Tag Archive for: RAN

People matter—especially when frigate crews are too small

People are getting carried away with the virtues of small warship crews. We need to remember the great vice of having few people to run a ship: they’ll quickly tire.

Yes, the navy is struggling to recruit and retain enough people, so needing fewer on each ship is superficially attractive. The wages bill will be lower, too. But the experience of Royal Australian Navy people, including me, tells us that a ship’s endurance is measured in the size of its crew more than almost any other data point.

Moreover, overloading people with work will only worsen the retention challenge. It almost certainly is doing so already.

In a 28 February article in The Strategist, Eric Lies expounds the virtues of the Mogami-class frigate, a derivative of which is being offered to Australia for its requirement for up to 11 general-purpose frigates. Among its advantages, he says, is that the ‘design needs a smaller crew’.

Even US aircraft carriers, with crews of more than 5,000, are limited by people. Each carrier has only one flight deck crew.  When those people need rest, it’s not negotiable. A carrier captain will husband the ship’s flight deck and air crews every bit as carefully as each other.

No amount of automation will change the dependency of ship endurance on crew endurance. Getting the endurance requirement right for a warship is one of the most vital capabilities to set. It’s simple: a navy’s ability lies in its people.

It follows that the small crew of the offered Mogami derivate, probably similar to the 90 in the original design that’s in service with the Japanese navy, would be a major limiting factor for a frigate in Australia’s sea conditions and enormous operating area. We need substantial endurance if our ships are going to be on station where we want to sustain a presence.  No presence is no deterrence.

A Mogami with a crew of 90 or so (presumably including an embarked helicopter flight of six aircrew and nine maintainers), will be exhausted after a fortnight on operations, even at low intensity and in good weather.

Trying to solve the navy’s recruitment and retention problems with small crews misses the essential point. If a ship is not designed with enough endurance to deliver the capability requirement sought, especially crew size and all the supporting facilities to sustain that crew, such as food storage, then the demand placed on each person aboard will be excessive.

I have no doubt that shrinking crew sizes has contributed significantly to the Royal Australian Navy’s recent poor retention. My experience tells me that we have been asking more of our people than is reasonable and that they pass judgement in the only way they can.

This matter is critical to the sustainability of naval power. Our history has useful pointers. The 4500-tonne Perth class destroyers built in the 1960s, one of which I commanded, had crews of 330. My Adelaide-class frigate, of much the same size and completed in 1993, had a crew of 220 plus an embarked helicopter. That is, it had a mission the destroyers did not have. My frigate crew became tired much more quickly than my destroyer crew.

In my frigate, everything we did as part of normal business—such as replenishing fuel at sea, launching and recovering the helicopter, firing weapons, myriad mundane domestic tasks,  plus simulated fire fighting, plugging up of holes and patching up of people in the event of battle damage—very quickly consumed everyone available. In navy parlance, almost everything was a whole-ship evolution, requiring the entire crew be put to work. No one except the captain had the luxury of having just one job. There was no redundancy.

The smaller Anzac class frigates have essentially the same set of missions as the FFGs, although with less capability overall. As fleet commander, I saw that fatigue in their crews of around 180 was a sharper problem than in earlier ships.

With the same suite of missions as an Anzac but half the crew, the endurance of a Mogami-derivative ship would be even more limited.

The smaller the crew, the more a ship can do things in only sequence because there are just not enough people to do them in parallel. Commanders may not have a choice about that. And, even when they do, the crew will always need rest sooner if the ship, for want of people, has no redundancy.

History shows starkly what has been happening.  Australia’s future Hunter-class frigates will reportedly be around 10,000 tonnes, with crews of 180. The heavy cruiser HMAS Australia, which served in World War II, also displaced 10,000 tonnes but her crew was greater than 800. In many respects, Australia was a much simpler ship, equipped for fewer missions, albeit more labour intensive to operate.

Reducing crew numbers is incompatible with increasing the size of ships, the number and complexity of their missions, their technological complexity and the variety of their systems. Our experience already tells us this.

Strategic and industrial factors favour Japan for Australia’s frigate project

It’s not just technical naval capability. Australia has persuasive geostrategic and industrial reasons for choosing Japan over Germany as its partner in building as many as 11 general-purpose frigates in a priority defence program.

The upgraded Mogami class offered by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) does have strong technical advantages for the Royal Australian Navy over the competing Meko A-200 from Germany’s ThyssenKrupp. But Australia must also consider that it and Japan share the threat from China, which is another reason to choose the Japanese design.

Related to that, the two countries can and should help each other. And, industrially, Japan is well positioned to help.

The Australia-Japan ‘special strategic partnership’ has great potential but is underexploited in defence industrial cooperation, largely because of Japan’s historically strict arms export controls. But the controls are gradually loosening as Japan faces an increasingly complex Indo-Pacific security landscape, with three assertive nuclear-armed neighbours—China, North Korea, and Russia—at its doorstep.

In response, Japan has taken significant steps, including establishing a joint public-private committee to support defence exports. This committee brings together representatives from various ministries and major industrial and defence firms such as MHI, Hitachi and NEC. The effort stems from lessons learned following Japan’s unsuccessful bid to sell submarines to Australia in 2016.

The stakes are high this time, since MHI is one of two finalists in the frigate program with an estimated budget of $7-11 billion.

The program, Sea 3000, prioritises rapid acquisition, requiring the first ship to be delivered by 2029. The first three members of the class will be built overseas by the designer and the rest in Australia.

The Mogami class is in Japanese naval service but the upgraded version offered to Australia is yet to be deployed. Thyssenkrupp’s design, Meko A-200 is an evolution of the Anzac class, which the new ships are intended to replace. A choice between the designs is due this year.

Leaving aside the question of which design is better technically suited to Australia (discussed in an accompanying article), Japan can offer more at a strategic and industrial level than Germany can. There are three aspects to consider.

The first is that Australia and Japan both reject Beijing’s moves to treat the South China Sea as its own. Australia and Japan have shared concerns over China’s increasing coercive behaviour that is responsible for the deteriorating strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific. Recent actions include China’s unlawful maritime claims with its 10-dash line (updated from the original nine-dash version), resource pilfering in the South China Sea, dangerous military manoeuvres, such as releasing flares in front of an Australian aircraft over international airspace, and violating Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands.

The steady tempo of China’s coercive measures in the Indo-Pacific prompted action from Australia and Japan. In December 2022, Japan approved three strategic documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program. These marked a shift in defence policy, a response to the real threat of military attacks on its territory. Similarly, Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program emphasise a strategy of denial, aiming to deter conflicts and prevent coercion through force.

Together, Japan and Australia view themselves as the northern and southern anchors of Indo-Pacific security, and both stand to play a strategic role in deterring China.

Germany is awakening to the challenge that China poses, but it is not there yet. The government of outgoing chancellor Olaf Scholz introduced a strongly worded China strategy in mid-2023, but his coalition government was deeply divided on China policy. So Berlin maintained Angela Merkel’s risk-averse policy, prioritising short-term economic gain over tackling strategic risks. Moreover, a major flaw in Scholz’s China policy was how strongly influenced it was by German companies with longstanding investments in China. This led to overdependency on China, paralleling the country’s reliance on cheap Russian oil and gas. However, the next German government, under Friedrich Merz, could potentially change course.

The second reason for Japan being a more attractive partner than Germany is that Australia and Japan stand to gain strategically by working more closely together in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra and Tokyo already share significant strategic alignment on China’s intensification of coercive activities, as highlighted in their eleventh 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations in September 2024.

Australia and Japan have also taken steps to strengthen military cooperation with the planned deployment of a Japanese Amphibious Brigade to Australia for joint exercises with US Marines. These measures underline the salience of the special strategic partnership, reflected in the Reciprocal Access Agreement signed in 2022. The agreement, Japan’s first defence treaty with an international partner since 1960, demonstrates the priority both nations place on their bilateral ties.

The third reason is that Australia would benefit from Japan’s industrial capacity and maritime expertise in building advanced warships designed for the same operational environment in the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s limited shipbuilding capacity demands help from partners, and Japan is well positioned to provide it quickly. A clear indication that Japan is serious came from Japan’s defence chief General Yoshihide Yoshida, who said Japan would give ‘priority’ to Australia if the Mogami design was selected for the frigate program.

A related consequence of choosing the Mogami design would be strengthening the interoperability of the Japanese and Australian navies: they’d be using almost identical ships.

Australia must also be wary of risks to export supply from a German arms industry that is suddenly coming under great pressure as the United States tells European countries to look after their own defence. Urgent domestic needs can push their way to the front of the queue. Japan’s industry has been under rising pressure too, but the problem has been building up for years.

Australia stands to gain significantly by deepening its defence industrial cooperation with Japan. By forging a robust industrial partnership, both nations can enhance their defence capabilities, address shared security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and translate their strategic relationship into tangible benefits. Given their shared concerns over China’s coercive behaviour, this enhanced cooperation is necessary for maintaining stability and deterring aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

Why attack missile boats can’t replace major warships

Attack missile boats are no substitutes for the Royal Australian Navy’s major warships, contrary to the contention of a 4 February 2025 Strategist article. The ships are much more survivable than attack boats and can perform long-range operations that small vessels cannot.

In the article, the author argues, for example, that a single missile hit could cripple a billion-dollar warship. In fact, this is highly unlikely.

The planning for the number, type and direction of travel of missiles needed to successfully engage a warship is a tactical art. The calculations are classified, but the Salvo Equation is an unclassified means of understanding how many missiles must be fired to damage a major warship, such as a destroyer or frigate. The number is greater than most people assume.

The debate on warship survivability isn’t new, and it remains paper-thin. Warships are designed to float, move and fight. As the RAN’s Sea Power Centre describes, they are survivable ‘through layered defence systems, signature management, structural robustness and system redundancy’.

Just because a missile is fired doesn’t mean it will strike, and even a strike doesn’t ensure the ship is disabled.

It’s true that threats to warships close to coasts have increased, and the proliferation of uncrewed aerial vehicle, uncrewed surface vessels and anti-ship missiles has made operations more complex. However, as offensive threats evolve, so do defensive capabilities, tactics and procedures. This is the dance of naval warfare.

To bolster the flawed claim that warships are ‘increasingly vulnerable in modern conflicts’, the article points to the 42-year-old, poorly maintained Russian cruiser Moskva, which Ukraine sank in the Black Sea in 2022, as a ‘most advanced warship’. Yet far more modern US, British and French warships have repelled more than 400 Houthi missile attacks in the Red Sea since 2023 without sustaining damage. Fourteen months of Red Sea operations show that well-armed warships with trained crews are highly effective.

The article conflates strategy with concepts, saying ‘the urgency of shifting Australia’s naval strategy to distributed lethality cannot be overstated’.

Think of a naval strategy as the big-picture plan for what a nation aims to achieve at sea with its naval capability (as opposed to maritime), while a naval concept is the theoretical framework that explains how its navy might actually fight and operate to achieve those goals.

‘Distributed lethality’ fits within the established concept of Distributed Maritime Operations, which isn’t about any particular category of vessel, large or small; it’s a way of fighting that emphasises massed effects through robust, networked communications that allow for dispersal of maritime units.

At its core, it’s a network-centric, not platform-centric, concept—as applicable to a fleet of frigates and destroyers as to smaller craft.

It’s a concept the RAN, at least in theory, has already embraced. In a 2024 speech on Distributed Maritime Operations, Fleet Commander Rear Admiral Chris Smith said ‘distribution as a core concept of our operations … seeks to manage a defensive problem while seizing an offensive opportunity’.

Australian naval strategy: reach and balance

In advocating for a shift towards attack boats, the article dismisses their limited range and endurance as problems that are easily fixed. They are not: range and endurance are fundamental to Australia’s naval strategy and central to the concept of reach.

At its core, reach is the requirement for a maritime power to be able to protect its vital interests at range from its territory. As an island nation dependent on long sea lines of communication for essential seaborne supply—from fuel to fertiliser, ammunition and pharmaceuticals—Australia needs an ability to protect critical imports and exports.

Doing that requires the combination of sensors and weapons that cannot fit into an attack boat: heavy and bulky towed-array sonars, large radars mounted high, long-range air-and-missile defence systems, and helicopters for hunting submarines.

Acceptance that Australia’s vital interests at sea are far from its coast is inherent in the roles ascribed in Australia’s National Defence Strategy. They include power projection, such as the capabilities of the Australian Army’s new amphibious fleet, which require protection that attack boats can’t provide.

Limited endurance and operational range are deficiencies that cannot be mitigated by basing in northern Australia, as the article suggests. Territorial force posture such as northern operating bases cannot transform coastal green-water naval assets such as attack boats into the open ocean blue-water capability Australia requires.

Another key strategic requirement for Australia is having a balanced fleet, anchored by larger destroyers and frigates. The essence of the idea of a balanced fleet is that a smaller fleet of ships must operate across the spectrum of maritime tasks. Attack boats cannot fight effectively in all three spheres of maritime warfare: surface, air and sub-surface. While they may complement frigates and destroyers where the budget allows, they are unsuitable to form the backbone of Australia’s fleet.

The call for such vessels falls into the common trap of thinking that modern naval warfare is simply about missile capability. But what is needed to constitute a balanced fleet is a mix of capabilities that can be brought together only in a frigate or larger ship.

This debate is an opportunity to highlight a crucial issue often overlooked in Australian strategic thought. The country needs a naval strategy with genuine reach and a balanced fleet, capabilities that simply can’t be met by a force built around attack boats.

The next Australian government needs a bolder plan for the navy

The past year brought a renewed focus on Australia’s deteriorating security situation and maritime capability. Despite the maritime emphasis in Australia’s 2024 defence announcements, the country remains far from being adequately positioned to defend its extensive sea lines of communication, subsea cables and broader national interests at sea.

With a federal election due by May, the next Australian government must spend on the navy, address the capability gaps and make timely decisions on future capability.

In the past 12 months, the oceans on which we depend for our protection and prosperity have experi­enced a dramatic deteriora­tion in security terms, unseen in recent decades. Globally, from the Black Sea to the Red Sea, maritime trade is under pressure. Europe has experienced further attacks on critical maritime infrastructure, including subsea cables – the backbone of internet connectivity.

Closer to home, we’ve witnessed escalating aggression from China’s coastguard, which regularly has attacked Philippine vessels in the West Philippine Sea.

Australian sailors have been placed at risk, most recently when a Chinese fighter pilot inexplicably deployed flares in front of an Australian helicopter operating in international airspace. This is not simply a canary in the coalmine; it means the breakdown of global norms.

If a conflict arises in the Indo-Pacific, it will be inherently maritime in nature and we will be compelled to fight with the capabilities we have at the time.

In February 2024, the government announced a historic expansion of the surface combatant fleet—the destroyers and frigates of the Royal Australian Navy equipped with offensive and defensive weapons including missiles and torpedoes. But this expansion is not expected to materialise until the 2030s.

During the past 12 months there has been an integration of new missile capabilities in the navy’s small fleet. Announcements have included the acceleration of building ships for the army and key achievements in training, treaties and export controls to support Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. In fact, 38 percent of Defence’s spending plan, the Integrated Investment Program, across the next decade will be directed towards maritime capabilities.

These developments are positive, but they have not shifted the needle in the near term to address Australia’s vulnerabilities in the maritime domain.

Australia’s surface combatant fleet has been reduced from 11 to 10 with the decommissioning of HMAS Anzac because of its age. The mine-hunting fleet also has been diminished, leaving only two vessels remaining after a mid-year decision to cancel their replacements. Australia’s two tankers, critical for replenishing fuel, food and ammunition for naval ships, have been laid up for most of 2024 because of defects. Additionally, much of Australia’s hydrographic capability, vital for surveying beneath the surface of the water, has been decommissioned, leaving only one ship in operation.

The list goes on. These issues are the product of decades of delayed and indecisive decision-making compounded by a lack of investment. The increasing frequency of attacks in the maritime domain, coupled with the absence of strategic warning time for a potential regional conflict, highlights the urgent need to address Australia’s waning maritime power. This is not simply a nice-to-have but an essential requirement for an island nation when global security norms are being redefined.

In 2025 a timely decision on Australia’s future frigate design will be critical to achieving the planned 2029 delivery of the first of 11 ships. This decision must prioritise the option that minimises delivery risks, ensures operational capability by 2029 (or sooner), maximises commonality with existing Australian systems and offers the design flexibility to accommodate future upgrades.

We must be even bolder than this. While the thought of another review may make us groan, the next government must conduct a thorough assessment of our broader naval and maritime capabilities. If we acknowledge that we’re not currently equipped to protect our trade routes or subsea cables, we must critically examine the composition of the wider fleet—not just the surface combatants but also our mine warfare, hydrographic, amphibious, replenishment and clearance diving capabilities.

Finally, we must confront the difficult conversation about spending to deliver these capabilities at speed. While the current government has made the first substantial increase to the defence budget in nearly a decade—projecting defence spending to rise from the current 2 per cent of GDP to 2.4 per cent by the end of the next decade—this will not be enough to revitalise our defence, particularly our naval capabilities.

During the Cold War, Australia consistently spent an average of 2.7 percent of GDP on defence, with spending exceeding that level during major naval construction efforts. If Australia is truly facing its most complex and challenging strategic environment since World War II, as outlined in the 2024 National Defence Strategy, we cannot afford to continue underspending.

Editors’ picks for 2024: ‘Submarine agency chief: Australia’s SSNs will be bigger, better, faster’

Originally published on 28 May 2024.

The nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines to be built under the AUKUS agreement are on track to be the world’s most advanced fighting machines, says Australian Submarine Agency Director-General Jonathan Mead.

‘They’ll have greater firepower, a more powerful reactor, more capability and they’ll be able to do more bespoke operations, including intelligence gathering, surveillance, strike warfare, special forces missions and dispatching uncrewed vessels, than our current in-service submarines,’ Vice Admiral Mead says in an interview.

With a displacement of more than 10,000 tonnes, the SSN-AUKUS class will be larger than current US Virginia-class attack submarine of just over 7000 tonnes. Australia’s six conventionally powered Collins-class submarines are each about 3300 tonnes.

The SSN-AUKUS submarines to be built for Australia and Britain, with help from the United States, will be a ‘bigger, better, faster and bolder’ evolution of Britain’s Astute-class submarines, Mead says. The design will have the advantage of more US technology and greater commonality with US boats.

Australian steel will be used to build Australia’s SSN-AUKUS submarines, subject to a comprehensive qualification process expected to be completed in the first half of 2025.

The steel is also being qualified to both the British and US standards. Having Australian industry involved will deepen and bring resilience to the three nations’ supply chains, with greater mass, confidence and scale, Mead says.

In April, major US warship builder Newport News Shipbuilding lodged an initial purchase order for processed Australian steel from Bisalloy Steel’s Port Kembla plant for testing and training.

The government has committed to having eight nuclear submarines, Mead says, ‘and we’re on track’.

‘We’re planning on three Virginias and five SSN-AUKUS. That takes the program through to 2054.’

The SSN-AUKUS submarines built by Australia and Britain will be identical, incorporating technology from all three nations, including cutting-edge US technologies.

Those for the Royal Australian Navy will all be built at Osborne in South Australia. ‘Osborne will be the fourth nuclear-powered submarine shipyard among the three countries and one of the world’s most advanced technology hubs,’ Mead says.

The SSNs will all have an advanced version of the AN/BYG-1 combat system, used in the Collins class and in US submarines, and the Mark 48 heavyweight torpedo, an advanced version of which has been developed by the United States and Australia.

Mead says each Virginia has a crew of about 133 and the likely size of the SSN-AUKUS crew is being calculated as design work progresses.

The massive scale of the program and the nuclear element has understandably attracted strong attention, including criticism and questions about how skilled workforces will be found to build and crew the boats. Commentary has included suggestions that AUKUS is ‘dead in the water’.

Mead has no doubt that the project can be completed as planned. ‘Every day we ask ourselves the same question: ”Are we on track?” The answer is “yes.”’

For the program to succeed, it must be a national endeavour involving the Commonwealth, states and territories, industry, academia and the Australian people, Mead says. ‘To develop that social licence, we must provide confidence that we are going to deliver this capability safely and securely and not harm the environment.’

To build a nuclear mindset there must be an unwavering commitment to upholding the highest standards of safety, security, stewardship and safeguards, with all decisions underpinned by strong technical evidence. ‘It’s essential that everything we do is underpinned by strong technical and engineering evidence,’ he says. The reactor will be delivered as a sealed and welded unit that won’t be opened for the life of the submarine.

Mead acknowledges that recruiting is the big challenge.

He says comprehensive training of crews has begun, with Australian officers and enlisted sailors already passing nuclear training courses. ‘Australian officers have also topped courses in both the US and UK, showing that our people are up for the task that lies ahead.’

It’s intended that about 100 Australian officers and sailors will be in US training programs this year and they’ll go on to serve on US submarines as part of their crews. Other Australians will train in Britain and serve in Royal Navy boats.

Mead’s agency now has 597 staff, including engineers, project managers, lawyers, international relations specialists and policy makers. That is likely to rise to about 1000.

Given that Australia is the first non-nuclear nation acquiring nuclear-powered warships, the agency is working flat out to ensure rigorous regulations and safeguards are in place, along with the international agreements to back them.

Mead says Australia’s Optimal Pathway for acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) was designed to ensure that Australia would meet the exhaustive requirements to own and operate such vessels as soon as possible.

According to the Optimal Pathway, the first stage will see the first of several US and British submarines operating from the base HMAS Stirling in Western Australia as Submarine Rotational Force–West (SRF-West) from 2027.

In 2032, Australia will receive the first of three Virginia-class submarines from the US. One of the Australian officers now in US submarines is likely to be its commanding officer after extensive service on a US boat. The first two of those boats will be Block 4 Virginias, each with about 10 years’ US service, and they’ll be delivered after two years of deep maintenance and with 23 years of operational life left in them, Mead says, adding that the third US boat will be a brand new Block 6 Virginia. The US Navy has not yet put the Block 6 design into production.

The plan is to have the first SSN-AUKUS completed in Australia by early 2040s. Australia has an option to ask for two more Virginias if the SSN-AUKUS effort is delayed.

Mead says that how long the Collins are kept operational will be a decision for the government of the day as the SSNs arrive. The current plan is to begin big overhauls, called life-of-type extensions, for the Collins class in 2026.

He acknowledges that having the Virginias, SSN-AUKUS and Collin classes all operational could bring supply chain and training issues, but he believes those challenges can be handled. Having combat systems and torpedoes that are common to all these submarines will help.

Australians are on the design and design review teams for SSN-AUKUS. ‘We are embedding more technical and engineering people into the British program.’

Large numbers of Australian workers will soon be embedded in the British submarine construction site run by BAE Systems at Barrow, UK. ‘Many will come from the Australian Submarine Corporation, where they’ve been working on Collins. They’ll deepen their expertise, very specifically on how to build a nuclear-powered submarine,’ Mead says.

BAE will bring the intellectual property to the partnership with ASC to develop Osborne into a shipyard for nuclear-powered submarines.

It’s often suggested in Australia that, because the US has fewer submarines than it believes it needs, it will refuse to hand any over to Australia if its own situation worsens.

Senior American officials have expressed strong alternative views on why the project’s success is very important to the US and why it is in their own interests to make it work.

The US publication Defense News quoted the commander of US submarine forces, Vice-Admiral Rob Gaucher, telling a conference in April that co-operation with Australia would help the US submarine fleet in important ways. These included increasing the number of allied boats working together on operations. Having Australian personnel gaining experience on US boats would help ease a recruiting shortfall in the US Navy that flowed from the Covid-19 epidemic, and having access to the Australian base at HMAS Stirling in WA would extend the US Navy’s reach and maintenance options.

Gaucher said that, because the Australian SSNs would operate in co-ordination with American boats, ‘we get more submarines far forward. We get a port that gives us access’ to the Indo-Pacific region.

He said that by the end of this year the US Navy would graduate about 50 Australians as nuclear-trained operators and another 50 submarine combat operators. They would train on US submarines for the rest of this decade, increasing the number of people qualified to stand watch on American boats.

‘We get the opportunity to leverage an ally who can help us with manning and operating. We get surge capacity because now I have another area [where] I can do maintenance,’ Gaucher said.

Dan Packer, a former navy captain who is now the US director of naval submarine forces for AUKUS, told Defense News that Australia had eight officers in the inaugural training cohort that began in 2023. Three of those eight will be moved into an accelerated training pipeline, and one will eventually be the first Australian Virginia-class commanding officer.

Packer said the US was helping Australia build its submarine force from about 800 personnel to 3000. This year the US would bring 17 Australian officers, 37 nuclear enlisted and 50 non-nuclear enlisted into its training program. ‘And we’re going to up that number every year.’

These personnel would be fully integrated into US attack submarine crews until Australia could stand up its own training pipeline.

At some point, he said, the US Navy would have 440 Australians on 25 attack submarines, with each fully integrated crew including two or three Australian officers, seven nuclear enlisted and nine non-nuclear enlisted sailors. ‘They will do everything that we do’.

Mead says Australian navy personnel have been aboard the US submarine tender USS Emory S. Land for several months learning to maintain and sustain nuclear-powered submarines, and a US Virginia-class boat will visit HMAS Stirling for maintenance this year. Parts will come from an evolving Australian supply chain.

That visit will not include reactor work, ‘but ultimately, we will undertake work on systems that support the sealed power unit, within the compartment that houses it on the submarine,’ Mead says.

He says providing the industrial base to build and sustain the submarines, and crewing them, will involve about 20,000 jobs. A lot of work is being done with universities, technical schools and industry to prepare this formidable workforce.

Mead has long been a student of international relations and says the decision to equip Australia with SSNs was based on recognition that the Indo-Pacific is becoming a more dangerous place and ‘nuclear submarines provide a very effective deterrent’.

He rejects the argument that technology will soon make the oceans too transparent for crewed submarines to operate safely. ‘Our allies and partners and other countries in the region do not see it that way, and neither do we. We’ve done our analysis, and we see that crewed, nuclear-powered submarines will be the leading war-fighting capability for the next 50 to 100 years.’

He’s at pains to stress that the submarines will always be under full Australian sovereign control.

‘They will always be under the Australian government’s direction, operated by the RAN, and under the command of an Australian naval officer.’

Recruitment now focuses on the ADF, not each service. That’s a mistake

The Australian Defence Force is missing an opportunity in shifting the focus of its recruitment drive away from the three armed services and onto the ADF as a whole. By doing so, it’s failing to make use of services’ separate traditions as attractions to potential recruits.

The former chief of the defence force General Angus Campbell told Senate estimates in February that the ADF was 4,308 personnel below its approved strength. In that context, ADF Careers in July launched its new recruitment campaign—Unlike any other job. Spruiking the benefits of joining the ADF, the flashy campaign splashed across social media.

But there’s a problem: people don’t join the ADF; they join one of the services. They join either the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army or Royal Australian Air Force, each of which has unique traditions, service life and a proud history of defending Australia.

The recent career advertisements, while slick and well produced, fail to tap into the core motivations that have driven Australians to serve for generations. Joining the navy, army or air force isn’t just a career move; it’s a commitment to a legacy of service and sacrifice.

The July 2024 ADF careers campaign came 12 months after the decision to rebrand recruiting from service specific—navy, army, air force recruiting—to ADF Careers. The amalgamation of the service recruiting functions, while an efficient use of resources, represents a wider trend within the Department of Defence of reducing the influence of the individual services.

The erosion of the authority of the service chiefs has added to a more bureaucratic structure and slower decision-making. But it’s the loss of service identity in the recruiting process that will be most problematic for an ADF attempting to grow to its greatest numbers since World War II.

This issue is not without precedent. The Canadian Armed Forces, in a well-meaning effort to streamline and modernise, unified the navy, army and air force into a single entity in 1968. The result was a loss of identity and tradition, which contributed to a decline in morale and recruitment. It took Canada more than four decades to reverse that decision; it officially reinstated separate branches in 2011. The lesson is clear: when military institutions distance themselves from their traditions and core values, they risk losing the very qualities that attract people to service in the first place.

Australia’s military has, until now, been largely immune to such missteps. The navy has its proud maritime legacy linked to battles such as the Leyte Gulf or Savo Island, the army its deep ties to land campaigns such as Gallipoli and Kokoda, and the air force its history of contributing to air superiority in theatres ranging from Europe to the Pacific. Those traditions are not just history; they’re living parts of what it means to serve. While it’s important for the ADF to adapt to modern challenges, it must do so without losing the traditions that make each service unique.

The recruitment shortfall in the ADF today isn’t due to a lack of attractive offers. Defence salaries are competitive, benefits are strong and the opportunities for career advancement are significant. But none of that will resonate with young Australians if the message of service is diluted. What the current advertisements fail to communicate is the sense of purpose that comes with wearing the uniform. That message, embedded in the traditions of the navy, army and air force, is what will inspire a new generation to enlist.

Canada’s decision to reverse unification of its services in 2011 was more than a symbolic gesture. It was an acknowledgement that the essence of military service lies in the identity that comes with being part of a distinct organisation. Reintroducing the separate services helped to restore the pride and tradition that had been lost. For Canada, the price of unification and efficiency had been the erosion of the very things that gave the military its soul. By reinstating the navy, army and air force as separate entities, Canada not only boosted morale but also reconnected its armed forces to the traditions that had historically been their source of strength and purpose.

The ADF should heed that example. The ADF’s strength lies not only in its modern capabilities but in the traditions that have shaped its identity. Young Australians aren’t just looking for jobs—they’re searching for meaning and purpose. They want to be part of something that matters.

If the ADF is to reverse its recruitment decline, it needs to shift the narrative. The focus must return to the traditions and values that make the navy, army and air force unique.

As Australia faces an increasingly complex strategic environment, the importance of a strong, capable and motivated defence force can’t be overstated. The lessons from Canada’s failed unification experiment are clear. When military institutions lose sight of their traditions, they risk losing their identity—and, with it, the ability to attract and retain the people they need. For the ADF, the path forward is not to abandon tradition in favour of efficiencies under the motto ‘One Defence’ but to find a way to honour the past while preparing for the future.

Royal Australian Navy tests the Swiss army knife of missiles

HMAS Sydney, one of Australia’s three Hobart-class air warfare destroyers this month became the first Australian warship to test fire Raytheon’s RIM-174A SM-6 missile, during Exercise Pacific Dragon off Hawaii. This followed hot on the heels of HMAS Sydney’s first launch of Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile (NSM) against a target ship during the biennial RIMPAC exercise. It is not clear what was the target for the SM-6 test.

Both of these missile types are earmarked to enter service with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The SM-6 will be added to the missile armament aboard the Hobart-class destroyers and eventually the Hunter-class frigates.

Australia’s government has touted these tests as a demonstration of greater depth and range in the Australian Defence Force’s missile armoury, as it seeks to realise the more focused and lethal force mandated in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and this year’s National Defence Strategy.

Both missiles are potent additions to the RAN’s firepower. However, what sets the SM-6 apart in Australia’s modestly sized missile arsenal is the impressive versatility in capability that it brings.

Like the SM-2 and ESSM, which are also carried by Australian warships and are fired from the same vertical launch cells, the SM-6 was primarily designed as an air-defence weapon. Defending against incoming aircraft and cruise missiles remains one of its functions. It is also capable of ballistic-missile defence in conjunction with the Aegis Baseline 9 combat system, with which the Hobarts will be upgraded.

Although official Australian statements have emphasised the SM-6’s air defence role, the missile can also target ships. Its effective range in that mode is not known but is likely to be significantly longer than the advertised 185km reach of the NSM, which is already an improvement upon the Harpoon missile that is being phased out as the Anzac-class frigates are progressively decommissioned. SM-6’s anti-ship function is attractive for the RAN, as the missile’s range and speed promise to restore a tactical edge in case of surface encounters with well-armed adversaries. China’s large and expanding navy is the likely benchmark.

The downsides of employing the SM-6 in this role are the high unit-cost of the missile, US$4.3 million, and its relatively small warhead. The NSM, which is half the price but is a slower-moving cruise missile, will serve as the RAN’s mainstay anti-ship missile in future. Still, the versality of the SM-6 makes it a handy force multiplier for the RAN, since its ships carry few missiles and could be reloaded only at long intervals when deployed forward. A missile that can perform several different tasks is very useful when sailing into harm’s way, as an adversary must take the all-round capability into account.

The versatility of the SM-6 now extends into the air domain, with the US Navy showing it at RIMPAC mounted on an F/A-18E/F Super Hornet as an air-to-air missile.  With an estimated range of 400 km, the AIM-174B, the air-launched version of SM-6, promises to fill a significant gap in US air defence capability by reaching aerial threats that couldn’t formerly be intercepted. While other US Navy and Air Force contenders to fill this requirement are under development, the AIM-174B could be an attractive and readily available option for the Australian air force to acquire from its ally. Australia also operates the Super Hornet, the avionics of which should be readily adaptable to controlling the AIM-174B.

Australia may not be making progress in retooling the ADF’s lethality as fast as many observers would like. But the successful testing of the NSM and SM-6 certainly point in the right direction for the navy. Their combined and complementary anti-ship capabilities are likely to be highly prized. The SM-6’s multi-functionality does not come cheap, but it appears to be a prudent investment in the current and future combat capability of Australia’s surface naval force.

Austal should stay independent of foreign frigate builders

It isn’t clear whether Hanwha Ocean is still interested in buying Australian shipbuilder Austal, but the government should oppose such an acquisition by the South Korean company or any other contender for the general purpose frigate program.

If Hanwha Ocean or one of its rivals bought Austal, in doing so the new owner might also acquire a powerful advantage in a competition that should be based entirely on Australian security considerations. Anyway, there would be a risk for the buyer of the deal backfiring, resulting in ownership of an Australian asset with no major local naval shipbuilding contracts.

Hanwha Ocean, part of the Hanwha Group conglomerate, is one of five foreign shipbuilders that the government has named as possible suppliers of 11 general purpose frigates. Eight of the frigates would directly replace the eight Anzac class ships of the same category, and three would expand the fleet.

Austal said in April that Hanwha Ocean had bid for it. The company declined to endorse the offer but the Australian government had no objection to it. Although Hanwha Ocean has reportedly lost interest, it has not said so. Even if it has, its move raises the possibility that one of the other foreign builders could try the same tactic.

They are South Korea’s HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co (HHI), Spain’s Navantia, Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems from Germany. The government is seeking information on how, where and when the builders could construct the first three frigates. The remaining eight frigates are intended to be built in Henderson, Western Australia.

There are only two shipbuilders in Henderson that could be awarded the contract for local construction:  Austal and Forgacs Marine & Defence, a subsidiary of Civmec, a heavy engineering and construction company listed on the Australian and Singaporean stock exchanges. Forgacs is building patrol ships of the Arafura class.

While Austal in partnership with a US company has built frigate-size warships in the US, it has not built a warship of that size or larger in Australia. It has scored a significant advantage over Forgacs, signing a heads of agreement with the government last year to establish a Strategic Shipbuilding Agreement.  When that final agreement is signed this year, Austal should become the strategic shipbuilder at Henderson. It has been speculated that Austal would then have a local monopoly over all future naval construction contracts in Western Australia.

No doubt, Hanwha Ocean did its homework and when making its bid was confident that Austal, on the verge of being awarded strategic shipbuilder status, would be building the frigates. The South Korean company would have hoped that by acquiring Austal it would improve the chance of the government choosing the Hanwha Ocean frigate design. So, it would have bought a competitive edge.

If Hanwha Ocean, or any of its competitors, acquired Austal before a frigate design was selected, the government would have two problems. Selecting a design by a new owner of Austal for construction by Austal’s government-endorsed shipyard would lead to complaints of favouritism from the unsuccessful shipbuilders and claims of incompetence from the opposition.

Other problems would arise if the design of a new Austal owner were not chosen. The winner would then be reluctant, at least, to have its design built by Austal. It would hardly want to put its intellectual property and building technology in the hands of a competitor. And even if that obstacle were overcome, the designer and Austal’s new owner might try to pin responsibility on each other for any problems in program execution: the designer might say the construction work was no good, while the new Austal owner might blame the design. Completion of the project could be delayed while the warring parties sorted it out.

Seeing such a risk, the government might prefer to ignore Austal and award Forgacs the frigate contract. The foreign buyer of Austal would then be left with a shipyard that lacked major Australian naval orders.

Neither Hanwha Ocean nor any of the other bidders for the frigate program should be allowed to buy Austal. If one did, the results would be damage to the project before it even started and, probably, creation of project management difficulties later.

Shaping a nuclear-powered culture within the Royal Australian Navy

With the continuing implementation of AUKUS Pillar 1, it’s imperative that the culture of the budding Australian nuclear navy is built with care. Failure to lay the cultural foundation now would risk creating a force that’s undermanned, overworked and unprepared for conflict.

Strong leadership will be required to reduce the chances of the poor retention rates seen by both the US nuclear navy and the Royal Navy from establishing themselves in the Royal Australian Navy.

Asking the correct questions is imperative. What’s the ideal selection process for nuclear personnel? What should the community’s guiding principles be? What support is most needed for the personnel to thrive?

Given the complex technical and interpersonal requirements for running nuclear-powered submarines, leadership needs to meld excellent engineering acumen with exemplary emotional intelligence. The US Navy’s selection process hinges almost entirely on a series of technical interviews in which nuclear officer candidates complete complex mathematics and science problems, but that doesn’t capture interpersonal skills.

A possible solution would be to select only sailors who have already completed an engineering tour for follow-on nuclear training and posting. Having their captain’s endorsement and a strong performance history would minimise the variabilities in their leadership skills.

Should there be additional psychological health screenings for all nuclear personnel? What’s the best way to balance diversity goals with the need for personnel with science, engineering and mathematics backgrounds, given the relative lack of diversity in enrolment? Inadvertently creating an old boys club would weaken the community, but attracting top-performing talent from a smaller selection pool will be difficult.

Even years after leaving the US nuclear navy, sailors can rattle off the seven principles that shaped their professional lives: formality, forceful watchteam backup, procedural compliance, integrity, a questioning attitude, level of knowledge, and ownership. Are those the right guidelines for the Australian navy? What would they mean in an Australian context?

The ultimate goal of nuclear propulsion is to provide reliable power no matter the tactical circumstances, and the expectation is that all systems will be functional. When the power plant operates well, engineers are practically invisible. When they get any attention, it’s often due to degradations and inoperable systems. That can create negative feedback loops that drive down morale and, ultimately, retention.

This is why creating an ethos of silent service is the key to the nuclear navy. Engineers will work harder, longer and for less thanks than most of the crew. There’s no avoiding that, but, with the right principles, it can become a source of pride and foster a culture of comradery and mutual support that will prove invaluable in operating and maintaining the power plants. Those principles should be simple and incorporated into every stage of training to ensure the widest uptake.

A comprehensive review of current support practices, including mental health management, can identify the strengths and weak points within the system as it stands. Offering large retention and recruitment bonuses, as the Australian Defence Force has recently done and as the US and Royal navies have been doing for years, provides only temporary financial support.

How does the Australian navy recruit and maintain readiness for its sailors who may be more at risk? The pool of eligible naval recruits is shrinking as the incidence of mental health issues trends upwards. This complicates the induction of sailors for some of the most arduous mental conditions within the forces. There’s already a growing need to provide mental health support to currently serving personnel.

One potential way to support nuclear submariners would be a rigorous ombudsman program to alleviate sources of stress about family left ashore. Another would be incorporation of basic psychological care into leadership programs. Also, continuing education, certification and professional development are vital.

Getting this right will boost recruitment and retention, but will also set sailors up for success upon leaving the service. Given Australia’s current lack of nuclear engineering jobs outside of the navy, this will be instrumental in demonstrating whole-of-life support to the sailors.

What the Australian navy should be doing right now is examining how best to develop its nascent nuclear personnel so that they become a pillar of the ADF.

The chance to build the nuclear culture and community from the ground up shouldn’t be squandered. There’s much good to be drawn from the US, British and Australian military experiences, but this is a chance to take the good and leave out the bad.

To do that, people must be selected with care and diligence. The principles that provide daily guidance and form the core of the nuclear community’s professional pride must be clearly established from the outset. Adequate support to not only maintain the community but to enable it to thrive is vital.

Access to the sea is an existential issue, says RAN chief

A year after being appointed chief of the Royal Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Mark Hammond admits to frustration when he’s asked why Australia needs a potent navy.

‘I wish that we were in a different intellectual space as a nation,’ Hammond says.

‘We’re a three-ocean island trading nation. We owe our economic prosperity to the sea. We’re custodians of the planet’s third largest exclusive economic zone. We have an annual import–export trade of about $900 billion per year that comes and goes by sea.’

All of that, says Hammond, relies on peaceful transit dependent on acceptance of and adherence to a rules-based order underpinning maritime trade and many other activities.

‘And most of the rest of our prosperity is derived from connectivity to the international financial system enabled by seabed cables, not by satellites. We have an absolute economic dependence upon the sea. We import nearly 80% of our liquid fuel with very low strategic reserves and limited refinery capability. Access to the sea is an existential issue.’

In a peaceful world it could be argued that trade will remain unmolested and prosperity will be assured by the international community behaving as predicted. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrated violently that stability is not guaranteed.

‘We’ve seen a breakdown of diplomacy and deterrence and a disregard for international law,’ Hammond says.

‘If we cannot assume access to the sea, I firmly believe we should take steps to assure it. That means a very strong maritime capability, and in my lane, a very strong navy.’

At the age of 18, Hammond started his career as an electronics technician. He was appointed chief of navy in July 2022 shortly after the new government was elected in an increasingly difficult strategic environment. Since then, the defence strategic review (DSR) has handed down its recommendations, the surface fleet analysis is underway, the pathway to nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) has been developed under the AUKUS agreement, and plans are in train to secure the workforce needed to make it all happen.

His strategic narrative focuses on diplomacy, deterrence and defence, codifying the RAN’s key missions under Defence’s ‘shape, deter, respond’ framework.

‘Our nation believes in solving problems through diplomacy,’ says Hammond. ‘We’re in a very challenging environment where some commentators say the risk of conflict is at its highest since World War II. We’re a peace-loving nation that would prefer to invest in diplomacy and deterrence and partnerships to avoid conflict in the first place. The navy exists to defend the nation.’

He says Australia’s interests and security can be advanced through naval diplomacy.

‘It’s an age-old responsibility and role of navies, and one that I think we’re particularly good at. Our nation has good convening power. Our navy is welcome in international ports, and we have extensive relationships across the Indo-Pacific and the globe which we develop and nurture,’ he says.

‘Those friendships should be leveraged to advance our diplomatic goals, and the Australian Defence Force’s deterrent effect. We’re a small force. There are many larger navies in the region and, where our interests and our values converge, we find many opportunities to work together.’

Most regional countries are island trading nations with histories and futures linked to the sea.

‘The navy leadership in the region recognises that,’ says Hammond. ‘Anything that changes the interpretation, for example, of coastal nations’ sovereign rights in their lawful exclusive economic zones has serious implications for a nation like ours.’

That starts with supporting the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s mission: ‘On a port visit we offer a service to the head of mission to advance Australia’s national objectives and interests.’

Hammond says naval movements are nested within an international engagement strategy.

‘A small navy can’t be everywhere, so it’s important to prioritise visits, exercises, activities and operations that offer the best benefit to our government and people, and to our allies and partners,’ he says.

This includes partnering with nations where it’s important to them.

‘You’ve seen conversations around the Australian government’s engagement with the Philippines, for example. That has implications for navy deployment,’ Hammond says.

‘If you want to influence global conversations around the rules-based order, you’d better be present where it’s being discussed most acutely. In our case that means being present in the region, particularly in the South China Sea.

‘It also means being present where it matters to our southwest Pacific neighbours, helping them with fisheries surveillance and counter-drug operations, helping them grow their nascent maritime capabilities into something more robust so that they can enforce their sovereign claims and their EEZs to advance prosperity.’

Hammond says that also means sending visible signals about partnership, hence two Australian submarine visits to Indonesia in the past 12 months. An Australian Collins-class submarine and an Indonesian submarine have just sailed and exercised together for the first time.

Pictured (left to right): Jodi Hammond, Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Mark Hammond, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy Admiral Muhammad Ali and Fera Djuara Matondang unveil a plaque during a tree dedication ceremony at the National Arboretum in Canberra, 1 September 2023. Image: Department of Defence.

‘We’ve also recently hosted the first visit by an Indian submarine. Deploying a submarine is a strategic decision, so when India chooses to send a submarine to Australia, it sends a serious and unprecedented message.’ The US commissioning a new warship, USS Canberra, in Australia symbolises the strength of the relationship between the two navies.

Defending Australia’s access to the sea depends on what it’s protected from and who we’re protecting it with, says Hammond.

‘That’s why we need an intellectual design around the integrated force that the DSR opines to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of what we are doing, and a force focused on the areas that absolutely matter to our economic wellbeing and security.

‘We need to be clear that in the context of great-power competition we are not the central player – we’re one of the affected communities in the Indo-Pacific and we’re not seeking to stand alone. We’re part of an international community bound together by shared interests, shared values. We’re looking to leverage those aspects of diplomacy, partnerships and alliances to strengthen regional stability and our ability to protect our national interest.’

Hammond is a very experienced submariner well placed to oversee the introduction of SSNs. He has served on Australian boats going back to the Oberons, commanded a Collins-class submarine, and served on American, British and French nuclear submarines. He graduated from the US command course in 2003 and spent five months on Netherlands Walrus-class submarines. That included exercises with Royal Navy SSNs, some in Scottish lochs.

He says much has been done already to make the force more lethal and that’s accelerating after the DSR with the acquisition of sea mines, Tomahawk land strike missiles and naval strike missiles.

SSNs will bring a high-end ability to rapidly project power from the sea, he says. ‘Anyone seeking to do us harm would need to contend with that reality. As the government says, that puts a real question mark in an adversary’s mind.’ As well, submarines are very expensive for an adversary to counter.

Hammond doesn’t buy the theory that by the time Australia’s SSNs are operational, technological advances will have rendered the oceans transparent and submarines won’t survive. He’s been hearing it since he started on submarines as a lieutenant and says the claim is yet to be backed up by significant technological change.

With an oceanography degree, Hammond understands the opacity of the marine environment: ‘Variations in temperature, pressure with depth, and salinity complicate the movement of sound and light and we still principally rely on exploitation of sound and light through water to detect submarines.’

Submarines are quieter than ever, their sonars hear at greater ranges, nuclear-power technology is more advanced, and torpedos and submarine missile systems are more advanced.

There’s a contest between detection and counter-detection, between range advantage derived from acoustic advantage principally for submarines, and new detection theories some involving space-based capability and some involving quantum technology, he says.

‘The above-water environment is completely transparent, but nobody stopped building fighter aircraft, surface ships or missile systems,’ Hammond says.

The contest continues with stealth aircraft and ships trying to be more submarine-like in terms of their signature.

Hammond says the deterrent value of SSNs was demonstrated in the Falklands when a World War II torpedo from a Cold War submarine put the Argentine navy in port for the rest of the war: ‘Nobody wants to be sailing around in a surface ship when there’s a hostile submarine there.’

Since 1999, Australian submariners have taken part in the US submarine command course and in joint exercises. Many Australian commanding officers have ‘driven’ a nuclear fast-attack submarine. Over 100 US commanders have driven Australian submarines, often firing dummy torpedoes against US SSNs. Safety mechanisms prevent impact and the torpedoes are recovered and data analysed.

Hammond says it’s very different fighting a conventional submarine aggressively at 2 knots as the Australians practise, and driving an SSN aggressively at 20-odd knots. ‘Understanding how each other operates enhances the lethal potential of both submarine communities,’ he says.

Australia’s conventionally powered submarines cruise near the surface regularly, running their diesel engines via a snorkel to recharge the batteries of their electric motors. On the question of why the RAN shouldn’t continue to operate long-range conventionally powered submarines into the future, Hammond recalls that the Oberons, which Australia operated from the late 1960s to the 1990s, could cover thousands of nautical miles on the surface relatively undetected to get to areas far from home. By the time the Collins class replaced the Oberons, the advent of satellite technology and long-range radar meant the days of surface transits lasting weeks were over.

‘When I cast my eye to the 2030s and 2040s and beyond, I see a convergence of artificial intelligence, quantum computing and new above-water detection capability that’s going to render periscope operations more complex, more challenging and more lethal than ever,’ he says.

‘For the safety and the security of the next generation of Australians who will serve in the submarine force, I’m all in on trying to decouple them from that high-risk environment at periscope depth. That’s what nuclear propulsion allows you to do.

‘We’re not changing the nature of our operations. We are changing the propulsion system which enables those operations because it leads to a greater likelihood of mission success and a safer and more secure environment in a warfighting context than what we will be able to derive from a long-range conventional submarine.

‘With that you get all the benefits of extended endurance and extended range. You get more days at sea out of a nuclear submarine than you do out of a conventionally powered submarine. You get from A to B more quickly.’

It takes a Collins submarine 23 days to get from Sydney to the US base at Pearl Harbor. That’s after a 10-day trip from Perth to Sydney. ‘You’ve already put a month of wear and tear and 10,000-plus miles on your platform. And then you roll into an exercise which goes for four weeks.’

That’s followed by an extensive maintenance session before the submarine sails home or continues its operation. By comparison, an SSN can get from Sydney to Pearl Harbor in seven days.