Tag Archive for: Prime Minister

Codifying conventions on Australia going to war

Australia has codified government responsibilities to parliament when going to war.

The code is set out in a memorandum issued by the Prime Minister’s Department at the end of November.

The conventions cover decisions to deploy the Australian Defence Force in a major military operation in armed conflict overseas.

The prime minister’s profound prerogative to launch war is still unfettered. But the conventions set minimum requirements for openness and accountability to the parliament about war aims, the deployment and its legal basis. The conventions nudge at Australia’s quasi-presidential war powers, listing basic steps the executive owes parliament and the people.

The government action follows the recommendations of a report on international armed conflict decision-making by Parliament’s Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, which pointed to ‘a clear need to improve the transparency and accountability of government decision-making’.

The memorandum affirms that deploying the ADF into armed conflict is a prerogative of the executive, flowing from section 61 of the constitution. The document notes: ‘In practice, the National Security Committee [NSC] of Cabinet exercises this power collectively to enable informed decision-making on matters of national significance.’

The code implies that cabinet practice should evolve to align more closely with the command structure envisaged in the constitution.

When John Howard was elected in 1996, he created the NSC as the peak decision-making body for national and foreign policy, a structure retained by all governments since. Unlike other cabinet committees, NSC decisions do not have to go to full cabinet for approval.

The NSC focus and habits of government meant that in deciding to go to Afghanistan and Iraq, cabinet relied on the minister’s power to direct the ADF under the Defence Act 1903. Using the Defence Act departed from the way it was done in World War II, when war was declared using the governor-general’s constitutional power as commander in chief of the military.

The new code means that future decisions to deploy the ADF to fight overseas should be made using the governor-general’s constitutional authority, not the Defence Act.

The memorandum then turns to the need to inform parliament of decisions for armed conflict, and to provide regular updates.

Within 30 days of a deployment, the government must convene both houses of parliament to deliver a statement on the conflict and open debate. The conventions call for the government to table an unclassified written statement outlining the objectives of the ADF deployment, the orders made and its legal basis.

The obligation to convene, inform and debate, is balanced by this statement: ‘Notwithstanding these practices, and consistent with long-standing policy, the Australian Government reserves the right to determine the appropriateness of disclosures with respect to questions of international law and advice on questions of legality, as well any considerations of national security or imminent threat to Australian territories or lives.’

The conventions promise regular updates to parliament on deployments to armed conflict and on military strategy.

During any active deployment of the ADF, the prime minister and the government leader in the Senate should give each house a statement on Australia’s involvement at least once a year.

At least two other times a year, the defence minister and their representative in the other chamber should deliver statements to each house to update on operations.

And the government is to brief parliamentary committees on the conduct of significant military operations.

As for military strategy, the government is to table publicly released Defence strategy documents in each house of parliament within 30 days of their publication.

All this might seem the obvious minimum in a parliamentary democracy. Yet practice has too often strayed towards the presidential rather than the parliamentary.

The norm in recent decades has been that defence white papers weren’t delivered to parliament, but released on a navy ship or in front of an air force jet; television’s needs trumped parliament. The habit-of-mind got so bad that Julia Gillard’s government did not even bother to table in parliament the 2013 Defence white paper or the 2013 National Security Strategy.

As I noted in my submission to the parliament inquiry, what a democracy demands of its parliament in conflict must be balanced against many other needs, from secrecy and security through to military imperatives.

Because the parties of government, Labor and Liberal, are united in protecting executive prerogative, no legal check is likely. Strengthening conventions is the practical way to strengthen parliament’s role in the use of Australia’s war powers.

Malcolm Turnbull the fixer

Image courtesy of Flickr user nickfarnhill

Politicians can be divided into ‘straights’, ‘fixers’ and ‘maddies,’ and Malcolm Turnbull must quickly find his inner fixer.

The transformation isn’t impossible because Turnbull has already tried the other two categories.

In his first stint as Liberal leader, Turnbull performed as a maddy. The party caucus cut him down; he was not the maddy they were looking for.

In the federal election, Turnbull campaigned as a straight. The voters didn’t believe him.

The election result and the nature of the Liberal party room demand that Turnbull discover his fixer abilities. The pressures from voters and party come from different directions but push fixer-wards.

The three categories of politician are from the British Labour MP Tony Benn. In one of those lightning bolts that reveal a vast landscape, Benn got a lot of truth into one sentence: ‘All political leaders, irrespective of party, political system, country or period in history, come in one of three categories—straight men, fixers and maddies.’

The maddies push for change and newness, often blowing up what stands in front of them, and they change history.

The fixers are the apparatchik artists, the doers of deals and buyers of bargains that are the lifeblood of politics from a dictatorship to a democracy.

The straights are loyal to their image of themself and their idea of what politics should be. They tend to be incrementalists whose drives are more firmly grounded than the other two categories, although the frame can be a set of understandings about power as much as moral principles.

To paraphrase Julia Gillard’s farewell press conference on what being a woman had meant for her leadership, the three categories may not explain everything, but nor do they explain nothing.

The maddy-straight-or-fixer model reaches towards the truth Walter Lippmann uttered long ago: the supreme qualification for high office is temperament, not intellect. We know Turnbull’s considerable intellect. The test he faces is about temperament.

The man who has alerted Australia to the Tony Benn definition is that great philosopher of the press and radio, Phillip Adams. Adams explains that the terms aren’t necessarily pejorative, as demonstrated when he defined Paul Keating as a maddy.

In the resulting phone calls from the Lodge, Keating purred. He loved being grouped with his maddy hero, Churchill, even if it meant sharing the same box with Mao and Hitler.

The definitions are useful because they are all about the interaction of personality with power, and have almost nothing to say about formal political labels. Even family ties can’t dislodge the judgement imposed by the three categories. George H W Bush was a classic and successful straight, whereas his son George W Bush was the worst sort of fixer—he broke things.

Some Australian leaders slot neatly into a category, while others don’t sit comfortably under a single heading. There’s hope for Turnbull as he settles to the fixer task.

Front and centre in the straight camp sits John Howard, beside his hero, Robert Menzies. Next to them, though, is the Labor idol John Curtin, plus others from Oz history including Deakin, Bruce, Scullin and Watson. Off to the edge of the straight frame is Malcolm Fraser, who seized office as a maddy but governed all the way through as a straight, then went back to being a maddy in retirement.

The fixers proliferate, as they should—fixing is just another name for politics. Still they’re a disparate crew: Bob Hawke, Julia Gillard, Harold Holt, Billy McMahon and just about every leader of the National/Country Party (although McEwan and Page had their maddy moments).

The maddies range from Paul Keating and Gough Whitlam to John Gorton and Billy Hughes.

Our two previous PMs refuse to go quietly into a category. Labor rages that Kevin Rudd was a maddy. Yet he campaigned and won office as Howard-lite and the voters always insisted he was a straight. The voters prevail. Rudd sits beside Fraser as a straight with a maddy wing.

Tony Abbott campaigned and triumphed as the fixer who’d repair the Labor mess. Abbott did have maddy traits, not least his wonderful ability to reduce complexity to a single-slogan phrase. Still, the voters thought Tony would fix it and gave him a thumping majority. Abbott’s first budget, however, was judged mad by the people. To the amazement of the Liberal Party, Tony kept blowing things up. Shift Tony to the maddy camp.

The close election result means Malcolm Turnbull has little room to channel his maddy aspirations. He may intone about innovation and exciting times, but this isn’t the excitement he craves. The innovation will be in the fixes he can cobbled together, not the big changes he pushes. No more thought balloons, Malcolm.

Plus, the Liberal caucus isn’t disposed to give Malcolm any maddy headroom. Turnbull is the first Liberal leader since Andrew Peacock who’s both socially as well as economically liberal, but today’s Liberal caucus is more in the Howard mould—socially conservative and economically liberal.

Malcolm is in the middle of a muddle, as the ever-sage Paul Kelly reports: ‘His government is shell-shocked. Its post-election resentments could not disguise its confusion. Turnbull won—but his inadequacies have been exposed. His leadership is diminished. His political strategy needs a rethink from top to bottom.’

Another of the doyen class, Michelle Grattan, pronounces: ‘A narrow majority, a divided Liberal Party, and a fractured Senate will make the road to strong policy initiatives a very steep one for Malcolm Turnbull.’

Whatever Turnbull decides to do—big or small—he’ll have to tip-toe before he can climb or jump.

The straight persona Malcolm wore during the campaign won’t do and the maddy traits are hemmed in from all sides. Arise, Malcolm the fixer, your country and party need you.

Reassessing Malcolm Fraser

Waving Good-bye at Osaka International Airport 20 June 1976 Photo album - Commemoration of the official visit to Japan by the Rt Hon John Malcolm Fraser the Prime Minister of Australia and Mrs J M Fraser, 15 - 20 June 1976

Malcolm Fraser, Australia’s 22nd Prime Minister, died in March 2015, at the age of 84. Fraser was Prime Minister from November 1975, to March 1983. This is part of ASPI’s new Strategic Insights paper, Reassessing Malcolm Fraser.

Malcolm Fraser helped cement the Australian political consensus on engagement with Asia—the Great Asia Project—that has directed Australian foreign policy for 40 years. Fraser’s term bedded down the establishment of the modern Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force in structures that endure. In 1976 his government issued Australia’s first Defence White Paper , marking the shift from forward defence to defence of the continent and its approaches

Fraser waged one of the greatest battles of Australian politics—the constitutional crisis of 1975—to destroy Gough Whitlam’s Labor government. However, Fraser embraced and enhanced much that Whitlam started in foreign and defence policy. Whitlam and Fraser stood together in proud rejection of White Australia and embrace of non-discriminatory immigration. Fraser was even louder than Whitlam in his promotion of multiculturalism as a core value.

The crash and crunch of the confrontation between Whitlam and Fraser is a major moment of Australian history. Yet the Whitlam policies on which Fraser built point to a simple Canberra truism: the consensus and continuities of policy are the broad current beneath the turmoil of political argument. What marks Whitlam and Fraser is how they turned that broad current. They stand together as important leaders who shifted the direction of policy and made firm a new consensus.

To start that consensus with Whitlam and Fraser is to mark a big before-and-after divide. Before 1972, Australia’s leaders were Asia Excluders; after ’72, the leaders became Asia Engagers.

Much of the commentary on Fraser’s death concentrated on how he had left the Liberal Party or, as Fraser put it, how the Liberal Party had left him. The central discussion of how Fraser’s international thinking changed must be his rejection of Australia’s alliance with the United States. His 2014 book Dangerous Allies is deeply flawed, and yet is a deeply important contribution to Australian debate precisely because of those flaws. Aged in his 80s, more than 30 years after losing office, Fraser had lost none of his ability to strike controversy and state his case in the sharpest terms.

The title Dangerous Allies is classic Fraser. Most modern books on foreign policy suffer from colon-itis. The title of the book is given and then the visible or invisible colon throws to a further phrase or phrases that define, refine and mediate the terms of the headline. No refining or definitional hesitation for Malcolm Fraser. He was writing about the danger of alliance with the US and quasi-alliance with Japan leading Australia to line up for a war against China.

It was tempting to write that Fraser had become Australia’s first isolationist leader. But that would have been to misunderstand and misrepresent his argument. He wanted strategic independence for Australia—to cease being what he called ‘a lackey of America’s’—so Australia could take its full place in Asia. The commitment to an independent Australia, able to think and act for itself, is central to the Fraser approach. The journalist Paul Kelly judged:

The unifying theme behind all Fraser’s foreign policy was a pragmatic and independent search for the Australian national interest. When speaking for Australia abroad he was consistently informed, formidable and constructive.

That word ‘independent’ recurs when talking of Fraser’s foreign policy compass. The aim is easily embraced by the Australian polity; steering the course to the aim is contested and controversial.

Such battles energised Fraser. All leaders must have the will to power. Fraser was defined by the steel of his will and his steely faith in his own judgement. The Prime Minister could be stiff and abrupt, even when trying to persuade. He was shy and solitary as a country child; a life in politics meant it wasn’t shyness but that glint of steel which could be glimpsed beneath the surface. His tall physique and—yes, steely gaze—meant that an argument with Fraser was a physical confrontation. And confrontation was what he did well. This man brought down a Liberal Prime Minister, John Gorton, stalked and bested a Liberal leader, Billy Snedden, and calmly saw off Andrew Peacock’s party room challenge to his Prime Ministership. In 1975, Fraser held his nerve and held his party steady in the great confrontation that killed a government with a clear majority in the House of Representatives. Self-belief was one of Fraser’s core strengths. Even as those beliefs might change, the strength of his conviction never wavered.

On Fraser’s death, his biographer Philip Ayres judged:

The most impressive thing about him, to my way of thinking, was his strong interiority and self-sufficiency, though there was an emotional vulnerability, as with anyone. He didn’t need other people much, except politically, and within the family. This offended the press, who had no possibility of plucking out the heart of the mystery – they just couldn’t get in there.

The Canberra journalist Jack Waterford wrote how Fraser rained telephone calls on all levels of the Australian public service, delivering sharp demands for instant information and explanation. In person he was daunting:

Fraser liked an argument, and, if a natural bully, usually warmed to people who stood up to him. He had about him a somewhat aggressive style of wanting to test every part of an argument before he adopted it, leading some to think that he was flatly opposed to a proposition he was in fact leaning to. Instead he was rehearsing the arguments, and learning, or absorbing, the counter-arguments. In this sense he did not mind being contradicted, even if he often disconcerted by the aggressive manner of his questioning, and a tendency not only to want to know what an official thought, but the complete provenance of an idea. One felt that one was being pinned, pushed, tested, and to the limit—and, because of Fraser’s impatience, never given much of a chance to explain.

What Fraser did to public servants he was equally willing to do to political colleagues and ministers. The evidence that today’s politicians might be a bit weaker than previous generations—or, at least, have a lower pain threshold—is the way the Labor Party caucus and ministry rebelled at the brutal treatment meted out by Kevin Rudd after little more than two years in government. The Liberal Party endured seven years of tough love (very tough, little love) from Fraser and the single leadership challenge was crushed.

One of Rudd’s many mistakes was to treat cabinet as something of a formality, with key decisions taken by a small ‘kitchen cabinet’. Fraser, by contrast, pushed and cajoled and kept cabinet sitting or reconvening until he got what he wanted, producing nearly 19,000 cabinet decisions. Rudd avoided cabinet while Fraser exhausted it.

Aged 45 when he entered the Lodge and only 52 when he left, Fraser was a workaholic, described by Paul Kelly as ‘an awe-inspiring political executive with a near-unrivalled capacity.’ That cabinet dominance also figures in Michelle Grattan’s summation:

Cabinet sat endlessly; his colleagues were exhausted. Fraser had his hands on everything – his department was omnipresent, ministers were often second-guessed.

Steel will and iron self-belief don’t guarantee the correct course, as Fraser’s former chief of staff and federal director of the Liberal Party, Tony Eggleton, recalled with one anecdote:

His determination sometimes translated into bloody-mindedness. I still smile when I remember Big Mal striding across the ballroom at the Savoy Hotel in London, convinced that he was taking a short cut to his suite. Despite the protestations of personal and hotel staff, he headed for a door and disappeared into the broom cupboard, to a clatter of mops and buckets. Despite some loss of dignity, he managed to crack a smile.

My best Malcolm Fraser story has me arriving at the Lodge with Owen Lloyd, one of the PM’s press secretaries, at 7pm one cool evening in 1980 to do a radio interview about an overseas trip Fraser would commence the next morning. Fraser emerged, glass in hand, to say there’d been a mis-communication; he was hosting a dinner and intended to do the interview at 7am, before departing for the plane at 7:30.

As we left, I told Owen that I’d be back at 7am with a companion, my two-year-old daughter Kate, as my wife would be on shift at the Royal Canberra Hospital. Sure, said the phlegmatic Lloyd, the staff will be glad to meet her. So it was that the next morning I handed a young lady in a dressing gown to the butler at the Lodge and went to record an interview with the Prime Minister. Heading to the kitchen 20 minutes later, I discovered Kate had enjoyed her first close encounter with chocolate biscuits, with nearly as much chocolate on her hands as her face.

With tape recorder on one shoulder and Kate on the other hip, I was turning towards the hall when up loomed an impressive figure in a magnificent pinstripe suit. ‘Ah, hello!’ said the Prime Minister. The ‘wow’ reaction from my chocolate-covered munchkin was to lunge at this immaculate apparition with both hands. I swerved even harder, nearly lost the recorder but held the girl, and the chocolate-smear-disaster was averted by inches.

It was the most human moment I ever shared with the big man. Typically, though, Malcolm Fraser had neither changed course nor altered speed.

Oz president, Oz cabinet

Oz president, Oz cabinet

Australian politics has grafted presidential habits onto a system of cabinet government. And recently, the Oz body politic has rejected the graft.

The mismatch between presidential aspiration and parliamentary power introduces stutters and stuff-ups into the Canberran process. If, for instance, ASPI’s brief is to ponder the workings and objectives of Oz grand strategy, does the Institute focus on the traditional cabinet framework or the day-to-day presidential reality?

Rudd, Gillard and Abbott each show in their own ways what happens when a president pushes too hard against cabinet and its parliamentary setting. Read more

Visiting the troops

Frustrated by General McClellan’s hesitation to pursue a badly battered Confederate Army following the Battle of Antietam, Lincoln visited the battlefield in October 1862 to impress upon the general the need to aggressively pursue Lee’s army. McClellan continued his cautious pursuit, and Lincoln subsequently replaced him with General Ambrose Burnside.Visiting the troops deployed overseas has been a tradition for Australian politicians at least as far back as June 1916, when Billy Hughes travelled to the Western Front and met soldiers shortly before the appalling battles of Fromelle and Pozires. It is remarkable that so much of Australia’s political culture has been shaped by the interaction of politicians with the military. In Canberra, Parliament House and the War Memorial face each other across the lake, both institutions dug-in to the hills around them, reminding us of the cost of political decisions to go to war.

Strategy may start with ideas about alliances, Anglospheres and Asian Centuries, but such planning is made reality by soldiers carrying guns in remote locations. So it’s utterly appropriate, in fact deeply necessary, that politicians should visit the troops overseas, look our deployed military and civilian personnel in the eye, and seek to understand what it really takes to promote Australian strategic interests abroad. Read more