Arguing the case for nuclear-powered submarines, Tony Abbott laments that, under plans to acquire French-designed conventional submarines, the RAN will take delivery of a class that:

will have less power, less range, less speed and less capability … and that it will come into service about a decade later than would be optimal at a time when strategic circumstances are changing against us.

In response, Defence Minister Marise Payne reminded Mr Abbott that:

Australia currently lacks the qualified personnel, experience, infrastructure, training facilities and regulatory systems required to design, construct, operate and maintain a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines … Developing a sovereign nuclear-submarine fleet would come at a very substantial cost premium to our conventional fleet.

But there’s more to be said. Nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) are about force projection. They exercise sea control in support of surface strike groups, shadow ballistic missile submarines, and deny enemy battle groups access to zones of interest. So, setting Australia’s lack of industrial and operational capabilities aside, the debate needs to be whether an Australian government would seriously consider deploying SSNs against a regional superpower.

Securing sea lines of communication and the nation’s seaboard remains paramount in Australia’s national defence strategy. Diesel-electric submarines (SSK) excel in littoral or coastal waters, as is the case for the continent’s northern and northwestern approaches. And Australia’s strategic alliance interests are well served by providing the US Navy with an operational submarine capability it needs but doesn’t have. The US values RAN submarines for their littoral capabilities that form a natural extension to United States Navy (USN) nuclear submarine operations.

Both USN and Royal Navy submarines are powered by highly enriched weapons-grade nuclear material that doesn’t usually require replacing during a 30-year submarine lifecycle. The French Navy powers its submarines with high-density, low-enriched uranium that necessitates periodic refuelling.

While a typical peacetime deployment would be similar for nuclear and diesel-electric submarines (50 to 100 days), a nuclear-powered submarine would ordinarily only need to dock to take on provisions and weapons, or undertake repairs and maintenance, and for crew change.

In addition to long endurance, nuclear power provides an SSN with a sustained submerged speed of over 30 knots. That translates into far-reaching, covert mobility that outperforms surface units in any navy’s inventory. SSKs lack speed, but the size of an SSN limits effective deployments in the littorals and estuaries, and its size gives a larger echo strength, increasing the probability of detection.

Thus, there are operational missions for which SSNs are not suited. The 7,000+ tonne displacement of the USN’s Virginia-class and the RN’s Astute-class arguably makes them too long and too high from keel to periscope to operate effectively in shallow waters. While the French Barracuda-class is smaller, the boats are still not particularly suited to operations in littoral zones compared to smaller, low-signature SSKs.

Conversely, due to a lack of mobility, SSKs are not suited for support of fast-moving surface forces. A sustainable speed of under 10 knots renders an SSK vulnerable to detection while snorting to recharge its batteries.

The chief of the German Navy, Vice Admiral Andreas Krause, was correct when he once described non-nuclear submarines as ‘vehicles of position’. The former submarine commander explains that, despite advances in sonar technology, detecting and targeting submarines in confined and shallow waters, where variable salinity and thermal zones are present, remains extremely difficult. In those littoral waters conventional submarines are tasked with intelligence-gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). And they are charged with the protection of shipping lanes, choke points and harbours.

Conventional submarines, the admiral emphasises, are also suitable for precursor operations—i.e. to ‘prepare a battle space prior to major operations’. Their first task is ‘to survey the area, identify threats and explore and assess the environment’. While perfectly suited to an ISR role in littoral waters, once hostile operations commence the modern conventional submarine can readily become a lethal weapons platform, either as a hunter-killer or in support of a battle group.

Admiral Krause’s view is supported by DCNS’s (now Naval Group) Director of Submarine Design Division, Vincent Geiger, and by former submarine commander Benoît Le Masson. After decades of force projections on the high seas, the French experts claim that smaller and middle powers are now emphasising the protection of their maritime borders.

Operating a submarine at less than 2 knots only metres above an irregular seabed, or bottoming undetected for a prolonged period, are tasks best suited to an SSK. Notwithstanding the advances made in anechoic tiling and the benefits of ambient noise prevalent in shallow waters, the acoustic signature of an SSN’s nuclear reactor and its associated appurtenances will rarely be hidden.

The infrared signature of a nuclear power plant is detectable in nearly all sea states due to the thermal structure of wave patterns. Close to the ocean floor, the cooling-water intake on SSNs could be prone to collecting contaminants. In contrast, today’s conventional submarines are extremely quiet, with very low infrared and magnetic signatures. When powered by Li-ion batteries and AIP propulsion, those submarines can operate at patrol-quiet state or sit on the seabed for several weeks without surfacing.

Australia’s liquefied gas, iron ore and coal—the country’s major earners—are exported from ports and terminals on the northwest and east coasts of Australia. The current offshore oil and gas fields are in waters of less than 200 metres’ depth. Safeguarding those installations is paramount to the country’s economic security.

But Australia’s strategic interests also call for greater range and longer patrol endurance. That seems to have influenced the government to select a submarine similar in displacement to that of an SSN. But increased size compromises stealth, without the offsetting advantages of speed and endurance. The government’s choice of the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A concept unites design and building risks, high program costs and an extended delivery schedule. And it’s a decision that promises few or no capability gains.

Both Hans Ohff and Hugh White have expressed reservations about Australia’s future submarine and the ability of Australian industry to deliver the project in a timely manner, but they don’t have detailed knowledge of the program.

DCNS agrees with only two of their claims: that the future submarine (Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A) will be a class with no equals, and that DCNS has a proven track record of naval design and construction. The authors’ other claims are wide of the mark. On the charge that a fleet of smaller submarines would be preferable, DCNS considered it more appropriate to propose a submarine based on the nuclear Barracuda design, the larger submarine being built for the French Navy, than to offer one based on the smaller Scorpene class.

The submarine’s design is directly related to the tasks Australia needs the vessel to perform and the larger design was better suited to the Royal Australian Navy’s stealth, warm water and endurance requirements. These elements were rigorously examined in the Competitive Evaluation Process.

Australia’s future submarine shares many of the attributes of the French Barracuda in that it will be designed to operate globally and it will share a similar hull form and many internal systems. Though there is an element of risk in any cutting edge submarine program, this can be offset by lessons learned from the French program.

DCNS’ track record is also relevant. The company has successfully executed a program of technology transfer to build submarines in partnership with such countries as Malaysia, Brazil and India, including retraining and upskilling the workforces in those countries.

Australia will join the list of countries France has successfully worked with and this nation has already shown it can build world class diesel electric submarines through construction of the Collins class.

DCNS is putting a great deal of effort into maturing the design along with program industrialization, a comprehensive build strategy and the infrastructure going in to Adelaide. By October this year we expect to have 50 Australian and 20 French staff working from Adelaide in the initial phase of the program, focused on such areas as management, engineering, technology transfer, procurement and supply chain development. Work will continue over the next 12 months on the design contract with the Commonwealth and with Lockheed Martin over combat system design and integration.

DCNS has set a number of goals to ensure the business shapes up to undertaking the build from 2021. By then we should have a new shipyard at Adelaide’s Techport including equipment test and hull construction facilities. There will be a land based centre to test major equipment including the submarine’s propulsion system. The production workforce will be assembling and the supervisors will be commencing on the job training. Construction of the first submarine is intended to begin in the early 2020s, further driving jobs and investment across Australia, with the first of class to be delivered to the Navy from the late 2020s.

Efforts to engage Australian industry in the project are also bearing fruit. We have been busying ourselves talking to hundreds of potential suppliers, so far issuing more than 700 requests for information to more than 200 companies.

Maximising Australian industry involvement grows out of an obligation to provide, build, operate and sustain the submarine fleet in association with industry and academic and technical bodies. Following the signing of the Design and Mobilisation Contract, DCNS is developing a detailed Australian Industry Capability Plan. A Transfer of Technology Strategy will be developed as part of the plan.

Throughout the design, construction and maintenance process, DCNS envisages an ambitious approach to the transfer of technology and in forming partnerships with government, industry and academia with the goal of enabling the submarine fleet to be largely maintained and supported in Australia. We are staging supplier industry days around the country. The last of these, in Melbourne, attracting more than 300 attendees from industry and educational institutions and one in Adelaide last year attracted 450.

These figures underscore the fact that though submarine construction is centred on South Australia, this is very much a national program and its success depends on engaging the most qualified suppliers from around the nation. Industry briefings to engage suppliers will follow in Brisbane on 11 May and in Perth, Darwin and regional centres.

Ohff’s characterization of the capabilities to be employed on the future submarines assumes capabilities stand still and are not incorporated as they become available. The program is designed to ensure that technology improvements are incorporated in each new vessel with the final submarine expected to be a considerable advance on the technologies in the first of class. Battery technology is one area where this is self-evident.

DCNS, with the Commonwealth and partner Lockheed Martin, is getting on with the job of implementing the program. It is intent on delivering on the commitment made to the Competitive Evaluation Process to deliver a regionally superior submarine which maintains Australia’s capability edge for decades to come.

There have been a number of well-argued suggestions that Australia should introduce nuclear powered submarines (SSN) and, more recently, an emotive argument that a conventional submarine is not up to the task required by Australia’s strategic circumstances, and that we could have SSN for less than the cost of the current program.

Nuclear propulsion removes the need to expose the submarine by snorting to recharge batteries and confers much greater mobility—an SSN can travel at high speed for prolonged periods enabling it to be more effective in a sea denial role (i.e. guarding the approaches to Australia). Food, stores and the effectiveness of the crew become the practical limit on endurance.

Australia obtains maximum benefit and deterrence by exploiting a submarine’s stealth to gain access to sensitive areas, where we don’t control the sea surface or air above it, for intelligence gathering or striking key targets afloat or ashore. These areas are a long way from Australia, necessitating long transits and will be increasingly heavily protected.

The benefits of nuclear propulsion combined with our requirements could indeed justify a move to an SSN fleet.

I will focus on the manpower issues—this is not to belittle the other important factors, but manning the capability is the first priority.

Australia would require the ability to ensure and oversee the safe operation of such a force. I do not believe that the Australian public would accept the notion of delegating this to another nation under a leasing agreement.

The SSN skillsets ashore and afloat are significantly more demanding than a conventional submarine. For example: each SSN carries two command qualified officers and five marine engineering officers—compared to a conventional submarine’s one of each!

The regimes of technical supervision, training and independent auditing of nuclear procedures is significantly more demanding, with very experienced personnel required to comply with best practices. The training and development of these individuals takes a long time, for example nuclear engineers/technicians may take 15 years following qualification to reach the necessary levels of experience to oversee the safe operation of the capability.

Having modeled the career paths necessary to achieve these experience levels I believe ten SSN is the minimum to sustain the critical mass of manpower. A smaller force will not generate the number of experienced personnel to safely supervise its operation.

As a rule of thumb the size of the Submarine Arm is driven by the number of qualified crew at sea, for every person at sea the Arm should contain another 1.6 – 1.8 people. So the crew size of the chosen SSN is a key determinant. For a fleet of ten of the larger British or American SSNs, an Australian submarine arm of about 3,400 would be required. The smaller French SSN would require half this number.

Australia currently has a submarine arm of about 600—there’s no credible way to grow the additional qualified manpower while overcoming the technical challenges of a transition to nuclear propulsion in time to replace the Collins class.

The Collins class has a finite life and if we embark on an under-resourced transition we stand the risk of having no operational submarine capability in the 2030s and 2040s.

The lower risk starting point is to build up to 9 conventional submarines, which would require about 1,500 in the submarine arm, bulked up with additional marine engineering officers and technicians to provide the manpower base to undertake the transition to SSN.

Modern conventional submarines, with air independent propulsion, carrying similar combat system and weapons can prevail against an SSN—the key factor is training and crew preparation.

The manpower lead-time of 15 years for nuclear propulsion would require us to start now on the process to train/recruit the nuclear expertise and plan for the transition to facilitate a final decision in 2030.

At that point the lead-time injected by the technical and logistic issues would entail a further 15 years before commissioning Australia’s first SSN, about 2046, in lieu of our tenth new conventional.

Cost will also be a significant consideration. The cost of developing the infrastructure, sustaining the qualified manpower and paying the original IP owner for his investment will be nothing like the figure quoted to US Congress for an additional SSN. This cost is for construction alone; logistic, IP and overhead charges are supported out of the US Navy’s wider R&D, training and logistic budgets. It is too soon to put a figure on an Australian SSN capability. Noting the cost of establishing the specialised logistic, training and education infrastructure, my instinct would be 4-6 times the cost of a conventional force of the same size.

There’s a sound argument for seriously considering transitioning to nuclear propulsion. But we’ll need many more people and it’ll take years to grow the pool. We’d have to start with a larger conventional fleet first. Given the long manpower lead-time, the Government should direct national preparations now to gather the details necessary for a well informed decision on nuclear propulsion by 2030, with an eye on a possible in-service date of 2046. And we should anticipate paying significantly more than our current conventional submarine capability costs.

After all of the fanfare and chest beating on 26 April about how 12 submarines will be built in Adelaide: silence. By all appearances—or rather the lack of them—it seems that the Department of Defence is in no rush and little, if any, activity on Australia’s largest naval shipbuilding project is expected until well after the Federal election. Contract negotiations for the detailed design phase haven’t been scheduled and are unlikely to begin for some months.

In the meantime, Defence says that they and presumptive designer, DCNS of France, are building up their Australian workforces, with a strong emphasis on science and technology.

The selection of DCNS hasn’t been without controversy, at least as far as the competition is concerned. TKMS of Germany has been anonymously quoted in the media expressing their displeasure at the decision, feeling that the Competitive Evaluation Process was rigged from the start as part of a plot to move to a nuclear powered submarine. The Japanese have been more restrained, at least publicly, but undoubtedly there are hurt feelings in Tokyo following strong encouragement in 2013 by former Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, to engage with Australia on the future submarine, only then to be shunned.

There are several reasons why DCNS has been selected, but the overarching theme appears to be access to advanced submarine technology. It’s necessary to remember that the CEP was more about selecting a long-term design partner able to help Australia develop sovereign capability than it was about a particular product. The combination of the expertise in DCNS itself, coupled with the French Navy, the highly influential and well-resourced Direction générale de l’armement (DGA), and the military research community is a formidable pool of talent.

One particular area where the French have a technology advantage over the German and Japanese designers is their familiarity with issues around propelling large submarines, having built SSBNs up to 14,000 tonnes displacement. Pushing the future 4,500 tonne Australian submarine through the water quietly at all speeds won’t be easy. While the Germans and Japanese continue to rely on conventional propellers, for their nuclear submarines, France—together with the US and Britain—has moved to pump jet or propulsor technology.

Without getting too bogged down in the technical pros and cons of each, at higher speeds propellers are prone to cavitation—basically water boiling at the edges of the blades due to the enormous pressure being generated—which in turn makes a distinctive noise that enemy sonars are able to detect. While conventional submarines spend most of their time on station at slow speeds—where the acoustic performance of propellers and propulsors is similar—when they do need high speed it’s typically at a moment of crisis. To be able to accelerate to maximum speed silently, while simultaneously turning and changing depth, is a great advantage for a big submarine if it is trying to escape in a hostile environment.

Because of the limitations of propeller technology for large submarines, we can likely conclude that the approach of DCNS in utilising their access to the most sensitive nuclear submarine technologies gave them a distinct advantage. Put simply, while Germany and Japan are excellent builders of conventional submarines, France is a first class builder of conventional and nuclear boats.

Several commentators, including Peter Jennings, have raised the possibility of Australia eventually moving to nuclear powered submarines and a consensus is slowly emerging that at the very least this possibility needs to be open to discussion. If that does come to pass, having DCNS as part of the team will make an eventual transition relatively easy.

There are a number of other factors that probably contributed to France’s win. While Germany and Japan are planning to move to lithium ion batteries in their conventional submarines, France is leery of doing so. This suspicion of lithium ion storage is shared by the USN and could have had an influence on the decision. Major French companies such as Thales and Sagem are already on the Collins, supplying a number of critical hi-tech items such as the entire sonar suite and the ring laser inertial navigation systems. Those companies have met or exceeded all of their targets for industry development, technology transfer and, in the case of Thales, re-export of sonar technology to France and Britain.

Finally, the French marketed well and positioned themselves to work as cooperatively as possible with the RAN to meet all of their requirements. The conservative approach to pricing the bid adopted by DCNS worked to their ultimate advantage because, as the Collins program has shown, there are a large number of developmental hurdles to be overcome—and that won’t be cheap.

Editor’s note: The Strategist has invited all three SEA 1000 contenders to explain their approach to meeting Australia’s future submarine requirement.

The first post in this two-part series explored several key questions pertaining to Japan’s ability to meet Australia’s future submarine needs. Those questions concerned cruising range, internal narrowness and operational lifespan. This second post will further explain the truth about the capability of the Soryu-class and the reasons why the Japanese proposal is low risk.

Is Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) necessary?

A concern has been expressed that since modern submarines are required to spend long periods of time submerged and to secretly evacuate to safer waters, AIP capability is indispensable. Yet it isn’t included in the Japanese proposal.

As a result of incorporating lithium-ion batteries into our submarines that surpass the capabilities of AIP, Japan doesn’t believe that AIP is an indispensable capability for modern submarines.

Japan has experience operating seven submarines installed with AIP systems. But after considering the evolution in lithium-ion battery technology—higher energy density, greater safety, faster recharging times—Japan decided not to install AIP systems on submarines that will be built from 2015 onwards. The new Soryu-class submarine will use lithium-ion batteries instead of AIP as that technology has led to improvements in submerged endurance and speed capabilities, thereby allowing operators to continuously traverse waters using a wider range of possible speed options that simply aren’t available to AIP.

We believe that this new Japanese technology will provide a capability that exceeds that of AIP.

Are lithium-ion batteries reliable?

There’s a concern that lithium-ion battery technology isn’t yet sufficiently developed to use in submarines.

As above, Japan made a decision to install lithium-ion batteries on any submarines to be built from 2015 onwards. Prior to their installation in submarines, our battery technologies have gone through a vigorous and complete verification testing. They’ve been thoroughly evaluated in over 20 different types of tests and no issue has been found concerning their reliability. Those tests include short-circuit tests, shock-resistance tests, drop tests, overcharging/over-discharging tests, seawater soaking tests and heat tests. The results clearly demonstrate that reliability isn’t an issue. With this assurance, we finally decided to install lithium-ion batteries in our own new submarines.

What does submarine cooperation mean for the ‘special strategic partnership’?

An argument has recently emerged in Australia suggesting that deepening defence and security cooperation with Japan would narrow Australia’s strategic flexibility and pose a strategic risk to Australia. But is a point of view that regards Japan as a source of strategic risk for Australia correct? Japan and Australia share the values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets and free trade, and we have a ‘special strategic partnership’ based on our mutual strategic interests.

Australia, along with a large number of other nations, has welcomed the more pro-active contribution Japan will make to the peace, stability and prosperity of both the region and the world in line with Japan’s ‘Positive Contribution to Peace’ based on the principle of international co-operation. It’s in that context that one should regard the deepening of security and defence co-operation between Japan and Australia.

As has been the case for many years now, Japan and Australia have been deepening security and defence cooperation based on our past 2+2 discussions and agreements. The Australian government’s 2016 Defence White Paper also endorsed the strengthening of security and defence cooperation between Japan and Australia. Our participation in the CEP for the future submarine program is just one part of a much wider and more diverse story. If we were to follow the logic of the argument, which is based on opposition to Japan and Australia deepening our defence and security cooperation, we simply are left asking ‘why?’

Furthermore, Japan regards Australia as a trusted partner which is why it concluded a bilateral agreement concerning the transfer of defence equipment and technology. Under assurances given by Australia based on the agreement, necessary technology will be transferred from Japan to Australia in the event that Japan is chosen as a partner for the future submarine program. The technology transfer will ensure that Australia will be able to possess and exercise its own sovereign control over its submarines.