Federal government initiatives revealed this month have reinforced Northern Australia’s pivotal role in national and international energy and minerals security. While they make for good announcements, whether federal and state policies can deliver on development objectives remains unclear.

One of the initiatives, the Future Gas Strategy, is a keystone of the Future Made in Australia policy. It is predicated on new sources of gas in the north being developed to supply domestic and export needs until at least 2050. A production tax credit for critical minerals aims to incentivise processing in Australia, while incentives for renewable hydrogen production target the starting of this promising new industry for the nation and its north.

Meanwhile, expanded government investment in geoscience seeks to unlock new minerals and energy regions, identify carbon storage opportunities and define groundwater resources, focusing strongly on Northern Australia.

While the Future Gas Strategy outlined steps needed to rebuild Australia’s reputation as a reliable trade and investment partner for liquefied natural gas and to meet future domestic gas demand, it was almost immediately undermined by the government’s abandonment of legislation designed to clarify consultation requirements for offshore gas developments. And, despite federal and state geoscience being very successful in attracting exploration investment, turning discoveries into new mines takes more than 15 years on average.

Realising the growth objectives of the resources initiatives requires concerted action by federal and state governments that go beyond removing barriers to investment and actively facilitate it. A government ‘front door’ to facilitate major private sector investment, announced in the 14 May federal budget, plus measures to expedite approval processes appear to be useful initiatives. But implementation remains to be tested, and federal and state government processes will need to align. The two steps forward and one step back on gas policies won’t help investor or customer confidence.

The gas strategy is underpinned by impressively thorough analysis from the Department of Industry, Science and Resources and arrives at some eminently defensible conclusions, including that gas is essential to the domestic and global energy transition. It finds that new supply is needed to meet demand through to 2050, to replace depleted fields, increase resilience and mitigate supply costs. While use of gas for electricity generation will decline over time, the manufacturing sector’s consumption of around 26 percent of domestic gas supply will continue, because there are no substitutes in most manufacturing processes that use it.

Northern Australia produces all of Australia’s export LNG and is a principal source of additional domestic gas supply. Gas reserves in southern states have been depleted by well over half, but depletion of reserves has reached only one-third in Queensland and Western Australia and just 4 percent in the Northern Territory. New pipelines and storage capacity will be needed to deliver required volumes to the southern market, the strategy concludes.

The strategy recognises that Australian LNG plays a central role in current and future energy security and living standards for several of our Asian neighbours—and enables their transition to greater renewable energy sources. While Australia’s LNG exports are forecast to grow in the next decade and then to decline towards 2050, the strategy says LNG has a clear role to play even beyond then.

Growing global LNG demand is driving many new projects in North America, Papua New Guinea, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Total LNG supply is expected to increase by nearly 50 percent by 2030, with Australia’s market share shrinking. Japanese companies have ramped up LNG investment elsewhere to tap alternative supply sources, partially in response to concerns about Australia’s supply reliability.

In the face of LNG supply competition, the gas strategy adopts the principle that Australia must remain a reliable trade and investment partner. ‘Government decisions on gas development rights should prioritise timely development and discourage repeated delays to ensure supply and affordability,’ it says.

The strategy notes that the LNG sector is the primary precursor to future investment in gas-consuming manufacturing and in hydrogen production. Massive renewable energy projects proposed for the Pilbara and Northern Territory could supply the large amounts of electricity required for hydrogen production.

The empowerment of First Nations people to benefit from energy projects and the transition to net zero is one of six actions in the strategy. In Northern Australia, there are many opportunities for much greater First Nations economic engagement, including by leveraging title to Indigenous lands and seas hosting resources production, transport and processing.

Northern Australia has great potential for additional capture and storage of carbon associated with gas production and processing. Identifying new basins in which to store carbon dioxide is a new objective of the expanded Resourcing Australia’s Prosperity minerals program. The program, run by Geoscience Australia in cooperation with state geological agencies, has been assessing geological potential over two large, underexplored areas in Northern Australia. The data gleaned has resulted in mineral explorers large and small taking up tenements.

Overcoming challenges to development may be daunting but is achievable with close cooperation between governments, industry and communities. Infrastructure, both hard and soft, is needed; project assessment, approval and facilitation processes must be streamlined, coordinated and made more certain; costs of project development and operation need to be mitigated to be market competitive; and governments have a role in helping to secure supply chains and project finance. Getting those settings right is also the key to enhanced resilience and security for Australia and its north. While recent strategies are a good start, government commitments to implementing changes will determine whether they are effective.

If Australia wants the ability to sustain northern air power, it needs air force bases that can fend off attacking missiles and also quickly recover from the hits by those that successfully penetrate.

The Royal Australian Air Force also needs to hone ways of dispersing valuable but vulnerable aircraft to civil airfields and operating them from there when under stress.

Hardening and dispersal offer greater defensive effect for their cost and are also faster to implement than active defences, so they should take priority while we wait for deliveries of protective surface-to-air systems.

Australia’s primary aim must be to preserve its modestly sized air force, and keep it operating, during the opening stages of a conflict, before an adversary has run down its necessarily limited stock of expensive strike missiles.

The Defence Strategic Review (DSR), issued in public form in April 2023, said the Australian Defence Force ‘must have the capacity to defend Australia and our immediate region.. [and] deter through denial any adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches’. In addition, the DSR insisted that ‘Australia’s army must be transformed and optimised for littoral manoeuvre operations by sea, land and air from Australia, with enhanced long-range fires.’

In response, the government agreed that improving the ability of the ADF to operate in the northern littoral with the provision of RAAF support from northern airfields was important and listed it as one of six immediate priority areas. The fields are RAAF bases Learmonth and Curtin in Western Australia, Darwin and Tindal in the Northern Territory, and Scherger and Townsville in Queensland. There is also a field on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Indian Ocean.

Then at the annual Australian and US ministerial meeting in July 2023 the joint communique said both sides would continue to progress the upgrading of Australia’s northern bases, particularly at RAAF Darwin and Tindal, with additional upgrades being closely considered for RAAF Scherger and Curtin.

The pressing need to improve the operational capacity and survivability of northern bases is hardly new. One of the DSR leads, Stephen Smith, pointed out that the issue had arisen when he had been defence minister, in the 2012 Force Posture Review and 2013 Defence White Paper. Unfortunately, little had been done since then.

Also, defence analysts have repeatedly emphasised the ‘importance of hardening the critical defence infrastructure and installations throughout northern Australia in the face of growing capability and proliferation of advanced ballistic missile systems, cyber, electronic warfare and long-range strike capabilities.’

Now the federal government is set to spend $3.8 billion over the next four years on Australia’s northern bases, including $2 billion for air bases.

What exactly that will buy is not yet clear, but the government will have to balance affordability against effectiveness while also balancing speed against what is desirable over the medium term.

The review gave some indication of the shopping list in its call for ‘immediate and comprehensive’ work at the air bases. It itemised: hardening and dispersal; runway and apron capacity; fuel storage and supply; aviation fuel supply and storage; ammunition storage; connectivity required to enable essential mission planning activities; accommodation and life support; and security.

Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy has since said the upgrades would include providing more shelters for aircraft to survive attack.

Another passive measure that has received less discussion is to prepare to disperse aircraft to civilian airfields or even major roads. For that, support teams are needed to supply aircraft with fuel and munitions by road.

The chief of the air force, Air Marshal Robert Chipman, said ‘there’s work to be done… to make sure that we can fight resiliently from our northern networks of bases.’

The relatively small size of the RAAF fleet and the high attrition typically expected with the opening of hostilities in any high end conflict means hardening basing infrastructure is a much cheaper option than replacing billions of dollars of highly sophisticated aircraft.

However, it is essential to get an integrated mix of active and passive measures right, as seen in the 1991 Gulf War, when the sizable and capable Iraqi air force was mostly decimated on the ground despite having many reinforced concrete bunkers. The problem was that they were not adequately supported by active defences. In the first three weeks, US pilots shot down 37 Iraqi aeroplanes, while over the same period 500-600 hardened shelters were targeted, with more than 60% of them destroyed or damaged, resulting in the loss of 141 aircraft in their bunkers.

As the Gulf War example makes clear, passive features need to be supported by active defences, such as surface-to-air systems, electromagnetic warfare systems and defensive air patrols that are intended to neutralise attacking aircraft or munitions before they hit.

The ADF is working on active defence with projects for a Joint Air Battle Management System that will also lays the groundwork for a future integrated air and missile defence capability. The army, meanwhile, is acquiring a new Short Range Ground Based Air Defence system, which could operate independently but will also form an inner layer of a larger, integrated defensive system.

Chipman says that ultimately Australia requires ‘more advanced surface-to-air missiles that are able to engage cruise missiles and ballistic missiles’.

With the DSR setting a near threat horizon, what Australia needs now are the systems, operating procedures and techniques such as dispersal and mobility coupled with the procurement of sufficient active measures that will enable Australia’s northern forces to manoeuvre and survive.

Defence needs to take the most affordable but consequential steps to rapidly reduce the vulnerability of Australia’s northern bases to air and missile attacks by quickly improving the level of base hardening.

The Yemeni Houthi rebels’ continued attacks on shipping in the Red Sea serve as a reminder that global supply chains remain highly vulnerable to disruption. Moreover, it highlights how food insecurity can simultaneously be an effect and cause of conflict.  

To address this, the international community must move quickly to combine its hard and soft power, mitigating the push and pull factors leading people to terrorism, violence, and piracy—factors that include food insecurity itself. 

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization defines food security as ‘when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’. The latest UN statistics suggest that 691 million to 783 million people are food-insecure, many of them in fragile and conflict-affected states. 

This latest disruption in Red Sea maritime traffic has historical precedent. The name of the maritime area in question is Bab el-Mendab, which translates to ‘the gate of lamentations’ or ‘the gate of grief’. In the current episode of the maritime drama, the grief for millions of people who depend on the life-giving goods transiting through this narrow strait may yet wax greater. 

The Houthis’ disruption of Red Sea maritime traffic has already significantly affected the global movement and price of goods for some nations. Container traffic has slowed, and 95% of the container shipping that once sailed through the Red Sea is now often diverted around Africa, adding nearly 5000km to the voyage in some cases. The additional distance is already significantly increasing the cost of such essentials as food, medicine and fuel. For the same reason, the Red Sea attacks are increasing the price of inputs for food and agriculture. 

For the globe’s most vulnerable populations, cost increases of this kind threaten to exacerbate pressures on food security and precipitate the kinds of downstream consequences that erode prosperity and security, fueling conflict. 

In response to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, ongoing since the 19 November hijacking of an Israeli-linked ship, Galaxy Leader, the US initiated the multinational Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect maritime safety in the waters around Yemen. The operation received implicit endorsement from a UN Security Council resolution passed on 10 January. The next day, the US and Britain launched strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. 

Until 11 January, it seemed Operation Prosperity Guardian would only respond to Houthi attacks if the group successfully damaged civilian or military vessels. Some may read the two-month delay in responding to Houthi attacks as a vulnerability in the international system ripe for exploitation. 

It’s unlikely that a state, perhaps except Iran, whose government has form on this matter in the Strait of Hormuz, would engage in such tactics around the world’s eight most important maritime chokepoints. They are Bab el-Mandeb at the Horn of Africa; the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf; the Suez Canal, Egypt; the Panama Canal, Panama; the Strait of Gibraltar, between Spain and Morocco; the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia; the Turkish Straits, Turkey; and the Cape of Good Hope, South Africa. 

Whether by design or accident, the Houthis renown has received a boost from the maritime attacks. Other non-state actors may get inspiration from the Houthis’ use of these attacks to achieve political, ideological and military objectives. Of particular concern are the militant groups that operate around Bab el-Mendeb. 

Beyond the immediate challenge of maritime terrorism and insurgency, events in the Red Sea are a reminder of the role of food insecurity in conflict. As former WFP executive director David Beasley outlined, ‘there is plenty of information on how conflict impacts food security, but there is very little evidence on how food insecurity can drive conflict or how food security might contribute to the building of more peaceful societies’. 

Nevertheless, food insecurity can sometimes be linked to factors that promote conflict: the recruitment of combatants; mortality and morbidity rates that undermine stability in already fragile societies; disputes over land and water in resource-constrained settings; and the mass displacement of food-insecure people. The 1992 famine in Somalia illustrated how food insecurity could accentuate political, economic or social dysfunction. 

The tragic irony of the Houthis attacks is that hunger is rife across Yemen itself, where 17 million people are food-insecure. Food insecurity has undoubtedly continued to undermine peace and stability in Yemen. It has been exacerbated by the conflict there and used to radicalise Yemenis to the Houthis’ cause. Strikes on Houthi positions and facilities through Operation Prosperity Guardian or otherwise under the Security Council resolution could deepen Yemen’s humanitarian disaster if such action harms civilians or civilian infrastructure. 

Governments and multilateral bodies, particularly through the UN, must work to secure maritime trade to avoid food insecurity contributing to further conflict in the Middle East and beyond. 

Australia’s support for the deployment of international fibre-optic cables in the South Pacific is a relatively recent development. Prior to 2017, the Australian government’s support for digital development in Pacific island countries (PICs) was focused only on cyber capacity building and cybersecurity assistance, leaving the task of connectivity itself to the private sector and international development banks such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

But Australia’s newly launched 2023-2030 Cyber Security Strategy has signalled an evolving commitment to building secure digital infrastructure for PICs. The impact of this on the jostle for influence in the Pacific—even at a time in which Australia is re-stabilising its relationship with China—can’t be understated.

The origins of the strategy go back to 2017. In that year, Huawei Marine, which became HMN Tech in 2019, floated a project that would supply an underwater cable linking Australia and Solomon Islands. With the Australian government growing more wary of the risks of working with Chinese companies with close ties to Beijing, when an agreement was finalised with the Solomon Islands Submarine Cable Company in 2017 to link Honiara to Sydney, Australia’s policy shifted.

The prospect of a Huawei Marine cable connecting Australia’s core network in Sydney to Honiara presented several potential vulnerabilities. In response, Australia funded its own new subsea cable project—the Coral Sea Cable, linking Sydney, Honiara and Port Moresby—which the government entrusted to Melbourne-based Vocus Group. Supply was then contracted to a well-established company working under the umbrella of Finnish telecommunications giant Nokia.

The cable project then became part of the government’s ‘Pacific Step Up’, with official announcements on it making no direct reference to China. This was a crucial early step in a broader shift that continued with the creation of the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) in 2019. The AIFFP is a vehicle to provide for funding infrastructure that helps Australia compete with China-driven projects in the Pacific when they pose a threat to Australian interests and security.

The AIFFP is now a cornerstone of Australia’s strategy in the Pacific. The agency is co-funding two ongoing cable projects, the Palau Cable and the East Micronesia Cable (EMC), with Japanese and American partners. Like the Coral Sea Cable, the funding of the EMC has a geopolitical element. Although the ADB initially led the original project, and HMN Tech seemed likely to win the tender, the project was canceled in 2021. Subsequently, in a collaborative effort, Japan, the US and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding with Nauru, the Federated States of Micronesia and Kiribati to eventually resuscitate the project by funding it and monitoring the choice of the cable supplier.

NEC, a Japanese company, was selected as the supplier in June 2023. Once again, HMN Tech had been ousted from its chance to shape the digital landscape in the South Pacific. Given the cost of this kind of infrastructure, involving Indo-Pacific partners was crucial to Australia’s success. Collaborating with Japan and the US allowed Australia to provide the region development assistance while limiting the expansion of Chinese technology investment.

Australia’s interest in better digital infrastructure for PICs seems to be extending to domestic networks too, especially with interest in 5G growing. In 2021, with a $1.3 billion loan from Export Finance Australia (EFA), the Australian government committed to supporting Telstra’s acquisition of Digicel Pacific, again with Japanese and American support. The EFA was able to lend to Telstra as the acquisition was seen as supporting the development of PICs. It then brought Digicel Pacific into the ‘Telstra Family’, echoing the government’s ‘Pacific Family’ narrative. In the six PICs where it operates—including Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga and Nauru—Digicel Pacific will also have to deploy non-Huawei or ZTE Corporation equipment for upcoming 5G networks. Additionally, the existing Chinese 3G and 4G equipment will be replaced as it reaches its end of life.

The end of 2023 was rich with new announcements about connectivity in the South Pacific. Google announced cable projects at first linking Australia, the US, Fiji and French Polynesia, though it includes the installation of branching units that will allow neighbouring islands to connect to it in the future. The US is considering co-investing in the projects with the Australian government. In addition, the Hawaiki Nui cable project—which will connect parts of the US (Los Angeles, Hawaii and American Samoa), French Polynesia, New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia and Singapore—has also been provided an AIFFP grant for the funding of branching units that will benefit other PICs along the cable route.

That said, some branching units already exist, including on the first cable built by Hawaiki, that remain unused. Many Pacific governments don’t have sufficient financial resources to connect their territory to the cable’s main trunk. This raises the question of whether Australia or the US could help fund these efforts and finally effectively connect many more Pacific islands to the region’s digital backbone.

Connectivity in the Pacific is of strategic importance to the whole Indo-Pacific, and so to the Australian government, which sees investment in a more connected region as a means to foster both development and regional security. For that matter, the 2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy includes $78 million of investment in submarine cables in the Pacific through the AIFFP. Additionally, the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience was set up during the Quad Leaders’ Summit in May 2023. However, as Australia proceeds, decision-makers must keep the needs of PICs front-of-mind and avoid letting short-term strategic games get in the way of the Pacific’s long-term security and prosperity.

Diplomacy used to be the prerogative of national governments, handled by a small group of leaders, officials, diplomats, and militaries. The acceleration of globalisation and interdependence since the 1970s led to the emergence of new, interconnecting issues other than security and military affairs and new channels connecting nations, such as informal ties linking governmental and non-governmental elites. Often these new connections were ignored, or perhaps misunderstood and underrated, by national leaders and diplomats.

International diplomacy is no longer the exclusive area for national leaders. Subnational diplomacy, which refers to engagement activities involving local actors and institutions, offers Australia many new opportunities to engage southeast Asia.

Subnational diplomacy is an effective tool for local actors to seize new opportunities and address specific issues that affect a limited constituency. Economic opportunity often drives these initiatives, with strong incentives at the local and state levels. Local leaders can capitalise on it quickly, by identifying issues that directly affect their constituencies, offering material benefits to the local population, and gaining stronger local political support.

Australian states and territories are aware of the benefits of greater economic linkages with Southeast Asia, and some are building initiatives with Southeast Asian counterparts.

In September 2020, Western Australia released its own engagement strategy with Asia. The strategy has been implemented through measures such as the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Ba Ria Vung Tau province in Vietnam to facilitate cooperation in trade and investment, tourism, education, and cultural exchanges.

In 2023, the government of New South Wales and the Jakarta capital city government renewed an MOU on cooperation with particular emphasis on agribusiness, food and beverages, technology, tourism and education.

The Northern Territory government and the West Nusa Tenggara provincial government in Indonesia also signed an MOU in July 2023 to establish a sister province arrangement, promote education and tourism opportunities and encourage knowledge and skill sharing in their respective service industries. The NT also signed an MOU with the Indian state of Kerala in October 2023.

Subnational diplomacy also poses challenges. Within federal systems, due to the principle of power-sharing—in Australia the division of powers among the three levels of government—local authorities possess a certain degree of autonomy and independence in initiating and implementing policies tailored to local needs.

But this autonomy does not necessarily extend to international diplomacy, and it can lead to the conflicting implementation of foreign policy.

When then President Donald Trump announced the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change, American state governors, mayors and businessmen stepped in to fill the void through own initiatives, such as the US Climate Alliance and Climate Mayors.

Having too many subnational actors pursuing diplomatic initiatives can also cause coordination issues, internal competition among local entities, and fragmentation of national strategies, especially when the national and subnational actors are competing to engage the same foreign partner. For example, Western Australia’s and Victoria’s efforts to engage with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)  raised some concerns over coordination issues when these efforts occurred against the background of Australia’s reserved attitude towards BRI.

The lack of coordination between the state and local levels can have serious implications for defence and national security as foreign actors take advantage of these subnational engagements to sow internal divisions and undermine national policies. Victoria’s MOUs with China—including one on BRI—came under intense scrutiny as Australia-China relations deteriorated.

State and territory governments are expected to continue to bolster ties with Southeast Asian local entities. A recent report from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) projected that Southeast Asia would drive global economic growth through 2040 and beyond. Australia will benefit from Southeast Asia’s economic dynamism in multiple ways, as a provider of commodities, quality products and services and as an investor in infrastructure and green energy transition.

DFAT’s report promotes a whole-of-government approach to enhance Australia’s economic engagement with the region. This strategy highlights the importance of Australian federal and territory governments in strengthening the country’s linkages to Southeast Asia. In 2022, Australia’s Ministerial Council on Trade and Investment was established to advance trade and investment opportunities with Indo-Pacific partners. The council comprises trade ministers from all states and territories and had its first meeting in 2023 to align trade and investment priorities.

Australian state, territory and federal governments should continue to support subnational diplomacy initiatives with Southeast Asia.

The region’s priority, like that of many states and territories, remains economic development, especially as climate change and geopolitical tensions have made regional leaders more aware of the importance of resilient and inclusive development.

State and territory authorities should focus on projects consistent with this vision, such as building critical infrastructure, supporting energy transitions, and enhancing skills and knowledge. Oversight and coordination by the federal government should continue to ensure that all projects are consistent with Australia’s strategy of engagement with the region and its national security interest, but the strong local incentives for state and territory leaders may yield quick results.