The tough stance taken by Papua New Guinea’s police commissioner on the 48 Chinese workers destined for the Chinese-run Ramu Nickel mine in PNG’s Madang Province gives an opportunity for the Chinese government to explain whether it’s using Chinese workers in PNG as test subjects for vaccine prototypes, and whether the workers were coerced or genuinely volunteered.

Commissioner David Manning, who is also the national emergency controller, responded to news that the 48 workers had been vaccinated with an unproven Covid-19 vaccine before leaving China by cancelling another flight carrying almost 200 workers destined for various Chinese projects in PNG.

Both Manning and PNG Health Minister Jelta Wong have demanded that the Chinese ambassador explain why the workers were vaccinated and why PNG authorities were not informed until the issue had been exposed in The Australian.

The opposition leader, Belden Namah, has chimed in strongly supporting the police commissioner’s actions, insisting that PNG is not a testing ground for vaccines.

These events may well strain the China–PNG relationship and the health minister is clearly irritated at the lack of a prompt response from the ambassador.

Part of the response from Ramu Nickel is typical—publicity campaigns in Australian and PNG media and warnings that PNG’s actions might ‘harm relations between China and Papua New Guinea’.

What will harm relations between China and PNG is the lack of respect shown by the company and Chinese officials for PNG’s government and population, who, after all, were unknowingly sharing the risks in this Chinese vaccine experiment in their country.

The harm is being generated by Chinese actions; exposure simply allows that harm to be addressed. The incident means that other Chinese projects that involve Chinese labourers must now also disclose whether any of the workers involved are similarly being used to test experimental vaccines.

This is about whether the PNG government and people can trust the Chinese state-owned enterprises that are active in PNG or whether confidence can only be established by close monitoring and supervision of these projects and the workers involved.

Beijing is desperate to win the global race to develop safe, effective vaccines against Covid-19, but that’s no excuse for inflicting risk on the people of other nations without their knowledge and informed consent.

Relations between the Ramu Nickel mine management and local landowners and the provincial government have been strained for years.

There has long been a lack of transparency when it comes to the makeup of the workforce, not only at the Ramu Nickel but at any number of other Chinese-run projects in PNG, most of which are funded by unfavourable loans to the PNG government by the Exim Bank of China.

Manning has a unique opportunity to establish the status of the vaccinated workers. He can use the wide powers available to him under the Covid-19 regulations to examine passports, visas and work permits—something Australia could and should help him to do.

One of the necessary questions is whether the workers consented to being vaccinated, and whether that consent was given because of incentives offered or under pressure. Manning might well also ask whether there are plans for other Chinese workers to be injected with a vaccine that isn’t internationally recognised or approved by the PNG government.

It’s been reported that China has been testing vaccines on military personnel and that some 30 ‘special volunteers’ at China’s SinoPharm have been voluntarily injected with experimental vaccines. But testing these vaccines on poorly paid skilled and semi-skilled workers who may feel compelled to agree is a deeper and more difficult ethical problem to contend with.

Examination of the backgrounds of these Ramu Nickel workers might be the start of ensuring that PNG standards for health, skills, qualifications, labour rules and immigration status are being met by Chinese-based mining and construction firms.

Questions that have long been asked about the integrity of the foreign workforce in PNG might finally be answered, and the conditions in place for China-sourced projects might be brought into line with the requirements that apply others, to PNG’s benefit.

The timing could hardly be better. PNG police and immigration officials have recently been raiding logging sites in the hunt for illegal foreign workers.

A clean-up of PNG’s visa and work permit system is to be welcomed. It is a project long delayed and longer overdue.

Australia’s engagement in such a process must be to provide the kind of technical and logistic support our neighbour needs.

It remains to be seen whether Manning will allow into PNG the almost 200 workers who were turned around after initially being given approval to work on projects for the PNG government and its state entities.

It’s hard to see that happening without greatly improved transparency and openness from Beijing that enables the integrity of companies’ operations to be established in accordance with PNG law and processes.

It’s been a long time since PNG ministers and officials have asked serious questions of the Chinese government about its workforce in PNG. That has now changed—and Beijing’s response is awaited with interest across Papua New Guinea.

As the federal government prepares to hand down its pandemic-delayed national budget in October, it will be looking for areas in which spending can be cut.

When the pressure’s been on in the past, the international development assistance program has been an easy target and, given the significant belt tightening and staff cuts in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, one can assume that it’s again under review.

Despite the undoubted pressures at home in the wake of Covid-19, it’s to be hoped that the government accepts the need to maintain our development assistance to Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific. Revise and restructure it most definitely, but any significant reduction would send a terrible message to our neighbours, virtually all of whom are struggling fiscally and economically, as well as socially.

The extent of the crisis varies from country to country and, so far, Covid-19 infection rates have been low in the South Pacific. But lockdowns, travel bans and related factors are having a devastating effect.

Of primary concern are our closest neighbours, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Fiji, but we also have to look at the impact on other small regional nations such as Tonga, Samoa, New Caledonia and the Cook Islands.

At over $1 billion, our total development assistance to the South Pacific is a significant part of our national budget. But there are real non-fiscal reasons why it must be protected, at least for the current financial year.

The first is the dire economic and social conditions in our key neighbours. Travel between Australia and these countries is off the agenda for this year, if not much of next year.

Tourism is vital to Fiji’s economy and very important to Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga. If travel between these countries and Australia and New Zealand continues to be barred, the consequences for their tourism and business sectors will be truly horrendous.

Our aid program to the smaller South Pacific nations needs urgent revision to help industries that are directly affected by the virus and Australia’s border closures. Australian investment in the tourism, hospitality and service industries in these countries is not insignificant, and our assistance will help both our own investors and the thousands of people they employ throughout the region.

The needs of PNG and Solomon Islands are less tourism related. There are 5,000 Australian businesses operating directly and indirectly in PNG, and many hundreds more in Solomon Islands, the Cook Islands, Samoa and Tonga. Most, if not all, will be struggling to survive and it will get worse before it gets better.

The federal budget is still three months away, which is enough time for DFAT and other government agencies to engage with Australian businesses operating in the region and discuss what practical and reasonable support can be given to them and to their employees to sustain their operations for as long as is necessary.

The tight restrictions on travel will make it difficult to maintain our existing development assistance programs at least for the balance of this financial year. Many of those programs relate to health, education and social welfare.

That aid money should not be dropped or deferred. It should be redirected in an innovative way.

One option which should be urgently examined is to expand the seasonal worker program in our agricultural sector. With appropriate quarantine systems in place, the program could be stepped up at a time when Australian farmers need workers. We can forget about European backpackers picking fruit and doing other work in rural communities for at least the next year.

The relatively low virus rates among our South Pacific neighbours ought to enable men and women from those nations to fill the gaps in our workforce. Most will return some of their income to their families, which will help ease the desperate economic circumstances most now face.

This program will only work with substantial federal government funding and management and the involvement of the states and territories. It might be just a short-term measure, but it would enhance our people-to-people engagement in the region—and that must be the heart and soul of our aid program.

Support for the private sector in our regional neighbours through our development assistance program needs to be maintained at least at current levels until the pandemic’s impact diminishes. That is many months, if not years, away.

The other reason we must maintain our regional development assistance is that, if we don’t, the People’s Republic of China will happily step into any gaps we leave. China is already increasing its aid in the region, as local media has noted. Any impression that we’re reducing our regional engagement will play into China hands.

We need to assure the people in our region that we are not neglecting them despite our own massive fiscal and economic challenges.

A targeted development assistance program, focused even more strongly on our people-to-people and business-to-business engagement, is surely what Australia needs today and as far as we can see into the future.

As China works vigorously to increase its influence in the region, it is stepping up its efforts to undermine Australia’s influence in Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific, and Australia is unprepared to counter Beijing’s push.

A disappointing aspect of Australia’s colonial administration over PNG up to its independence in 1975 was a failure to prepare the emerging nation to be a leader in agriculture and fisheries for both domestic consumption and export.

At independence, PNG’s economy was reliant on producing coffee, cocoa and copra, all of which were heavily affected by fluctuations in price and demand. It had a very small cattle industry, and no sugar industry or grain production despite the environment being wholly suited to crops in demand in PNG, Southeast Asia and beyond.

The fishing industry was small and disorganised, and fishing was purely a matter of subsistence for many.

Australia’s neglect of PNG’s agriculture and aquaculture sectors back then was made even worse by the rapid replacement after independence of agricultural officers with local people who were often not well trained for the job.

Today, agricultural production in most areas is stagnant at best and in decline at worst. Palm oil production has been a success story, but for key agricultural products such as coffee and cocoa quality has generally deteriorated and the income received by PNG’s hundreds of thousands of small-hold growers has been in decline for years.

The situation with aquaculture is even worse. PNG exports are largely confined to tuna, an industry often exploited to the disadvantage of local communities. PNG’s coastal area and rivers abound in fish, prawns and lobster, but the harvesting and export of these products are limited.

That is all about to change—in a way that will not benefit the people of PNG to the extent it should and that will present a significant challenge for Australia.

For decades, people in PNG have asked why Australia doesn’t import top-quality seafood, especially prawns, lobster, barramundi and other fish, from their country. The reason proffered has always been ‘biosecurity’ issues. Given that half of Australia’s seafood is now imported and much of it comes from countries such as Vietnam and even China, surely any biosecurity concerns about PNG produce can be addressed?

We have almost certainly missed the boat when it comes to assisting PNG to develop a sustainable aquaculture sector.

On 15 June, China’s ambassador to PNG, Xue Bing, signed an agreement with PNG Foreign Minister Lino Tom for substantial volumes of PNG seafood to be exported directly to China. At the same time, the ambassador held out the prospect of a free-trade agreement between China and PNG.

For the best part of 60 years, Australia has neglected the development of an industry that would directly lift the living standards of hundreds of thousands of Papua New Guineans and now China is set to take control of its future. And it is going to do so right on Australia’s northern doorstep.

What is yet to be revealed is whether the agreement is principally about replacing Australia’s high-value seafood exports to China (worth more than $500 million in 2019) or about grabbing effective control over PNG’s seafood sector, including fishing for tuna, which is in high demand internationally.

Based on recent experience, I believe the agenda is much wider than just replacing Australian exports. It is about getting a dominant place in an industry that is underdeveloped but has enormous potential.

The Chinese embassy in Port Moresby would be aware that the capacity of PNG authorities to monitor catch levels and impose biosecurity and other controls is just about zero.

The rivers and coastal areas of Western Province—the part of PNG closest to the Australian mainland—abound in high-quality marine products, especially barramundi and prawns. Some of Australia’s Torres Strait Island communities are within easy reach by canoe and share fishing rights with their PNG neighbours.

Chinese fishing fleets will, sooner or later, target other areas close to Australia, including the Gulf of Papua, which adjoins the Coral Sea and the Great Barrier Reef and is rich in king prawns.

Australia’s experience in PNG and the South Pacific surely tells us that when China focuses on an industry it does so methodically and with little regard to what that means for the ‘grass roots’—in this case, coastal communities right around PNG.

In PNG, that means eight million men, women and children who rightly see food production, and agriculture generally, as being their one hope for a better future.

The Papua New Guinean government’s extraordinary decision to effectively nationalise the Porgera Gold Mine may open the door for the People’s Republic of China to step up its aggressive push to acquire mining interests in our closest neighbour.

The Porgera mine is in Enga province in PNG’s northern highlands, a region notorious for tribal fighting, illegal mining and general lawlessness. It is owned by the Porgera Joint Venture—a partnership between Barrick Gold and the China-based Zijin Mining Group—which is listed on the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges. The mine is operated by Barrick, which is headquartered in Canada and is the world’s largest gold producer.

The joint venture has been seeking a 20-year extension of its special mining lease and the PNG government has been sending mixed signals on the issue for many months.

But late last Friday, Prime Minister James Marape announced that the lease would not be renewed and ‘negotiations’ would be held with the joint venture with a view to the mine being transferred to the government.

Led by Barrick, the consortium has flatly refused to agree to the transfer and threatened to take legal action to secure the lease extension.

The PNG government’s decision will further erode investor confidence already damaged by an economy in crisis, a deteriorating fiscal situation and the earlier failure to reach agreements with proponents of the Papua LNG project and the Wafi-Golpu copper and gold project. Both were being negotiated when Marape was elected prime minister in May 2019.

It will also create a significant quandary for the country’s international supporters, notably the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and Australia, which have been urging the PNG government to focus on major investment in the resource sector to begin the daunting task of securing the nation’s economic and fiscal future.

There’s no doubt that the decision was driven by Marape’s policy of ‘economic nationalism’. He frequently talks about ‘taking PNG back’, though it’s not been clear exactly what that means.

The decision to nationalise the mine has also been driven by public pressure on Marape and his government. In recent years, domestic and international environmental and anti-mining groups have conducted a sustained social media campaign against Porgera and Barrick over the environmental and social impacts of the mine and claims of a heavy-handed approach by police and joint venture security staff.

Marape referred to these issues when justifying the refusal to renew the lease.

Social media is a powerful weapon in PNG. It helped bring down the last prime minister, Peter O’Neill, and it has started, albeit slowly, on Marape over political corruption and resource development and management issues. He has been criticised for not acting fast enough on promises he made before and after his election as prime minister.

The joint venture has operated in a difficult environment for years and hasn’t adequately addressed the aggressive social media campaign it has faced.

But it was entitled to believe, on the basis of initial statements from the new government and a court decision in its favour in August 2019, that its lease would be renewed, albeit with more demanding conditions.

However, anyone who has followed the many, and often confusing, statements from the prime minister and senior ministers over the past 11 months would have registered doubt that the lease would be renewed, and certainly not without higher revenue sharing, taxation and other imposts.

But the government’s refusal to further discuss a new lease, and its announcement that the state would take over the ownership and operation of the mine, have sent shock waves beyond PNG and alarmed existing mining, oil and gas operators, most of which have substantial Australian equity and management.

The big question now is who will actually run this giant mining operation.

PNG’s government could not run something this complex in such a politically and socially difficult part of the nation. That points to China as the likely operator and probably owner of the mine with the agreement of the PNG government.

Zijin Mining Group has links to the Chinese Communist Party and holds a 47.5% share in the joint venture along with Barrick. How it responds to the decision will be an important gauge.

China has been aggressively pursuing activity in the Highlands Region, which is home to 40% of PNG’s population and is rich in oil, gas, gold, silver and copper.

Acquiring a large gold and silver mine would unquestionably be attractive for China, and if that doesn’t happen then running it would be the next best thing. China is already the majority owner and operator of the Ramu Nickel Mine in Madang Province.

The Marape government’s attitude to Chinese ownership or management is hard to read. The O’Neill government’s pro-China policy in non-resource areas hasn’t been changed by Marape. There’s no doubt the PRC influence is strong, and growing.

How should Australia respond to this nationalisation exercise?

Even though there’s no Australian equity involvement in this joint venture, the negative impact on confidence in the mining, oil and gas sectors, in which there is massive Australian involvement, cannot be ignored.

If Australia is to continue to generously support PNG in its extremely difficult circumstances, we need to insist that investor confidence be secured, and not be smashed even further.

That will happen if this decision is not reversed.

One of the questions frequently asked about Australia’s closest neighbour, Papua New Guinea, is whether a military, or other, coup is possible.

Over the 40-plus years of my association with PNG, my view has been consistent—it is possible but fortunately highly unlikely.

There are two reasons why I have always been confident in this assessment.

First, the basics of PNG’s parliamentary democracy are reasonably secure and stable. PNG has a modern and generally relevant national constitution, a robustly independent judiciary, a generally free press (more recently joined by a growing social media presence and influence), and most important of all a vibrant national parliament—even with its many imperfections.

The second reason for my confidence is somewhat more complex, but nonetheless critical.

When PNG gained independence the founding leaders, such as Michael Somare and Julius Chan, showed great wisdom in ensuring that the newly raised PNG Defence Force established and maintained a ‘balance’ across the country’s administrative regions in the recruitment and training of personnel.

I had the privilege of mentoring the PNGDF’s first commander, Brigadier General Ted Diro, when he left the defence force and won a seat in parliament at the 1982 national elections. Maintaining the regional balance is something he discussed with me, and he regarded it as one of the most important achievements of his term as commander.

The balance was clearly designed to ensure that harmony and discipline within the fledgling force were maintained, and that young men and women from all parts of PNG could serve the nation in the defence force.

Even though it was largely unwritten, and not enshrined in the constitution adopted at independence, the policy was clearly designed to ensure that none of Papua New Guinea’s four regions (Highlands, Southern, Momase and Islands) could dominate numerically, even though historical factors did see officers from the Southern Region hold more senior positions in the period after independence.

Over the years since 1975, the leadership of the PNGDF was broadly shared by officers drawn from all regions, and care was exercised in the recruitment process to ensure proportionate representation.

There’s been no doubt in my mind since I first went to PNG in 1977 that the commitment to fair representation of all four regions in the recruitment and training process has been an important factor in ensuring the military has generally stayed out of politics and upheld its role as a disciplined force.

The defence force deserves considerable credit for its non-interference in PNG’s vibrant political process despite the fact that the military has been woefully underfunded by successive governments, resulting in limited recruitment until recently, inadequate pay and conditions (especially housing), and a lack of equipment.

There have been demonstrations, and worse, but given the inadequate attention the force has received that’s hardly surprising.

The one attempt at a ‘coup’, if it rates as such, was actually initiated by the then police commissioner, Paul Tohian, 30 years ago when the national government led by Rabbie Namaliu (whom I advised at the time and for many years after) negotiated a ceasefire with the Bougainville Revolutionary Army to enable the withdrawal of PNGDF personnel who had been sent to Bougainville when the rebellion broke out in 1989.

Tohian strongly opposed the ceasefire. He had overall responsibility for the disciplined forces— defence and police—during the state of emergency on Bougainville, but he was overruled by the national government.

The attempt lasted but a few hours and Tohian’s call to both defence and police personnel to join him in bringing down the government attracted almost no support either from the leadership or from the rank and file.

I was in Port Moresby at the time working on some key strategies for Namaliu. I regarded Tohian as a friend, having worked with him during the successful state of emergency to reduce crime in Port Moresby some years earlier. I was quickly briefed on the unfolding events and didn’t feel at all threatened as it became apparent that he was acting more out of frustration than anything else.

Now, however, there’s credible evidence that the crucial maintenance of balance in the PNGDF has been put at risk.

Social media is remarkably robust in PNG—not always accurate, but always forthright.

Newspaper The National reported that a PNGDF recruitment team was stood down after claims emerged on social media that of the 320 recruits currently undergoing training at Goldie Recruit Training Depot near Port Moresby, 253 are Highlanders, 37 are from Momase, 16 are from the Islands Region, and just 14 are from the Southern Region.

There’s rightly growing alarm at those numbers. It is absolutely contrary to the careful approach successive governments, and disciplined force leaders, have adopted since independence.

If not dealt with the very stability of the defence force will be at risk. The balance put in place at independence has served the national interest generally well.

A vibrant democracy in Papua New Guinea is not just vital for our closest neighbour as it deals with critical economic and social challenges. It is also clearly in Australia’s interests for democracy and stability among the almost 9 million Papua New Guineans who are our neighbours and friends to be encouraged in every way.

A PNGDF that doesn’t have the balance the country’s founding leaders insisted on is a potential long-term risk to the stability of the country and its democratic systems.