. Read more
There is an emerging consensus that the United States is challenging China’s dominance in Myanmar, with analysts reporting signals of ‘Myanmar’s shift from China’s orbit toward the West’. This apparent shift was brought into focus by the suspension of China’s Myitsone Dam mega-project in northern Myanmar’s Kachin State in September 2011, a decision described as a ‘democratic act’ by US Senator John McCain. Many have described the dam suspension and other recent events as signs that Myanmar wants to be ‘part of the new world order instead of being half-colonized by China’.
The thrust of these analyses is the vilification of Chinese involvement, in contrast to the idolisation of US engagement. That viewpoint needs some analysis. On face value, it cannot be assumed that US involvement is necessarily positive or negative. But nor is Chinese.
China’s years of diplomacy and assistance have supported and cultivated Myanmar’s development. It is unfair to the Chinese government to insinuate that Myanmar’s recent liberalisations and the increasing involvement of other foreign nations were unforeseen by the Chinese. Indeed, the Chinese have actively encouraged Myanmar to engage with the international community over the years, including supporting their ascension to ASEAN. Read more
The defence budget of the Republic of Indonesia has seen a significant increase in 2012, reaching US$8 billion—an increase of 29.5% from the previous year. The funding increase is intended to meet Indonesia’s minimum essential force (MEF) requirements. One purchase will be the main battle tank (MBT) Leopard 2A6 from Germany. The final purchase of 100 units is the result of tortuous negotiations after an earlier sale of the same type of tank was rejected by the Dutch parliament, leaving the vehicles available for sale elsewhere. Indonesia is determined to boost its armour to the equivalent of the forces of Malaysia and Singapore, who acquired MBTs some years ago.
But behind the purchase of Leopard tanks, there are is a crucial observation; the concept of procurement of military capability by Indonesia is not particularly well-planned. The Indonesian Ministry of Defense and the Indonesian military’s (TNI) headquarters have both expressed interest in buying the MBT, for different reasons. For TNI, it is a step up in capability, as their current armoured vehicles include only light tanks. From the government’s point of view, it’s a chance to implement a government purchase scheme which, by eliminating the role of broker, will reduce the occurrence of corrupt practices.
But as the impact of financial crisis that plagued Europe took hold, Indonesia was offered an opportunity not only in the form of an offer to buy the Dutch Leopards, but also AH-64 Apache helicopters and F-16 Block 52 fighter jets (which would mean TNI would at least have weapon systems comparable to Singapore’s and Malaysia’s). But on the other hand, Indonesia’s military procurement strategies seem to be emotionally driven; Indonesia wants to be seen to be keeping up militarily with neighbouring countries. Read more