Tag Archive for: PLA-N

Giving China a ladder to climb down

Mark Hobbs

The 12 July judgment by the Hague-based Arbitral Tribunal on the South China Sea constituted a near-total defeat for China. While it was widely expected that the Philippines would win, it wasn’t expected that China would lose by such a wide margin.

Understandably, China has taken a hawkish and resolute stance against the Tribunal. Eager to show China’s resolve in defending its bastions in the South China Sea, China landed two civilian airliners on Mischief Reef on 13 July. It conducted two military exercises near Hainan Island—one just before the 12 July verdict and another the week after—closing off maritime areas and warning mariners that that area was prohibited.

There’s now a distinct possibility that tensions will escalate in the South China Sea. Given that the Arbitral Tribunal had ruled that all the features in the Spratlys are either rocks or low-tide elevations, the US now has the legal cover to conduct FONOPs closer to, or even inside, the 12nm zones around the maritime features. In June, French defence minister Jean-Yves le Drian said that France should urge European Union countries to conduct ‘regular and visible’ patrols in the South China Sea. Chinese anger at such overt challenges could well lead to a conflict not from deliberation, but from accidental escalation.

Regardless of the verdict, China has a solid physical position in the South China Sea. In February, it was found that China had installed high-frequency radar on Cuarteron Reef, and possibly radars on Gaven, Hughes and Johnson South reefs. Such facilities would enable it to establish control over large swathes of the South China Sea within the nine-dash line. Three 3,000m airstrips in the Spratlys serve to defend China’s advanced submarines based farther north at Hainan Island. Deployed in the South China Sea, Jin-class submarines with JL-2 nuclear missiles can break into the Pacific Ocean to get within striking range of the continental United States. Given such a strategic position—compounded by Xi Jinping’s heady mix of nationalism and rejuvenation from a ‘century of humiliation’—it would be irrational for Beijing to give up its assets in the Spratlys.

The Arbitral Tribunal wasn’t able to rule on questions of sovereignty, and while it did rule that China’s historic rights claim to the nine-dash line was incompatible with UNCLOS, it didn’t conclude that the nine-dash line per se was invalid or illegal. That gives China some wiggle room to continue to press its claim. In the clearest, quasi-authoritative response to the judgment, Wang Junmin, deputy dean of the CPS Postgraduate Institute, notes that the Philippines had used the Chinese expression ‘historic rights’ to argue China hadn’t claimed ‘historic title’ to the South China Sea (the former may include sovereignty, but may equally include more limited rights, such as fishing or rights of access that fall ‘well short’ of claims of sovereignty; the latter is used specifically to refer to historic sovereignty). Writing in the PLA Daily on 18 July, Mr Wang wrote that Chinese references to ‘historic rights’ doesn’t imply that China doesn’t claim ‘historic title.’ He added that China has ‘historic title’ and ‘historic fishing rights’ in different areas within the nine-dash line.

By claiming that China has ‘historic title’ to internal waters in ‘archipelagos or island groups’ that are at a ‘relatively close distance’ and that can be viewed ‘integrated whole,’ China could well draw straight baselines around the features it occupies in the Spratlys and claim extended maritime zones outward. Such a hardened position goes directly against the Tribunal’s conclusions and would likely be challenged by the US.

It’s time, however, for China and the US to pull back from such a brink. The signs thus far are encouraging. The Chinese government didn’t yield to public calls for a boycott of Philippine goods (Xinhua called this ‘irrational patriotism’), and China has stressed that it would intensify talks for a binding Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea. The US has urged the resumption of bilateral talks between China and other claimants, and encouraged them not to act provocatively. Likewise, the Philippines has responded sensibly, with President Rodrigo Duterte saying he wouldn’t adopt a ‘flaunt or taunt’ position against Beijing.

In the medium term, the best approach isn’t to pummel China with the 501-page judgment, but rather, to ensure that it has enough face to pursue tangible and functional outcomes. Those could include accelerating talks for the COC, an expansion of the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to include coast guard ships, and getting claimants—like the Philippines—to postpone negotiate directly with the Chinese.

Speaking to his American counterpart recently, Admiral Wu Shengli, the chief of the PLA Navy stressed that China would never sacrifice its sovereignty and interests in South China Sea, would never stop construction there and never be caught off guard. Yet he signalled that both sides could cooperate by following CUES and Rules of Behaviour for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters.

Working on tangible and functional outcomes—and not rubbing China’s nose in the ruling—might well be the best way forward.

Seeing the dragon on our doorstep (part 1)


A key challenge in the coming years for Australia will be the PLA’s growing ability to project military power beyond what Chinese military thinkers deem to be the first and second island chains (see map below).

‘Near Seas’ vs. ‘Far Seas’

When considering the canvas upon which future geopolitical competition in Asia is to be played out, it seems doubtful that China will be content to seek control of the South China Sea alone. Beijing has every incentive to steadily increase its naval power projection capabilities to protect vital strategic interests—notably trade and energy—along the Maritime Silk Road that traverses the Indian Ocean.  The MSR, along with the Silk Road Economic Belt that runs overland through Eurasia, are the foundations for ‘The China Dream’ of national rejuvenation. Without access to energy resources, China’s economy will slow, the country will become more vulnerable to internal social and political disorder and the CCP’s grip on power will weaken.

Current projections suggest that by 2020, imported oil will make up 66% of China’s total oil demand, and by 2040, it will make up 72%. Up to 80% of China’s energy and trade will move along the MSR and through the Malacca Strait from Africa and the Persian Gulf. The nearby Lombok­–Makassar straits are also strategically significant as most super tankers too large for Malacca traverse this deep water route. It also allows PLA Navy submarines to access the Indian Ocean submerged, and the entrance to the Lombok Strait is also very close to Darwin.  The MSR starts and ends in the South China Sea, meaning that the the China Dream is unattainable if Beijing’s claim of ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the South China Sea remains unfulfilled.

Chinese control of the South China Sea through steady militarisation of disputed territories is therefore a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. National Defense University Professor Liang Fang suggests ‘that a military presence along the Maritime Silk Road must serve to deter any potential enemy, and that, ultimately, sea lane security can only be assured by carrier battle groups on station’. Correspondingly, the most recent Chinese Defence White Paper—released in May 2015—makes clear that China is now beginning to move beyond a narrow focus on counter-intervention operations (or ‘anti-access and area denial’ in western circles) in the Near and Middle Seas, and is set to project power and presence into the Far Seas of the Indian Ocean as part of an ‘open seas protection’ role for the PLAN.

At this stage the PLAN has it’s first overseas base in Djibouti; have visited Sri Lanka; have negotiated port access to both Gwadar in Pakistan and Chittagong in Bangladesh; and have sustained counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. If one considers the ancient Chinese game of Wei Qi (or ‘Go’) as a parallel, China is already moving stones to prevent encirclement, while expanding presence.

China will likely operate directly within Australia’s northern maritime approaches as it projects power from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean through the Southeast Asian straits. Most important for Australia is that there are no surprises like the January 2014 ‘Christmas Cruise’ when a Chinese PLAN deployment of three warships transited Sunda Strait and then deployed off Christmas Island. Australia must ensure it has a broad area maritime surveillance capability, which a combination of air (P-8A and MQ-4C), as well as naval platforms, supported by space-enabled C4ISR networks can provide. Tracking PLAN deployments from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean through the straits is vital, and not just for PLAN surface vessels. Australia needs to enhance its undersea warfare (USW) capabilities, including through the development of Theatre Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW) systems to network and share information, and which are cued by an Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) focusing on key maritime straits.

The 2016 Defence White Paper doesn’t mention such capabilities, and as such we are dependent on foreign provision of such intelligence. Yet an Australian TASW/IUSS capability—something like an undersea equivalent to JORN—makes a great deal of sense, and could complement allied USW surveillance in the region, as well as directly support the complete spectrum of ADF maritime surveillance activities.

Sun Tzu wrote that to ‘know the opponent and know yourself will lead to victory in one hundred battles’. Seeing Chinese naval activities, including submarine deployments, at a long distance contributes directly to achieving all three of the Strategic Defence Objectives as laid out in the Defence White Paper.

A second piece will consider China’s growing naval capabilities and examine implications for Australia’s ability to pursue its Strategic Defence Objectives.