Tag Archive for: Satellite

The five-domains update

Sea state

Australian assembly of the first Multi Ammunition Softkill System (MASS) shipsets for the Royal Australian Navy began this month at Rheinmetall’s Military Vehicle Centre of Excellence in Redbank, Queensland. The ship protection system, which uses launched decoy projectiles to defeat incoming sensor-guided missiles, will be integrated into Australia’s ANZAC-class frigates and Hobart-class destroyers. The system has already been operated by New Zealand’s two ANZAC-class frigates for about 10 years.

Last week, Defence announced upgrades to the main transmitter at the Harold E Holt Communication Station near Exmouth, Western Australia—the first major overhaul since the facility was commissioned by the US navy in 1967. The Australian-operated very-low-frequency antenna array contributes to US nuclear deterrent through long-range communication with US ballistic-missile submarines. Maintenance will be carried out on a rolling schedule, to ensure the station remains in operation.

Flight path

China’s J-36 stealth fighter was back in the sky for its second test flight, this time flying solo. The test flights seemingly reveal two unique features: a diverterless supersonic inlet design that assists in regulating air flow and a three-engine layout. Both features suggest supersonic speed capabilities. The timing of its debut signals China’s readiness to challenge the United States’ aerial dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. Last weekend the US made a surprise announcement awarding the Next Generation Air Dominance contract to Boeing for the F-47 fighter jet.

Canada will become the first buyer of Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN). The world-leading radar technology system can detect and track targets thousands of kilometres away by refracting high frequency radio signals. Its sale could be Australia’s biggest defence export to date. The surprise announcement from new Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney comes despite the US’s long-held interest in acquiring the technology.

Rapid fire

The first two of 42 planned High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) vehicles were delivered to Australia this week. The Albanese government accelerated the acquisition of the US-made precision-strike platform. The systems will be fielded by the 10th Fires Brigade and improve army capabilities. The delivery follows the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Australia and the US in March for co-assembly of Guided Multiple Rocket Launch System (GMLRS) munitions for use with HIMARS platforms. Assembly will begin at Orchard Hills in Western Sydney later this year.

At the end of February, Defence Minister Richard Marles inspected the first batch of the Australian army’s new AS9 self-propelled artillery and AS10 armoured ammunition resupply vehicles. The South Korean designs will be manufactured by Hanwha at its Armoured Vehicle Centre of Excellence at Avalon. Australian supply chain partners are already producing components to support delivery. The AS9 is the army’s first self-propelled artillery piece. The army currently operates M777 towed artillery.

Final frontier

An Australian-made nanosatellite was successfully launched into low-Earth orbit as part of Defence’s Buccaneer project. Weighing less than ten kilograms, Buccaneer Main Mission was a collaboration between Adelaide-based Inovor Technologies and the Defence Science and Technology Group. Over its 12-month operational lifespan, the nanosatellite will gather data on how radio waves propagate through the upper atmosphere, potentially improving Australia’s over-the-horizon radar capabilities.

At the end of last month, US-based Varda Space Industries retrieved its Winnebago-2 space capsule after re-entry over remote South Australia. The landing site, Koonibba Test Range, is about 500km north-west of Adelaide. It is operated by Australian firm Southern Launch in partnership with the Koonibba Community Aboriginal Corporation. As the first commercial return to a commercial spaceport anywhere in the world, this is a landmark moment for Australia’s space industry.

Wired watchtower

Microsoft has released research showing that Russian state-sponsored hacking groups are expanding cyber operations to target critical infrastructure and governmental organisations in Western countries, including Australia. The BadPilot campaign is associated with Russian state actor Seashell Blizzard, and intrusions have targeted sectors such as energy, telecommunications and defence manufacturing. Hackers exploit known but unpatched vulnerabilities in widely used IT management and remote access software platforms. Once they gain access, they maintain their presence in compromised networks using legitimate remote-access tools such as Atera Agent and Splashtop remote services.

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission is taking fixed-income broker FIIG Securities to court after a 2023 cyberattack. The attack affected FIIG’s entire IT network and resulted in the theft of approximately 385 gigabytes of confidential data, potentially exposing the personal information of around 18,000 clients. ASIC alleged that FIIG failed to update and patch its software and lacked sufficient cybersecurity measures, leaving its systems exposed to intrusion and data theft. This breach contributed to growing concerns over Australia’s cybersecurity resilience and was part of a broader pattern of intrusions, including those attributed to state-backed groups.

The future of the Combined Space Operations initiative

As space becomes more contested, Australia should play a key role with its partners in the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative to safeguard the space domain.

Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States signed the CSpO initiative in 2014. It has since grown to 10 partners, adding New Zealand, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Norway.

In 2022 the partners released the CSpO Vision 2031 statement, outlining its mission to improve cooperation, coordination and interoperability to ensure freedom of action in space, enhance mission assurance and prevent conflict.

Now in its second decade, CSpO in its efforts and activities must respond to the contestation and congestion of space.

Australia and its allies confront a more challenging security outlook across all five domains of conflict. The space domain is now seen as an operational domain in its own right, rather than merely an enabling adjunct for the traditional air, sea and land domains.

The role of the initiative will become only more important new challenges emerge.

The space domain is contested as adversary states develop a full suite of counterspace (such as anti-satellite, or ASAT) capabilities to deny, degrade and disrupt access to vital space support systems which support joint and integrated military operations and the function of economies and societies.

Space is also increasingly congested as more states and non-state actors deploy large constellations of satellites across multiple orbits and space debris grows. This makes avoiding collision a key challenge.

The first objective of the vision 2031 statement is to prevent conflict, including conflict ‘extending to or originating in space.’ The starting point for this must be space domain awareness, which is an area where Australia plays a key role.

Australia occupies an ideal location for monitoring important regions of space, including low-earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO). Australia hosts several space-domain awareness sensors. For example, the 2023 announcement of a Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) at Exmouth in Western Australia, expected to be operational by 2026, will enable space surveillance out to GEO, an orbit used for satellite communications.

The collaboration that Australia and its CSpO partners undertake on space domain awareness allows the sharing of strategic and tactical intelligence across multiple classification levels. Information can be shared in real time via national headquarters for joint operations—for example between HQ Joint Operations Command near Canberra and the Combined Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Space Force Base in California.

But it also demands a robust, and interoperable space infrastructure, and the ability to ensure continued access to space support. This requires encouragement of commonality in space systems, including resilient satellite architectures and responsive space access.

The development of proliferated LEO (pLEO) satellite mega-constellations enhances space resilience by embracing a ‘small, cheap and many’ solution and avoiding large, complex and expensive satellites in GEO. CSpO partners can work together to develop such pLEO architectures to deploy lower-cost small satellites across multiple orbits and offer services in areas such as satellite communications, satellite relay, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and other specialised tasks.

Australia has redefined its JP-9102 Advanced Satellite Communications project away from ‘large, few and expensive’ satellites in GEO towards a distributed multi-orbit architecture. So CSpO collaboration on new approaches to satellite networks is an obvious step forward that could benefit all members. This would harmonise partners’ efforts, enhance information sharing through common capabilities in space and reduce a concerns of a lack of Australian government support for space initiatives.

Space mission assurance would also benefit from development of responsive space access using Australia’s advantageous geographical location for launch and returns. The north of the continent is close to the equator, maximising the energy boost from the Earth’s rotation for payloads launched from locations such as northern Queensland. The result is lower launch cost.

Additionally, launch sites in southern Australia are good for sun-synchronous and polar orbits often used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance satellites. Australia could support launch requirements for CSpO members. For example, Australia and the US already cooperate through the Technology Safeguards Agreement on launches and returns, signed in October 2023.

Finally, CSpO states need to confront challenges posed by adversary counterspace threats, including through development of credible space control capabilities to defend vital space capabilities. The National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program allude to this challenge, but the practical aspects of space control needs to be realised. It would be an opportunity for CSpO, perhaps through AUKUS Pillar 2, to start putting capability substance behind the declared requirement for such a role.

Power of persistence: Australian technology addresses challenge of space monitoring

Knowing what is going on in orbit is getting harder—yet hardly less necessary. But new technologies are emerging to cope with the challenge, including some that have come from Australian civilian research.

One example is the satellite-transmission monitoring system of Australia’s Quasar Satellite Technologies, which derived from work done by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). Another is FireOPAL, a passive sensor system that my company, Lockheed Martin Australia, has helped develop by building on initial progress by Curtin University in Perth.

Satellites look down at the earth in peace and war to watch over the scene or to scrutinise part of it. Some inspect other satellites and may try to disrupt them. Some are designed for communications, including military communications. So, countries need to know what each other’s satellites are up to.

They need to know which satellites are in which orbits, how they have changed course and how many minutes ago they did that. What are they transmitting? Is that a foreign satellite moving close to one of ours, maybe to jam it, or is it a piece of orbital debris? Is it already jamming?

Since the first satellite rose into space in 1957, more than 6740 launches have placed another 20,000 into Earth’s orbit. At least 10,000 are functioning, and thousands more will come online over the next few years with the construction of mega-constellations. In addition, 40,000 pieces of debris of significant size are in orbit.

The traditional way to monitor all this is to point telescopes, radars and passive radio antennas at limited parts of the sky, assembling a mosaic of pictures, or to point the sensors at particular orbital objects, whether satellites or debris. But there are only so many such sensors, and the number of satellites and pieces of debris is rising.

Also, military satellite operators are getting better at executing surreptitious manoeuvres, so a satellite that had formerly been tracked on a certain orbit might now, unknown to the tracking country, be heading somewhere else. Additionally, a technique of near-constant manoeuvring is an emerging challenge for operators.

Altogether, risks are rising that surveillance systems, pressed to keep watch on the most important targets, will miss critical events in space involving other satellites, such as a manoeuvre, break-up or malfunction. Indeed, orbital objects are sometimes not known at all until they are discovered incidentally in surveillance that wasn’t targeting them.

Australian companies are stepping up with novel solutions. With advanced antenna technology, Quasar Satellite’s technology continuously surveils radio-frequency signals not from a single point but across a broad swathe of space—for monitoring as well as communications. The technology goes back to CSIRO’s ASKAP radio telescope installed in Western Australia for scientific research.

FireOPAL stares at the sky optically. Its origin was Curtin University technology for watching the larger sections of the sky to detect atmospheric entries by meteorites. The university and Lockheed Martin Australia have adapted it to track satellites.

The key point is that sensors such as FireOPAL don’t need to be tasked with pointing at a particular spot in the sky, spending time looking there while things are happening elsewhere; they look across a wide field of view.

At the 2024 Australian Meteorological and Oceanography Society conference, a report published by defence systems integrator Peraton and Lockheed Martin Australia demonstrated that persistent wide field of view, untasked optical observation by FireOPAL could reduce the interval between successive observations of a space object to seconds. This is a remarkable and potentially disruptive advancement, because it shifts the paradigm from tasking sensors and observations to an always-on approach.

When processed through a Peraton space-domain awareness system, data from FireOPAL can detect a satellite’s manoeuvre within 60 to 120 seconds. This compares with traditional detection-to-processing speeds that can be hours or even days. This allows those watching on-orbit activities—civil space agencies and defence organisations—to make operational responses faster—for example, avoiding the risk of a collision, or countering a foreign satellite’s potentially hostile approach to a friendly one.

More work is needed to overcome the challenge of proliferating space objects. The mission systems that control and make sense of the data need adaptation. They need to be able to receive information from supplementary sources to fill gaps in collection. Open mission systems that can plug and play with diverse data sets are critical.

These sources would include broad sensor mixes such as radars, which can see through bad weather and at night as well as day. Australian companies such as Quasar Satellite offer radio-frequency monitoring capabilities that can track the position of a satellite through its emissions. Another Australian champion is Silentium Defence, which provides space domain awareness observations with passive radars.

Both companies are viable options for adding to the sensor mix.

Australia stands to play a larger role in space-domain awareness through its security alliances and such advantages as geography and skilled workforce. It can further benefit by harnessing emerging commercial developments in the sector.

Wary of cable sabotage, Taiwan looks to satellites as back-ups

Taiwan is paying attention to seabed risks. It’s suffered undersea cable breaks and it has noted deliberate attacks on such communications lines under the Baltic Sea.

Its response is to build a robust and redundant national system for switching wholly to satellite communications if it must.

All that stands between Taiwan and a near-total internet blackout are 15 undersea cables. In early January, one off Taiwan’s north coast suffered mysterious damage. Taiwan suspected a Chinese-owned ship was responsible. Luckily, the data connections the cable was carrying were immediately rerouted and restored.

The island was not so lucky two years earlier when subsea cables near the outlying Matsu archipelago were cut by two Chinese vessels, perhaps accidentally. Around 14,000 Matsu residents spent more than 50 days with cripplingly slow internet before Taiwan was able to repair the connections.

Elon Musk’s SpaceX, having helped Ukraine, at first seemed like an obvious possible partner for Taiwan. Taiwanese officials even held exploratory talks with the company in 2019. But in early 2022, these talks broke down. SpaceX wanted full ownership of its Taiwanese venture, as it does for such operations in other countries. The government wanted a domestic entity to have at least 50 percent ownership to prevent China from pressuring SpaceX or Musk to withdraw services from Taiwan during a conflict.

Musk also made comments that Taiwan perceived to be pro-Beijing, which soured officials’ feelings. In 2023, he described the rambunctious democracy as an ‘integral part of China’ and suggested the US military was preventing the two sides unifying. As a result, Taiwanese officials are now even leery of relying on Starshield, a business unit of SpaceX in development designed to provide satellite constellations to the US military.

After the dropping the SpaceX project, Taiwan’s digital affairs ministry in 2023 hatched a plan to produce other low earth orbit and medium earth orbit satellite constellations. The program calls for Taiwan to build roughly 700 satellite receivers across the island that will function as hotspots. The plan calls for participation of several satellite providers, both commercial and governmental, to avoid having a single point of failure. ‘The more layers you have, the more resilience you have,’ said Sheu Jyh-shyang, an expert from Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research.

As part of this plan, Taiwan’s Chunghwa Telecom, which is one-third owned by the Taiwanese government, signed a deal with London-based Eutelsat OneWeb in 2023 for services from satellites in low Earth orbit. The service began in October. However, the signals were accessed through ground stations in Japan, Thailand and Guam, as Taiwan’s 700 planned receiving stations had not been completed. Chunghwa also signed a deal last August with Luxembourg-based SES to add its medium-orbit satellite services to Taiwan’s space-based communications.

But then, in December, Taiwan’s science and technology minister, Wu Cheng-wen, told foreign reporters that OneWeb’s capacity was too small for the country’s needs. This was hardly surprising: OneWeb’s satellites number in the hundreds, whereas Starlink has more than 6000.

Wu said Taiwan had begun talks with Amazon subsidiary Project Kuiper. This is one of the few ventures that can potentially rival Starlink. Project Kuiper is intended eventually to have more than 3000 satellites in low earth orbit.

However, satellite constellations’ capacity will still be far behind the service offered by Taiwan’s undersea cables, says Sheu. So they will serve as an emergency backup, Sheu says. The project aims to keep government and society working even if all subsea cables are unusable, he says.

The back-up satellite systems would provide internet access for only critical services: government agencies, the military, hospitals and financial institutions. Taiwan would use social media to send messages to the international community about its plight, Sheu says, but the internet would not be used for public entertainment.

Taiwan has pledged almost US$10 billion towards space industry development over the next several years. This includes plans to launch the first of two government-developed indigenous communications satellites by 2026. Taiwan must also develop its own launch rockets. Otherwise, its defence will always be at the mercy of foreign countries, as they will have the final say on Taiwanese satellite launches. Wu said that the government wanted to pick a site in southeast Taiwan for a launch pad and that launches were expected within five years.

In the meantime, the government has come up with interim measures. In October, it unveiled an indigenously developed balloon that acts as a high-altitude communications platform. It can give ground network coverage within 11km and stay airborne for two weeks. Wu describes this as an ‘intermediate solution’ to help quickly restore communications if infrastructure is destroyed in case of natural disasters or ‘other events’.

In January, the defence ministry said it would step up surveillance of areas where subsea cables were located. The navy plans to detect and monitor vessels that are loitering or otherwise engaging in suspicious activities.

Satcom future in doubt, industry left adrift as Defence cancels project

Secure satellite communication is a key requirement for ADF ability to undertake joint and integrated operations in a multi-domain operational environment. Known as satcom, it forms the informational backplane and foundation of modern warfare. Without this critical space support, military forces in the air, sea and land domains are deaf, dumb and blind. They cannot fight.

So it was crucial that Australia pay for secure and resilient satcom capability to replace commercial satellites that are at or close to the ends of their operational lives. Defence Joint Project 9102 (JP9102) was to be based initially on three to five communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) at 36,500km above Earth’s surface. It was to offer nationally independent satcom for the ADF.

On 4 November, the government scrapped JP9102. The move has generated uncertainty about the future of a critical ADF capability. There is also anger in the Australian commercial space community over the negative signals the decision sends about government support for the space sector.

The government justified cancelling JP9102 thus:

…with the acceleration in space technologies and evolving threats in space since the project’s commencement, Defence has assessed that a single orbit GEO-based satellite communications systems would not meet strategic priorities …. As such, Defence has decided to cease its current procurement activity with Lockheed Martin Australia for a single orbit GEO-based satellite communications system …. Instead of a single orbit solution, Defence must instead prioritise a multi-orbit capability increasing resilience for the Australian Defence Force.

Certainly, relying on satellites in a single, geostationary orbit is no longer enough for the ADF. Yet the decision to cancel JP9102 can be challenged. For example, why did the government simply did not rescope the project to bring forward acquisition of low earth orbit (LEO) and medium earth orbit (MEO) satellites, thus opening greater opportunities for Australia’s commercial space sector to participate? This could have occurred in a timely manner would complement Lockheed Martin’s delivery of the three to five GEO satellites under the original contract.

As it now stands, Defence has indicated that its strategy going forward is to continue to rely on existing architecture. The Defence Department statement says ‘… Defence’s current satellite communications capabilities support the immediate needs of the organisation.’

But there is risk in this, because the existing satellites are expiring. Defence notes that the ADF uses a hosted ‘…payload on an Optus C-1 satellite, ultra-high frequency channels on Intelsat IS-22, a commercial satellite; and proportional access to the US Space Force’s Wideband Global SATCOM system (WGS) network, which Australia gained by paying for WGS-6’, one of the satellites in the system.

Defence indicates that Optus C-1 will reach the end of its life in 2027—that is, in three years. The satellite has already had its life extended and has had its GEO orbit altered to extend it further. But it wanders in its position, so it isn’t very useful for anything other than naval forces. The authoritative source Gunter’s Space Page also notes that IS-22, launched in 2012, is designed to serve for 18 years, so it will expire in 2030. WGS-6, launched in 2013, is designed for 14 years, so it will reach the end of its service life in 2027.

The WGS constellation is being replaced by more sophisticated versions of these satellites in a program called Protected Tactical Satcom (PTS). If Australia wants access to PTS services, it will again need to pay the United States somehow. As with WGS, it would run the risk that the US would take bandwidth priority in a crisis.

PTS satellites are due to be launched between 2028 and 2029, just as Australia will lose its current GEO satcom services. So, any delay by government in deciding on what will replace JP9102—be it in LEO or indeed using several orbits—will present the risk of a capability gap emerging. Sticking with JP9102 as it was, and introducing LEO and MEO components together would have avoided the risk and preserved Australian control over a critical capability.

With the cancellation of JP9102, the government must quickly declare its new plan. Simply stating that Australia will ‘continue to rely on existing satellite communications’ isn’t good enough when that capability won’t last long and when getting results from a new project will take years.

The government cannot kick this can down the road to the 2026 National Defence Strategy and its associated spending plan, the Integrated Investment Program. There simply isn’t time. The project will need to be declared and go out for tenders, then any bids must then be reviewed, a prime contractor chosen and adequate funding provided before the satellites can be made and, finally, launched.

Ideally, Australian companies should be allowed to compete. But the way that JP9102 has been handled by government—following last year’s cancellation of the civilian project National Space Mission for Earth Observation—hardly inspires confidence in government commitment to the Australian commercial space sector.

That’s the biggest disappointment in the cancellation of JP9102.

Australia’s space future is at risk, with massive implications

In a brutal blow to Australia’s space sector, future economy, industrial base and international reputation, the Australian government has axed the National Space Mission for Earth Observation (NSMEO), doubling down on the recent cancelling of both the Australian spaceports program and funding for space access, which aimed at getting Australian space tech into the global space economy.

In a confusing move against a national strength, it actually undercuts other government policies such as the National Reconstruction Fund, which Minister for Industry and Science Ed Husic has said the space industry can access.

Harnessing the advantages of space as a sector and a domain should be a key organising principle for the National Reconstruction Fund. The space domain has many applications for technologies in which the government wants to invest—additive manufacturing, robotics, quantum, automation and big-data management. Space-based solar power offers a path to reliable, sustainable and very cheap energy for the entire earth.

A national space mission is vital to any country that is serious about space. It can provide an organising concept for industry and certainty of funding and demand for space services, including satellites, payloads, launch facilities, data management from orbit and earth, and mission control. It enables a joined-up approach to developing the skillset necessary across government and the private sector for more complex missions.

The NSMEO could have ensured that Australian companies kept up with global standards and retained the ability to insert themselves into an industry conservatively estimated to be worth over US$1.5 trillion before 2040.

That opportunity has been lost.

The locus of innovation and capability development in space has long shifted and it’s no longer the sole preserve of secretive and expensive government programs. The commercial sector has assumed the driving seat and that commercialisation is unleashing a transformation for humanity. This latest technology-driven revolution opens unlimited opportunities for Australia’s national security, its future prosperity and its way of life. Decision-makers need to better understand how Australia’s space future is a matter of national interest.

Over a decade, commercialisation has democratised access to space and changed significantly how we do important things on earth. Like early 20th century electrification and the ‘digital transformation’ accompanying the semiconductor revolution, commercial actors have begun humanity’s ‘space disruption’.

Off-earth capabilities offer cheaper and more effective alternatives to activities on the planet’s surface, including for earth observation and intelligence, environmental monitoring and management, communication, transportation, manufacturing and fabrication. Access to plentiful resources in space offers options to cease depleting terrestrial resources that are finite and necessary for the earth’s ecology. It offers enduring and promising ways to manage, and possibly to begin reversing, the impacts of climate change.

If we fail to recognise the opportunities in space, our economy—and security—will be left in the dust. Nations that do not share our interests and can actively use space to threaten us are moving apace in all areas of space development. We cannot afford to leave the competition in this key domain, which has a direct effect on Australia, to others. Space is the ultimate high ground.

Just as our key allies, including Quad partners, are ramping up space cooperation and boosting their space economies—as seen in last week’s joint communiqué from President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which made clear that the US and India are on ‘a course to reach new frontiers across all sectors of space cooperation’—we are giving them the clear message of disinterest and lack of ambition.

It is particularly confusing given government and industry have realised the need to come together to tackle threats in other domains, including critical and emerging technologies and cyber, and that it is space which both supports the activities we take for granted in our daily lives and offers solutions to the world’s most pressing problems.

Now, Australia is a consumer of space services provided by other nations that regard those services as secondary to their own national and commercial interests. Australia depends on others for weather services, GPS, communications connectivity and precision navigation and timing. As a nation suffering increasingly catastrophic weather events, and one that professes to be committed to combating climate change, Australia owns and operates no space assets that can give us real-time information that could save lives. The same technology also offers visibility of regional activity, including military, maritime, air, ocean health, methane, carbon dioxide and hydrogen monitoring. Axing the national mission makes no sense in this context.

From a defence perspective, emerging space technologies are producing new capabilities that are small, cheap, unsophisticated and leverage mass. The nation that most effectively couples these options with the more expensive, exquisite, fewer but high-end capabilities is likely to achieve both strategic and tactical advantage. It’s not a matter of one over the other. We must think carefully about human–machine teaming to preserve life, win battlefield superiority and codify where possible the responsible and ethical use of technology.

Left to authoritarian states like China and Russia, space will become a frontier of anarchy in which passive nations will need only to look to the heavens to see both the stars and their sovereignty disappearing, replaced by millions of satellites encircled by debris, without agreed rules and regulations. The transformation of space will rewrite history. If we are not part of that transformation we put our future in the hands of others, making 200 years of debate on the law of the sea and the fight for territorial sovereignty look like child’s play.

Commercial actors have set loose a ‘virtuous circle’ in space—similar to that observed over decades in the semi-conductor industry. If Australia and its allies want to avoid being left scrambling for industrial and technological capability for space, we need to act now. Iterated innovation in launch systems by companies such as SpaceX, and many smaller companies, combined with ongoing miniaturisation of microelectronics and other components of satellite payloads, is driving down costs—rapidly and predictably—for ever more business models in space. This, in turn, rationalises new investment in launch and space infrastructure.

New space businesses are reshaping our terrestrial lives. Some of these changes are more visible than others. How does Uber know where to pick you up and drop you off? Do you know, or care, whether a terrestrial or satellite network connects your phone calls? Timing signals, without which the internet cannot function, are maintained by satellites. Our lives already depend, utterly, on space.

Fortunately for Australians, geography blessed us with important advantages in this global economy. A thinly populated continent with little conflicting air and marine traffic or electromagnetic emissions gives us the planet’s best real estate to put things into, or bring them out of, space. This is true regardless of whether those things are people, matter or that vital 21st-century commodity, data. Similarly, relatively unobstructed views of a huge swathe of the southern hemisphere sky give Australia unparalleled potential to track and help manage activities in space itself.

Although Australia has long recognised and enjoyed our geographical blessings, we’ve been slow to grasp the opportunities our location gives us in space. Only in 2018 was the Australian Space Agency established and were rules governing the industry including launches and returns regulated. After a burst of activity with the agency’s creation, progress has notably slowed. Its budget for 2023 provides $34.2 million to support core functions and focus on regulation, compared to the 2023 budget of the Canadian Space Agency at C$2.5 billion and NASA’s budget allocation in 2023 of US$25.4 billion. Ours is stunningly insufficient.

The timidity, and even ambivalence, with which Australia has assumed its role in space is perplexing for two reasons. Australia is missing an opportunity to take a leading role in ‘spatial transformation’ and the 21st-century trans-global economy. And it is failing to optimise vital international partnerships that are firmly in its strategic interests.

The impact of this spatial transformation extends through the economy to geostrategic competition. Consequently, global powers have opened a new race to build previously unimagined space capabilities, to control particular orbits and to access lunar ice deposits—a key to creating renewable fuel supplies. This new space race is not about national prestige, but about building and maintaining genuine strategic advantage on earth. Accordingly, competition projects tensions about the proper way to organise economies and society into space, including whether a rules-based international system and a free-and-open internet should or even could extend beyond earth’s surface.

These questions touch on Australia’s national interests and international responsibilities as a proponent of the rules-based international system. As with collective defence on earth, Australia’s own democratic values oblige it to develop and sustain capabilities that ensure stability of the rules-based system against its competitors and potential adversaries in space. And those competitors are developing capabilities in space rapidly. They are investing broadly, for economic and scientific advantage—but most importantly for the strategic high ground that dominance in space offers.

Failure to defend the open international system in space will likely result in collapse of that system on earth. With war raging in Ukraine and the rules-based system under the most strain it has ever experienced, the time to strengthen and extend it in every domain should be a key priority. In direct contrast to the decision to axe the space mission, it’s time for Australia to look up and aim high.

Boosting space capabilities through AUKUS

The AUKUS partnership opens up new opportunities for promoting deeper information and technology sharing, integrating security- and defence-related science and technology, and building industrial bases and supply chains. In addition to the momentous decision for Australia to acquire nuclear submarines, the agreement nominates cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and ‘additional undersea capabilities’ for trilateral cooperation. Interestingly, though, the vital area of space wasn’t mentioned in the initial communiqués, but it needs to be a key area of cooperation under the pact.

Unchallenged access to and use of the space domain will be essential for the AUKUS partners in any use of military force and is critical for fighting a Western way of war that is precise, decisive and rapid, reduces the cost in lives lost, and minimises the prospect of failure. More broadly, the space domain is an essential foundation for ensuring the stability and security of prosperous and modern economies and societies. In virtually every aspect of national security and our day-to-day lives, space plays a vital role.

The importance of space was reinforced by the most recent AUSMIN communiqué, which emphasised establishing ‘shared capabilities in Space Domain Awareness, Space Command and Control, Satellite Communications, and Positioning, Navigation and Timing’ and reaffirms the need for a ‘common understanding of space-related threats … to meet the challenges posed by the current strategic environment’.

The joint statement from last month’s Quad leaders’ summit in Washington included commitments to ‘identify new collaboration opportunities [in space] and share satellite data for peaceful purposes such as monitoring climate change’ and to ‘consult on rules, norms, guidelines and principles for ensuring the sustainable use of outer space’.

All three AUKUS partners are space powers and have bilateral arrangements with each other. An AUKUS space partnership would formalise a trilateral approach to space cooperation in several areas of space security. This could be done through a ‘shape, deter and respond’ approach, akin to the broad defence policy concept outlined in Australia’s 2020 defence strategic update.

The shaping component will entail building international consensus on strengthened legal, regulatory and diplomatic approaches, led by the AUKUS states, to constrain opportunities for adversaries to undertake aggressive behaviour in space. At the same time, cooperation on space domain awareness that enhances the AUKUS partners’ ability to monitor activities in orbit, deny anonymity in the event of hostile and aggressive actions and ensure attribution could strengthen diplomatic efforts to create legal and regulatory approaches that limit the freedom of adversaries to act hostilely.

Australia is already taking a leading role in space domain awareness by expanding space surveillance under Defence’s joint project 9360 and hosting a C-Band radar and optical telescope for space surveillance at Exmouth in Western Australia. It makes sense to develop space domain awareness through AUKUS, particularly given that Australia is geographically best located to monitor China’s space-launch trajectories and watch activities in geosynchronous orbit.

The threat of hostile and aggressive behaviour in orbit is real. China already deploys direct-ascent, ‘hard kill’ anti-satellite, or ASAT, weapons that can threaten US, UK and Australian satellites in low-earth orbit (LEO) and has demonstrated technologies for threatening satellites out to geosynchronous orbit, holding at risk the entire range of critical US, UK and Australian space support in a crisis. Both China and Russia are already demonstrating the means to launch co-orbital ASAT weapons that could unleash ‘soft kill’ attacks, which don’t physically destroy a target satellite but disable or deny access to it. Such weapons are ideal for grey-zone operations in orbit prior to a military conflict. Ground-based counterspace capabilities, including cyberattacks on satellites, are also emerging as threat, as is laser-dazzling of satellites in LEO.

Certainly, international consensus is needed on new legal norms and regulatory approaches to constrain such threats. All three AUKUS states fully support UN General Assembly resolution 75/36 on responsible behaviour in space, introduced by the UK in December 2020. This resolution, while non-binding, needs to be further developed, with an initial goal for a binding resolution banning development and testing of kinetic ASATs. AUKUS could complement activities being pursued through the Quad and other multilateral forums in achieving such an outcome this decade.

Beyond legal and diplomatic efforts to shape the space environment, the AUKUS partners should work towards common approaches to boosting space resilience and strengthening deterrence in space. The initial focus should be on augmenting existing and planned capability architectures with low-cost small satellites and constellations of cubesats. A cooperative approach to developing common architectures within an AUKUS space framework could complement larger satellites for key space defence projects. It would benefit all three states by building common satellite technologies that could take advantage of faster innovation cycles, co-development processes and rapid deployment to expand satellite systems in a crisis.

A disaggregated, ‘small and many’ approach to space support would be more difficult for an adversary to attack than the traditional ‘large and few’ architecture. Reducing the prospect for a successful counterspace campaign and denying China and Russia the ability to deliver a decisive ‘Pearl Harbor in space’ is probably the most important goal for AUKUS. Such an attack would quickly take away any knowledge edge and dramatically boost the risk of rapid defeat, leaving the three states effectively ‘deaf, dumb and blind’ in a crisis.

Responding to challenges when they emerge will require back-up augmentation and disaggregation to enable rapid reconstitution of lost space capability in the event deterrence fails. The best way to do this would be to engage with commercial providers to ensure that small satellites can be launched on demand, as dictated by a rapidly changing tactical situation in orbit.

Australia is already well placed to contribute to this vital task. There are three potential launch sites: Whaler’s Way in South Australia, operated by Southern Launch; Nhulunbuy in the Northern Territory, to be operated by Equatorial Launch Australia; and Abbott Point near Bowen in Queensland, where space launches by Australia’s leading launch vehicle company, Gilmour Space Technology, could occur as early as 2022. Australia’s geographic location makes it ideal for supporting both US and UK launch requirements, particularly those involving reusable launch technologies.

Other active approaches to space control through denial are being considered, including, for Australia, a ground-based space electronic warfare capability. A common AUKUS approach to rapid and responsive space launch to reconstitute lost capabilities, as well as defensive space control to defend critical systems, is an obvious step forward.

The commercial advantage in space’s grey zone

In 2019, Russia employed an intelligence-gathering satellite to make a close approach—known as a rendezvous and proximity operation, or RPO—with a US spy satellite. The incident lasted for several days as Russia’s Cosmos 2542 released a small subsatellite, Cosmos 2543, to stalk the US KH-11 satellite. The Americans took immediate action to prevent the Russian craft from getting dangerously close, but it’s likely that the Russian satellites, and ground sensors, gathered useful intelligence on the US satellite.

That was clearly a Russian military operation, but it’s important to consider the possibility that a commercial actor in space, perhaps operating on behalf of a peer adversary, could do the same thing.

A future grey-zone incident in space could involve a commercial satellite—either one purpose-designed for on-orbit refuelling and repairing of other satellites or an earth-observation satellite with a dual role that includes space-based space surveillance—carrying out an RPO on another nation’s satellite, or interfering with it.

A report by the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, Defense against the dark arts in space, explores scenarios in which a friendly satellite is damaged or interfered with by a hostile state, or by a commercial actor operating on behalf of a state, in grey-zone activities that fall below the level of outright aggression.

In a crisis or war, there’s always the risk of a major-power adversary using counterspace weapons to attack friendly satellites. But the increasing amount of activity in space means it’s a slippery slope from the operational domain to the warfighting domain.

Grey-zone operations in orbit accentuate the risk of conflict, because the nature of the space domain, and of space technology, makes it difficult to respond to events happening at a rapid pace hundreds or even thousands of kilometres above the earth.

An adversary might mask an attack on an opponent’s satellite through various grey-zone tactics. Monitoring RPOs is already challenging and, as space becomes more crowded and congested, deliberate and inadvertent RPO events will grow in frequency. The growth of satellite megaconstellations with tens of thousands of satellites will provide new opportunities for states intent on exploiting this grey zone.

For example, an adversary could integrate an anti-satellite capability into a civil satellite designed to service other craft in space, particularly as such commercial activity grows in scale in coming years.

At the same time, the use of commercial space-based space surveillance satellites could allow an adversary to carry out RPOs during what appears to be innocent commercial activity.

So, it’s clear that the key to operating in the grey zone in orbit is to mask aggressive acts behind commercial activities, and to exploit the resulting deniability and confusion.

If a satellite malfunctions after a commercial craft passes close by, was that an aggressive RPO or simply a technical failure? How does the owner of the now-dead satellite respond when there’s no certainty about whether it has been attacked or not?

New types of ground-based counterspace capabilities widen this grey zone. States are more likely to employ soft-kill capabilities that disable, deny or damage a satellite, rather than physically destroy it.

Such measures can include cyberattacks or control by ground facilities, uplink and downlink jamming, and laser-dazzling of sensors on satellites designed for intelligence-gathering.

A cyberattack against a satellite, directly or through supply-chain infiltration months or even years before its deployment, provides an adversary with an anonymous and deniable avenue to gather intelligence, or to conduct spoofing operations by feeding false information via the satellite. This happened in June 2017 when Russian hackers spoofed US GPS satellites to counter US surveillance drones.

The central questions here are what constitutes aggression and how can a state victim of such an attack in the grey zone respond? The UK introduced resolution 75/36 into the UN General Assembly in December 2020 with the goal of ‘reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors’, which Australia has supported.

This resolution sets a basis for further diplomatic discussion that ideally will lead to strengthened legal and regulatory arrangements to minimise the risk of irresponsible behaviour, such as direct attacks and, in particular, events that create space debris. Certainly, Australia, and its allies in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing community, should support such efforts towards a more effective legal and regulatory arrangement to better manage threats from counterspace capabilities.

But even with such a framework in place, responding to grey-zone risks in orbit will still be challenging. Defining what constitutes a counterspace capability and determining if an attack or interference has occurred is obviously more ambiguous than a clear attack by an opponent using a purpose-designed anti-satellite weapon, such as those tested by China, Russia and more recently India.

The difficulties are compounded with soft-kill systems that are impossible to identify, verify and monitor. As space becomes more congested, with megaconstellations rapidly emerging in the coming decade, determining what constitutes an attack versus an accident will be a key challenge for those involved in legal and diplomatic efforts. So will working out what to do about attacks emanating from commercial satellites.

Another key challenge is time, or lack of it. The legal and diplomatic process underway in UN bodies towards strengthening regulatory arrangements and establishing norms of responsible behaviour will move achingly slowly in comparison with the fast pace of the development of counterspace technology and the growth of commercial space technology. At the same time, the global strategic environment is deteriorating just as fast. The legal process may simply be too slow to respond to the rapid changes occurring around it.

Securing spectrum for Space 2.0

Every day, we’re surrounded by a sea of radiofrequency signals—from our smartphones, GPS, vehicle proximity sensors, and TV and radio broadcasts. All of these systems use the radiofrequency spectrum, on an exclusive or shared basis.

Spectrum is critical national infrastructure like dams, roads, ports and the electricity network. It’s invisible, yet it’s embedded in our nation’s daily activities and thus core to our prosperity and growth. Spectrum is the unseen essential and fundamental input to the operation of many public-benefit and for-profit enterprises, but also to our national security and defence capabilities. Spectrum security must become a greater part of our national interest considerations.

The radiofrequency spectrum nominally spans 1 kHz to 300 GHz. It sits just below the optical spectrum, which includes infrared, visible light and ultraviolet. In Australia, the frequency range that’s allocated and managed by the domestic regulator is 8.3 kHz to 275 GHz.

Globally, spectrum is managed by the International Telecommunications Union, a UN agency charged with facilitating international information and communications technologies. On the domestic front, the Australian Communications and Media Authority is the local regulator and, together with the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, ensures that Australia complies with its international treaty-level obligations at the ITU.

Spectrum rules and regulations vary across countries and regions. Last year, more than 3,300 delegates from governments, academia and industry attended the ITU World Radiocommunications Conference 2019 in Egypt to work out the legal and technical framework that governs international use of the spectrum and satellite orbit allocation. Four years of policy and technical deliberations precede each conference. Is that too long a cycle to support the timelines for new-technology innovation, especially Space 2.0 endeavours?

Over the next four years, the ACMA will be focused on ensuring spectrum availability for future 5G services for Australia. Given the limited resources available for spectrum management, is there a new role for a non-profit trusted adviser organisation to provide enduring support to ACMA in the fast-moving Space 2.0 spectrum landscape?

Radiofrequency spectrum is a finite resource, and it is becoming more congested and contested. Regulators such as the ACMA, the US Federal Communications Commission and the ITU are increasingly placing tighter constraints on the allocation, use and sharing of spectrum. Competition is fierce, and Space 2.0 businesses can succeed or fail based on their access to secure, long-term spectrum rights, whether directly as a spectrum licensee or indirectly as a consumer of space-based data.

The ACMA navigates this tension by allocating spectrum based on a ‘maximum public benefit’ test. Every public and private enterprise using space-based data has spectrum as a key business risk and opportunity—whether they know it or not.

Space-based systems require assured access not only to orbits but also to spectrum for all parts of their functioning—from satellites to essential ground-station gateways, user terminals and intersatellite links. Spectrum underpins the global space economy, which some estimates forecast will grow from US$350 billion to US$1 trillion by 2040.

The ITU operates on a first-come, first-served basis for satellite coordination of earth orbits and frequencies. Satellite filings, where operators register their operations step by step with the ITU, establish a precedence in the satellite coordination queue. The Australian government needs to give strong consideration to national objectives for strategic satellite spectrum and orbit-location filing.

The satellite industry has been plagued by ‘paper satellite’ filings—notifications by member states to the ITU of satellite networks and constellations that they never intend to actually build. These filings block or slow other countries’ endeavours to access space and they can be traded much like other company capital assets. This legal conundrum clogs the regulatory process and is a costly waste of the limited resources available for spectrum management. Australia must, at a minimum, vigorously promote greater due diligence by all ITU member countries to avoid paper filings through their administrations.

Satellites have the unique benefit of ubiquitous global coverage. While there are no fences in space, satellite network operators are required to get permission from each country in which their operations seek to ‘land’ services or data. Is Australia’s legal framework for the space domain prepared for an increase in foreign satellite operations to and from Australian soil?

In recent years, space has re-emerged as desirable high ground for national and commercial interests alike. Spectrum battles are likely to become fiercer, with states and commercial parties staking and defending spectrum claims. There’s an emerging imperative for national-interest space-spectrum policy and objectives to be defined and pursued.

Global spectrum coordination is an important facet of developing global markets. In 2019, the ITU allocated over 17 GHz of globally harmonised spectrum to future 5G services. Some of that erodes the historical allocation to Space 1.0 geostationary satellite services. However, innovation is highest in the Space 2.0 low-earth-orbit satellites, and new services and business models are being developed as a result of the lower-cost and easier access to space created by companies such as SpaceX, Rocket Lab and Gilmour Space Technologies. New satellite technologies are pushing the envelope of space-based data services, including the internet-of-things, daily imagery of the whole planet, and detection of aircraft and ship traffic.

The ITU, ACMA and FCC reviews of Space 2.0 spectrum and licensing rules and regulations for satellites are welcome. Mega-constellations such as Elon Musk’s Starlink have enormous spectrum and orbital footprints. How might all users be assured of access in a congested orbit and spectrum domain? Sharing between satellite networks, and with other services, entails complex policy and technical compromise. Perhaps a more proactive sharing approach is required, based on actual transmitter characteristics measured by spectrum monitoring and with the application of artificial intelligence and cognitive radio, for the benefit of all spectrum users.

It may be time for higher levels of government to pay attention to the Space 2.0 spectrum, starting with a review to steer and coordinate policy on space spectrum and orbital access across national interests in the defence, civilian and commercial spheres.

Rules needed to stop arms race in space

Laws and regulations covering outer space are mired in geopolitical gridlock and are failing to keep pace with burgeoning commercial use of space and new technologies. Dependency on space is increasing both in everyday civilian life and military applications, yet, despite its cross-cutting importance, space security continues to be considered a niche field.

While outer space is often conceptualised as infinite, space that can be used for human activities is a finite resource, much like minerals or fossil fuels. Earth orbits where human space activities in telecommunications, geolocation or satellite broadband can occur are limited in range. In low-earth orbit (LEO), where most space activities and satellites are located, objects ranging in size from a fleck of paint to a school bus are components of the growing amount of space debris. Tracking capabilities can cover only a fraction of those objects.

Think of the earth’s orbits as highways in space, where traffic and congestion are rapidly increasing without the road rules to match. It’s a potential minefield of problems, as collision with debris poses a risk to spacecraft that in worst-case scenarios can escalate into a domino cascade of collisions known as the Kessler effect. As with all limited resources, exercising sustainable practice is key. A failure to manage and minimise space debris will reduce the long-term viability of satellites in LEO and render outer space less usable for future generations.

Antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities are one area in which countries need to be forward-thinking in using regulation to prevent the unnecessary generation of space debris. Such systems are designed to disable or destroy satellites for military purposes. The destruction of a satellite leaves behind a field of debris (though it’s important to note that a satellite can be taken offline without being physically destroyed). The reasons for demonstrating ASAT capabilities range from domestic politics to national prestige to establishing credible space deterrence, so the testing and prevalence of ASAT capabilities are only likely to grow as they continue to be unregulated and viewed as legitimate weapons.

There’s nothing in existing space law that prevents or officially regulates the testing of ASATs and defines an acceptable level of space debris. In 1985, the first ASAT test conducted by the US left behind some 300 pieces of debris, which took 17 years to disintegrate in the earth’s atmosphere. When China destroyed its Fengyun-1C weather satellite in 2007, more than 2,300 trackable (golf-ball or larger sized) pieces of space debris were generated. A second, arguably reciprocal, American test followed shortly after. The latest test occurred in March 2019 in India’s Mission Shakti, which official statements declared was completed at an altitude that ensured a minimal amount of space debris that would soon disintegrate in the earth’s atmosphere, but recent research has cast significant doubt on those claims.

Differing space situational awareness capabilities and a lack of shared big data (which includes independent sources) mean that a test’s impact can be difficult to predict and substantiate. The space domain lacks an independent body that can verify, check and assess the space sustainability of something like an ASAT test. That means the demonstration of force in a test that causes the physical destruction of a satellite is worrying not only for potential conflict, arms races and peaceful norms in space, but for space sustainability too.

However, the possibility of future ASAT tests also presents an opportunity. A recent paper released by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research advocated the adoption of ASAT test guidelines based on the recommendations of the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence-building measures. The report recommended the adoption of three principles based on creating no long-lived debris, creating debris only at low altitudes when necessary and notifying parties when debris is created. Although the principles are largely abided by in a de facto manner, official adoption could strengthen space sustainability norms. The GGE noted that adoption of these three principles would be a much-needed confidence-building measure that could be an interim stepping stone towards greater international regulation that helps prevent the weaponisation of space.

Every ASAT test is perceived as ramping up competition in outer space. Securing even a small win for preventing arms races through guidelines for such tests will be no easy feat, and enforcement is a vexing prospect. However, the utility and symbolic value of adopted guidelines shouldn’t be underestimated as an assurance to states and private actors that ASAT practices will account for long-term space sustainability.

Verification of ASAT tests will necessitate international cooperation and greater dialogue with the private sector. In the words of DFAT Secretary Frances Adamson, countries must engage in ‘preventative outer space diplomacy’ if we are to have any hope of bringing order to the final frontier.

Tag Archive for: Satellite

Xinjiang Data Project website launch

ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre has launched the Xinjiang Data Project, along with two new major pieces of research, on Xinijang’s detention system, and on the destruction of mosques and significant Uyghur cultural sites in the region. One of the most effective research methods in both of these projects was the collection and analysis of satellite imagery, including the examination of night-time satellite imagery from Xinjiang.

Since 2017, a government crackdown in the far-western region of China known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has seen over a million Uyghurs and other Turkic and Muslim minorities extrajudicially detained in a vast network of purpose-built detention facilities. There have also been media reports about incidents of mosques demolished or repurposed, along with other Uyghur cultural sites. 

Credible data on the extent of Xinjiang’s post-2017 detention system is scarce. But researchers at ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre have now located, mapped and analysed 380 suspected detention facilities in Xinjiang, making it the most comprehensive data on Xinjiang’s detention system in the world. This new database highlights ‘re-education’ camps, detention centres, and prisons which have been newly built or expanded since 2017, and we believe it covers most such detention facilities. 

The findings of this research contradicts Chinese officials’ claims that all “re-education camp” detainees had ‘graduated’ in December 2019. It presents satellite imagery evidence that shows newly constructed detention facilities, along with growth in several existing facilities, that has occurred across 2019 and 2020. 

The second key piece of research on our new website is a project investigating the rate of cultural destruction in Xinjiang. This research estimates 35% of mosques have been demolished; and a further 30% have been damaged in some way, usually by the removal of Islamic or Arabic architectural features such as domes, minarets or gatehouses. We estimate approximately 16,000 mosques have been damaged or totally destroyed throughout Xinjiang (65% of the total). The majority of demolished sites remain as empty lots. 

Further, 30% of important Islamic cultural sites (sacred shrines, cemeteries and pilgrimage routes) across southern Xinjiang have been demolished since 2017, with an additional 28% damaged or altered in some way. This includes the complete demolition of the ancient pilgrimage town of Ordam Mazar. 

This new research and associated maps and satellite imagery, can be viewed at the Xinjiang Data Project website.