Tag Archive for: Nuclear Submarines

Australia’s plan for acquiring nuclear-powered submarines is on track

Since the announcement in September 2021 that Australia intended to acquire nuclear-powered submarines in partnership with Britain and the United States, the plan has received significant media attention, scepticism and criticism.

There are four major risks to the AUKUS national enterprise: the political will of all partners; delivery schedule; the cost of acquiring and sustaining the capability (including its impact on Australia’s broader Defence budget); and workforce challenges, both for uniformed personnel and within the submarine-building industry.

While these risks remain significant, the progress so far demonstrates a commitment to proactive mitigation. On the political front, the partnership demands considerable backing from Britain, the US and Australia amid global upheaval.

Yet despite changes in government across all three nations since AUKUS was first announced, the initiative has retained bipartisan support, a point reinforced by the US Congress supporting it through the passing of the National Defence Authorisation Act in December 2023, including the sale of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia.

The political will was further reinforced by the agreement of all three partners on the optimal pathway for Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines within 18 months of its announcement and the signing of the trilateral AUKUS treaty in August last year, which came into effect in January.

Although the treaty was finalised before US President Donald Trump’s election, the new US administration has since shown strong support, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio calling AUKUS ‘something that I think you’re going to find very strong support for in this administration’ and a ‘blueprint’ for co-operation.

The new US secretary of defense stated in February that ‘the president is very aware, supportive of AUKUS, recognises the importance of the defence industrial base’.

Regarding the cost risk, while it is undeniably substantial, it is not orders of magnitude higher than the ill-fated conventional Attack-class submarine project. Senate estimates from October 2021 put that project’s acquisition and sustainment costs at almost $235 billion through to 2080.

In last year’s budget, the Australian government included money in the Defence allocation to cover the expected costs of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines over the next decade. While the overall defence budget remains a significant concern, this measure has been an important step in mitigating the cost risks of AUKUS.

Australia has been steadily increasing nuclear-submariner training in the US and Britain, and since mid-2024, shipbuilders from South Australia and Western Australia have been training on nuclear-powered submarines in Hawaii.

Whether these measures will prove sufficient remains to be seen, but it is a promising start.

Schedule risks remain a key concern, particularly for the phase two sale of three Virginia-class submarines set to begin in 2032. The Collins-class vessels are already beyond their intended service life, meaning the entire plan hinges on the Virginias arriving on time—or at least only slightly delayed.

The 2023 National Defence Authorisation Act, which lies at the heart of Malcolm Turnbull’s concerns, mandates that in 2031—270 days before the sale of the first Virginia-class submarine—the US president certifies that certain conditions are met. Notably, the transfer of the submarines will not degrade US undersea capabilities.

As Turnbull correctly notes, the US submarine industrial base is already struggling to meet its planned production rate of two Virginia-class submarines per year and is unlikely to reach its goal of 66 attack submarines by 2054.

However, this does not mean that the US president in 2031 would seek to undermine Australia’s submarine program by refusing to sell three submarines. Undersea warfare effectiveness hinges on more than raw submarine numbers; it depends on having the right submarines in the right place at the right time.

This is where access to Australia’s western naval base, HMAS Stirling—and the maintenance facilities it will provide for US nuclear submarines—becomes crucial. It will help ensure US submarines can be deployed effectively when and where they are needed.

Australia’s broader contributions, including the continued support of the Harold E. Holt Communications Station north of Exmouth, further bolster US undersea warfare capabilities by facilitating secure communications with nuclear-powered submarines in the region.

It is imperative for Australia to make clear to the US just how vital submarines are to our national security, and to emphasise that the extensive support we provide, including access to Australia’s strategically important geography, is part of the deal. This is especially important given the more transactional nature of the current US administration and alliance framework.

In response to Turnbull’s call for an ‘urgent assessment’, the answer is that Australia’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines remains on track.

Yes, it carries significant risks—as any major national endeavour does—but the challenges have been identified, and mitigation measures are in place. The progress made over the last three and a half years is substantial. Rather than repeatedly reassessing the program, we should concentrate our political and intellectual capital on ensuring it stays the course.

Virginia, we have a problem

Australia’s plan to acquire Virginia-class submarines from the United State is looking increasingly improbable. The US building program is slipping too badly.

This heightens the need for Australia to begin looking at other options, including acquiring Suffren-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) from France.

The Covid-19 pandemic dramatically disrupted work at the two shipyards that build Virginias, General Dynamics Electric Boat at Groton, Connecticut, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ yard at Newport News, Virginia. It badly hindered output at many companies in the supply chain, too. With too few workers, the industry has built up a backlog, and yards are filling with incomplete submarines.

Within six years, the US must decide whether to proceed with sale of the first of at least three and possibly five Virginias to Australia, a boat that will be transferred from the US Navy’s fleet.

Nine months before the transfer goes ahead, the president of the day must certify that it will not diminish USN undersea capability. This certification is unlikely if the industry has not by then cleared its backlog and achieved a production rate of 2.3 a year—the long-term building rate of two a year for the USN plus about one every three years to cover Australia’s requirement.

The chance of meeting that condition is vanishingly small.

The situation in the shipyards is stark. The industry laid down only one SSN in 2021. It delivered none from April 2020 to May 2022. The USN has requested funding for only one Virginia in fiscal year 2025, breaking the two-a-year drumbeat, ‘due to limits on Navy’s budget topline and the growing Virginia class production backlog’.

As of January 2025, five of 10 Block IV Virginias ordered are in the yards, as are five of 12 Block Vs for which acquisition has been announced. (Work has not begun on the other seven Block Vs.)

The building time from laying down until delivery has increased from between 3 and 3.5 years before the pandemic to more than 5 years. The tempo is still slowing: the next Virginia, USS Iowa, is due to be delivered on 5 April 2025, 5.8 years after it was laid down.

On the original, pre-pandemic schedule, all the Block IVs could probably have been delivered to the USN by now. This is a gap that cannot be recovered in a few years, despite all the expensive manpower training and retention programs in hand.

Exacerbating the problem for the yards, the Block V submarines are 30 percent larger, and more complex to build, making a return to shorter build times unlikely.  Speaking to their shareholders in October, the chief executives of Huntington Ingalls and General Dynamics blamed their slowing delivery tempo on supply chain and workforce issues.  HII says it is renegotiating contracts for 17 Block IV and Block V Virginias.

Furthermore, Electric Boat has diverted its most experienced workers to avoid further slippage in building the first two ballistic missile submarines of the Columbia class, the USN’s highest priority shipbuilding program, in which the Newport News yard also participates.

It gets worse. Many USN SSNs that have joined the US fleet over the past few decades are unavailable for service, awaiting maintenance. The pandemic similarly disrupted shipyards that maintain the SSNs of the Los Angeles and Virginia classes. In September 2022, 18 of the 50 SSNs in commission were awaiting maintenance. The Congressional Budget Office reports lack of spending on spare parts is also forcing cannibalisation and impacting the availability of Virginia class SSNs.

Australia’s SSN plan must worsen the US’s challenge in recovering from this situation, adding to the congestion in shipyards and further over loading supply chains already struggling to deliver SSNs to the USN.

A US decision not to sell SSNs to Australia is inevitable, and on current planning we will have no stopgap to cover withdrawal of our six diesel submarines of the Collins class, the oldest of which has already served for 28 years.

In the end, Australia’s unwise reliance on the US will have weakened the combined capability of the alliance. And Australia’s independent capacity for deterrence will be weakened, too.

As I wrote in December, it is time to look for another solution. One is ordering SSNs of the French Suffren class.  The design is in production, with three of six planned boats delivered.  It is optimised for anti-submarine warfare, with good anti-surface, land-strike, special-forces and mining capability. It is a smaller design, less capable than the Virginia, but should be cheaper and is a better fit for Australia’s requirements.

Importantly, it requires only half the crew of a Virginia, and we should be able to afford and crew the minimum viable force of 12 SSNs.

Let’s build on the good progress in training, industry and facility preparations for supporting US and British SSNs in Australia, all of which should continue, and find a way to add to the alliance’s overall submarine capability, not reduce it.

Preserving an Australian submarine capability: a wicked problem hedged

In my previous post, I suggested that Australia has insufficient submarine personnel to start a transition to nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) while maintaining its existing operational capability to deploy at least two Collins-class submarines in harm’s way. I argued that the capability to deploy two submarines, be they nuclear or conventionally powered, must be preserved throughout the transition if we are to defend Australia in the difficult times now unfolding.

This capability is also critical to produce the greatly expanded number of qualified, experienced submarine personnel required for the transition. I lived through the transition from the Oberon-class submarines to the Collins and led the recovery program for the Collins, after we failed to recognise the need to maintain an operational submarine capability. Battling back from a nadir of 35% of the required personnel took more than a decade and depended on the dedication of many; in benign times, that was challenging and expensive but not hazardous. The same situation does not obtain today.

Due to lack of capacity in US and UK shipyards, the SSNs will have to be built here. An Australian build is also essential if we are to develop the technical capability in the civilian workforce necessary to sustain nuclear-powered submarines in this country. These preparations will take a long time and require a substantial national endeavour.

A transition strategy combining the build with the UK’s follow-on design for the Astute class, as appears to have been suggested recently by the UK defence secretary, could enable a hybrid build. As an example, the front half of the submarine, containing the weapons, crew accommodation and control room, could be built in Adelaide and the after end, containing propulsion, in the UK. That would enable the workload to be spread, offer economies of scale and enable US weapons and a US combat system to be incorporated for Australia’s needs, with US design assistance. Such a strategy would, however, add significantly to the complexity and risks. It won’t be quick. We should allow for sufficient time to get it right and to hedge against likely delays.

In the meantime, the ageing Collins require a challenging life-of-type extension (LOTE) involving a demanding and high-risk upgrade, within the normal two years allocated every decade for a major refit. Failures or delays in the Collins LOTE or in the transition strategy will leave Australia unable to sustain the personnel or to deploy two submarines—and, in due course, without an operational submarine capability. Recovery could take more than a decade, as we found with the Collins, a decade when our need is greatest.

A wicked problem indeed, but how do we hedge against this unhappy outcome?

Building additional conventional submarines as an urgent priority would provide a hedge against delays in either program, ensure we can maintain an operational submarine capability, increase the size of the submarine arm, re-establish an Australian submarine-building capability and greatly increase resilience in the support and supervision areas of the submarine enterprise. Importantly, it would also provide a growing pipeline of submariners to crew the SNNs when they come on stream.

In addition to the LOTE, building additional Collins, updated to the LOTE configuration, would provide submarines that meet Australia’s requirements and regulations and would be the lowest risk option. Such an approach would exploit existing supply chains, minimise logistical and training impacts and require the shortest lead time.

The effort to build additional Collins should have started much earlier, as I urged in 2018. But that doesn’t preclude the government from initiating an urgent design effort now, providing a viable option to commence building in 2024 should fears about the SSN timing prove correct.

This program should aim to commission the first new Collins boat in 2032 and one every year thereafter, achieving a force of 12 submarines in 2038, when the first LOTE Collins retires. We would need to mobilise our national resources and those of Saab Kockums, the original designer of the Collins, to assist ASC, the Collins ‘design authority’, to achieve this ambitious target. The Defence Department’s business-as-usual approach will not get us there.

The ‘Collins hedged’ approach wouldn’t delay the achievement of an operational, sovereign nuclear submarine force; indeed, it may well shorten the timeline and make it realistic. For the reasons set out in my previous post, there’s no way we can achieve this in the same timescales without increasing the number of conventional submarines in the period before Australian-flagged SSNs can join the fleet. The long-lead-time preparations, such as training experienced technical personnel and refining a design to meet our requirements, can occur in parallel with this program, so that we time the SSN building program to avoid a valley of death in the shipyard.

Critically, we will have sustained an operational submarine capability throughout and avoid a scenario where delays in the LOTE or nuclear transition make the whole process take decades longer. Evolving the Collins design as the build progresses will allow the introduction of new technology to mitigate the vulnerabilities of conventional submarines.

This will be expensive and challenging. Undertaking a transition from where we are, with a force of six ageing Collins, would be significantly more challenging. And it would leave us highly dependent on others and probably without an operational Australian submarine force through the decades of highest risk. That course may appear cheaper, but it wouldn’t be cheap. In fact, would be highly likely to fail regardless of how much we spent in the process. That is money and resources wasted, not saved.

The Collins hedging strategy enables us to demonstrate that we can double the number of submarine personnel, re-establish a submarine building capability, and build up the industry and the shore support and supervision roles with a fall-back position should any of these essential components prove unachievable or unaffordable.

I look forward to the solution provided by the nuclear-powered submarine taskforce but worry that it is answering the wrong question by looking for the shortest route to an SSN. The prerequisite for sustaining an operational submarine capability, namely, the ability to deploy two submarines in harm’s way, needs to be added to this aim. Without this critical requirement the strategy will produce an expensive illusion, not the sovereign, operational submarine capability we’ll need to see us through the difficult times ahead.

The government needs to move quickly to set up the Collins hedge option and provide a Plan B to avoid a looming capability gap.

Going full steam ahead on nuclear submarines could push Collins class to the brink

Submarines provide a unique, asymmetrical capability, giving the Australian government a range of options not offered by other platforms. Their critical importance has been emphasised in multiple defence white papers, most notably since 2009 when an increase from 6 to 12 submarines was agreed.

The published aim of the nuclear-powered submarine taskforce is ‘to advise government on the optimal pathway to acquiring a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines for Australia’. ‘Optimal’ here could be interpreted as ‘quickest’. Taking such a path would be a significant strategic mistake if it also trashes Australia’s existing sovereign, operational submarine capability.

I suggest that two deployable submarines is the minimum Australia requires in the challenging times we face. It’s what we have now, with six Collins-class boats largely dependent on Australian supply chains, with more than 90% of sustainment done by local companies—and the submarines are Australian manned and controlled.

Jumping into one or two nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) that we won’t own as they will likely be leased, dependent on foreign crews, supervision, support and an overseas supply chain, none of which we control does not meet the aim of having a sovereign capability.

ASPI’s Marcus Hellyer describes this as the ‘damn the torpedoes’ approach. The plan to ensure a continuous, sovereign, operational submarine capability under this strategy is not obvious and is yet to be explained, but what’s certain is it will take decades to achieve. All this during a period of heightened strategic risk.

UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace has hinted at an alternative approach: a new SSN incorporating the requirements of the AUKUS partners that would start construction in the mid-2030s. This makes sense as the UK production line will close with the completion of the seventh Astute-class  submarine and the US Virginia class is not well suited to Australia’s requirements. A new design would enable updated reactor and other features to be installed. This approach could ultimately meet the aim of a sovereign Australian SSN capability but it will take a significant amount of time and come with the risks all new-design submarines face.

We should expect delays and cost increases, particularly in the first of class which is essentially a prototype requiring a couple of years to evaluate and produce design fixes to be incorporated in the following submarines. That lesson was learned the hard way in the Collins program, where we ended up with five prototypes and rectification was protracted and much more expensive that it otherwise would have been. In the UK in 2010 a parliamentary committee found the Astute program to be almost five years late and 53% over budget.

I should affirm my support for Australia’s transition to nuclear-propelled attack submarines as my detailed study, delivered to the Department of Defence in 2013, and my public advocacy implies. I think it’s an essential, if challenging, transition that should have started years ago, but didn’t.

The media and political focus on when Australia might commission its first SSN—be it new or a leased second-hand submarine—is misplaced. The date we should be looking at is when we might have a fully operational, sovereign SSN capability that can be deployed to defend Australia. What is required to achieve this?

In a Strategist article published in October last year, I discussed the workforce needed before Australia can own its first SSN. The Royal Australian Navy submarine arm has peaked and fallen back with approximately 850 personnel—a commendable effort from three or four seagoing submarines. This number of personnel is insufficient to operate six Collins while providing the several hundred more required to prepare for the first SSN. Conversion of RAN submariners in US and UK nuclear submarines will be a major task and will take some time; both navies have limitations of their own and must prioritise their own needs. Initial training of new recruits will be even more demanding, take longer and have a higher attrition rate.

The submarine squadron staffed by technical experts and operationally experienced personnel is a key element; supporting, training, assessing and moulding a crew into a winning team able to safely and successfully confront real-world challenges and threats. Personnel are but a portion of the big picture, however.

Submarines be they nuclear- or conventionally powered, operate in a particularly harsh regime, with many systems difficult or impossible to access at sea and the price of failure high. Provided they are regularly and appropriately maintained and supported, a fleet of six submarines can provide two ready to defend Australia at any one time.

The government has committed to at least eight SSNs but the navy would need six to be certain of deploying two of them at once. Six SSNs delivered with a drumbeat of two to three years, driven by production limits and the time required to generate crews, would require 10–15 years plus around 12 months for the operational work-up for the sixth submarine. Getting to the starting line to build our first SSN is going to take another decade. Add the build time and you’re looking at a 30-year plus transition. It’s also a realistic time for the development of expertise.

Australia has learned the hard way that it requires an integrated and comprehensive set of infrastructure manned by naval and industry personnel to create and sustain an operational submarine capability, descriptively titled ‘the submarine enterprise’. Failure of any component hazards the final objective of deployable submarines.

A dedicated, secure submarine base and a shipyard, both with qualified, experienced workforces, specialist workshops and tools, are key components. And they must be supported by supply chains under Australia’s control. The presence of nuclear reactors would add significantly to the complexity, cost and quality and quantity of labour required. Repairs to a defective reactor must be done in Australia to avoid months of additional delay incurred by transporting an immobilised SSN to an overseas shipyard. Reactor repairs can be protracted and complex.

Any transition plan should demonstrate how it will preserve a sovereign, operational submarine force of at least six submarines—though that could be a mix of conventional boats and SSNs. That capability is currently based on ageing Collins, which must undergo a high-risk life-of-type extension, or LOTE. Hellyer’s earlier discussion on this is worth re-reading.

If the LOTE is successful, the first Collins will go out of service in 2038. Then the force will no longer be able to consistently provide two deployable submarines. The last is set to retire in 2048.

A ‘damn the torpedoes’ approach is highly likely to cause the collapse of the Collins capability as personnel and resources are drawn to support the transition. The Collins capability is also highly vulnerable to failure or delay of the LOTE. Either or both events will leave Australia without deployable submarines under Australian control. It has rightly been described as a ‘wicked problem’.

A ‘wicked problem’ by definition does not have an easy or perfect solution. I look forward to hearing more of the nuclear taskforce’s solution, but the signs that it is answering the right question are not propitious.

In my next article I will discuss an alternative approach with a clear Plan B.

Policy, Guns and Money: COP26, nuclear submarines and vaccine passports

The first week of Glasgow’s COP26 climate summit is over, and we have seen a number of countries make landmark promises to help mitigate the effects of climate change. ASPI’s Robert Glasser and Anastasia Kapetas discuss these commitments, Australia’s position during the conference and what’s in store for the remainder of the summit.

With the Australian government’s recent announcement that it will acquire nuclear-powered submarines and cancel the Attack-class program, it looks like we might be waiting until the late 2030s until the first submarine is in service. Defence capability experts Marcus Hellyer and Andrew Davies consider the decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines and discuss Australia’s potential naval capability gaps and how they can be addressed.

As international travel begins to reopen, digital vaccine passports are set to be a requirement in many parts of the world to prove vaccination status. ASPI’s Teagan Westendorf and Gill Savage discuss the challenges for the rollout of vaccine passports, potential issues with interoperability and how to address cybersecurity risks.

Making the shift to nuclear-powered submarines: training and recruiting

In the first post in this series, I considered the structure of the safety regimes needed to independently audit the Royal Australian Navy’s procedures and training to operate a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN), along with the personnel required to do this work.

The crew and naval organisations needed to support and oversee the SSN were considered in my second post. Here, I review some of the training and education structures, before summarising the total personnel requirement for phase 1, the starting point for a transition to SSNs.

It is assumed that the RAN will be given the requisite access to the training schools of the navy that supplies our submarines and access to their boats for at-sea training until it has established sufficient capacity in Australia. This is a significant undertaking for the supplier navy. At-sea training billets are always in high demand, so adding the conversion and ab initio training required for the RAN will be a significant imposition even without considering the security and other national issues that could arise. This requires early resolution during the 18-month study period, to establish the viability of the whole proposal. Let’s examine the engineering specialist training, possibly the most demanding and time consuming.

For operators to have a full understanding of the submarine reactor, they will be obliged to undergo a high level of both education and training. This will be undertaken overseas until training is repatriated. Detail on this is outside the timescale of this analysis, but it’s useful to understand the length of training pipelines involved.

The marine engineering officer training pipeline involves new entry naval training, an engineering degree, postgraduate nuclear training and submarine training. Assuming the trainee proceeds smoothly through the pipeline, it takes seven years. The qualified submarine marine engineering officer will then undertake a sequence of sea and shore postings, after which they will complete their qualification as the chief engineer in charge of the engineering department. They will then undertake a posting as a deputy before being assessed fit to be appointed as the chief engineer in charge of the nuclear plant. This process takes an additional nine years. That’s a total of at least 16 years from initial entry to chief engineer.

The nuclear technician sailor operating the reactor completes a technical apprenticeship, general submarine training and specialist courses prior to their first sea appointment as a watchkeeper. This is followed by the four-month nuclear technician short course and then two years at sea before completing the eight-month nuclear long course and returning to the sea as a supervisory watchkeeper. That posting is likely to be followed by a shore job, either as an instructor or as part of the nuclear repair facility team, before a return to sea as a trainee watch leader to qualify as a nuclear chief of the watch. There can be no substitute for experience in this position; simulation can assist but not replace the core knowledge gained from actual reactor operation. The process typically takes eight to 10 years.

This is a snapshot of the technical training to illustrate the long lead times needed to have qualified, experienced reactor operators and supervisors. Command qualified warfare officers are another scarce commodity: it takes six to eight years to qualify and there’s a high wastage rate.

Overall, the number of personnel involved in preparing for our first SSN will need to include an allowance for the wastage rates typically experienced with overseas training and long training pipelines. In practice, a buffer of around 30% would be required to ensure enough personnel complete the training and become qualified.

This discussion identifies the organisations and typical manning numbers required to prepare for and safely operate our first SSN. In gross terms, at least 400 personnel plus about 120 for attrition, all with the appropriate qualifications and experience, will be needed before the first boat is  commissioned. The lead time varies with the position to be filled, and the preparation of the personnel in the safety and policy positions will also take some years. These personnel are in short supply in the British and US navies, so we can’t rely on recruiting from overseas. If we’re to preserve a cooperative relationship, any transfers will have to be agreed with the supplying navy. Until we have several SSNs in service (say, four to six), we will have to depend on the supplying navy’s training system and seagoing submarines for training and experience.

All these requirements will no doubt be managed in a detailed training plan to be developed in collaboration with the supplier navy during the 18-month study period.

It should be clear from this discussion that the manpower obligation prior to safely operating our first SSN precludes an early move to lease an SSN—even in the unlikely event that one was available.

Australia can make this transition, but it is going to take time, a national commitment and a lot of assistance from our AUKUS allies. As Admiral Michael Gilday, chief of naval operations of the US Navy, said on 23 September:

This is a very long-term effort that’ll be decades, I think, before a submarine goes in the water. It could be. I don’t see this as a short-term timeline. We have an 18-month exploratory period that’ll get after a lot of these questions and help Australia come to grips with exactly what they need to do to get in a path akin to the United States Navy.

It’s not feasible to meet the requirements of the nuclear training pipelines, and the subsequent postings to gain experience, by drawing trained submariners from the current submarine arm of about 900 personnel. Those personnel will be operating the six Collins-class submarines, which are critical to generating qualified submariners and defending Australia.

As navy chief Vice Admiral Michael Noonan recently advised a Senate estimates committee, the RAN must grow the submarine arm to 2,300 personnel. To achieve this growth, provide for our defence in uncertain strategic times and hedge against the risk of delays in the transition, the government should be urgently considering increasing the number of conventional submarines. It is now very late in the day and we can’t afford to waste another 18 months waiting until the end of the current study to have this conclusion accepted. If these submarines were to be constructed in Adelaide, it would have the important additional benefit of re-establishing Australia’s submarine-building capability.

In a recent Strategist post, Marcus Hellyer noted: ‘Every time ASPI has looked at the path to acquiring nuclear boats we’ve concluded that Australia still needs a new conventional submarine to ensure we can safely transition to a nuclear fleet.’ He is right.

Making the shift to nuclear-powered submarines: safety first

The agreement for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) is the most significant part of the recent AUKUS announcement. The offer of assistance from the United Kingdom and the United States to acquire this capability places us at an excellent starting point for what will be a challenging national journey.

Such a combination of support was inconceivable five years ago when I began publicly agitating for SSNs. Today it is the right strategic decision to meet the changing circumstances facing Australia and its Western allies. It will ensure that our submarine crews have safer, more survivable and hugely more effective submarines.

Marcus Hellyer’s recent Strategist posts on the practicality of leasing detail a number technical considerations. What about the personnel required for the safe operation of our first SSN? Of all the challenges to achieving the transition to this new capability, and there will be plenty, having the right people in place may prove to be the most important.

Australia’s submarine capability is a critical asset to deter and, if necessary, to take the fight to an attacker. Sustaining it through a long transition and generating the additional submarine personnel to undergo nuclear training will be a challenge, but it’s certainly not impossible. Australia absolutely can do this if we confront it as a national challenge, with a good plan. The extra personnel we need must be trained in the first place and suitably experienced; that will take time. We can achieve it with the assistance of the navies and civilian regulators in the UK or US, or more likely both.

The safety ethos required for the nuclear power plant is a significant step up from the Collins class conventional fleet, which already exceeds those applied to a civilian airliner in risk management terms. The nuclear power safety regime will have additional layers of supervision and independent auditing oversight of the Royal Australian Navy’s and shipyards’ training, procedures and maintenance activities.

To guarantee that nuclear safety always remains paramount, it is essential that a robust framework of supervision and regulation be in place with clear lines of responsibility running from the bottom to the top of the organisation. For Australia to meet this requirement, our regulatory and technical organisations will be obliged to become competent, with the capacity to provide practical safety oversight and to enable the government to maintain sovereignty and discharge its responsibility for the safety of RAN-operated nuclear reactors.

This responsibility can’t be contracted offshore and nor could an overseas system extend its coverage or foreign personnel to undertake this in Australia without compromising our sovereignty. The Australian public (and no doubt the international community) would expect the highest standards of safety and supervision, exercised under national control, ultimately by an elected official such as the minister for defence.

The safety regime will have an independent auditing chain of responsibility involving civilian regulators such as the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), which is responsible to the minister for industry and is currently focused on research into nuclear engineering. It will also involve the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) to manage Australia’s standards on nuclear protection and safety. ARPANSA is currently responsible to a third minister, the minister for health. At each level, specialist support will be required to allow the responsible officials and ministers to discharge their responsibilities for nuclear safety.

To ensure that all operations are conducted safely, the nuclear-related functions at any site must be subjected to a safety case analysis from which a site licence will be generated detailing the regulations relevant to that site together with any preconditions or restrictions. This is a complex business and its importance shouldn’t be underestimated, but it is within Australia’s reach and competence. These are functions ANSTO and ARPANSA will be able to address.

In the UK, these responsibilities are combined in the Office for Nuclear Regulation.

No doubt these structural issues will be resolved in preparing for Australia’s SSNs. At this stage, it’s sufficient to flag the broad requirements and get a sense of the number of people involved. The key requirement is that the regulatory functions be independent of the RAN’s line of authority to ensure a plurality and independence of oversight for the nuclear safety reporting chain.

So, how many people are we talking about? I estimate that the civilian auditor or regulator will need up to 24 additional staff with the required qualifications and experience, half of whom should be in place at the start of the program.

These arrangements must be in place, and the personnel must be trained, tested and certified, before the first submarine’s reactor is activated with its ‘initial criticality and power range testing’. Let’s call this phase 1 of the transition. For a British or American SSN, this occurs 18 months prior to the navy commissioning the submarine. Allowing six months for training, testing and certification, phase 1 should start two years before the first SSN is commissioned into RAN service. Many key personnel will be required earlier than this to set up arrangements.

The agreement for release of US or UK technology will almost certainly insist on Australian organisations meeting the US’s and UK’s standards as a precondition. As the US Navy’s procedures illustrate, multiple layers of protection are involved to ensure this is a no-fail activity. All of this is overseen by the director of naval reactors, a four-star admiral.

In addition to civilian organisations, the RAN would be obliged to ensure that its own infrastructure included the appropriate expertise and experience to ensure safety standards were met at all levels. In my next post, I’ll consider the uniformed personnel and some of the industry workforce required to be in place before we can operate an SSN.