Tag Archive for: Natuna Islands

Something’s gotta give: Indonesia’s policy options in the Natunas

Image courtesy of Flickr user Cooperation Afloat Readiness Training (CARAT)

For the third time this year, the Indonesian navy has faced off against Chinese fishing vessels trawling within the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone surrounding the Natuna Islands. The latest incident occurred on 17 June when an Indonesian warship pursued and fired warning shots at the Chinese vessels, which were ultimately confiscated and their crews detained.

Indonesia and China continue to butt heads on official interpretations of the incident. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi used the aftermath of the spat to reiterate Indonesia’s position on the South China Sea issue: as Indonesia shares no overlapping territorial waters with China, it’ll remain a non-claimant state. China’s foreign ministry took an alternative view, stating that ‘China and Indonesia have overlapping claims for maritime rights and interests’ in the waters surrounding the Natunas. As Beijing expands upon its claim that those waters are a ‘traditional Chinese fishing ground’ and Indonesian lawmakers urge the government take a firmer stance on the disputed waters, it’s important that the Indonesian government actively canvasses its options.

Currently Indonesia appears to stubbornly stick to a position of ‘hollow neutrality’. This is fundamentally a ‘see no China’ policy wherein it rejects the notion of provoking or confronting China over contested waters. Regardless of whether Indonesia continues down this path, it’s likely that the number of incursions will continue to rise within the boundaries of Indonesia’s EEZ—especially as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) prepares to hand down its ruling on the Philippines v. China case. In other words, China will continue to take advantage of Indonesia’s uncertain posture. China’s acknowledgment of overlapping claims indicates that perhaps Beijing doesn’t see the waters off the Natunas as part of Indonesia’s EEZ, which aggressively expands its previous claim that the area is a ‘traditional fishing ground.’ The now-disputed waters have the potential to increasingly become a hotspot where China can demonstrate its resolve.

Complicating Jakarta’s position is the poor coordination evident in cross-departmental responses to China’s maritime incursions. As Foreign Minister Marsudi repeats her stance on Indonesia’s non-claimant status, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti has argued that she ‘will not consider relations between countries in this matter,’ and that the incursions are ‘a serious offense’. To have both ministers on such different pages spells trouble for a solid and consistent approach that works in Indonesia’s interests.

Of course, Indonesia could opt to speak with one voice on the matter. Pudjiastuti (and others) are attempting to reframe the incursions in public discourse. The issue is currently being presented merely as an economic maritime resources dispute. There have been few strident assertions about protecting Indonesia’s sovereignty of the kind that we saw at the beginning of Jokowi’s presidency. Avoiding that kind of tough talk means economic ties with Southeast Asia’s largest growth engine go relatively unharmed. Should Indonesian leaders shift to talking about the incursions as a political, territorial sovereignty dispute, Indonesia takes a greater risk—but still stands to gain. That’ll be particularly important as China increasingly seeks to enforce its maritime claims.

Indonesia should make clear that its money is on international law. By upgrading its South China Sea policy to reflect the rapidly changing maritime environment in which it has a serious stake, Indonesia signals to states seeking to challenge the boundaries of its EEZ (read: China) that such an action is an incursion upon Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty. It would strengthen its position that states choosing to ignore those boundaries are subverting the regional rules-based order established by UNCLOS and supported by ASEAN.

Both Indonesia and ASEAN stand to benefit from pitching their tents in the camp of international law. As an influential, de-facto lead of ASEAN, Indonesia can promote, within the group, the idea of putting necks on the line for the sake of a resolute stance—perhaps a second round of attempting to clarify the Association’s position on the South China Sea after last week’s disappointing U-turn.

But while change is tempting, there are many reasons why Indonesia is unlikely to alter its policy stance on the South China Sea. By shedding its status as a non-claimant, Indonesia could place itself in the uncomfortable position of justifying China’s request to negotiate over the maritime boundary. By revamping its South China Sea policy to take a harder line with China, Indonesia would then be legitimising China’s claim that a border dispute exists—something that many Indonesian foreign ministers have been both denying and attempting to avoid. There are also routes for Indonesia to maintain strategic ambiguity by ‘forging partnerships with multiple powers’ (PDF) with security interests in the region, which wouldn’t require it to jump headlong into an explicit border clash with China.

Furthermore, it’s highly unlikely that Jakarta would become ASEAN’s new leader on the South China Sea. ASEAN’s fracturing on the issue are perfectly illustrated by Cambodian Prime Minister Hung Sen stating that his country wouldn’t support the PCA’s ruling. The diversity in stances in ASEAN shows that the issue runs deeper than even the Association’s Fundamental Principles, which include mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and the settlement of disputes by peaceful manner, can encompass. So, really, why would Indonesia toss its hat in the ring?

Indonesia must decide soon whether or not to upgrade its South China Sea policies, as developments in the region are quickly shaping the strategic environment. Indonesia can choose to act preventatively and establish a firm, unified whole-of-government approach, and unequivocally throw its weight behind international law. Alternatively, it can maintain its neutral stance.

China can and will up its game in enforcing the boundaries of the nine-dash line claim—especially as the PCA’s 12 July ruling draws nearer. How Indonesia chooses to act next will set an important precedent in the region. And forming a firm and unambiguous stance on dealing with encroachments on water that will only become more contested should be at the forefront of Indonesian policymakers’ minds.

Indonesia, China and the Natuna Islands: a test for Jokowi’s maritime doctrine


Last Sunday’s incident north of Indonesia’s Natuna islands, in which two armed Chinese Coastguard ships forced an Indonesian patrol craft to release an intruding Chinese trawler, shows once again that Jakarta must confront the reality of an overlap between its 200-mile economic zone and China’s ‘historic’ nine-dash line of maritime sovereignty that penetrates deep into the South China Sea.

Indonesia may not be a claimant to the disputed Spratly Islands, but the incident is the first real test of President Joko Widodo’s ambition of turning the country into a maritime power, a policy that necessarily means asserting sovereignty over its vast sea boundaries.

Although it has strongly supported ASEAN’s efforts to create a Code of Conduct to head off the danger of open conflict, Indonesia’s approach up to now has seemed strangely adrift at a time when superpower rivalry in the region is heating up.

Former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono turned a blind eye to three incidents, two in 2010 and one in 2013, in which Chinese gunboats forced Indonesian fisheries protection craft to release Chinese poachers caught fishing in Natuna waters.

Not only has the nine-dash line become an annoying ambiguity Beijing refuses to explain, but those incidents, largely unpublicised at the time, showed China was willing to use threats of violence to enforce its version of the maritime boundary.

Widodo has been equally tentative in his approach to Beijing, particularly with Chinese companies financing and building some of his treasured infrastructure ventures, including the Jakarta-Bandung rapid rail project and several major coal-fired power plants.

This time Indonesia detained all eight crew members and launched an official protest, with feisty Fisheries and Maritime Affairs Minister Susi Pudjiastuti summoning Chinese Ambassador Xie Feng to demand an explanation.

Indonesia has always claimed it doesn’t have a dispute with Beijing in the South China Sea, but a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement claiming the trawler was in ‘traditional Chinese fishing grounds’ will be hard to ignore.

Although Indonesia has sunk 155 foreign fishing vessels since a crackdown against illegal fishermen went into force at the start of Widodo’s presidency in late 2014, only one was of Chinese origin–and even that had been captured back in 2009.

Soon after the campaign began, Pudjiastuti received an unsigned letter at her home, bearing a Chinese Embassy stamp, which warned of dire consequences if captured Chinese trawlers were scuttled, like those from Thailand, Vietnam and other neighbouring countries. ‘I think they have a long term global view and in that they see the Chinese lake to the south as a necessary part of that view,’ says one former senior Indonesian diplomat. ‘The Law of the Sea isn’t the only reference for them. It’s anything that serves their interest.’

Given the unfolding events in the South China Sea and its designated job of protecting an archipelago that sprawls across some of the world’s most important trading routes, it’s extraordinary that the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) still plays only a minor role in the nation’s strategic planning.

Indeed, even the Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs is more preoccupied with day-to-day domestic events than coming up with strategic guidance on what the region might look like in 20 years and how the military should position itself.

Instead, with the TNI having surprisingly little to say about big power involvement in the region, it is the Foreign Ministry which takes the lead by default in pursuing a so-called ‘free and active’ policy, built largely around enhancing ASEAN’s role as a burgeoning but hardly unified regional community.

In its still-to-be-released 2014 Defence White Paper, TNI does acknowledge the possibility of Indonesia being affected if tensions in the South China Sea erupt into conflict. But mostly it plays down external threats and focuses on international terrorism, transnational crime and illegal immigration as priority issues.

In the past two years, TNI commander Gen. Gatot Nurmantyo has crafted those issues into a newly-developed theory of an international conspiracy in which unnamed foreign states are supposedly using domestic proxies to weaken the country from within and to rob it of its resources.

It remains unclear what real evidence he has to support the idea, but it serves as an ideological justification for the military’s efforts to regain a more prominent role in internal security. As the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) noted in a recent report: ‘For the TNI, the great value of the proxy war thesis is that it fuses international and domestic threats and suggests that to deal with an external threat, the military must strengthen its internal security role’.

Apart from superficial elements, officials in the wider region complain that Indonesia doesn’t have a coherent foreign policy. Domestic critics agree, saying the problem lies in the whole policy-making process itself.

Even continuing to place ASEAN as a cornerstone of what is largely a reactive policy isn’t convincing given the fact that most Indonesians see the newly-implemented ASEAN Economic Community as more of a threat than a challenge because of logistical and educational weaknesses.

Yudhoyono openly welcomed US President Barack Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’—and the training of US Marines in northern Australia—because he was worried the serious inroads the Chinese were making into the region threatened to squeeze ASEAN apart.

But if it was a good example of SBY being a ‘foreign policy president,’ Indonesia has since failed to build on the leadership role it saw for itself under his presidency, or in advancing the concept of a Code of Conduct that will hopefully make the South China Sea a safer place.