South China Sea Archives - Page 8 of 9

China’s new wave of assertiveness in the South China Sea

14 May 2014

Since 1 May, China has deployed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 floating oil rig off the central coast of Vietnam for an exploratory mission. Vietnam has been infuriated as the rig has been parked well within Vietnam’s lawful Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), just 120 nm from its maritime baseline. It has also caused widespread concerns across the region.

The incident is the latest development in what can be seen as a new wave of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea following its successful de facto seizure of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012. After a relatively calm year of 2013, this new wave started earlier this year with China’s siege of the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys. There are also reports that China has been actively preparing for the construction of an airstrip on the Johnson South Reef, which it occupied after a naval skirmish with Vietnam in 1988. Read more

The threat that leaves something to chance

15 April 2014

Since 2009, China’s non-military maritime law authority vessels have engaged in low intensity coercive activities (PDF) designed to alter the status quo in China’s maritime periphery. Regional states have largely been at a loss as to how to deal with China’s growing maritime presence and, for its part, the US has been reluctant to physically insert itself into disputes for fear of militarising them unnecessarily. But there are signs of mounting frustration in Washington with the current state of affairs and America’s policy settings. And while analysts are right to point to the risks of escalation in any confrontation between the PLA and the US Navy, it’s increasingly clear that the US must do something, even if it means mirroring China’s own provocative practices.

In a recent Foreign Policy article Ely Ratner and Elbridge Colby argue that by foreshadowing the prospect of ‘penalties’ for coercive diplomacy in future, America can ‘inject a healthy degree of risk into Beijing’s calculus’, and discourage China’s destabilising behaviour. While Ratner and Colby aren’t forthcoming on what kinds of penalties the US should be willing to impose, it’s clear that directly threatening the use of superior force would be a risky option. China could quite easily ignore threats (whether implicit or explicit) and push the difficult choice of conceding or escalating back onto the US. China’s much heralded counter-intervention capabilities mean that America’s ability to impose substantial military penalties is heavily reliant on capabilities like stealth and long-range precision strike. Those capabilities are hard to leverage in threat-based contests because they are not visible until used against an adversary, in which case a conflict threshold has already been crossed. Rather, the US needs to find ways to contest China’s actions without unnecessarily escalating a crisis or making threats that can’t be honoured. Read more

Implications of recent incidents for China’s claims and strategic intent in the South China Sea (part 2)

28 November 2013

When discussing China’s South China Sea (SCS) strategy, it’s necessary to begin by asserting that there is in fact a strategy that’s readily discernible from public documents and pronouncements. Though there’s been some disagreement over the degree of coordination between operational units and the central government, with some analysts even questioning if Beijing actually has a discernible strategy in these areas, others have contended that China does in fact have a plan—one that it regards as increasingly successful in achieving its desired objectives. According to Peter Dutton (PDF), the Director of the Chinese Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the US Naval War College, this strategy is centred on the use of ‘non-militarized coercion’ that has provided a means for controlled escalation.

While the execution of this strategy may have at times in the past been poorly implemented due to the vague and developing nature of the strategic goals, since (and even before) Xi Jinping came into power, there’s been a concerted effort to at least increase coordination and oversight, if not to clarify the strategic objectives themselves. However, this increased coordination and oversight is primarily intended to better control the potential for escalation. It’s also part of a wider evolving Chinese strategy to better protect what it views as its ‘maritime rights and interests’ in the SCS. These new strategic objectives do little more than consolidate previous strategic guidance. This suggests that existing patterns of expanded Chinese maritime presence and corresponding incidents at sea are more likely to persist than diminish in the years ahead, though they may be managed more closely by Beijing. Read more

China’s Achilles’ heel in Southeast Asia

15 October 2013

Recent commentary on US President Barack Obama’s last minute cancellation of his trips to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Bali and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Brunei overwhelmingly reflected classical ‘zero-sum’ thinking. The common reading is that the credibility of the US ‘pivot’ has been further undermined, and that China used Obama’s absence to boost its position with the ASEAN nations.

However, international politics hardly follows such binary dynamics. Indeed, for many reasons, Beijing’s goal to bolster its position in Southeast Asia at Washington’s expense is very likely to fail. First, regional leaders understand very well that one cancelled presidential trip to Southeast Asia doesn’t equal a change in the US’s Asia strategy. Key regional powers such as Malaysia and Indonesia acknowledged Obama’s imperative to stay at home. Instead, Secretary of State John Kerry attended both meetings and delivered the key message Southeast Asian countries wanted to hear: America expects China and its neighbours to peacefully resolve their territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Read more

China’s 10-dash line and cross-strait tensions

12 September 2013

John Blaxland recently argued on The Strategist that China is largely responsible for tensions in the Asia–Pacific. Indeed, its new ‘10-dash line’ is likely to increase the fears of its neighbours about Beijing’s expansive territorial claims. The new map is particularly worrisome for Taiwan, which has already initiated steps to counter China’s assertiveness.

Released in January this year, China’s ‘10-dash line’ declares 80% of the South China Sea Chinese. The 10 dashes are not Beijing’s only claim—there are dozens more beyond that, including the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Significantly, it also asserts Taiwan to be a part of China’s sovereign territory, which is reinforced by the new ‘10th dash’ off the east coast of Taiwan.

The new dash complicates cross-strait relations. It reiterates China’s long-standing assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan, not only subsuming China and Taiwan’s identical claims in the South China Sea, but also those regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The identical claims are based on a 1947 Kuomintang nationalist government map containing 11 dashes. The map was adopted by the Chinese communists and adjusted when President Zhou Enlai deleted two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin. China and Taiwan both argue that historical documents show the islands are a part of Taiwan. For the mainland, which claims that Taiwan is part of its territory, by extension Taiwan’s claims become its own. Read more

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