New Zealand Archives - Page 5 of 5

Australia and New Zealand: the pitfalls of unnecessary summitry

11 February 2013/in Strategist Article

Imagine a parallel universe where the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers conclude their annual meeting by announcing that they’d get together the next time there was a large enough issue to require their mutual high level attention. That might hardly rate a mention in the Australian press. But in New Zealand, where the trans-Tasman relationship is sometimes approached with excessively high public expectations, the Prime Minister of the day might be accused of sacrificing the most important international meeting of the year!

After the weekend meeting between Julia Gillard and John Key in Queenstown, I think that controversy could be worth risking. First of all, we don’t currently have a serious regional crisis erupting where the two countries have to make concerted decisions about the possibility of intervening together. Indeed as the Timor Leste and Solomon Islands missions wind down, the reverse is occurring: New Zealand and Australia are both getting personnel out. When a new crisis in our rather large neighbourhood erupts, the two leaders should meet as a matter of urgency. But this would be a summit of mutual necessity not of ritual obligation. Read more

The incredible shrinking ANZAC alliance

5 December 2012/in Strategist Article

It’s the lot of smaller countries to fret over how seriously their interests are treated by bigger allies. It’s not surprising then that Robert Ayson worries about what New Zealand has to do to stay on Canberra’s radar screen. There’s good reason for Wellington to be concerned, because Australia’s strategic focus increasingly looks north. Limited resources for defence engagement after the 2013 White Paper will be ear-marked mostly for countries like Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, rather than New Zealand. But the chill wind from Canberra hasn’t just been blowing since the global financial crisis. What Australian governments have said about New Zealand in previous defence white papers, allows us to chart the steady diminution of the importance of the ANZAC relationship in Australian thinking. Here are all the Australian white paper comments on New Zealand since 1976, with fuller excerpts here (PDF). The key phrases read like a series of scenes from that great B-grade Hollywood movie, The Incredible Shrinking Man:

1976: ‘Defence cooperation with New Zealand is fundamental to our interests …’

1987: 'Australia and New Zealand share a defence relationship which is of basic importance to the security of both countries …’

1994: ‘ … our defence alliance with New Zealand remains important to Australia's defence policy.’

2000: ‘… our defence relationship with New Zealand shows the imprint both of our strong similarities and of the sometimes surprising differences between us.’

2009: ‘ … from a strategic point of view what matters most is that they are not a source of threat to Australia.’

The last quote bundles New Zealand with Indonesia, PNG, East Timor and the Pacific Islands: from key ally to alley cat in one generation? Read more

Reader response: the legacy of RAMSI

4 December 2012/in Strategist Article

Thank you to Shahar Hameiri for his recent post on RAMSI. No doubt we’ll be hearing and talking a lot about the impact and legacy of the mission in the coming months. Indeed in the last few days, we hear that the last of the NZ military rotations has completed its input.

Shahar’s particular viewpoint is one I find intriguing. Certainly the influence of those involved in logging on the political economy of Solomon Islands has been and continues to be significant.

In terms of the wider issue of the impact and legacy of RAMSI a number of things arise. Of most concern is the perception that the ‘institutional strengthening’ aspect of the mission has, in effect, created a parallel government rather than assisting local stakeholders in developing and maintaining crucial processes and systems that can be embedded and sustained. It’s hard to see how this has contributed to the statebuilding project overall. Allied with this (and alluded to by Shahar) is the skewing effect on the economy (particularly in Honiara) of the influx of military and police personnel as well as expatriate advisers wanting (and paying for) services and goods (but mainly services) of various kinds. It is a matter of concern as to what the social impacts will be if and when this largely artificial economic buttress is removed.

Managing the effect of withdrawing this type of economic buttress is not an easy challenge to address in any environment. The first aspect of addressing this challenge is to acknowledge its existence and identify potential risks, particularly those relating to social conflict at an early stage where possible. Allied to this is the importance of acknowledging the wider social impacts of a long-term intervention such as RAMSI on a small yet complex society such as that of Solomon Islands. It is inevitable that the presence of this mission will leave a range of impressions on the country, especially in Honiara where it’s most visible. These impressions span a range of things both tangible and intangible. The ‘exit strategy’ for RAMSI needs to encompass a whole lot more than putting people and equipment on planes and ships. It’s not possible for an outside influence, even one as significant as RAMSI, to ‘do’ nation building for a sovereign state. However, what is to be hoped is that Operation ‘Helpem Fren’ will have indeed assisted the people of Solomon Islands to recover from a very painful period in order to move forward on a their own journey.

Tess Newton Cain specialises in developing knowledge connections in the South Pacific region. She is a research associate of the Development Policy Centre and is currently employed by the Pacific Institute of Public Policy.

What the Kiwis want from trans-Tasman defence relations

28 November 2012/in Strategist Article

It’s hard to get folks excited about the Australian–New Zealand defence relationship. It’s uncontroversial because we’re already close partners in a fairly low octane South Pacific neighbourhood, where we’re expected to work together. And it’s often overshadowed by links with bigger and more distant players. Chief among these is Australia’s long-standing and very close relationship with the United States. Stephen Smith and Jonathan Coleman may have met in the same city (Perth) and the same month (November) for their annual Australian–New Zealand Defence Ministerial consultations as the biennial AUSMIN talks which had earlier involved Smith, Leon Panetta, Bob Carr and Hillary Clinton. But you would have to be from Mars to expect the media interest to be anywhere near equal.

If I was an Australian defence planner—a tough job in today’s austere times—I’d still be looking to the US relationship to have a larger impact on the future shape of the ADF. But for defence policymakers here in New Zealand, the same formula doesn’t apply. That’s not to deny that our defence relationship with the United States has come on in leaps and bounds over the last couple of years. There are even hints on an informal ANZUS triangle coming onto the scene—the Smith/Coleman communiqué indicated that New Zealand forces will observe the 2013 US–Australian Talisman Sabre exercise ‘with the aim of full participation from 2015 onwards.’

But it would take a minor revolution for New Zealand’s burgeoning relationship with the US to steal first place in Wellington’s calculations from defence links with Australia. And because the Australia–NZ relationship matters a whole lot on one side of the Tasman and rather less on the other (militarily, as well as economically and politically), New Zealand has work to do to stay on Canberra’s radar screen. That could get harder as Australia pays more attention to its links with significant Asian powers, including Indonesia, and possibly Japan and India, as the region’s geopolitical shifts become more evident. And as Australia looks more to its north and west, and especially out to the Indian Ocean, it might not see much of New Zealand. Read more

New Zealanders and the rising cost of Afghanistan

6 September 2012/in Strategist Article

Two multiple casualty incidents in one fortnight have made August the deadliest period for New Zealand’s Defence Force in Afghanistan. In those two weeks, the death toll among New Zealand’s deployed forces—in theatre for a decade—has doubled.

These incidents occurred in the increasingly difficult northeast portion of Bamiyan, the central and relatively calm province where New Zealand has maintained a Provincial Reconstruction Team since 2003. The common view is that the attackers appeared to be operating from across the border in neighbouring Baghlan Province.

Recent media commentary on these incidents increasingly asks direct questions about New Zealand’s commitment in Afghanistan. Why are we still there? What have we really accomplished? Shouldn’t we be getting out right now? Read more

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