Tag Archive for: radicalisation

From home to horror: the association between domestic violence and terrorism

Domestic violence is an under-recognised early indicator of terrorism. It is not a reliable solitary indicator, but when observed alongside risk factors, it can prompt authorities to take a closer look at a potential terrorist.

So far as can be demonstrated so far by data, the connection is correlative, not causative: the two behaviours overlap. But knowing this is still valuable. Recognising the link could enhance public safety and national security.

Research from the UK’s Project Starlight shines a light on this issue. In 2019, an analysis of 3045 individuals referred to the Prevent program—designed to prevent extremism—revealed that more than a third had a link to domestic abuse, either as victims, perpetrators, or witnesses. This figure is far above the general population’s 5.7 percent rate of domestic abuse.

Alarmingly, many of those referred were victims or witnesses of domestic violence, not perpetrators.

Studies in Pakistan have also found that individuals who experienced domestic abuse were more likely to gravitate toward extremist ideologies. The study looked at 562 young people aged 16 to 25 and found a clear link between growing up with domestic violence and later supporting extremist beliefs.

So, we should think of domestic violence as a risk factor in someone’s conversion to violent extremism, just as doctors know that some things point to a risk of disease even though medical research hasn’t yet found out why.

Two examples, among many that could be cited, illustrate the association. Omar Mateen, who carried out the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, had a history of domestic violence. His violent behaviour toward his ex-wife included physical and verbal abuse. Likewise, Khalid Masood, who was responsible for the  2017 Westminster attack in London, had a record of abusive behaviour toward his partners.

Though the data does not show a causative relationship, we can reasonably theorise on the drivers. Research shows that domestic violence and radicalisation are both promoted by a deep need for control and identity—things extremist groups readily exploit. Survivors of domestic abuse, especially those who experienced trauma in childhood, often find these needs unmet in their lives. By searching for belonging and purpose, they become targets for groups that promise power, community and meaning. Recognising this is the first step towards intervening.

Central to both domestic violence and terrorism is moral disengagement—the process by which perpetrators view their harmful actions as necessary or justified. Whether it’s in the home or through terrorist acts, violence is rationalised as a legitimate tool to exert power and control.

In Australia, positive steps are being taken to address each issue. Though they are not coordinated with each other, they happen to align. The National Plan to End Violence Against Women and Children (2022-2032) addresses domestic violence and gender-based violence, with an understanding of the complex social and psychological drivers at play. The plan is a vital first step in reducing violence and promoting the wellbeing of all Australians. Similarly, the Living Safe Together initiative aims to prevent violent extremism and provides support for individuals at risk of radicalisation.

While these efforts remain separate, they share strikingly similar goals. Both recognise the underlying trauma and vulnerability that can fuel violent behaviour—whether in the form of domestic abuse or extremism. Early intervention, community support and collaborative efforts between social services and national security agencies are core elements of both programs.

Australia should pursue a more coordinated approach—one that treats the prevention of domestic violence and radicalisation as complementary goals. Law enforcement, social services and national security agencies should collaborate to identify early warning signs of vulnerability and intervene before individuals are drawn into extremist ideologies.

 

This article has been corrected to say that research shows domestic violence and radicalisation are promoted by a need for control and identity. It has also been corrected to say that separate policies addressing domestic violence and risks of radicalisation are not coordinated with each other.

Australia’s new CT and CVE strategy: light on policy and specifics

Australia has a new counterterrorism (CT) and counter-violent extremism (CVE) strategy—but it’s light on counterterrorism and lacking in strategy. While it introduces two new CVE measures, it presents itself more as a communicative document than a real strategy or action plan.

Titled ‘A Safer Australia – Australia’s Counter-terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy 2025’, it was quietly released on 17 January, two years after then home affairs minister Clare O’Neil vowed to revise and update the strategy of 2022. Yet there is little to show for two years of development.

As of August 2024, Australia’s national terrorist threat level is ‘probable’—higher than when the previous strategy was released. The document also arrives amid a spate of antisemitic incidents in Sydney and Melbourne and increasing political pressure on government to respond. Clearly, the title of ‘A Safer Australia’ does not reflect our current security climate.

The strategy will improve Australia’s early-intervention capacity. But it is a CVE strategy, not a CT strategy: it is focused on community intervention programs, not Australia’s capability to pre-empt or respond to terrorist acts. The document does not provide new CT policy, resourcing or strategic direction. A comprehensive strategy should address both.

Even on CVE it is light on policy ideas and specifics, supporting criticisms that the department has lacked in-house capability to lead on CT policy since the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation were moved outside it.

The strategy begins with a sober assessment of the threat landscape and focuses on countering rising youth violent extremism, as well as highlighting changes to the character of terrorism. But these challenges—including hybrid ideologies and youth radicalisation—were discussed in 2024 by ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess in greater and more engaging detail.

It aims to prevent CVE at a community level through two main initiatives. Firstly, the government intends to nearly double funding to state and territory partners for CVE intervention programs, which they lead, and commit to ongoing funding. Secondly, it will establish a national version of the successful NSW Step Together program, a confidential, non-police community support service that parents can contact if they are concerned their child is radicalising. The government will also better include young people in developing CVE policy.

These will not address the drivers of youth extremism, including real and perceived grievances. The strategy also highlights the challenge of online spaces and radicalisation but commits only to closer collaboration with technology companies and partners. It overlooks structural factors contributing to the rise of violent extremism. More funding and a federal helpline are positives but are small offerings after two years of delay.

Instead of policy innovation, the strategy repeatedly refers to existing measures and ‘improving partnerships and collaboration’ with various stakeholders. It rarely provides examples of how it will do this.

For instance, when announcing the strategy, Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke highlighted an ongoing commitment to engaging Southeast Asian partners—an important measure that already exists. The strategy introduces no mechanisms for engagement or deepening relationships. Instead, it references the 2022 ASEAN-Australia Counter-Terrorism Dialogue.

For CT, the strategy is seemingly more focused on communications than action, saying in its executive summary: ‘The Strategy is for all Australians to develop a greater understanding of the evolving threat and what Australian governments are doing to respond to those challenges.’

Transparency and communication with the public are important, but they are not a strategy. Furthermore, the government is hardly promoting transparency by releasing the document with little notice on a Friday in mid-January.

Instead of foreshadowing new initiatives, the document commits to improved bureaucracy and internal functions, recommending improved internal assessment pathways and better consultation. Its action plan calls for yet another government review into existing frameworks. After a considerable wait for this strategy, it calls for more waiting.

Instead of new initiatives, it explicitly defends the status quo, saying ‘our current system for preventing and responding to terrorism is mature and works effectively.’

Certainly, Australia’s national security professionals at the coalface have an excellent record. But such confidence in the system contradicts reporting from September 2024 of a breakdown in collaboration between the federal government and the states and territories over the National Counter-Terrorism Plan—describing the situation as an unprecedented ‘clusterf—k’.

A key issue highlighted was the Home Affairs limited capacity to deliver counterterrorism policy, with migration absorbing significant time and resources. Similar issues were raised by ASPI’s Justin Bassi and John Coyne in August, with the division of counterterrorism responsibility between Home Affairs and the Attorney-General’s Department splitting expertise.

A real CT and CVE strategy requires new policy, more specifics and clear objectives. An increasingly difficult operational environment demands innovative policy backed by expertise. Terrorism is evolving and the threat it poses is increasing. Policy and resourcing need to be commensurate with this challenge.

A new normal: individual jihad and the West

The terrorist attack at Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida on June 12 represents the recent shift in terrorist modus operandi within Western jurisdictions. Preliminary details indicate that the attack was undertaken by an individual without a direct connection to any established terrorist organisation, using readily available weaponry and rudimentary tactics, and who, according to President Obama, ‘was inspired by various extremist information that was disseminated over the internet.’

The adoption of this form of individualised jihad as an overarching premise for operations, coupled with the explicit deployment of the online environment and weaponised content to facilitate and encourage these types of operations, will continue to have a significant impact on terrorism and counter terrorism dynamics in the West into the future.

As an indication of the virulence of these types of attacks, there have been nearly thirty individual or small cell jihadist attacks in the West since 2009, all using low-tech, low capability tactics, and overwhelmingly evidencing various levels of engagement with the online environment prior, during, or in the aftermath of the operation. Nearly two-thirds of these attacks have taken place since the declaration of the so-called Caliphate in June of 2014.

These types of operations represent the new normal of terrorist attacks in the West, and are likely to remain a permanent aspect of the terrorism landscape. The tactics employed afford high levels of operational security, and minimal likelihood of interdiction. The intelligence challenge that these attacks present will continue to confront counter terrorism agencies of the Western democracies for the foreseeable future.

To understand how these types of attacks became the norm of contemporary terrorist tactics in the West, it’s necessary to understand three intersecting drivers. First, there’s the emergence of a strain of strategic thinking within the broader jihadist milieu that legitimised and advocated for the incorporation of individual and small cell operations into broader jihadist practice. Second, the rise of key English speaking propagandists which openly encourage and inspire this type of terrorist activity. Finally, individualised jihad has been underpinned by the leveraging of the online environment as a tool of decentralised command and control. Social media has been used as a means of providing access to radicalising material, as well as tactical and targeting suggestions, coupled with claims of ongoing religious permissibility. The ongoing refinement of this facilitation system, particularly by Islamic State (IS), has led to the increased adoption of the strategy.

The deployment of these tactics is the outcome of an intentional, directed effort by the broader jihadist movement to inspire actors within the West to undertake individual or small cell operations. These types of attacks have become both more frequent and arguably more effective, in part as a consequence of the emergence of what’s known as ‘jihadist strategic thought’.

In particular, the ideas contained in the ‘military theory’ section of Abu Musab al-Suri’s The Call to Global Islamic Resistance advocate the importance and value of the atomisation of jihadist activity. Al-Suri’s work has been readily available online since 2005, but has informed the broader strategic and organisational thinking of much of the contemporary jihadist movement. As Jason Bourke writes in his recent book:

‘If al-Awlaki was the propagandist who did most to shape today’s threat against the West, and al-Zawahiri and al-Baghdadi are currently the most influential commanders, then al-Suri is the strategist of greatest relevance’.

Most significant in the amplification of the idea of individual jihad was the adoption of al-Suri’s ideas by Anwar al-Awlaki, and the operationalisation of these ideas through the publication of Inspire magazine. The production of a readily accessible, English language publication that simplified the ideology and justifications for jihadist activity broadly, but in particular a brand of DIY terrorism, individualised jihad has had substantial ramifications for terrorist practice in the West.

British citizen Junaid Hussain and Australian Neil Prakash sought to emulate the practices of Awlaki. In a reflection of the significance with which these propagandists are held by counter terrorism authorities, all three have met similar fates. The substantial quantity of English language output by jihadist groups, in particular by IS, is indicative of the value placed on reaching English-speaking audiences.

The online environment has proven a boon for the full operationalisation of the concept of individual jihad—particularly social media. Providing convenient access to a global audience, while providing the opportunity for interactivity and a sense of belonging has proven highly effective in both recruiting individuals to join jihadist groups, but also in encouraging them to act. The online jihadist community was quick to celebrate the attack in Orlando, with IS issuing a statement claiming responsibility for the attack, and using its online radio broadcast to refer to the attacker as ‘one of the soldiers of the Caliphate in America.’

In the aftermath of an attack like the one in Orlando, there’s an inevitable temptation to apportion blame. Whether this targets the broader Muslim community, intelligence and law enforcement failings, or involves exploiting the tragedy for partisan political purposes, it’s both incorrect and counterproductive.

Those responsible for incidents like Orlando, beyond the operatives themselves, are those who have sought to construct a system that encourages and facilitates these types of operations. Ongoing efforts by various agencies of government are slowly and methodically targeting these individuals, and the system they have built, while trying to preserve the principles and values that oursociety was founded upon. There’s value in reflecting back to Prime Minister Turnbull’s first national security statement in November of 2015, and restating that:

‘Our response must be as clear eyed and strategic as it is determined. This is not a time for gestures or machismo. Calm, clinical, professional, effective. That’s how we defeat this menace’.