Steel for the Royal Australian Navy’s first offshore patrol vessel is being cut in Western Australia and trucked to Adelaide where construction is set to begin next week.

The vessel is the first of 12 OPVs based on the PV80 design of the German shipbuilder Lürssen. It’s one of two OPVs to be built at ASC’s Osborne shipyard. The remaining 10 vessels will be built in the Henderson yard of WA-based Civmec. The steel, from Australian mills, is cut by Civmec and taken by road to South Australia.

The 1,700-tonne OPVs, 80 metres long and capable of 22 knots, will ultimately replace the navy’s Armidale-class and Cape-class patrol boats, coastal minehunters and survey ships.

Lürssen chief executive Peter Lürssen told The Strategist that Australian officials had completed their review of the design, and assembly of the ships was on schedule for the promised mid-November start date. The first plates to arrive at the Osborne yard gate were those for the first ship’s double bottom, and truckloads would continue until Christmas, Lürssen said.  ‘Because the OPV is only 80 metres, we build the whole length deck by deck. Because we don’t have to cut steel, we can put more people onto assembly so that helps get more people into work earlier.’

The first OPV is scheduled to be launched in Adelaide in the first quarter of 2021.

Lürssen rejected concerns that Civmec has not built ships previously. ‘They are very well trained and equipped for steel construction. If you go to their headquarters, interestingly enough, you can see a section of a submarine they built to demonstrate how good they are. This is really good quality. They have done fantastic work in steel.’ That included structures designed to function under great pressure in very deep water.

‘They know what this is all about. The rest is a skill base that we will develop together.’

The Henderson area, south of Perth, had a strong shipbuilding history, so Lürssen was confident of finding enough expert personnel for the OPV project. Australian engineers would be taken to the company’s yards in Germany to gain further experience in design and construction.

Lürssen said he was happy with the relationship that was developing with ASC. ‘Everything’s scheduled and on track. We have full agreement on price, terms and conditions. It took a little longer than with others, but that, I think, is understandable because ASC is not in an easy position.’ ASC, he said, was in the midst of a reorganisation and plant construction. ‘I’ve seen this happen to other companies and it was more complicated. So everything’s on track there.’

Building two ships in South Australia and the other 10 in WA was not a big issue, Lürssen said.

‘It’s all possible, and it’s not complicated as long as you know the distribution of the work early on in the contract. And it was always made clear to us that two will be built in Adelaide, and then 10 in WA. And this was easy because when you start in the beginning, you can plan for it.’

The split build is intended to keep the South Australian shipbuilding workforce employed in the time between the end of construction of the navy’s three air warfare destroyers and the start of work on nine new frigates.

During the competition for the OPV contract, Lürssen raised the prospect of exporting naval vessels from WA, so how realistic was that?

‘Absolutely. We are talking to a number of countries already—and we are actively promoting Australia as the builder.’

Lürssen had already been talking to the Philippines about the possibility of building six OPVs for its navy. Discussions were also underway with two other countries, but it was too early to name them at this stage, Lürssen said. ‘When you talk to a client, then you are in a front-running position. You don’t want to share that information with others.

‘A chicken should only make noise when the egg is there and not way before that. So you will hear us talk about things when we’ve got things to say.’

He said his company was one of five or six from Australia and abroad which had responded to a request for information about the project from the Philippines navy.

‘We clearly made the case that a number of ships need to be built in Australia to familiarise the Philippines people with the build techniques, and then they can continue the contract in the Philippines.’

Lürssen said his company would have the resources to run two such projects simultaneously. It won the Australian competition on technical quality and overall performance, so of course it was hopeful, he said. ‘We will put our best effort forward together with our Australian partners to win the competition.’

WA-based Austal has already shown strong interest in the Philippines contract and Lürssen said the other companies involved came from Britain, Italy and South Korea.

The OPVs will undertake what the navy refers to as ‘constabulary missions’ and maritime patrols and they are intended to be ready to respond quickly to emergencies.

They’ll be equipped with state-of-the-art sensors and command and communication systems that will allow them to operate alongside Australian Border Force vessels, other Australian Defence Force units and vessels of regional partners.

The 17th of November marked the centenary of the Second Battle of the Heligoland Bight. An inconclusive action, unsatisfactory for both Germans and British, it came about because of vital changes in the naval war. The battle itself has an interesting Australian sidelight as the first occasion on which RAN College graduates saw action: present aboard HMS Glorious were five 18-year-old RAN midshipmen of the initial 1913 entry.

In 1917, the British had finally started an effective offensive minelaying campaign in the Heligoland Bight. That it had taken so long was due to the poor quality of British mines—after many delays, the Royal Navy’s first reliable mine was copied from a German model. Seeding mines in the Heligoland Bight created a problem of coastal defence for the Germans 150 nautical miles off their coast. It was ‘anti-access/area denial’ in reverse. The minefields cut Germany off from the North Sea, constraining not only the High Seas Fleet, but also the U-boats on which Germany was depending to starve Britain into submission by sinking Allied shipping. The German navy was soon absorbed by the minesweeping effort, placing increasing strain on ships and people.

With Admiralty intelligence of German operations, the opportunity could not be missed. The Germans had deployed 14 minesweepers and two mine breakers, escorted by eight torpedo boats and four light cruisers, commanded by Rear-Admiral von Reuter in the cruiser Königsberg. The battleships Kaiserin and Kaiser (‘the married couple’) were providing heavy cover, but from 60 miles southeast. The British approached the Bight early on the 17th. Covered from the west by the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, the First and Sixth Light Cruiser Squadrons and their destroyer flotillas were supported by the ‘large light cruisers’ Courageous and Glorious under the command of Vice-Admiral Napier.

British knowledge of mine danger areas was extraordinarily hit-and-miss. Only the Grand Fleet’s commander-in-chief and the battle cruisers’ commander, Vice-Admiral Pakenham, had a full picture. Napier had enough information to go east past ‘Line A’, and believed he could also move past ‘Line B’, which made provision for recent British minefields, but had been ordered not to proceed further east than ‘Line C’. The light cruisers’ charts, however, didn’t include Line C. Furthermore, there was little information about the mines. Line C related to ineffective British mines laid long before, but Napier didn’t know that.

When contact was made, the rising sun silhouetted the Germans, but at long range. Courageous and Glorious took on the enemy light cruisers with the First Light Cruiser Squadron’s support, while the Sixth Light Cruiser Squadron initially went for the sweepers. Napier didn’t take advantage of the large light cruisers’ speed of over 30 knots, never ordering more than 25. Failure to exploit the large cruisers’ speed was significant as the other British ships were no faster than their German opposite numbers.

Finding 15-inch shells falling around them, all German units rapidly made smoke. Within 15 minutes, ‘all enemy vessels were well hidden’. Von Reuter took risks, delaying his withdrawal to ensure no light craft were left behind and steaming through waters believed dangerous because of British mines. The British were baffled by the thick smoke, consumed by the fear that it concealed waiting torpedo craft or U-boats (none were present).  When an uncertain Napier arrived at Line B just before 0840, he turned northeast before deciding to resume the chase. The Germans continued their retreat, however, and their gain of four miles was crucial.

Meanwhile, the fast battle cruiser Repulse had been detached by Pakenham and took the lead. The light cruisers, unaware of the restrictions, also continued onwards. Rear-Admiral Phillimore, in Repulse, received a warning from Pakenham about Line B, but ignored it. At 0908, Pakenham, worried by the growing risks, issued a recall. Napier, however, decided to go on, although not for much longer. Cardiff, Caledon and Royalist had already been hit. Von Reuter hoped to cripple his opponents, so they could be finished off by his reinforcements. The battle cruisers Hindenburg and Moltke had sailed at 0840 and were followed by two battleships. The proximity of Germany was confirmed by the appearance of aircraft which bombed the British ships.

The British believed they were scoring hits, but to limited effect. Geometry didn’t allow them to use torpedoes and only one weapon was fired. The Germans, however, did no better. Galatea may have been struck by one that failed to explode, but there were no other hits. When wakes were seen, the British assumed they were U-boat torpedoes, while several ships thought they spotted submarines.

At 0930, Kaiserin and Kaiser finally came in sight of von Reuter. Captain Grasshof in the Kaiserin saw his task as covering a retreat, not taking the offensive, despite this being the action in the Heligoland Bight that the Germans had always wanted. Von Reuter attempted to order Grasshof to advance northwest, but his signals weren’t received and the battleships turned east. A frustrated von Reuter had to continue his retreat. Only the British light cruisers maintaining their advance allowed the battleships to engage them. Just before this, the Germans scored an important hit. A 150-millimetre round struck Calypso’s forward superstructure, killing her captain and many bridge personnel.

At 0932 Napier reached Line C and turned south, ordering Repulse to advance no further. Probably as unaware as the light cruisers of Line C, Phillimore continued the pursuit, providing important support to them. Had Repulse not been present, Grasshof might have been more enterprising, particularly as he was joined by four destroyers. Von Reuter would certainly have acted differently, but Repulse scored a single hit on Königsberg with important consequences. The shell started a serious fire. Königsberg’s speed reduced, von Reuter’s ideas of turning back were frustrated and his continuing southeast meant the action was effectively over, for the British cruisers responded to the battleships’ salvoes by turning away. The opposed forces opened rapidly and a sudden fog ended any chance of the action’s immediate resumption. Hindenburg and Moltke made their best speed to join but didn’t venture further after they found von Reuter. The Germans finally turned northwest only after the two extra battleships arrived in the afternoon, but the British had gone.

The Germans recriminated afterwards. With the Kaiserin’s and Kaiser’s misemployment, they had lost the chance of an important success. Grasshof was posted ashore. The British had their own problems. Napier was subjected to bitter criticism, although opinion wasn’t unanimous. Where he had clearly erred was failing to use the Courageous’ and Glorious’ speed. Pakenham was particularly critical of the risks Phillimore took in Repulse, although the commander-in-chief, Admiral Beatty, endorsed his actions. The British had to admit that neither their doctrine, planning nor exercises had prepared them for such conditions. The deficiencies that had been revealed could not be concealed, even if public criticism was directed at the Admiralty, rather than the Grand Fleet, where blame really lay. The failure would contribute to the dismissal of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Jellicoe, six weeks later.

As for the young RAN midshipmen, perhaps they learned something from their seniors’ failures. The quality of their performance in 1939–1945 suggests they did.

Welcome to The Strategist Six, a feature that provides a glimpse into the thinking of academics, government officials, military officers, reporters and interesting individuals from around the world.

1. How long will the Collins-class submarines operate and, in retrospect, how should Australians view the Collins program?

The new submarine is entering service from the early 2030s. The Collins class will be our primary capability into the 2030s. We’ve always made it clear that it’ll be necessary to extend its life. There’s nothing preventing us doing that. Collins is employed on operations today and I believe it is regionally superior. With the Collins, we took the audacious and very successful step to manufacture submarines in Australia. I think we overlook too often the successes achieved in delivering a fleet of very capable submarines. Now that appropriate support and sustainment arrangements are in place, we’re seeing a world-class submarine that meets Australia’s expectations.

2. Given the current debate, is the future submarine a new design and could an existing submarine have been bought ‘off the shelf’?

It’s a new design, as any conventional submarine to meet our capability requirements would have to be. That doesn’t mean it’s devoid of the lineage of Naval Group designs that have preceded it—and, in particular, the Barracuda design as a reference. We’re also drawing on Naval Group’s experience in designing conventional submarines. After years of research, we couldn’t find a military-off-the-shelf submarine to meet Australia’s requirements. We need a submarine with the range and endurance of Collins to operate where we believe submarines need to operate. We have to improve stealth and sensor performance in a submarine that will operate into the 2070s.

3. What’s the design and construction schedule and when will the submarines be delivered?

A key lesson from the Collins program, and many shipbuilding programs, is to ensure we have a mature design before construction commences. We began construction of the Collins with less than 10% of production drawings and detailed design complete. This time we’ll ensure we have high design maturity before the build.

Work on establishing the dimensions of the submarine is complete. That pre-sizing—the initial length, diameter, displacement and other key parameters—is crucial to ensure the submarine remains balanced as the design proceeds and increasing requirements are considered. Nobody wants a submarine that becomes too large in trying to meet too many requirements.

We’re currently in concept design, which will lead into preliminary design and then detailed design and a very effective plan for how the submarine will be built. There’ll be a lot of testing in laboratories and on land-based test sites. We’ll also need prototyping so that when we start construction we’ll have a practised workforce and proven methods. Three key facilities to be completed by mid-2021 include the land-based site to integrate and test the main motor, the batteries, the diesel generators, the DC switchboard and the platform management system which will control all of that and knit it together before it’s installed in the submarine. The combat system will be built and tested on a raft in a physical integration facility and then inserted into the submarine as the boat is built. That will ensure it works well and allows a high level of security. We need a hull construction hall built by mid-2021 to train the workforce. We should commence construction in around 2023, ramping up to construction of the modules that will go into those hulls and aiming to deliver the submarine in 2032. We’re allowing about 36 months before starting the second submarine so that we can fold what we learn on the first boat into the second. Then we’ll go into, probably, a two-year drumbeat for commencement of construction of the remainder. There’s no time to waste now.

4. Will all the submarines be built in Australia and why was Naval Group chosen as a partner?

Many people think we’re going to build them in France. We’re not. We’ll build all 12 in Australia. Australians must be involved in all stages of the design and construction of the yard itself and the submarine, the supply chain and the integration and testing of platforms and combat systems as we go through the design process. Without the ability to do those things on our terms, we lack true sovereignty and the ability to upgrade and deploy the submarines when and as we must.

To ensure we have the sovereign capability to sustain the submarines through their lives, we must maximise Australian industry’s involvement. That’s not simply done by mandating a level. By most accepted figures, we had between 67% and 70% involvement in the Collins, but we didn’t emerge from the acquisition phase with a sovereign capacity to operate and sustain the submarines. That took many years of hard work. We need to get that right from the beginning. A key driver of the choice of Naval Group was capability and the assessment that it offered us the best opportunity to design and deliver a regionally superior submarine and, importantly, one over which we have the sovereign capacity to operate and sustain over its life. This could not be simply a commercial relationship. It always had to be backed by a treaty-level government arrangement between our country and the home nation of our partner. We’re developing plans for technology transfer.

5. Are you converting a nuclear-powered Barracuda submarine to conventional power and might a switch be made to nuclear power in the future?

You can’t convert a nuclear submarine to a conventional submarine. That’s why we have a deliberate design process. The Barracuda is a reference design. Many calculations and methods used to develop the Barracuda can be reemployed effectively in the future submarine. That’s a tremendous advantage and it’s what most submarine nations do—go back to the lineage of their designs and take them forward. There’s no plan to switch to nuclear power. Before we can contemplate a nuclear-powered fleet, there’d need to be a much broader policy debate about nuclear power itself.

6. Is there any doubt about using pump-jet propulsion, will the submarine use air-independent propulsion and lithium-ion batteries and will it have a land-strike capability?

We are using pump-jet propulsion that was offered by France. Some claims about the pump jet are misleading. It’s not purely for use in nuclear submarines. It can be efficient across the entire speed range, taking account of the submarine’s size, the speed required and stealth. It needs to be tuned to the hull of the submarine. The hull needs to be tuned to the pump jet. We did not specify that the boat should have or not have air-independent propulsion or lithium-ion batteries, rather that it met our requirements. We’ll continue to look at all applicable technologies as we go through the design process. The government did not require a land-strike capability. The future submarine is being designed to fulfil key roles, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], and special operations.

Navy Chief Tim Barrett has warned that Australia’s new surface warship and submarine force must be powerful enough to strike blows to deter a distant enemy from attacking Australia.

In his address to ASPI’s annual White Ensign Dinner, Vice Admiral Barrett said that by 2025, it is expected that almost half of the world’s economic output will come from the Asia–Pacific region. It lies at the centre of the massive economic trading artery running from the Middle East, across the Indian Ocean, through the South China Sea, past Japan and on to North America.

Four of the world’s top defence spenders—the United States, China, Russia and India—are active in the region, Barrett said. ‘Many of the global challenges will increasingly be played out in our region.’

The navy chief said traditional challenges like state-on-state coercion and competition are on the rise and non-traditional threats are making their presence felt in profound ways.

‘Global terrorist networks are taking root in Southeast Asia, and Australia and its neighbours are all looking to work together to strengthen regional counterterrorism capacity. We will also need to respond to the effects of climate change and natural disasters’, Barrett said.

‘I expect that we will face challenges to our border security of increasing complexity and scale, whether they be from coordinated illegal fishing enterprises or from international criminal syndicates seeking to smuggle illegal migrants. And we will face these challenges in a faster paced environment, a more complex environment, and possibly against near peer competitors’, he said.

‘Advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems will become more prevalent, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of stealth capabilities. We will face increased offensive cyber and space-based challenges which may be able to disable or degrade our infrastructure and operational networks.’

There will be more autonomous systems, such as unmanned combat vehicles, above and below the oceans, on land and in the air.

Barrett said that over the next two decades, other technological advances such as quantum computing, innovative manufacturing, hypersonics, and directed energy weapons are likely to bring weapons and systems into the region.

‘There has never before been a time when threats distant from our shores, whether they be from the sea, land or air, can so quickly affect our direct interests. Australia will need to be able to bring together a balanced, connected and integrated force that combines different land, air, sea, intelligence, electronic warfare, cyber and space capabilities so that we can apply more force, more rapidly and more effectively’, he said.

‘We need a balanced, connected and integrated force that can deliver lethality when required. Lethality is the key to our ability to wage war and, subsequently, the key to how we deter an attack on our interests.’

That’s why the navy, and the ADF as a whole, are being rebuilt and expanded, he said. The navy is moving back to being task-group oriented to make it more agile and responsive.

‘As the navy is expanded, we must be cognisant that we maintain our focus on core capabilities that will enable the navy in the future to apply decisive lethal force at the adversary’s point of maximum vulnerability, where the application of that lethal force makes the greatest strategic sense.’

Core capabilities are the ability to project, from a distance, power from the sea; the ability to impose unacceptable costs on an adversary; the ability to deliver targeted and decisive lethality; the ability to take decisions quickly and manoeuvre naval force with speed and flexibility; the ability to enhance survivability by ensuring that personnel are able to adapt doctrine and tactics to meet the needs of the moment; the ability to exploit and manipulate our strategic advantages deriving from our capacity to project power from the sea; ‘and finally, the ability to ensure, as a part of a coherent national force or an allied–coalition force, that we have the mass and the flexibility to deter and, if necessary, to dominate our adversary at sea’.

The future submarine project will a potent part of that mix. The navy chief rejected suggestions that the French project to build Australia’s 12 big new conventional submarines is set to fail. He said that ‘contrary to recent commentary, the project appears to me to be meeting its milestones’.

He was referring to a report in which a team of former senior public servants, businessmen and defence analysts headed by ANU professor and defence specialist Hugh White warned that the navy could be left without a submarine force for ‘a decade or two’ because the plan to design and build the new submarines was wildly ambitious. Naval Group of France, formerly DCNS, is the international partner to design the boats.

‘We have formal government-to-government agreements in place, a functioning design centre has been built in Cherbourg (by Australian tradespeople with Australian materials) and the Australian project team is filling it rapidly. The construction site in Osbourne is being secured and yard design is in progress’, Barrett said.

He said work has begun on the navy’s two new tankers and the first is expected to be delivered in 2019 and the second in 2020.

The evaluation of the tender for 12 offshore patrol vessels is complete and a decision is expected from the government later this year, Barrett said. ‘We are on track, with the construction of the first vessel to begin in 2018.’

Tenders for the navy’s nine new frigates are being evaluated and the process is on schedule for construction to commence in Adelaide in 2020.

The two giant assault ships, or landing helicopter docks, are in service ‘and have already fought their first battles (but these were mainly reputational ones and were with the media)’, Barrett said. An early problem identified with their propulsion pods was managed in a deliberate, disciplined and seaworthy manner and both ships are proving their utility, he said. ‘We have demonstrated that we are able to deploy task groups equipped with a wide range of capabilities from high-end warfighting to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.’

One of the LHDs, HMAS Adelaide, is leading the six-ship Joint Task Group, Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2017, on visits to Asian nations. Adelaide has army and air force elements on board. ‘This deployment will be Australia’s biggest coordinated task group operation since the early 1980s.’

Barrett said the six Collins-class submarines are performing very well, with four available at a time.

And just over a week ago, the navy’s most sophisticated warship, the air warfare destroyer HMAS Hobart, was commissioned.

‘Amid the complexity of all that is this ambitious shipbuilding plan, with all the challenges that big decisions bring, and with the ferocious debate that accompanies such potentially high-risk endeavours—the evidence is, we are getting on with things’, Barrett said.

‘So while there remains some uncertainty in how the final plan will unfold, and certainly there is some public criticism of what has been referred to as the veil of probity associated with ongoing commercial negotiations, there are, I believe, some clear indications of progress being made and there is clarity emerging around the future vision of the national shipbuilding enterprise’, he said.

‘We need to understand and remain vigilant to the fact that this shipbuilding stuff will be a medium- to high-risk venture for the next 30 years, until the full mantle of continuous shipbuilding is secured. It will require vision and resolve. And to sustain it will require a different approach to every problem.

‘But I believe it is not beyond us. I base this on the evidence of what has already occurred. And changes in behaviours of those involved.’

Barrett said that it is critical to unite the navy and the nation in a national endeavour to ensure success. It has to be recognised that the navy is an intrinsic national capability, intimately connected to the social, economic, industrial and educational drivers of national wellbeing—‘not just something you bring out in times of trouble’.

‘And if we are to harness the benefits and opportunities of the Defence White Paper and the national shipbuilding plan, there must be a fundamental shift in thinking about what the navy actually is, where it fits into our national architecture and how it relates to the national economic infrastructure.’

To have a naval force that is available, sustainable and affordable as well as lethal, there has to be a closer relationship between Defence and industry.

‘I think the actions we have taken over the past few years with regard to industry engagement have set a good foundation for making this recapitalisation a success over the decades to come’, Barrett said. ‘But it will require constant resolve towards an enterprise behaviour.’

The navy is already reaping benefits. ‘I have seen improvements in the way we (navy and industry together) manage not only the seaworthiness of our vessels, but the seaworthiness of our entire enterprise from the top down with the implementation of the Defence Seaworthiness Management System’, Barrett said.

Australia’s surface warships and submarines will, in future, be much more closely linked to allied vessels to provide a collective defence against increasingly lethal threats, Royal Australian Navy chief Tim Barrett tells The Strategist.

Discussing options and capabilities the revitalised fleet will bring, Vice Admiral Barrett says surface warships provide a meaningful visible presence in, for instance, protecting trade routes. ‘A navy must be able to demonstrate presence but also be capable of engaging and operating with others in the region—not just those you might consider to be future adversaries, but all others.’

Barrett says the issue then is to ensure vessels can operate freely against the sorts of threats being developed. Weapons being designed to attack surface ships are driving the shape, numbers, size and design of naval forces and, more importantly, the way the fleet will operate.

‘So I still think there’s a role for surface ships. While we still have trade routes around the world and the requirement for a surface ship to be able to support, engage and demonstrate an intent to allow that free flow of trade, I think the visible presence will still be there.’

The US naval concept of ‘distributed lethality’ is intended to deal with emerging threats to the fleet by arming and connecting every vessel in it to allow them to operate in contested waters as a much more lethal force, says Barrett. That will concentrate the mind of an adversary who may wish to attack a carrier group but who has to contend with the fact that all of the ships in a fleet could pose a lethal threat, making targeting much more difficult.

‘Each ship becomes more lethal,’ Barrett says. Distributed lethality could involve ships from various nations using their Aegis air defence systems to protect the fleet from every direction. ‘If we’re to design a fleet in this day and age, and if we acknowledge our alliance, we would certainly need to consider those elements, otherwise we’d be an orphan sitting in one part of the region and not being able to provide a meaningful contribution.’

Barrett says that even before the navy’s future frigate has been selected, a lot of work is already being done to establish infrastructure for its construction. ‘That’s being done knowing we haven’t finalised the selection of a particular type but there are certain aspects that will be generic in terms of design.

The government provided a very ambitious program—to cut steel by 2020, the navy chief says. ‘Doing a number of things in parallel provides an increased risk that must be managed. It’s a challenge but we knew that as soon as the date was set. But at the moment those things we told government we would do, are being done.’

From time to time it’s suggested that the short take-off and vertical landing version of the new joint strike fighter, the F-35B, could be bought to operate from the navy’s giant landing ships, or landing delicopter docks. The Spanish version of the LHD does operate British Harriers, so how feasible would it be for the RAN to do something similar?

The government’s been very clear in saying it would not do that, Barrett says. ‘If you ask me in practical terms what would it take, Britain had to modify its carriers to take the JSFs. I’d envisage that we’d have to do that as well so there would be a cost beyond the airframes. That’s just to operate them on deck.’

Barrett says it would be possible to fly the JSFs off the RAN’s landing ships if technical issues could be resolved. ‘But in practical terms, it’s a relatively small deck that we’ve got, with six spots for helicopters. And you would need to consider broadly what you were seeking to achieve with that number of aircraft.’

The RAAF plans to use its conventional take-off and landing F-35As as part of a networked force with tankers and the Wedgetail command and control aircraft. Barrett says it’s not clear what strategic advantage having jets aboard ships would bring to the navy.

‘As an aviator I’d say that would be nice to have. But as chief of the navy I’d ask you to explain what you are trying to achieve here.’ Having a relatively small number of jets would mean fewer helicopters to carry troops ashore. ‘If you turn the LHD into a fixed-wing carrier, then you’re completely changing the effect you’re trying to deliver and the nature of how you operate and defend that ship changes as well,’ Barrett says.

‘So could we put them in? We’d find a way. Should we put them in? I would like to see all of the strategic logic before I could then consider the advice I’d provide to government.’

Asked if the navy’s confident of finding, recruiting and training enough people to run its new ships, Barrett responds, ‘If we do what we’ve always done, the answer is, no.’ Drawing a capable workforce will require coordination from government, industry and the education system as a whole of nation project, he says.

‘There’s a good opportunity for us all to reconstruct how we recruit from school, how we educate, and develop the skills which will allow me to dip into a bigger pool to have people to go to sea. I envisage a lot more people moving from navy to industry and back to navy through their lives. I also see closer engagement with education departments to put purpose behind why people should be studying certain things.’ And an increasing number of naval ships are being manned by civilian crews, Barrett says.

Might Australia in the future employ unmanned surface warships? That’s possible, says Barrett, along with unmanned submarines and aircraft, but they’d be likely to work with manned vessels on specific tasks.