Tag Archive for: Pacific Islands

Editors’ picks for 2024: ‘A PNG view on recruitment for the ADF: yes, please’

Originally published on 12 August 2024.

Papua New Guineans should serve in the Australian Defence Force. As a Papua New Guinean, I believe this would instill Western values of democracy and freedom in our young people, who must be made to realise that these principles are under threat as China expands its influence in the region.

Australian military service would also provide employment for young people from PNG and other Pacific island countries, giving them real life skills.

As Australia considers the possibility of Pacific recruitment, it must understand that this would not just be a way to make up the ADF personnel shortfall. It would also help the countries from which service personnel were drawn, demonstrating good will towards the Pacific and going well beyond mere words in promoting their alignment with the West.

In general, the Pacific islands would prefer to align with Australia and the United States rather than China, but this view is predominantly held by older people, especially those who remember what they call the good times of the colonial era. In contrast, the younger people do not care greatly whether their countries are aligned to the West or not.

Service in the ADF would do more than bind many young people in PNG and other Pacific island countries to Australia. It would also teach them the moral values that come with military service, values that are lacking among far too many of them, especially in PNG. And they would take those values back home after completing their ADF service, to the gratification of their fellow citizens, not least their extended families.

Serving in the armed forces of a sturdily democratic country such as Australia would also reinforce democratic values that are fast eroding in the Pacific islands.

Terms of service for Pacific island people should require them to return home after, say, nine years in the ADF. If they later wanted to apply for Australian citizenship, they could be given preferential treatment, but only after at least five years serving in the armed forces of their home countries.

This should be an important feature of Pacific recruitment. Pacific defence and security forces are short on skills and suffer declining disciplinary and ethical standards. The infusion of ex-ADF people would address both problems. For the PNG Defence Force, the skills transfer would be particularly effective, because almost all its equipment has been donated by Australia.

If Pacific islanders did not shift from the ADF to their home countries’ forces, their skills would still benefit their countries in non-military employment.

In return for giving Pacific islands these benefits, Australia would gain from their labour availability. Pacific island countries, such as PNG, have economies that are not growing much but populations that have exploded, leaving many well educated young people unemployed.

The $600 million that Canberra plans to spend on establishing a team from PNG in the Australian Rugby League competition would be far better spent on ADF recruitment in the country. It would employ far more PNG people if it were. And rugby league does not teach life skills, whereas ADF service would provide that and other much deeper benefits.

Crucially, Pacific countries must be treated as equal partners in defence of democracy and freedom. It is not their politicians but their people who must realise that Western values that they enjoy, such as democracy and freedom of speech, are not guaranteed.

They must also be reassured that the Pacific islands are not merely a military buffer against a threat to Australia. Young Papua New Guineans, who have a better grasp of geopolitics than their parents, are increasingly of the view that PNG must not be treated as useful cannon fodder in a possible war. If they think that that is Australia’s attitude, any sense of loyalty or partnership will vanish.

They can see what China is doing to enlarge its influence and what the US is doing in response. In my experience, they are not clear about what Australia is doing, as distinct from what it is merely saying, to demonstrate commitment to the region.

In the spirit of equal partnership, the ADF should avoid creating a Pacific Regiment, one composed entirely of Pacific recruits, as that would give rise to criticisms of colonialism and second-class status. Instead, as recommended by former British Army officer Ross Thompson, it should follow the model that Britain uses for Fijian recruits: it should spread Pacific islanders across a range of units.

Australia needs to demonstrate its commitment to Pacific island countries. The best way it can do so is by giving Pacific islanders the benefits of service in the ADF.

Keeping Chinese embassies out: Taiwanese president’s tour of the Pacific

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s visit last week to three independent Pacific island states was more important than it looked. The visited countries have diplomatic relations with Taipei instead of Beijing, and it’s deeply in the interest of Taiwan and its friends to keep it that way, in part by such efforts as presidential visits.

Establishment of Chinese embassies in the three countries—The Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu—would follow any diplomatic switch. Those embassies would become official centres of power in counties that, being small, are highly vulnerable to influence. Also, Taiwan’s little allies amplify Taiwan’s voice in international forums from which China keeps it excluded.

One of the most important levers in Taiwan’s diplomatic toolkit is the presidential visit. Trips to the United States get most attention, and Lai did visit Hawaii and Guam, but the most valuable tool is visits to the few countries that recognise Taiwan diplomatically. These countries experience constant pressure from China to switch recognition. China can offer these countries tens of millions of dollars in foreign aid; Taiwan’s financial and political constraints limit it from making the same offers.

The three Pacific Island countries stick with Taiwan due to shared political and cultural values. Many states stuck with recognition of the government in Taiwan (formally, the Republic of China) out of opposition to the communist political system of the People’s Republic of China. In the Pacific, these ties are even stronger due to their shared Austronesian descent with Taiwanese indigenous people. These intangible values are often unseen in day-to-day governance. Taiwan needs to actively promote those values through people-to-people ties up to and especially at the presidential level.

Maintaining relations with Taiwan is also important for good governance and freedom in the Pacific island countries that recognise it. Recognising Taiwan prevents an official Chinese presence from moving in. While China can and does act through unofficial envoys, such as business leaders and gangsters, their ability to influence cannot be compared with the fortresses of official influence that China has erected across the Pacific. Upon establishing a diplomatic presence, China floods a host country with diplomats and other officials to further its interests.

Embassies are sources of not only licit but also illegal and malign Chinese influence. In a letter to domestic political leaders, a former president of the Federated States of Micronesia, David Panuelo, highlighted that China’s coercive political activity ran through the embassy. Examples included harassing calls from the ambassador, bribing of legislators and other broad efforts to undermine political institutions.

Moreover, the malign activity of Chinese embassies spreads beyond their host countries. Panuelo notes being followed by men stationed in the China’s embassy in Fiji while he was in Suva. In another instance, the Chinese embassy in Fiji published a video essay to discredit a report on China’s policing and organised crime activity in the country.

Beyond blocking the spread of China’s malign influence, Taiwan’s Pacific allies also give it a voice on the international stage, highlighting its achievements and advocating its presence in international organisations. In remarks at the 2024 UN General Assembly, Palau and the Marshall Islands both voiced support for Taiwan’s participation in the UN. At the COP28 climate talks last year, Palau and Paraguay, which also recognises Taiwan, spruiked Taiwan’s climate accomplishments and inclusion. Countries that recognise Taiwan also vocally support its accession to the World Health Organization, Interpol and other international institutions. This advocacy is particularly important in the Pacific Islands Forum where China has sought to revoke Taiwan’s dialogue partner status—Palau will host the forum leaders meeting in 2026.

Instability in Pacific politics? Yes, but it’s stable instability

Political instability in the Pacific isn’t significantly increasing. It just feels like it—with the recent dissolution of parliament in Vanuatu and motions of no confidence in Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Solomon Islands.

Although the past two years show a spike in leadership challenges, these are due to specific countries—Vanuatu in 2023 and PNG in 2024—and not widespread circumstances. A review of the political history of selected Pacific island countries since 2010 shows no distinct upward trend in the frequency of attempts to change government. Moreover, the reasons for the attempts have not changed significantly.

In other words, Pacific instability is more or less stable.

Pacific island governments are taking steps to try to reduce instability, but those measures are likely to take time to have much impact.

Since 2010, there have been at least 49 attempts to change or remove the prime minister in four Pacific island countries: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Tonga. Those countries aren’t the only ones in the region that have faced such challenges, but their high frequency of political turnover makes them most useful for analysis.

 

Note: Leadership challenges can result in various outcomes, including motions of no confidence that lead to votes of confidence, leadership resignation, motion withdrawals and dissolution of parliament through other means.

 

While no-confidence motions submitted by opposition members are most common, in each of these countries leadership challenges or changes can take place in other ways. Resignations can pre-empt votes for removal—as just happened in Tonga—and in Tonga and Vanuatu the king or president, respectively, can decide to dissolve the legislative assembly under the certain conditions.

More often than not, such attempts fail to achieve a change of leadership: only 11 attempts successfully toppled the prime minister or triggered a dissolution that ultimately resulted in a new leader in the 14 years for which we assembled data. Regardless, the motion itself often triggers a shake-up in ministerial roles to guarantee numbers and shore up coalitions. While that has less impact than a change in leadership, it can still impair the government’s effectiveness.

For example, in Vanuatu, which had the highest recorded number of leadership challenges, many motions were withdrawn once the opposition realised it didn’t have the numbers. But the motions continued to occupy sitting time or triggered a distracting extraordinary session of parliament.

In PNG, the government has previously adjourned parliament to avoid a no-confidence vote. In 2021, the hiatus lasted four months, meaning the government didn’t meet as often as it could have during the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2016 then prime minister Peter O’Neill adjourned parliament to avoid such a vote amid student protests against government corruption.

Even when things appear calm, leaders spend a lot of time and effort in keeping parliamentarians happy. Between 2016 and 2020, then Vanuatu prime minister Charlot Salwai survived a total of six no-confidence motions to become the first Vanuatu prime minister to last a full four-year term in more than 20 years. He was eventually charged with perjury at the end of his term for misinforming the public and the courts about his decision to appoint additional parliamentary secretaries to maintain stability. In 2021 Salwai received a suspended jail sentence of more than two years, which forced him out of his seat. Later that year, he received a presidential pardon, allowing him to again stand for public office.

In Solomon Islands, attempts to remove the prime minister have been less frequent than in some other Pacific nations, but no-confidence motions against provincial premiers occur more often. They aren’t limited to Malaita, where an ongoing battle over the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan versus Beijing has contributed to recent political instability, but also occur in other provinces.

It’s not unusual for foreign partnerships to feature in leadership challenges, but, in this dataset, partnerships with China, Taiwan, the US or Australia were mentioned only occasionally. Currently, it’s more common for geopolitics to be part of the conversation in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands.

In Vanuatu last year, those attempting to remove then prime minister Ishmael Kalsakau questioned whether deeper security engagements with the West that the government was considering would undermine Vanuatu’s proud non-aligned position.

In 2011, Solomon Islands prime minister Danny Philip resigned after his coalition disbanded, citing concerns over corrupt use of Taiwanese discretionary funding. Deepening relationships with China were a factor in political instability and riots in Honiara in 2006 and 2021, and Chinese businesses were targeted in the 2006 Nuku’alofa riots.

Historically, undesired closeness to foreign powers has been cited on occasion and has probably been a smaller or non-public factor in other attempts at changes of government. Most challenges come down to domestic power jostles and concerns over government mismanagement and corruption.

Many Pacific countries have sought to introduce legislation to reduce political instability within their systems, but the effect of such changes varies or is still emerging.

In 2010, Tonga introduced time constraints on votes of no confidence. Such motions may not be within 18 months after or six months before an election, nor 12 months after the last such motion. And yet, it has still seen at least one such motion per term.

In PNG, in addition to grace periods of 18 months after an election and 12 months before one, no-confidence motions require the approval of the Private Business Committee of parliament, which decides whether a motion should proceed to a parliamentary vote. However, motions rebuffed by the committee are repeatedly resubmitted, as in 2015 and 2016, when four motions against Peter O’Neill were moved before the final one failed. The PNG government had also attempted to extend the grace period to 30 months, as well as to triple the notice period for motions to 21 days in 2012 and 2013, but the Supreme Court overruled those constitutional amendments in 2015.

Vanuatu has also pursued greater political stability. It held its first referendum since independence with the aim of reducing political instability by forcing independents to affiliate with a party and ruling that members would have their seat vacated if they were expelled from their party. Unfortunately, the resulting laws were not gazetted by the government before the dissolution occurred. Even if they had been, it would have taken time for such changes to have any effect.

In looking at all this, Australia shouldn’t be one to judge. Since 2010, Australian prime ministers have faced eight leadership challenges, four of which were successful. Those challenges also led to process changes at the party level, which at the very least have reduced challenges to the prime minister in recent years. In time, we may see the Pacific’s changes having a similar effect.

China’s strategic shift to ‘small but beautiful’ projects

Amid an economic downturn and intensifying competition in the Pacific, China is refining its foreign investment strategy, increasingly starting projects it calls ‘small but beautiful’.

Although modest in scale, they can quietly build influence and can catch foreign policymakers off guard. With this shift, China can foster economic growth and deepen geopolitical ties across the Pacific region.

The phrase ‘small but beautiful’ (‘xiao er mei’) has become prominent in Chinese business, emphasising the value of customised, flexible, focused and efficient products.

On 19 November 2021, at the Third Symposium on the Construction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi Jinping used the phrase to describe foreign cooperation projects for which he wanted prioritisation. In October 2023, he re-emphasised the point as a key action for China to support high-quality BRI construction projects, undertaken jointly with the governments of the investment-destination countries.

To this end, Beijing has tightened capital controls and investment regulations amid growing concerns over investment risk, political instability, corruption and project quality. The average scale of projects has declined.

Applying the small-but-beautiful idea to BRI projects reflects Xi’s evolving strategic approach to enhancing cooperation and mutual understanding with other countries. Big BRI projects in the Pacific have been promoted as efforts to enhance sustainability and improve lives, but they have been tainted by corruption, suffered from defaults by debtors in the target countries and provoked foreign wariness of China’s intentions.

Xi clearly hopes shifting the focus to smaller and better targeted projects will improve foreign public sentiment towards China.

In May 2022, China reaffirmed its commitment to enhancing comprehensive strategic partnerships in the Pacific island countries. Since then, projects have included promoting planting and using juncao, a kind of economically productive grass, and proposals to offer 2500 scholarships for government officials and training in human resources for 3000 people from Pacific island countries from 2020 to 2025. This has been intended to demonstrate dedication to the region’s development.

Some small but beautiful projects have been technology transfers, which have attracted little attention. Sharing the knowhow for using juncao has been an example. Since February 2024, there’s been notable activity at the China-Pacific Island Countries Juncao Technology Demonstration Center in Fiji. The chairman of the China International Development Cooperation Agency, Luo Zhaohui, surveyed the centre and spoke highly of its contribution to promoting friendly China–Fiji cooperation and future expansion into the South Pacific region.

In March 2024, 34 representatives from across the Pacific region attended a one-week course to learn how to use juncao. Some participants expressed gratitude towards China for helping their communities.

China has set up Luban Workshops in Asia, Europe and Africa. These offer vocational education programs to cultivate locally sourced technical personnel trained in operating Chinese technology and equipment, and match Chinese companies with skilled labour.

The training programs also help to improve perceptions of China among attendees. For example, teachers, students and alumni of Luban Workshops held in Indonesia, Ethiopia and South Africa have expressed gratitude towards China and dismissed criticism of Beijing’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and its treatment of Uyghur Muslims.

Building on this success, China may seek to expand its Luban Workshop network and range of small but beautiful project offerings in the Pacific to gain influence. China’s public messaging will no doubt prioritise the merits of sustainable development for local communities while subtly strengthening its presence and sway. These seemingly modest initiatives may be easy to overlook, but they are an important element of China’s strategy to increase its standing in the Pacific.

Climate security is an opportunity in Australia’s regional strategy

From Pacific leaders to regional intelligence analysts, climate change is consistently identified as the foremost security issue for the Pacific island region. Yet Australia’s current defence and intelligence approach to regional engagement, focused mainly on traditional defence, fails to adequately address this existential concern, leaving a gap in its strategy.

Greater integration of climate security issues into Australia’s defence and intelligence establishments, drawing inspiration from the United States’ approach, could improve Australia’s Pacific reputation. It would demonstrate that Australia takes the threat of climate change seriously and streamline regional mitigation, adaptation and preparedness efforts. With growing geopolitical competition in the region and the likely US retreat from climate-security leadership, this has never been of greater strategic importance.

Australia’s National Defence Strategy is clear that deepening Pacific relationships is key to our strategy of deterrence by denial. We seek to build and maintain these relationships mainly through traditional security arrangements, particularly by delivering what the strategy calls a ‘comprehensive package’ of maritime security infrastructure, equipment and training.

However, this approach doesn’t seem to be greatly enhancing our strategic influence in the Pacific. This should come as no surprise, as the strategy fails to account for the full breadth of security priorities and threat perceptions of its subject countries.

Since the early 1990s, Pacific island leaders have made it clear that climate change is their greatest security challenge. As the high commissioner of the Solomon Islands to Australia said in 2020, ‘climate change, not Covid-19, not even China, is the biggest threat to our security’—a threat, and plea for action, that Australia is perceived to have largely ignored.

Australia remains one of the largest greenhouse gas emitters per capita. Considering this—along with sentiments such as Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr’s statement that world leaders who remain inactive on climate issues ‘may as well bomb’ Pacific nations—how can Australia expect to be the Pacific’s partner of choice?

In contrast, the US has been a global leader when it comes to matters of climate security. It was an early advocate and placed climate change ‘at the heart’ of its national security. With the recent US Framework for Climate Resilience and Security, the 2022 National Security Strategy and the 2021 National Intelligence Estimate, the US’s defense and intelligence community leads the way in monitoring, analysing and assessing climate security threats. This information is crucial to streamlining mitigation and adaptation policies, identifying priority areas of investment and ensuring adequate preparedness not only domestically, but for partners across the globe.

Climate security leadership gave the US a significant and under-recognised advantage in the Pacific: it demonstrated its commitment to, unity with, and genuine respect for the people of the region and advanced the US’s status as the preferred partner.

But with an incoming president who has previously called climate change a hoax, US climate security leadership is likely at its end.

With China’s domination in almost every aspect of the renewable energy transition likely to win Beijing favour throughout the Pacific, climate security is an emerging gap in the West’s regional strategy.

If Australia wants to maintain regional strategic balance, it must urgently step up and lead in the climate security space. Leaving this area uncontested risks further compromising Australia’s regional influence, ceding the upper hand to other players in the region.

Australia’s capacity to engage with matters of climate security is much smaller than that of the US, so identifying and acting upon leverage points will be necessary. Australia should adopt a climate security strategy based on what has been the US strategy—one that considers how Australia’s National Intelligence Community can best be mobilised to monitor and assess climate security threats.

To facilitate this process, Australia should establish a climate intelligence working group.

This group should be a partnership between relevant scientific and intelligence agencies, similar to the United States Climate Security Advisory Council. It should identify and advise the government on priority areas of focus, which should be resourced and supported accordingly. Group output may, for example, include an annual net assessment, from which public and partner products could be produced.

This enhanced incorporation of climate security issues into our defence and intelligence establishments will demonstrate the seriousness with which Australia considers climate security threats. By affirming our commitment to and partnership with Pacific island nations in overcoming these threats, Australia may garner substantial favour throughout the region.

Furthermore, Australian leadership in this space would highlight Pacific islanders’ calls for urgent global climate action. As stated by Whipps, ‘the hardest challenge, I think, is sometimes you get drowned out—people denying that it actually is happening ….’

Australia can ensure that our neighbours’ voices are amplified, not drowned out.

If we want to persist with our current strategy, rather than adopt one that relies less on our Pacific partners, it’s time to take climate security seriously.

As former Samoan prime minister Tuila’epa Sa’ilele Malielegaoi said, ‘We all know the problem, the solutions. All that is left would be some courage to tell people there is certainty of disaster.’

Conflicting interests and geopolitical competition in Pacific deep sea mining

Deep sea mining is emerging as a new frontier of resource extraction. A race is underway for underwater resources with important economic, environmental and geopolitical implications.

For Pacific island countries, deep sea mining offers economic opportunities and international leverage but risks severe ecological damage. It could reshape regional alliances and traditional power dynamics as China advances its activities to secure critical minerals and bolster its influence. The US faces challenges in maintaining stability and countering Beijing’s influence.

In the Pacific Ocean there are vast reserves of critical minerals, such as cobalt, nickel and other rare earth elements, that raise national security concerns due to their technological uses. For example, these minerals have applications in such renewable technologies as electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines, and in defence technologies such as missiles, aerospace parts, magnetic systems and radar. Competition for critical resources complicates American and Chinese tussles for influence in the Pacific and regional and global concerns about energy transitions and environmental degradation.

With rich deposits of minerals in their exclusive economic zones, deep sea mining promises Pacific islands wealth, enhanced international status and leverage—for example, through influence in negotiations or economic bargaining power. Experts have determined that the value of seabed minerals could reach up to US$20 trillion.

However, the potential economic benefit must be weighed against ecological damage and natural resource depletion. Studies have shown that the disruption of deep-sea ecosystems, whether on abyssal plains or hydrothermal vents, could harm deep ocean biodiversity and affect fisheries, such as tuna stocks, that local communities rely on for food and income. Also, sediment plumes and waste from mining activities could diminish water quality, posing risks to tourism, a vital economic sector for many island nations.

Deep sea mining is dividing the region and may impede cooperation. Nauru and Tonga have each granted exploration licenses to subsidiaries of The Metals Company, a Canadian company that specialises in deep sea mining exploration. Kiribati’s state minerals exploration company has an agreement to sell deep-water tenements to The Metals Company.

Cook Islands is moving cautiously, still looking at the feasibility of deep sea mining. And the Melanesian Spearhead Group, which includes Fiji, PNG, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, has instituted a moratorium on it. Its members worry about environmental degradation and damage to marine ecosystems, which are at the heart of their cultural identity and livelihoods.

The International Seabed Authority is the multinational organisation responsible for creating a regulatory framework and overseeing deep sea mining. Other stakeholders, including Pacific governments, mining corporations and environmental advocacy groups also play roles in shaping the region’s approach to deep sea mining.

China has positioned itself as a leader in deep sea mining for access to resources and to gain favour with Pacific island states. Beijing’s strategic engagements with Tonga and Nauru on infrastructure investments and financial aid, and with Kiribati on fisheries and maritime domain access, reflect China’s efforts to expand its Belt and Road Initiative into the Pacific to develop economic dependence. Increased influence would allow China to shape international seabed mining regulations, secure and dominate access to minerals necessary for green energy technologies and defence systems, control strategic maritime routes and potentially establish a military presence in the region.

From a US perspective, China’s activities in the Pacific threaten its regional influence. Its growing presence has implications for US interests and military operations. The US needs to monitor China’s activities and develop strategies to counterbalance Beijing’s influence and reassess its own approach to deep sea mining to maintain competitiveness and sustainability.

Developing precautionary deep sea mining policies would allow the US to lead responsibly and in doing so strengthen Pacific partnerships. Through collaboration that balances economic opportunities with environmental responsibilities, the US and the Pacific islands can align policies and mutual interests, fostering relationships built on mutual respect. This strategy would not only ensure that resource extraction supports long-term regional stability, environmental preservation and partnerships, but would counter Beijing’s influence.

Hardly an inducement: tourism from China gets up Palau’s nose

China might want to think again about its use of tourism as a means of influencing Palau. The people of the little Western Pacific country believe they’d be better off without swarms of tourists from China on their islands, causing environmental damage and spending their money mostly with Chinese businesses.

Other ill-effects include upward pressure on prices and the locking up of land in China-linked real estate investments, Palauan officials and people involved in tourism said in interviews.

In a leaked letter this year, the president of the country of 18,000 people, Surangel Whipps Jr, told an unidentified US senator that China had offered to ‘fill every hotel room’ and build as many more as Palau wanted.

To Palauans, that sounds more like a threat than a promise. A senior official sums up the general assessment of tourism from China: ‘The negative impacts [are] more than the value of the tourism itself.’

China has already put Palau through a cycle of what it thought was economic inducement and punishment. Last decade, it ramped up tourism numbers to the country but then knocked them down again by revoking Palau’s status as an approved destination, punishing it for continued diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Arrivals from China peaked at 90,000 in 2015 and slumped to 28,000 in 2019, before the Covid-19 pandemic crushed tourism globally.

Now tourism from China is rising again: 8000 visitors from the country arrived in the five months to May.

There is a sense in Palau that it is just the beginning of resurgence. Businesses and investors connected with China have begun refurbishing Chinese restaurants and hotels in anticipation of a new surge in visitors. In what looked like a deliberate reminder of China’s economic importance ahead of Palauan general elections on 5 November, direct flights from Hong Kong resumed just five weeks ago.

When Americans, Australians and people from most other countries travel to Palau, they stay in Palauan-owned hotels, eat at Palauan restaurants, hire Palauan tour guides and contribute to the Palauan economy.

When tourists from China come, ‘they have these charter flights coming in, where a Chinese company owns a hotel in Palau, owns a tour company in Palau, owns the airplane that’s bringing them into Palau, so all this money that is being made from these tours is not trickling down to the local economy,’ says a former Palauan tour guide who, like other people interviewed for this report, asked not to be named.

One of the interviewees adds, ‘Chinese tour companies bought out entire hotels,’ leading managers to cancel reservations for other tourists. That ‘destroyed the market overnight’ for tourism from elsewhere.

This person also says that when tourists began arriving last decade, Chinese companies began acquiring long leases on prime real estate. (Foreigners can’t buy land outright.)

The senior Palauan official says, ‘One of their methods is they’ll lease property for 99 years and they don’t do anything to it, so they’re basically stalling development for Palau. That’s one of their tactics’ to gain economic and political influence. The result is diminished opportunity for locals to build businesses on suitable land.

Palauans have seen tourism drive inflation and expect that a renewed surge in arrivals from China will do the same again. ‘This kind of mass tourism will tend to push up the price of mass produce and local resources…,’ says the senior official. The price of giant coconut crabs, for example, was US$7 per pound before last decade’s tourism surge, the official says. Now it is US$60 per pound.

While tourists from any country will always include some who care little for protecting the natural environment, Palauans have found that the problem is unusually serious with groups from China.

The former tour guide recalls damage that tourists from China caused to one beautiful attraction, Jellyfish Lake. Some stole protected jellyfish from the lake to eat in their hotel rooms, using drawers as cutting boards. Hotels were forced to replace furniture and remove utensils that could be used for cooking.

Palauans often hear of tourists from China stealing animals from native habitats and bribing guides to look the other way. One interviewee describes instances of people from China taking giant clams for consumption directly from a reef. Another says tourists paid fishermen to bring them turtles, clams, shark fins and even dugongs, all of which are protected.

Then there’s infrastructure and business disruption. During the initial surge ‘they [came] in such big numbers, it overwhelms our sewer systems,’ the former tour guide said. ‘It overwhelms our stores. It overwhelms our tour services.’

Palau’s government has been trying hard to diversify tourism sources. Two weeks ago, Palau signed a deal with Japan for direct flights from Tokyo in 2025. Three days later, Australian airline Qantas agreed to take over direct flights from Brisbane from Air Nauru, aiming to increase frequency.

Palau’s people will welcome that.

Beijing has presumably imagined they would instead welcome another wave of tourism from China. But the behaviour of many of its tourists, the disruption caused by their arrival surges, and the cornering of their spending by operators and hotels connected to China—all these have only helped to galvanise Palauans against Beijing.

Don’t give a free pass to Beijing for its aggressive behaviour

The whole point of the post-World War II system of international rules and norms was that large countries, great powers, could not just do whatever they wanted.

The post-War order is meant to provide a check on the untrammelled power of the powerful, whether through military invasions or more subtle ways of bending the will of other countries—methods such as interference, coercion and malicious cyber intrusions.

Yet when asked recently how Australia would address China’s influence in the Pacific, Foreign Minister Penny Wong said, ‘China’s doing what great powers do, and great powers try to lift their influence and expand their influence in the region that they wish.’

To be sure, foreign policy is tough. Every country in the region and many beyond it are trying to navigate this most tricky of relationships—a great power flexing its muscle aggressively but with whom we are all deeply economically entwined. Yet that does not mean we should minimise or excuse China’s behaviour when it bulldozes rules and norms so carefully established to maintain stability and security.

This is not a case of picking one’s battles. China is waging its hybrid warfare on all fronts and setting precedents through our silence—Beijing’s overreaction to a statement on human rights by an Australian official in the UN in the past fortnight shows that Beijing hasn’t budged an inch in the past two years.

It is a calculated strategy to make Australia pull any punches at a higher level on something like human rights abuses in Xinjiang. This isn’t stabilisation—it’s Beijing saying that Australia will toe the line or else.

By limiting all but the most unavoidable criticisms of China to statements delivered by officials rather than ministers, Australia has been offering Beijing a compromise. Instead of taking that as a win, China continues to bite back hard. Fortunately this should serve only to highlight that no such compromises should be made.

The type of influence China exercises is not something we can accept as simply ‘what great powers do’. It launched a cyber attack on the Pacific Islands Forum, spreads online disinformation in the Pacific to undermine democracies and weaken Pacific partnerships, sought security agreements that lack public transparency, and undertaken various other malicious activities—such as hybrid and grey zone operations.

And that’s just in the Pacific—China is carrying out this malicious activity globally, not to mention being the main supporter enabling Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Of course, other significant powers seek influence, but responsible nations don’t behave like this. The United States for instance, as the longstanding international superpower, has built enormous global influence. But—notwithstanding its share of mistakes—it has done so overwhelmingly by cultivating alliances and genuine partnerships based on shared values and a common desire to improve conditions in the world and to the benefit of the citizens of their partner nations.

Think about it: the US has dozens of genuine friends around the world. China doesn’t have friends; it has subordinates, captive debtors, vassals.

We should remember that the trend in international politics has been to curb the kind of crass and predatory political behaviour we see from Beijing. Until about a century back, colonialism and conquests of other states were considered normal. But ideas of what constitutes acceptable international behaviour have changed dramatically, as seen through the development of international institutions, laws and norms. They don’t always work, but the international community should strive to do better, not revert to letting great powers engage in behaviour reminiscent of an earlier age.

The climate of peace and commerce that has resulted from multinational cooperation has benefited few countries as much as China with its stellar growth over recent decades. There have been continuous efforts in recent times by Indo-Pacific powers to strengthen the rules-based order and prevent it from eroding, including through the use of international law to adjudicate disputes, as the Philippines did in 2016 when it used international arbitration to resolve its dispute with China—which Beijing went on to ignore.

China’s behaviour has been completely at odds to this trend. Its worldview is based on dividing the international community into big and small powers—in which small powers should know their place in the international hierarchy. This world view does not permit peaceful settlement of disputes. Instead, the strong push their way through. Such a view should be opposed and called out, not rationalised.

Wong went on to say that the Pacific is now the field for a ‘permanent contest’. That much is true, but we cannot regard it through a false equivalence. The work that Australia does as a partner of choice, and the support we get from friends including the US, are worlds apart from the malign influence that China seeks to wield.

It is possible that at some stage, China will become so strong, and the relative balance of power so skewed, that others will not be able to push back. At that stage, countries in the region would have to find some other modus vivendi with China. But as long as they are able to, it is perfectly natural for them to push back.

Indeed, what would be unnatural would be for countries in the region to simply throw up their hands and accept Chinese hegemony. In international politics, aggressive behaviour must be countered, not explained away.

China’s missile test demonstrates disrespect for Pacific

China’s launch of a missile with a dummy warhead across the Pacific on 25 September and responses from Beijing and Paris reveal a lack of respect for Pacific island countries.

Not only did China demonstrate its disconnect from the Pacific in an unnecessary show of military force; it reminded others that even in the Pacific, it does not prioritise relationships with Pacific island countries.

The missile launched from China travelled nearly 12,000km, passing close to or over Pacific island countries and landing 700km from French Polynesia, a semi-autonomous overseas territory of France.

China notified Australia, France, New Zealand and the US of the impending launch. This selective view of powers in the Pacific reveals China’s show of force to have been a blunt message intended for Western audiences, as if they were the only ones that mattered. China ignored the Pacific islands the missile overflew or came close to and maybe didn’t even think of the message they could receive, that they could be potential targets.

Despite China’s enthusiastic investments in Pacific island countries, it clearly does not prioritise its relationships with them and its interests don’t align with those of the region.

France also should consider whether it could do better. Despite being notified by China, Paris apparently failed to pass the information on to French Polynesian leaders and later gave no clear statement of its position on the launch. Instead, France’s high commissioner in French Polynesia, Eric Spitz, downplayed the significance of the launch, noting that the payload had been inert and had fallen in international waters and that China had given France notice. Only ‘if they see it fit, at an appropriate time, would French authorities make their position known on this launch’, Spitz added.

In contrast, the president of French Polynesia, Moetai Brotherson, expressed ‘disappointment on the fact that we had not been informed about this launch’. It is a double disappointment for French Polynesian leaders. They are right to expect clear communication from Paris, and they should have the full backing of Paris when they need to speak out. Brotherson says he will seek clarification from the high commission and French President Emmanuel Macron and personally express his concerns to the local Chinese delegation.

Only on 18 October did Spitz express his regret that Papeete was not informed, but he reaffirmed his position that ‘China respected international law’. Spitz’s apparent consistent lack of concern is in stark contrast to Brotherson’s position. Paris should not speak for Papeete, but it should show support for the latter’s concerns.

Those who did publicly criticise the test included Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand and Palau. Kiribati’s response was a reminder of Pacific priorities and partnerships. Kiribati President Taneti Maamau, sometimes characterised in media reporting as China’s Pacific ally, was clear on his stance against the launch in a statement published by his office. The presidential office took issue with not getting notice of the test. The statement also highlighted that Kiribati’s position against weapon testing is the same ‘at the regional and international stage and it is the same at the bilateral level’.

That is to say that Kiribati does not take sides. Rather, Kiribati’s priority is Kiribati, and its leaders and government will speak out when partners act against its interests. Simplistic views of Kiribati’s foreign relations will only make it more sceptical of those claiming to be its partners.

In response, the Chinese embassy in Kiribati dismissed notification as unnecessary, as the test ‘was not meant to target Kiribati or any other country in the Pacific’. To believe this requires intentionally forgetting that Australia, France, New Zealand and the US were warned. In taking this attitude, China failed to recognise that its actions were unwelcome or to concretely respond to Kiribati’s complaints.

The failure to effectively engage with repeated messages from Pacific island countries about the test is a further sign of China’s deprioritisation of Pacific island countries themselves in its approach to the Pacific region. Rather than engage with them, China acts as if it expects them to unquestioningly accommodate its interests and behaviour.

Fijian Minister of Home Affairs Pio Tikoduadua explicitly mentioned the issue of respect. ‘If countries of the world want respect, then you know, we should be giving respect first,’ he said.

It may have been a message for China, but it is one that other powers in the Pacific should take note of.

How giant China looms over tiny Palau’s economy

Palau is finding itself increasingly entangled in China’s economic web—in many cases, it seems, because Beijing is controlling investment and business links with the strategically critical Pacific nation of 18,000 people.

Beijing is using tactics such as creating dominance in tourism, making empty investments in real estate, bribing local politicians and sending Chinese organised crime to Palau. Its economic influence becomes political influence as local leaders consider local jobs, incomes and infrastructures when making decisions.

It’s no exaggeration to say that the scale of China’s involvement in the Palauan economy poses a challenge to the sovereignty of this US-aligned country.

Tourism dominance

Over the past two decades, Palau grew increasingly dependent on Chinese tourism, only to suffer heavy repercussions when Beijing withdrew that business.

In 2008, Palau received 634 Chinese tourists, less than 1 percent of all visitors. By 2015, the number had skyrocketed to 91,000, or 54 percent.

But, in response to Palau’s continued recognition of Taiwan, China banned state-backed package tours to the country in 2017, and the COVID-19 pandemic further upended the tourism industry. Because 40 percent of Palau’s gross domestic product comes from tourism, the disruptions seriously affected the economy. To compensate for lost business, Palau has had to campaign for direct flights and visitors from elsewhere.

Most recently, China issued a travel warning for Palau, citing concerns over ‘frequent safety cases’. The action looks like retaliation for Palauan accusations of China being behind a March cyberattack on the country’s financial systems.

Since China issued the warning, the number of Chinese tourists coming to Palau has plummeted to barely 25 percent of all visitors. While it is still too early to predict how this will affect Palau’s economy in the long run, China is likely sending a strong signal that acting against its interests will be neither unnoticed nor without consequence.

Buying up land

Investment in Palauan real estate from China has increased since the early 2000s. An increasing number of Chinese nationals or businesses have bought leases for buildings and land of 50 to 99 years. They include businesspeople linked to the Chinese Communist Party. In many cases, no land development has followed the purchase of these leases, with many properties having been abandoned entirely. Lessees’ intentions remain unclear, but by locking up valuable land in long leases, these individuals hold substantial control over economic development on the island. If Chinese investment continues to grow at an unchecked rate, then businesspeople and officials from China will likely have leverage over Palauan economic decision making.

Some investors appear to be advertising in China to sell Palauan land. In 2017, a Chinese website advertised available housing in Palau, promising returns up to 20 percent.

A Chinese law reportedly allows any land owned or leased by a Chinese national to be used for intelligence purposes, so Chinese nationals’ ownership of properties presents special opportunities for Beijing. That would challenge US military goals in the region.

Monetary inducements

Bribery is also part of China’s efforts at gaining sway in Palau. China appears to be using criminals to gain influence over Palauan officials and politicians.

In a well-publicised letter to an undisclosed US senator in February, President Surangel Whipps personally expressed concern over China’s inducements aimed at Palau generally. He described how China had promised economic benefits to Palau in exchange for severing ties with Taiwan, including hotel investments, increased tourist numbers and provision of US$20 million per year for a call center in Palau.

Crime by Chinese nationals

Since 2019, Palau has experienced a large increase in Chinese organised crime and drug trafficking, with illegal gambling surging in popularity.

On New Year’s Eve in 2019, 165 people, mostly Chinese nationals, were arrested in as such activities were shut down. By June 2020, four more illegal gambling operations were shut down. There are still several suspected illegal gambling operations in the country, most staffed by Chinese nationals. Authorities have determined the organisations’ leaders to most likely be tied to Chinese crime syndicates, such as the 14K triad based in Macau.

Similarly, methamphetamine trafficking from China and the Philippines to Palau has increased exponentially over the past two decades. Contributing factors include the extreme smallness of Palau’s Narcotics Enforcement Agency, made up of merely eight people. Also, corruption among law enforcement officials allows for intercepted meth packages to go uninvestigated while drugs that aren’t linked to syndicates, such as cannabis, get busted.

As Palau grapples with the economic fallout from reduced Chinese tourism, rising corruption and escalating Chinese national linked organised crime, its sovereignty hangs in the balance. Especially as it nears its November 2024 presidential elections, the US must recognize and address these vulnerabilities to reinforce its commitment to Palau, as failure to do so could result in a significant shift in the region’s geopolitical alignment.