Tag Archive for: RAN

Editors’ picks for 2022: ‘Australia’s “damn the torpedoes” path to nuclear-powered submarines’

Originally published 4 October 2022.

I’ve often thought that Australia’s submarine transition is a wicked problem, perhaps one of the most wicked in the public policy arena. A wicked problem is one that is difficult or even impossible to solve because key stakeholders have fundamentally different interests and requirements. No solution can satisfy them all. It’s not just possible, but inevitable that intelligent people will be committed to very different solutions to wicked problems.

I was reminded of this recently after my colleague Andrew Nicholls and I had written a series of articles in The Strategist unpacking the schedule of the transition from the Collins-class submarine to a future nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), examining the likelihood of a capability gap and considering whether a new conventional submarine could fill that gap. After the last piece, I received lengthy responses from two retired senior naval officers. They agreed with each other that we were wrong in our analysis of the issues. That’s not unusual; I’m quite used to people pointing out my errors. What was more interesting is that the two officers took diametrically opposed positions to each other. But, of course, that is the nature of wicked problems: subject-matter experts will disagree.

Officer 1 was strongly opposed to a new conventional submarine, arguing that the Royal Australian Navy couldn’t sustain three classes of submarines (the Collins, the new boats and SSNs) and Australia couldn’t simultaneously conduct three major submarine programs (the Collins life-of-type-extension, the new boats and SSNs). Instead, ‘maximum effort must go into acquiring some SSNs as fast as possible, with the first few probably built overseas’.

Officer 2 agreed with the ultimate need for SSNs but argued that the days of the conventional submarine were far from over, although they may need to be used differently to remain relevant. The best way forward was to accept the long timelines involved in the transition to SSNs and fill the gap by building more Collins-class boats. They would include all the upgrades installed since the original build program plus those planned for the life-of-type-extension program.

There are, of course, many subvariants of this second position, each advocating a different conventional submarine solution. Ultimately, the two positions are irreconcilable—either you acquire a new conventional submarine or you don’t. But they do set out the two broad pathways forward: go all-in on getting SSNs as fast as possible and live with the risks that arise, or embark on a deliberate, extended transition that is built around addressing the risks of that process.

We’ve looked at the second of these two approaches in previous work. That’s because when you take a standard approach to capability acquisition, it looks like the safer one. But what if we accept that AUKUS is not the standard approach to capability acquisition? Moreover, if we accept the argument of proponents of SSNs that conventional submarines will become obsolete in key areas in which Australia might want to operate, then the wicked problem looks somewhat different. No amount of conventional submarine capability will meet our requirements. And if we take the navy at its word that Australia can’t manage three huge submarine programs and operate three distinct classes of submarine, a new conventional boat would simply add to our problems.

So, what would a damn-the-torpedoes accelerated development of SSN capability look like? Above all, it would need to embrace the fact that an Australian SSN capability isn’t going to be a sovereign capability; Australia will always be dependent on our major partner for the acquisition, sustainment and, to a degree, operation of the capability. But once we accept that, several possibilities outside the traditional approach open up that embrace the concept of leveraging our AUKUS partners’ capabilities.

Various elements of this potential path have been suggested already, and, indeed, some are already getting underway. They include:

  • training of Australian submariners at US and UK facilities and then on their boats
  • leasing and/or purchasing of older US boats for training, as either seaworthy submarines or moored training vessels
  • provision to Australia of US Navy boats already in service or on the production line
  • joint US and Australian investment in expanding US industrial capacity to build more boats faster
  • joint Australian–US crewing of operational US Navy boats
  • extended visits or even basing of US boats in Australia
  • forward deployment of a USN submarine tender to Western Australia to support SSNs there
  • the start of maintenance on those US boats in Australia as soon as possible to develop local industry skills and capacity
  • extended visits of Royal Navy submarines to Australia.

Each path has different levels of probability and risk, but in combination could they produce an AUKUS SSN capability in Australia in a faster timeframe than the traditional, by-the-book approach? If we adjust our risk appetite to the urgency and severity of our strategic circumstances and throw the capability acquisition manual out the window, is a combined capability of four to six SSNs operating out of Australia consisting of a mix of RAN, USN and RN boats and crews feasible by the mid-2030s?

And if we’re damning the torpedoes, burning our bridges and crossing the Rubicon, other big capability options might open up. Potentially, we could cancel the Collins life-of-type-extension. After all, one of the key justifications for the scale and scope of the LOTE that has led to its effectively becoming a ‘son of Collins’ was that the new systems being installed would provide the Collins with significant commonality with the cancelled Attack-class submarine and act as a transition step between the two. That reason is now gone. And if conventional submarines are passé, why spend billions keeping them going deep into the 2040s? We could limit the scope of the LOTE to something more akin to a standard full-cycle docking and devote the money and human resources saved to accelerating the SSN program. Or we could upgrade some of the Collins fleet and retire the remainder in the early 2030s without a LOTE or final full-cycle docking.

Certainly, this approach raises many serious questions. For example, as Officer 2 wrote, you can’t rush the development of nuclear stewardship. And it certainly wouldn’t be a traditional Australian-owned and -operated capability, at least in those early stages. Even if it is a viable pathway, we’d still need to invest in mitigating capability risk through systems other than a new conventional submarine. There are many options there too, from the ‘small, the smart and the many’ approach of disposable autonomous systems and guided weapons to the ‘big stick’ approach provided by a long-range strike system such as the US Air Force’s in-development B-21 bomber. But avoiding the expenditure of the very large amount of money that would be needed for a new conventional submarine could make these complementary capabilities financially possible.

Many of the elements I’ve listed here will be necessary, whatever path Australia takes to SSNs. In all honesty, I’m not yet convinced this approach will deliver something by the mid-2030s. The only people with the information needed to determine which of these two broad pathways is the optimal one are those on the nuclear-powered submarine taskforce. It’s good that the government has directed the taskforce and the defence strategic review team to work closely together, because the choice of SSN pathway will likely have major implications for the rest of Defence’s force structure and acquisition program over the coming decades.

Editors’ picks for 2022: ‘Australia’s navy is cultivating “a nuclear mindset”, says SSN taskforce chief’

Originally published 27 October 2022.

After a year of intense research, the head of the 350-strong nuclear-powered submarine taskforce is confident the Royal Australian Navy will be equipped with SSNs.

Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead tells The Strategist he believes ‘absolutely’ that the massive and highly complex industrial-scale endeavour is viable.

Set up after the AUKUS technology-sharing agreement was signed by Australia, the US and the UK a year ago, Mead’s SSN taskforce will deliver recommendations on options to the government by March next year, and he says the work is on track.

The government will choose the design. Mead says a range of options have emerged. He won’t be drawn on specifics, but says it can only be done with the unfettered support of all three nations. ‘We are providing options to our government on what we think is the optimum pathway, and we are working on that with our partners. I am very confident that we will be in a position for the government to make an announcement next year on an optimal pathway, in conjunction with the other nations’ leaders.’

Mead cautions that a whole-of-government approach with very strong backing from industry and the support of the Australian people will be essential for the plan to work. ‘Defence cannot do this by itself. This social licence is a very important aspect for us. We need Australians to have confidence in our ability to build and operate these submarines.’

Submarines operate at the highest end of warfighting capability, says Mead, and they deliver significant deterrence. ‘When you put a nuclear-powered submarine in the mix, you’ve got almost an exponential increase in speed, manoeuvrability, survivability, endurance, lethality in their ability to launch long-range missiles, to operate around the region and to protect Australia.’

The government had made it clear that submarines were a fundamental part of Australia’s defence capability. Defence Minister Richard Marles has said the need for haste is dictated by deteriorating strategic circumstances, sharpening competition and rapid military modernisation. The taskforce’s recommendations will go to the government at the same time as the defence strategic review by former defence and foreign minister Stephen Smith and former Australian Defence Force chief Angus Houston.

‘We are briefing them so that they can take on board our body of work as well,’ Mead says.

Members of Mead’s team often work through the night in talks with the US and UK partners. They include personnel from all three services, the Lucas Heights reactor, the nuclear regulator and a range of departments.

He won’t comment on the argument that an interim conventionally powered submarine will be needed to avoid a capability gap, but says the government has given him very clear direction to develop options that will deliver the nuclear-powered capability ‘in an expeditious manner’.

‘I’m only looking at nuclear,’ he says. ‘We are working with the US and UK on a range of options that we think can deliver the capability in an expeditious timeframe.’

Any decision to opt for an interim conventional submarine would be up to the government and the Department of Defence.

No one doubts that the submarine force will be eye-wateringly expensive.

The taskforce proposal will be presented to the government at the same time as the results of the Smith–Houston strategic review—and at a time of economic pressures and invidious trade-offs when the world is emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic while facing a dangerous strategic environment. Marles has undertaken to strengthen the lethality and deterrent effect, but that assurance comes as demands for support for services such as the National Disability Insurance Scheme and veterans’ welfare increase.

With a strong social agenda, the government faces painful choices as it deals with a complex set of interlocking problems, and clear choices on ADF capabilities will be vital.

The review will focus on strengthening the ADF’s deterrent effect by getting sophisticated weapons and platforms into the hands of its men and women faster. Areas for rapid development include hypersonics and cyber. Some programs will be accelerated. The reviewers will be looking at options, possibly other than submarines, for long-range strike capability. Missiles and long-range bombers such as the B-21 will be in that mix.

Australia needs to be able to defend itself against sophisticated threats—and to give an adversary pause to consider whether an attack is a good idea. While much is discussed about potential flashpoints such as Taiwan, Australia must be able to defend itself against unexpected threats.

Threats may come in the traditional domains of sea, land and air—or in the shape of cyberattacks, or threats to democracy. Greater interdependencies mean that threats can come from different domains at once, with more lethality and greater range. Great-power adversaries can operate in all these domains, making defending against them much more complex and expensive.

While there’s a need for hard power to deter, that can’t be the only focus. Defending the nation means putting more resources into diplomacy to develop deeper relationships with neighbours, and improving intelligence-gathering to ensure threats are identified and understood as they develop. While Australia must be strong enough to deal with actors that see conflict as a means of getting their way, it needs to reassure friends that it has a defensive mindset.

Australia needs to be able to strengthen civil structures and protect democracy at home. There are many ways democracy can be ‘squeezed’, and Australia must be able to operate much more broadly in the ‘grey zone’ where it can come under serious threat short of open war. That can include active coercion from a major power, or even from tiny states taking advantage of the situation.

The ADF has now been freed up to prepare more openly for the grave strategic consequences of climate change.

A hard fought-over element is whether the army needs all the 450 armoured fighting vehicles it has asked for. Critics say the number should be cut so some of the $28 billion cost can be diverted to a range of other weapons to provide deterrence urgently. The ADF’s strong view is that soldiers learned in World War I that they could defend themselves against rifle fire, but they need armour to defend against machineguns and so it is tactically sensible to have some such vehicles to protect them.

As these debates evolve, Mead has identified the optimal pathway to SSNs, with nine components underpinning the daily work of the taskforce. ‘If we can’t put a green tick next to each of those nine components, then the boat becomes almost a meaningless concept,’ he says.

First is Australia’s strategic situation and the policies set by the government to deal with it.

The second is how to assess and gather each AUKUS partner’s contribution along the lines of the systems and processes the US long ago established in the UK to make this truly a trilateral program.

Third is building the workforce, identifying the educational requirements and training required for navy crews, welders, naval architects, for those who’ll create the regulatory system, and those who’ll staff the laboratories—and, says Mead, setting a 14-year-old schoolgirl on a path to captain the first or second SSN.

Fourth is the capability, the design of the submarine, and how it can be achieved quickly, safely and in the most secure manner. Mead won’t say where the design choice will land—on the US Virginia class or the SSN(X) to follow it, Britain’s Astute class which is about to go out of production, or the SSN(R) that will follow it—or something else.

‘Clearly these are decisions for government, and not just our government, but also the partners. They need to put it through their political systems.’

He says nuclear submarines will be built in Australia. ‘That’s very important to ensure Australia has a sovereign capability. They are likely to be built on land adjacent to South Australia’s Osborne Naval Shipyard earmarked for the previous Attack-class submarine project.’

Number five is the need to set up an industrial base that can support SSNs and a supply chain to build and maintain them—and to provide components for partner submarines, optimising the industrial bases of all three countries.

‘If we are building a component for an Australian build and that’s what our partners need, then it would be wise for us to identify things we can assist them with. All countries have constrictions and bottlenecks.’

Teams from the US and UK have visited Australia to see what might be available here. Much cooperative work has been done already, he says, with the Collins-class submarine already using combat systems and torpedoes developed with the US.

An option is for Australia to do a deeper level of maintenance on US and UK submarines during their visits to bases such as HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. That could gradually increase to major maintenance.

‘We need to start sending people from our industrial base to the US and UK to be embedded in their construction and maintenance yards so that when submarines visit Australia our people will have the necessary experience. They’ll understand how the regulatory system works, the radiological safety procedures and the nuclear ecosystem.’

For six months, Australian submariners have been working in US submarines ‘at the back end where the reactor is’. The UK has also committed to embarking Australians on its boats.

‘That’s a demonstration of our partners’ commitment,’ Mead says, adding that more Australians are being sent on reactor courses. ‘They’ll have the opportunity to be posted to US and UK submarines for two or three years. They’ll become experts and we’ll bring them back to Australia—or they may do a follow-on posting in a shore position in the US and UK. Then we’ll bring them back to Australia, and they become crew one for the first submarine that we acquire.’

Six is stewardship, which Mead says is the umbrella that brings all the other components together. ‘We need to be an appropriate steward of nuclear material and nuclear technology. That will require a lot of work, and a very demanding standard will be expected of us by the Australian people, and by our partners. We call it “sovereign ready”. That’s when we would be capable of operating a nuclear-powered submarine.’ Mead is not saying yet when that might be.

There are signs all over the taskforce precinct stressing the importance of building a ‘nuclear mindset’, and each member’s ID card comes with that message.

Mead notes a report by the US director of naval reactors that in 65 years of operation, US Navy nuclear-powered warships and their support facilities have had no discernible effect on public health or the environment.

‘It’s safe for the people, and it’s safe for the environment. We intend to learn from the US and UK so that we can demonstrate identical standards,’ he says. ‘This nuclear mindset is a way of thinking within our people, within navy, and within other areas of the department that will allow us to be the effective stewards, to make sure that nuclear safety is paramount. We have an unyielding commitment to security and nuclear safeguards, that we strive for improvement.

‘Accountability, that’s a fundamental aspect of nuclear technology, and we want the best people dedicated to excellence.’

Component seven is the need for high-level security to protect the technologies the US and UK are sharing, which they regard as the crown jewels among their weapon systems.

Eight is the crucial issue of ensuring non-proliferation—preventing the spread of nuclear technology and highly refined bomb-making materials. International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Rafael Grossi has visited the taskforce HQ for detailed talks with Mead. ‘He said he was satisfied with the level of engagement he’s been having with Australia and our US and UK partners. That’s a very important body of work, making sure that we continue to uphold those exemplary standards of non-proliferation that we’ve done in the past, as we will in the future.’

Mead says the ninth crucial element is the need to clearly explain to Australians, and to the US and UK, what the program is all about and how the safety and reliability of the submarines can be assured.

From the bookshelf: ‘The Scrap Iron Flotilla’

Mike Carlton has emerged as a gifted historian of Australia’s outstanding naval contributions in two world wars. He polishes this reputation in his new book, The Scrap Iron Flotilla: five valiant destroyers and the Australian war in the Mediterranean. Carlton has always been persuasive in print. His earlier books, Cruiser on the wartime record of HMAS Perth, and First victory 1914, detailing HMAS Sydney’s destruction of the German raider Emden, suggested both the enthusiasm for and appreciation of Australian naval history which the author has in abundance.

Flagship, on the role of HMAS Australia in the Pacific War against the Japanese, is impressive not only for the telling of the tale of a great warship, but in dealing with the complexities of the early alliance relationship with the Americans.

The Scrap Iron Flotilla displays Carlton at his best. He now brings something of the character of Patrick O’Brien’s novels to his depictions of action in the Mediterranean during the early years of World War II, between 1940 and1942.

It is not simply a tale about warships. It is about the bravery of the Australian sailors, the nature of the confrontations with the Axis and the pressures on the ageing destroyers.

The five destroyers of the flotilla—His Majesty’s Australian Ships Stewart, Waterhen, Vendetta, Voyager and Vampire—could best be described as old but resilient at the war’s outbreak.

Vampire, Vendetta, Voyager and Waterhen were sister ships of the Admiralty’s V and W class destroyers of about the same vintage as Stuart but a little different. From 1916, English and Scottish shipyards had been turning out V and Ws by the dozen, as fast as they could go. Sixty-seven of them were built in all, with another forty cancelled after the war ended. Like Stuart, they were advanced for their time, a design so successful, so tough and seaworthy, that it would set a benchmark for succeeding classes built for the next twenty years.

The five destroyers would prove their value time and again, including on convoy duty to the besieged Allied garrison in Tobruk in 1941. Their courage was never in doubt, nor was their reliability and seamanship as part of the British Mediterranean Fleet. But Carlton notes in a cheeky paragraph that there were few creature comforts:

The Admiralty’s naval architects, serenely aware of the infrequent and reluctant bathing habits of the British lower classes, had not troubled to provide baths or showers for the sailors in the destroyers. There were two open spaces below decks at the break of the fo’c’sle, port and starboard, each about 3 metres by 2, with a tiled floor and a drain and a line of four chipped ceramic wash basins … That was all, for 100 men and more. There was no privacy, and there were no taps, either.

Rule Britannia.

The Mediterranean was a critical theatre for the early years of the war, controlling access to Suez and on to India and Australia, and being recognised by both the Italians and the Germans for its strategic value. The Middle East and North Africa may have been secondary to the war in Russia, but there was no doubting the implications if the Axis had defeated the Allies and occupied the region.

Carlton faithfully recounts the flotilla’s contributions in battle in Mediterranean waters, but easily the most intriguing chapter of The Scrap Iron Flotilla is to be found in the description of activities on the Danube River in Romania when Australian seamen were called upon to undertake extraordinary duties. Enter Ian Fleming.

The late author of the James Bond spy novels has a walk-on part in Carlton’s book, being involved in the recruitment of an aristocratic character of dubious qualities to become part of a sabotage mission on the Romanian oil fields. Romania’s oil fuelled the Nazi war machine for years and the British Secret Service was determined to destroy this lifeline.

Unfortunately, official British policy was to keep Romania in a neutral corner. And not see Bucharest become part of the Axis. Fundamentally the two objectives would inevitably collide. The Australian seamen were recruited as volunteers for this hazardous, perhaps foolhardy, mission. The chapter is among the best in Carlton’s book.

The pages of The Scrap Iron Flotilla may not be encrusted with salt, but the Mediterranean breeze is certainly there to be felt. This is a very fine testament to the courage of the Royal Australian Navy in a most difficult period of World War II. Future generations of Australians will stand in Mike Carlton’s debt.

Australia’s navy is cultivating ‘a nuclear mindset’, says SSN taskforce chief

After a year of intense research, the head of the 350-strong nuclear-powered submarine taskforce is confident the Royal Australian Navy will be equipped with SSNs.

Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead tells The Strategist he believes ‘absolutely’ that the massive and highly complex industrial-scale endeavour is viable.

Set up after the AUKUS technology-sharing agreement was signed by Australia, the US and the UK a year ago, Mead’s SSN taskforce will deliver recommendations on options to the government by March next year, and he says the work is on track.

The government will choose the design. Mead says a range of options have emerged. He won’t be drawn on specifics, but says it can only be done with the unfettered support of all three nations. ‘We are providing options to our government on what we think is the optimum pathway, and we are working on that with our partners. I am very confident that we will be in a position for the government to make an announcement next year on an optimal pathway, in conjunction with the other nations’ leaders.’

Mead cautions that a whole-of-government approach with very strong backing from industry and the support of the Australian people will be essential for the plan to work. ‘Defence cannot do this by itself. This social licence is a very important aspect for us. We need Australians to have confidence in our ability to build and operate these submarines.’

Submarines operate at the highest end of warfighting capability, says Mead, and they deliver significant deterrence. ‘When you put a nuclear-powered submarine in the mix, you’ve got almost an exponential increase in speed, manoeuvrability, survivability, endurance, lethality in their ability to launch long-range missiles, to operate around the region and to protect Australia.’

The government had made it clear that submarines were a fundamental part of Australia’s defence capability. Defence Minister Richard Marles has said the need for haste is dictated by deteriorating strategic circumstances, sharpening competition and rapid military modernisation. The taskforce’s recommendations will go to the government at the same time as the defence strategic review by former defence and foreign minister Stephen Smith and former Australian Defence Force chief Angus Houston.

‘We are briefing them so that they can take on board our body of work as well,’ Mead says.

Members of Mead’s team often work through the night in talks with the US and UK partners. They include personnel from all three services, the Lucas Heights reactor, the nuclear regulator and a range of departments.

He won’t comment on the argument that an interim conventionally powered submarine will be needed to avoid a capability gap, but says the government has given him very clear direction to develop options that will deliver the nuclear-powered capability ‘in an expeditious manner’.

‘I’m only looking at nuclear,’ he says. ‘We are working with the US and UK on a range of options that we think can deliver the capability in an expeditious timeframe.’

Any decision to opt for an interim conventional submarine would be up to the government and the Department of Defence.

No one doubts that the submarine force will be eye-wateringly expensive.

The taskforce proposal will be presented to the government at the same time as the results of the Smith–Houston strategic review—and at a time of economic pressures and invidious trade-offs when the world is emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic while facing a dangerous strategic environment. Marles has undertaken to strengthen the lethality and deterrent effect, but that assurance comes as demands for support for services such as the National Disability Insurance Scheme and veterans’ welfare increase.

With a strong social agenda, the government faces painful choices as it deals with a complex set of interlocking problems, and clear choices on ADF capabilities will be vital.

The review will focus on strengthening the ADF’s deterrent effect by getting sophisticated weapons and platforms into the hands of its men and women faster. Areas for rapid development include hypersonics and cyber. Some programs will be accelerated. The reviewers will be looking at options, possibly other than submarines, for long-range strike capability. Missiles and long-range bombers such as the B-21 will be in that mix.

Australia needs to be able to defend itself against sophisticated threats—and to give an adversary pause to consider whether an attack is a good idea. While much is discussed about potential flashpoints such as Taiwan, Australia must be able to defend itself against unexpected threats.

Threats may come in the traditional domains of sea, land and air—or in the shape of cyberattacks, or threats to democracy. Greater interdependencies mean that threats can come from different domains at once, with more lethality and greater range. Great-power adversaries can operate in all these domains, making defending against them much more complex and expensive.

While there’s a need for hard power to deter, that can’t be the only focus. Defending the nation means putting more resources into diplomacy to develop deeper relationships with neighbours, and improving intelligence-gathering to ensure threats are identified and understood as they develop. While Australia must be strong enough to deal with actors that see conflict as a means of getting their way, it needs to reassure friends that it has a defensive mindset.

Australia needs to be able to strengthen civil structures and protect democracy at home. There are many ways democracy can be ‘squeezed’, and Australia must be able to operate much more broadly in the ‘grey zone’ where it can come under serious threat short of open war. That can include active coercion from a major power, or even from tiny states taking advantage of the situation.

The ADF has now been freed up to prepare more openly for the grave strategic consequences of climate change.

A hard fought-over element is whether the army needs all the 450 armoured fighting vehicles it has asked for. Critics say the number should be cut so some of the $28 billion cost can be diverted to a range of other weapons to provide deterrence urgently. The ADF’s strong view is that soldiers learned in World War I that they could defend themselves against rifle fire, but they need armour to defend against machineguns and so it is tactically sensible to have some such vehicles to protect them.

As these debates evolve, Mead has identified the optimal pathway to SSNs, with nine components underpinning the daily work of the taskforce. ‘If we can’t put a green tick next to each of those nine components, then the boat becomes almost a meaningless concept,’ he says.

First is Australia’s strategic situation and the policies set by the government to deal with it.

The second is how to assess and gather each AUKUS partner’s contribution along the lines of the systems and processes the US long ago established in the UK to make this truly a trilateral program.

Third is building the workforce, identifying the educational requirements and training required for navy crews, welders, naval architects, for those who’ll create the regulatory system, and those who’ll staff the laboratories—and, says Mead, setting a 14-year-old schoolgirl on a path to captain the first or second SSN.

Fourth is the capability, the design of the submarine, and how it can be achieved quickly, safely and in the most secure manner. Mead won’t say where the design choice will land—on the US Virginia class or the SSN(X) to follow it, Britain’s Astute class which is about to go out of production, or the SSN(R) that will follow it—or something else.

‘Clearly these are decisions for government, and not just our government, but also the partners. They need to put it through their political systems.’

He says nuclear submarines will be built in Australia. ‘That’s very important to ensure Australia has a sovereign capability. They are likely to be built on land adjacent to South Australia’s Osborne Naval Shipyard earmarked for the previous Attack-class submarine project.’

Number five is the need to set up an industrial base that can support SSNs and a supply chain to build and maintain them—and to provide components for partner submarines, optimising the industrial bases of all three countries.

‘If we are building a component for an Australian build and that’s what our partners need, then it would be wise for us to identify things we can assist them with. All countries have constrictions and bottlenecks.’

Teams from the US and UK have visited Australia to see what might be available here. Much cooperative work has been done already, he says, with the Collins-class submarine already using combat systems and torpedoes developed with the US.

An option is for Australia to do a deeper level of maintenance on US and UK submarines during their visits to bases such as HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. That could gradually increase to major maintenance.

‘We need to start sending people from our industrial base to the US and UK to be embedded in their construction and maintenance yards so that when submarines visit Australia our people will have the necessary experience. They’ll understand how the regulatory system works, the radiological safety procedures and the nuclear ecosystem.’

For six months, Australian submariners have been working in US submarines ‘at the back end where the reactor is’. The UK has also committed to embarking Australians on its boats.

‘That’s a demonstration of our partners’ commitment,’ Mead says, adding that more Australians are being sent on reactor courses. ‘They’ll have the opportunity to be posted to US and UK submarines for two or three years. They’ll become experts and we’ll bring them back to Australia—or they may do a follow-on posting in a shore position in the US and UK. Then we’ll bring them back to Australia, and they become crew one for the first submarine that we acquire.’

Six is stewardship, which Mead says is the umbrella that brings all the other components together. ‘We need to be an appropriate steward of nuclear material and nuclear technology. That will require a lot of work, and a very demanding standard will be expected of us by the Australian people, and by our partners. We call it “sovereign ready”. That’s when we would be capable of operating a nuclear-powered submarine.’ Mead is not saying yet when that might be.

There are signs all over the taskforce precinct stressing the importance of building a ‘nuclear mindset’, and each member’s ID card comes with that message.

Mead notes a report by the US director of naval reactors that in 65 years of operation, US Navy nuclear-powered warships and their support facilities have had no discernible effect on public health or the environment.

‘It’s safe for the people, and it’s safe for the environment. We intend to learn from the US and UK so that we can demonstrate identical standards,’ he says. ‘This nuclear mindset is a way of thinking within our people, within navy, and within other areas of the department that will allow us to be the effective stewards, to make sure that nuclear safety is paramount. We have an unyielding commitment to security and nuclear safeguards, that we strive for improvement.

‘Accountability, that’s a fundamental aspect of nuclear technology, and we want the best people dedicated to excellence.’

Component seven is the need for high-level security to protect the technologies the US and UK are sharing, which they regard as the crown jewels among their weapon systems.

Eight is the crucial issue of ensuring non-proliferation—preventing the spread of nuclear technology and highly refined bomb-making materials. International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Rafael Grossi has visited the taskforce HQ for detailed talks with Mead. ‘He said he was satisfied with the level of engagement he’s been having with Australia and our US and UK partners. That’s a very important body of work, making sure that we continue to uphold those exemplary standards of non-proliferation that we’ve done in the past, as we will in the future.’

Mead says the ninth crucial element is the need to clearly explain to Australians, and to the US and UK, what the program is all about and how the safety and reliability of the submarines can be assured.

Australia’s ‘damn the torpedoes’ path to nuclear-powered submarines

I’ve often thought that Australia’s submarine transition is a wicked problem, perhaps one of the most wicked in the public policy arena. A wicked problem is one that is difficult or even impossible to solve because key stakeholders have fundamentally different interests and requirements. No solution can satisfy them all. It’s not just possible, but inevitable that intelligent people will be committed to very different solutions to wicked problems.

I was reminded of this recently after my colleague Andrew Nicholls and I had written a series of articles in The Strategist unpacking the schedule of the transition from the Collins-class submarine to a future nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), examining the likelihood of a capability gap and considering whether a new conventional submarine could fill that gap. After the last piece, I received lengthy responses from two retired senior naval officers. They agreed with each other that we were wrong in our analysis of the issues. That’s not unusual; I’m quite used to people pointing out my errors. What was more interesting is that the two officers took diametrically opposed positions to each other. But, of course, that is the nature of wicked problems: subject-matter experts will disagree.

Officer 1 was strongly opposed to a new conventional submarine, arguing that the Royal Australian Navy couldn’t sustain three classes of submarines (the Collins, the new boats and SSNs) and Australia couldn’t simultaneously conduct three major submarine programs (the Collins life-of-type-extension, the new boats and SSNs). Instead, ‘maximum effort must go into acquiring some SSNs as fast as possible, with the first few probably built overseas’.

Officer 2 agreed with the ultimate need for SSNs but argued that the days of the conventional submarine were far from over, although they may need to be used differently to remain relevant. The best way forward was to accept the long timelines involved in the transition to SSNs and fill the gap by building more Collins-class boats. They would include all the upgrades installed since the original build program plus those planned for the life-of-type-extension program.

There are, of course, many subvariants of this second position, each advocating a different conventional submarine solution. Ultimately, the two positions are irreconcilable—either you acquire a new conventional submarine or you don’t. But they do set out the two broad pathways forward: go all-in on getting SSNs as fast as possible and live with the risks that arise, or embark on a deliberate, extended transition that is built around addressing the risks of that process.

We’ve looked at the second of these two approaches in previous work. That’s because when you take a standard approach to capability acquisition, it looks like the safer one. But what if we accept that AUKUS is not the standard approach to capability acquisition? Moreover, if we accept the argument of proponents of SSNs that conventional submarines will become obsolete in key areas in which Australia might want to operate, then the wicked problem looks somewhat different. No amount of conventional submarine capability will meet our requirements. And if we take the navy at its word that Australia can’t manage three huge submarine programs and operate three distinct classes of submarine, a new conventional boat would simply add to our problems.

So, what would a damn-the-torpedoes accelerated development of SSN capability look like? Above all, it would need to embrace the fact that an Australian SSN capability isn’t going to be a sovereign capability; Australia will always be dependent on our major partner for the acquisition, sustainment and, to a degree, operation of the capability. But once we accept that, several possibilities outside the traditional approach open up that embrace the concept of leveraging our AUKUS partners’ capabilities.

Various elements of this potential path have been suggested already, and, indeed, some are already getting underway. They include:

  • training of Australian submariners at US and UK facilities and then on their boats
  • leasing and/or purchasing of older US boats for training, as either seaworthy submarines or moored training vessels
  • provision to Australia of US Navy boats already in service or on the production line
  • joint US and Australian investment in expanding US industrial capacity to build more boats faster
  • joint Australian–US crewing of operational US Navy boats
  • extended visits or even basing of US boats in Australia
  • forward deployment of a USN submarine tender to Western Australia to support SSNs there
  • the start of maintenance on those US boats in Australia as soon as possible to develop local industry skills and capacity
  • extended visits of Royal Navy submarines to Australia.

Each path has different levels of probability and risk, but in combination could they produce an AUKUS SSN capability in Australia in a faster timeframe than the traditional, by-the-book approach? If we adjust our risk appetite to the urgency and severity of our strategic circumstances and throw the capability acquisition manual out the window, is a combined capability of four to six SSNs operating out of Australia consisting of a mix of RAN, USN and RN boats and crews feasible by the mid-2030s?

And if we’re damning the torpedoes, burning our bridges and crossing the Rubicon, other big capability options might open up. Potentially, we could cancel the Collins life-of-type-extension. After all, one of the key justifications for the scale and scope of the LOTE that has led to its effectively becoming a ‘son of Collins’ was that the new systems being installed would provide the Collins with significant commonality with the cancelled Attack-class submarine and act as a transition step between the two. That reason is now gone. And if conventional submarines are passé, why spend billions keeping them going deep into the 2040s? We could limit the scope of the LOTE to something more akin to a standard full-cycle docking and devote the money and human resources saved to accelerating the SSN program. Or we could upgrade some of the Collins fleet and retire the remainder in the early 2030s without a LOTE or final full-cycle docking.

Certainly, this approach raises many serious questions. For example, as Officer 2 wrote, you can’t rush the development of nuclear stewardship. And it certainly wouldn’t be a traditional Australian-owned and -operated capability, at least in those early stages. Even if it is a viable pathway, we’d still need to invest in mitigating capability risk through systems other than a new conventional submarine. There are many options there too, from the ‘small, the smart and the many’ approach of disposable autonomous systems and guided weapons to the ‘big stick’ approach provided by a long-range strike system such as the US Air Force’s in-development B-21 bomber. But avoiding the expenditure of the very large amount of money that would be needed for a new conventional submarine could make these complementary capabilities financially possible.

Many of the elements I’ve listed here will be necessary, whatever path Australia takes to SSNs. In all honesty, I’m not yet convinced this approach will deliver something by the mid-2030s. The only people with the information needed to determine which of these two broad pathways is the optimal one are those on the nuclear-powered submarine taskforce. It’s good that the government has directed the taskforce and the defence strategic review team to work closely together, because the choice of SSN pathway will likely have major implications for the rest of Defence’s force structure and acquisition program over the coming decades.

Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF’s offensive power?

A significant proportion of defence commentary these days is focused on quickly and cost-effectively enhancing the Australian Defence Force’s lethality in the context of China’s growing power and assertiveness. Much of this discussion is concerned with defence in the literal sense—that is, the protection of Australian territory, life and property. A favourite notion of notable pundit Greg Sheridan, for example, is stationing thousands of missiles in northern Australia. Other suggestions include laying smart sea mines to block the choke points on Australia’s approaches.

These commentators are concerned with a scenario reminiscent of 1942 when we’re faced with an enemy on our doorstep and our allies are on the back foot. Considering such a scenario is all well and good, but are we there yet? I suggest that the best way to deter a revisionist power from initiating conflict or, failing that, to win a war is to maximise the forces that can neutralise the adversary’s ability to wage war.

Here, history teaches important lessons in Australian strategy that the government’s strategic review should consider. Since the late colonial era of the 1870s–1890s, Australia has had two broad defence objectives. The first was obviously to defend Australia (even if it was not yet a unified country). The second was less self-evident. It derived from Australia’s position as a small dominion of the British Empire, dependent on maritime links for trade and access to British capital for its economic development. The problem was that Australia was dependent on a stable and friendly world order but didn’t have the capacity to maintain such an order on its own. Historically, few countries ever do. Australia did, however, have the capacity to add substantial forces to those maintained by Britain and could assist it to defeat a revisionist power. The same conditions prevail today in our alliance with the United States.

It’s important to consider both of these historical objectives because it’s hardly adequate to establish ‘fortress Australia’ if our strategic environment becomes hostile and impinges on the country’s prosperity. As former minister and governor-general Paul Hasluck wrote, ‘[To keep oneself from being overrun is not exactly the same as winning the war.’

So, the ADF needs to operate on two tiers. It needs the capability to defend Australia and expeditionary forces to assist its allies. That means the object of enhancing the ADF’s lethality quickly and cost-effectively should also be applied to its offensive expeditionary capability. Some might argue that the nuclear submarines being acquired under AUKUS, the Hobart-class air warfare destroyers and the Canberra-class landing helicopter docks, along with associated ground forces, have the expeditionary side of the equation well in hand. However, the AUKUS submarines in particular will only materialise in the long term. While the idea of additional destroyers has been floated, if approved, they will also take years to deliver.

There are a multitude of options, but the one I want to focus on involves augmenting an existing platform: the stalwart Collins-class submarine. The Collins will be Australia’s primary manned submarine capability for at least a decade. Analysts are still discussing the potential need for another conventional submarine to plug a capability gap in the transition to nuclear submarines. So, relatively small investments into the conventional submarine fleet are not ill-advised.

My argument is twofold. First, the government should equip the Royal Australian Navy with a dedicated submarine tender similar to USS Frank Cable. Second, it should equip the Collins with Tomahawk missiles, something the navy has said it is looking into the feasibility of. Both of these moves could be made quickly and cost-effectively. The RAN’s new replenishment ship, HMAS Supply, was laid down and commissioned in less than three years.

A tender would be a powerful force multiplier because it would permit the Collins to be forward-deployed to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Christmas Island or Manus Island. Currently, the offensive utility of the Collins is limited by its slow transit speed and relatively short range. Forward-basing them at these locations would shave almost 2,000 nautical miles off the transit to the South China Sea, thus reducing the transit time to patrol areas and increasing the time the submarines can spend on mission. If this were done on a regular basis, it would save considerable wear and tear on the ageing submarines. Such a move would certainly require some diplomatic smoothing with Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, however.

Arming the Collins with Tomahawks is possible and would drastically enhance the submarines’ offensive firepower. The Collins is equipped with 21-inch torpedo tubes for the Mk48 torpedo, similar to those that could launch earlier versions of the Tomahawk. Reports suggest there would be few complications in equipping the Collins with Tomahawks. The Block V would be the best option since it has a range of more than 900 nautical miles—likely around triple that of the planned long-range anti-ship missiles, or LRASMs—and has an anti-ship capability. Coupled with forward basing, Tomahawks will give the Collins the ability to project power into the South China Sea, providing a deterrent effect and the ability to add to allied offensive forces in a conflict.

Australia’s Hunter-class frigate program must be stopped and redirected

In 2009, Australia’s government decided that it would replace eight Anzac-class frigates with nine ships optimised for antisubmarine warfare (ASW). There was no justification in the Royal Australian Navy capstone doctrine for acquiring and optimising a frigate for ASW, which it regarded as among the most difficult of naval operations to be conducted and most effectively performed using submarines and aircraft. General-purpose ships can contribute to ASW, but their primary tasks are air defence, anti-shipping and land attack, and command and control at sea. Soon, this can be expected to include serving as controlling nodes for unmanned vehicles of various types.

Powerful and survivable large surface combatants, in numbers commensurate with the expected threat and national budgetary limitations, remain central in the order of battle of any navy of a middle power such as Australia, but they need to be fit for purpose.

There were three contenders for what became the Hunter frigate program. The Italian FREMM was already in service. Spain’s Navantia offered a derivative of the Hobart class, known as the F-5000, proposing an extended flight deck, two hangars and an integrated mast to carry the CEA radar. The third design, the BAE Systems Type 26, was incomplete, but the first ship for the Royal Navy had commenced construction. Navantia’s offering carried the lowest technical risk, but the FREMM, and much more so the Type 26, would need considerable modification to equip it with the RAN’s sensibly mandated changes. Those included the US Navy Aegis combat system, which was to be integrated with a new Australian-developed advanced phased-array radar, the US Standard missile system, Australian-specified communications systems and USN helicopters.

In 2018, Australia selected the Type 26, of which the Hunter will be a derivative. BAE Systems had never integrated a US combat system into its RN ship designs. Defence described important aspects of the risk as extreme.

With an estimated displacement of 10,000 tonnes, it will be the RAN’s most numerous and largest, but least well-armed, surface combatant. Not including deck-mounted launchers, it will have 32 missile cells, which is 16 fewer than the smaller Hobart class with 48, and 64 less than the USN DDG-51 (a ship slightly smaller than the Hunter) with 96. The Hunter will operate a single helicopter with space to carry a second, versus two for the DDG-51. China’s Type 055 destroyer is about 12,000 tonnes and has 136 cells and two helicopters.

From 2016 to mid-2020, the cost of the future frigate program increased from an estimated $30 billion to $45.6 billion, and further increases are likely. Some $6.26 billion has been contracted to convert the ostensibly mature design, but the schedule has slipped by at least 18 months. In raw terms, the approximate cost of a missile cell in the nine-ship Hunter class will be $158 million, compared to about $31 million per cell for 10 ships of the now building DDG-51 Flight III. The Hunter’s crew is forecast to be 180, versus the 329 of a DDG-51, but nonetheless it will take three Hunters to deliver the same firepower as a single DDG-51 and require 211 extra crew.

In 2013, the government expected that its future surface combatant would provide an option to conduct strategic strike. In 2021, that option was exercised through the announced acquisition of the Tomahawk missile system, which will be fitted to the Hobart class. The Hunters could also be fitted but they don’t have enough cells to carry a lethal load. They will also be capable of contributing to a future ballistic missile defence role, but once again there are insufficient cells.

Regardless of how naval warfare evolves, the more missiles you carry, the better the odds of success. A misguided emphasis on optimisation for ASW operations has resulted in Australia choosing a ship unsuited for its needs. A change of direction is needed.

My new ASPI report, The Hunter frigate: an assessment, released today, recommends that the Hunter frigate program in its current form be stopped and redirected.

Agreement should be reached with the US government to construct in Australia nine ships of the USN DDG-51 Flight III destroyer, integrating the Australian phased-array radar.

If negotiations with the US aren’t expeditious, a further three or four ships of the Hobart class already in service with the RAN should commence construction as soon as possible, using as much as possible of the combat systems and other equipment already being procured for the Hunter class. Wherever possible, the construction should be to the original design and not incur the risks of modifications.

A longer term program of collaboration with the US should be commenced to join its new DDG(X) program (integrating the Australian radar), potentially timing Australia’s entry into that program as the end of life of the first of the Hobart class is being approached.

Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry should be provided with multi-decade planning information necessary for its proper preparation to deliver the required ships and submarines to the RAN. The industry should plan for and then build those ships to be constructed in remediation of the Hunter program.

The RAN’s future ships and submarines programs should be mandated to be built by Australian-owned prime contractors, using overseas designers and systems as needed, and to incorporate Australian industrial content judged necessary to sustain that industry by an arrangement involving the RAN and industry and approved by the government.

Long-term planning, in the order of 30 years, should be implemented by the RAN, which should provide a clear and publicly available articulation of when its large and small combatants and submarines will reach the ends of their lives. This will include announcing when replacements will be sought in a timely manner in advance of their retirement. The public will similarly be given lengthy notice of intended changes to the composition of the RAN’s fleet.

These plans should be approved annually by government.

The arrangements for the overall management of Australia’s sovereign shipbuilding program should be adjusted to ensure maximum control by the government over the choice of its naval platforms and the fostering of its associated supply chains.

Australian-built evolved Collins needed to bridge the gap to nuclear subs

I should start by affirming my support for Australia’s transition to nuclear-propelled attack submarines, or SSNs, as my detailed study, delivered to the Department of Defence in 2013, and my public advocacy implies. I think it is an essential, if challenging, transition that should have started years ago.

In my recent Strategist article, I discussed the workforce needed before Australia owns its first SSN. This is but a portion of the big picture, and I think the media and political focus on when we might commission our first SSN, be it new or a leased second-hand submarine, is misplaced. The date we should be looking at is when we might have a fully operational SSN capability that can be deployed in harm’s way, to defend Australia. That is a vastly different and more challenging set of requirements.

The nuclear-propulsion study that’s now underway will no doubt detail these requirements; the following is my estimate of what will be required, based on modelling of the workforce structures used by the Royal Navy.

What is a fully operational SSN capability? The target should be to replace the Collins-class capability; that is, a submarine force with industrial and logistical support to be able to deploy two boats in harm’s way, under Australian sovereign control.

This will require six SSNs. The same ‘rule of three’ applies to both conventional and nuclear-propelled submarines. With a three-year interval between introducing each boat, driven by the time needed to raise and train the next crew, it will take at least 15 years after the first SSN is commissioned to achieve these numbers. It would be sensible to add a period of final work-up after the sixth SSN is commissioned, say, three years, so that’s 18 years all up. The Collins capability took much longer to deliver, something the navy should learn from.

Preparing trained crews to man the submarines will be a challenge and could well be the critical path determining the timing to achieve the goal of six SSNs. At this point, depending on the crew size, the Royal Australian Navy would have 600–720 personnel in seagoing crews. A spare crew of, say, 20 per submarine (each Collins sub has 13), to provide operational relief and ensure fully crewed boats for deployment, leads to a total submarine arm of 2,160–2,520 (using the rule of thumb that a total submarine arm should be three times the number of personnel at sea). This is two to three times the current size of the RAN’s submarine arm.

Crews are a key ingredient to capability, but as the Defence’s Capability life cycle manual sets out, an operational capability requires all nine elements of the ‘fundamental inputs to capability’. Here are some of the more critical when it comes to SSNs.

In the operational support areas, the sovereign ability to support the submarines with intelligence—backed by high data-rate, discrete satellite communications—and the ability to target Tomahawk missiles will be new requirements.

Based on the Royal Navy and UK regulatory approach, a sovereign support and supervisory capability for the RAN will include uniformed personnel, additional civilian regulators in the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation and the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, and an industrial workforce. They must be overseen by an independent verification and audit capability. How many trained and experienced people to support six SSNs are we talking about? Based on my modelling, I estimate Australia would need almost 500 trained, experienced and certified personnel.

Fleet Base West near Perth will house both Collins and SSNs at this stage, since there won’t be time to generate the additional 200 nuclear-experienced personnel required for a second submarine squadron on the east coast. Building a base is the first step; training the experienced personnel to man it will be another and the critical path. Fleet Base West will require additional security and certified docking, ship-lift, tug and crane facilities, impacting on the ASC facilities across Cockburn Sound at Henderson.

Meeting the safety case for nuclear requirements will add significantly to base costs and complexity. Protection should include local air defence against drones, seaward defences and surveillance systems protecting against sea mines and intruders. The UK base in Faslane has a squadron of minehunters, several offshore patrol vessels and a company of Royal Marines to provide these services.

We can conclude at this point that while leasing a number of tired, obsolescent SSNs dependent on the Royal Navy or US Navy for crew and supervision may provide a photo opportunity, it wouldn’t amount to an operational, sovereign SSN capability.

Given the time required—18 years from commissioning the first SSN (whenever that might be)—we can also conclude that the RAN is going to need additional conventional submarines to cover the long transition time and avoid the risks and costs of a second life extension to Collins.

Critically, we must increase the number of Australian submariners, enabling us to spare personnel to undertake the long nuclear training and experience pipelines while sustaining an operational Collins-class capability.

Despite the political cost of admitting the current approach is flawed, the government should avoid wasting further time and initiate preparations to build an updated Collins-class submarine in Adelaide.

This program would have the additional benefits of re-establishing a submarine-building capability in Australia prior to building SSNs, exploiting the preparations that were being made for the now-cancelled Attack class and avoiding a Defence and industry workforce ‘valley of death’.

Why does Australia need an east coast submarine base?

In a speech earlier this week, Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced that Brisbane, Newcastle and Port Kembla are the three possible sites for a new east coast base for Australia’s nuclear submarines under the AUKUS partnership.

Why is a new base needed for the nuclear submarines, given the navy’s existing submarine base in Western Australia south of Perth and the submarine construction and maintenance facilities in Adelaide?

Primary factors are the strategic and operational advantages of both east and west coast basing.

Nuclear submarines’ range and endurance are limited only by how long the human crew can stay healthy and sane on patrol. So, theoretically, they could be based anywhere and operate across the globe.

But humans do crew the boats, and adversaries also calculate how a submarine can move from its home port to areas of interest across the Pacific.

A nuclear submarine coming out of Western Australia’s Stirling naval base would have to go through narrow straits in the Indonesian archipelago to get to these places. One operating out of the east coast has a much broader set of paths there.

A sub from Stirling has advantages threatening a potential adversary that wants to use the narrow Indonesian straits, and also has advantages patrolling around the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean.

So, having bases on both coasts gives Australia’s military broad options and complicates a potential adversary’s plans. Those are two important elements that will help make the nuclear submarines a powerful deterrent weapon.

Why announce the possible base locations now, weeks before a federal election? And what’s involved in a base like this?

A simple reason is politics: Morrison no doubt wants to keep the national security theme running, as he thinks it gives the Coalition an advantage. He probably assesses that Labor remains politically vulnerable here with voters, and keeping Anthony Albanese agreeing with him on security helps Morrison more than it helps Labor.

Beyond the politics, though, getting the possible base locations out into the public debate makes sense. The nuclear submarine program is a decades-long endeavour, and will cost well north of the cancelled French Attack-class subs program’s $90 billion price tag. A figure of double that, maybe even $250 billion, wouldn’t be a surprise.

The last thing any government should do is rush this program, because it needs to be done safely, and it needs to be done well—to the highest levels of regulatory, operational and maintenance skill. Our US and UK partners won’t let us take delivery of highly enriched uranium in nuclear submarine reactors if we even look like we might do it any other way.

However, some big decisions need to be taken early because they will shape the rest of the submarine program, and because it will take a long time to get them underway and done.

Choosing the sites where the subs will operate and be maintained from is one of those big early decisions. Another is choosing whether the US or the UK will be Australia’s primary partner for the program analysis Admiral Jonathan Mead’s taskforce is focused on, together with his US and UK counterparts.

With Morrison’s announcement, the essential community, state and local government consultation can begin with the Queensland and NSW governments and the many stakeholders. Defence and other Commonwealth officials now have the licence to give briefings and take submissions on everything involved in a major new naval base.

Those briefings will be eye-opening. They will start to show the Australian public the magnitude, complexity and scale of this enormous tri-nation endeavour. One picture can tell a lot of this story.

The US Navy’s drydock in Hawaii shows what a new base like the one Morrison announced looks like. Huge, expensive and full of technologies, systems and skilled people that must combine to keep nuclear submarines operationally ready and technologically capable. The new base is not a few wharves, sheds and cranes—unless, in an own goal, Defence builds the base to not do deep maintenance and sustainment.

It should be more like the second Sydney airport and the rapidly growing industrial and research groupings around it. Morrison mentioned having already put aside $10 billion for submarine facilities. This new base and related facilities around it will eat most of that.

I won’t try to do a beauty pageant about Brisbane, Newcastle and Port Kembla in a few words. Each site has benefits. Brisbane was a base for submarines in World War II, although those subs weren’t anything like the size of nuclear boats.

Most important, the three sites share some critical attributes: they have capable and broad industry and research communities close by (universities and existing companies) and populations to recruit crews from. This gives something to use and to grow with new entrants and activities focused specifically on supporting nuclear submarines.

Each place would allow the submarines to operate widely across the Pacific. They are places where a large new submarine base can be built—like the one the US Navy has in Pearl Harbor, without the expensive, deeply competitive fight for waterfront in Sydney Harbour.

That will allow it to be at a scale that allows not just Australian submarines but those of our US and UK partners to be maintained and to operate from it—a direct benefit to our and our region’s security. None of the three will need to compete locally for skilled people with existing naval hubs in Western Australia and South Australia.

There will probably be a whole lot of jockeying and positioning from the various interests promoting each site, along with equally fervent opposition to the idea of having nuclear reactors with highly enriched uranium anywhere near affected communities, no matter how impeccable the safety records.

In the midst of these busy, noisy voices, it will be worth keeping in mind Australia’s dangerous international environment and the contribution that the submarines—and the other faster-moving technologies in the AUKUS arrangement—will make to keeping Australians safe and deterring war.

Editors’ picks for 2021: ‘Australia’s nuclear submarine decision leaves more questions than answers’

Originally published 30 September 2021.

It is correct, as former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull has asserted, that few of the questions raised by the government’s announcement that Australia will acquire nuclear-propelled submarines (SSNs) have been answered. The particular question he raised goes to the nature of the nuclear industry needed to support the submarines, but there are others that are just as essential to the success of the enterprise.

On Turnbull’s question, the government has suggested that the ‘game-changer’ enabling us to acquire SSNs is the development of reactors that don’t need to be refuelled over the life of the submarines, meaning we don’t need a civil nuclear industry to support them. However, operating submarines that don’t need refuelling still requires a nuclear industry—it just isn’t the industry you might first imagine.

We may not need civil nuclear power plants, or facilities that can enrich uranium to fuel the submarine’s reactor, but we’ll still need to perform maintenance and repair on the submarines, including the reactor. You can’t have an effective military capability if you need to return it to the US any time there’s a defect. Deeper maintenance will require putting the boats in dry dock and shutting down the reactor, working on it and starting it up again in an absolutely safe manner. We’ll need to develop that maintenance workforce from a very low base.

We’ll also need an independent and highly skilled workforce that can establish and enforce the rigorous safety regime that is absolutely critical to the operation of a nuclear fleet. That regulatory workforce will need to be built almost from scratch and will need to be in place well before the first boat arrives.

It may be possible to develop that workforce without a civil nuclear sector, but it’s misleading to say we won’t have a nuclear industry. Any enterprise where you are operating, shutting down, restarting and maintaining reactors—all in a robust and trustworthy regulatory and safety environment—is an industry. And much of that industry needs to be under Australian management—otherwise, we won’t have sovereign control of our most significant military capability.

What is the scale of that workforce and how do we develop it? Hopefully in the year of discussions leading up to the government’s announcement, the Department of Defence was able to develop a reasonable understanding of the answer to the question.

But there are other unanswered questions that are just as critical to the success of the enterprise.

First, with the first SSN not entering service until the late 2030s, how will we maintain an effective submarine capability? On that schedule, our Collins submarines will be older than the Indonesian submarine KRI Nanggala that was lost with all hands in a training accident earlier this year.

Second, what’s it going to cost? The government has said it will cost more than the cancelled Attack class. A lot will depend on which boat we select and the size of the enabling industry and workforce. Fifty per cent more than the $90 billion for the Attack class could be a safe starting assumption.

Third, what is the role of Australian industry in the building and sustainment of the SSNs? Australians would like to see a lot of that money stay here, but they also don’t want to see requirements for Australian industry involvement slow down delivery and drive costs up.

Fourth, how are we going to generate the much larger uniformed workforce needed to operate the new fleet? The US Navy’s Virginia-class SSNs have a crew of about 130, compared with the Collins’ 56. We’ll likely need at least twice as many submariners, so we’ll have to dramatically grow their numbers while simultaneously imparting nuclear engineering skills so they can safely operate the boats.

That gets to the final question. During the Attack-class program, many observers called for a Plan B due to its cost, schedule and capability. The government has now jumped from the previous Plan A to something completely different. But, in light of these unanswered questions, there are already calls for another Plan B in case the new plan doesn’t deliver.

Every time ASPI has looked at the path to acquiring nuclear boats we’ve concluded that Australia still needs a new conventional submarine to ensure we can safely transition to a nuclear fleet. Yet the government has cancelled the Attack program and burned its bridges behind it. So, the final question is, what gives the government such confidence that this plan is going to work?