No rest for the weary as Australia is faced with another bout of damaging Snowden revelations. Latest documents suggest that the Defence Signals Directorate (now the Australian Signals Directorate) offered to ‘share bulk, unselected, unminimised metadata,’ likely including data from Australian nationals. Following the revelations, Attorney-General George Brandis faced a grilling on the floor of the Senate as various definitions of metadata were batted about. Canada came off quite well in the latest leak by imposing privacy restraints on data pooling, however word that it let the NSA spy on the 2010 G20 and G8 summits has certainly soured moods.
On The Strategist our own Big Data debate rages on, with Anthony Bergin questioning whether big data tactics can keep up with shifts in terrorist tactics and David Schaefer introducing a new dimension to the discussion with metadata for cybersecurity. While ABC’s Caro Meldrum-Hanna questioned whether Australians should even be concerned with all the talk of mass surveillance, UN special rapporteur Ben Emmerson called metadata surveillance ‘at the apex of public interest concern,’ elevating the issue further by launching a UN investigation. Read more
To look at recent defence white papers you wouldn’t know that Australia’s special forces (SF) had been deeply involved in the 9/11 wars and have suffered half the killed in action losses. Indeed, looking across the 1994, 2000, 2009 and 2013 white papers, the post-Cold War era seemingly continues as far as our SF are concerned. The reality is starkly different. The SF have become a highly valued, well-resourced and sizeable part of the ADF force structure. For this to continue—and the strategic threat environment suggests it should—the next white paper needs to include a considered discussion of the role and future shape of our SF.
Today’s SF force structure is a response to the non-state actor, violent extremist network threat. Before the 9/11 attacks, the SF was a boutique arm, typically intended to undertake long range, long duration surveillance and reconnaissance tasks. But the demands of combat operations during the last decade have transformed the way SF are now used operationally, especially in three areas: working with friendly airpower to win wars, the tight integration of operations and intelligence and the return to favour of combat advisers. Read more
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Despite the aphorism that generals always prepare for the last war, the 2011 Libyan campaign to oust the Gadhafi regime presents some useful pointers regarding the exercise of deadly force by Australia. This is especially so when compared with the lengthy, costly and perhaps inconclusive military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. From a Western perspective, the Libyan campaign was short, cheap, and successful.
Nineteen nations, employing the most potent military coalition in the world (NATO) attacked a small country, of 6.6 million people, for seven months to eventually force a change of regime. No NATO personnel were lost in combat, there were few civilian casualties caused by NATO and the mission was clearly achieved. The cost was about one billion dollars, one ninth of what it costs for a month in Afghanistan.
The campaign has been widely hailed by air power advocates, but it was more than just a sophisticated air campaign. Forces from aerospace, land and maritime and cyber domains were all needed to ensure success. In the opening attack on the night of 19 March 2011, 45 precision munitions from three B-2 bombers aircraft and 110 Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched against air-defence and other targets. The British also launched Tomahawks and delivered Storm Shadow cruise missiles from strike aircraft flying from Britain. This initial engagement, mainly by the US with some UK and French support, was crucial to the eventual outcome as it enabled subsequent operations to occur unencumbered by an air threat, and it began the attrition of Libyan military assets. Once air superiority had been established, the Europeans were then able to conduct about 90 per cent of all strike sorties.
The employment of precision guided missiles was central to maintaining domestic public opinion, ensuring fewer civilian casualties as well as removing the air threat. This part of the campaign is a model for the future and Australia is working to be able to implement a similar strategy. The elements required included Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance capabilities, aerial tanker support and a supply of precision-guided weapons. Australia is currently purchasing the Growler electronic warfare aircraft, which potentially offers an offensive cyber capability. Australian forces, with the JSOW-C long range strike weapon on Super Hornets have similarly capable missiles and modern combat aircraft with which to deliver air superiority. Read more
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