Russia’s likely to be pleased with the outcomes of the NATO meeting in Warsaw and will certainly not regard their strategic position as weakened. Russia will welcome signs of discord and posturing within both NATO and the European Union. The NATO emphasis on increased deterrence isn’t likely to restrict Russia from acting militarily in pursuit of its interests.

Despite strong statements condemning Russian intervention in the Ukraine, NATO support for Ukraine remains largely symbolic, and limited to diplomacy and some capacity building initiatives. In a telephone hook up with Putin at the start of the Warsaw summit, Merkel and Hollande stressed the need to intensify negotiations to implement the 2015 Minsk II agreements. Implementation would represent a setback for the Ukraine and—along with incorporation of Crimea—a substantive loss of sovereignty, as it would secure Russia’s significant strategic gains.

At Warsaw, NATO deferred any decision on a Black Sea fleet to challenge Russia’s dominant and growing naval presence in the Black Sea. Romania and Bulgaria reversed their original support following Russian warnings. Even the position of Turkey, originally an advocate, became unclear in the wake of its growing rapprochement with Russia. As Russia begins operating advanced frigates and submarines in the Black Sea, its capacity to exert its influence on the littoral nations will likely grow.

Failure to address control of the Black Sea may prove NATO’s biggest strategic shortcoming at Warsaw, given its intention to bring Georgia into the alliance. Russia’s foreign policy commits it to the security of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and it has expressed opposition to Georgia’s membership of NATO. Russia can be expected to resist NATO penetration into the Trans-Caucasus that connects it with Turkey and Iran and contains Chechnya, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Russian domination of the Black Sea would be key to military action in support of Russia’s interests in the Trans-Caucasus. Russia’s growing rapprochement with Turkey will ensure its strategically important naval access to the Mediterranean through Turkey’s control of the Bosporus and Dardanelle straits.

NATO has a problem of capability in Europe. Russia would have noted that the announcement on military expenditure by European members of the alliance was muted and hopeful rather than optimistic. The NATO guideline for defence expenditure is 2% of GDP. Only Greece, the UK, Estonia and Poland currently meet that requirement, with 19 members falling below 1.5% of GDP—including France, Germany, Spain, Turkey and Canada. Russia must question the credibility of NATO’s capacity to meet and sustain the Warsaw commitment to enhanced collective defence and deterrence .

Europe isn’t anti-Russia. Gaining public support for increased investment in defence capabilities is going to be difficult, especially as rising nationalistic Eurosceptic parties challenge the traditional parties in Europe over the next 18 months. Finding support for maintaining sanctions on Russia also won’t be easy.

According to a recent Pew Research Center survey, the majority of European citizens see Daesh (76%) and climate change (66%) as the major potential threats to European security, followed by cyber attacks (54%), refugees (49%) and then tensions with Russia (34%). One of the most significant findings was the widespread disapproval of the EU’s policy on Russia, with many Europeans believing it more important to have a strong economic relationship with Russia than take tough foreign policy positions.

Politicians anxious about coming elections, and the economic consequences of Brexit, are increasingly opposed to sanctioning Russia. The French Senate overwhelmingly voted in favour of lifting sanctions on Russia despite government opposition. The Italian, Hungarian and Greek governments have spoken in favour of softening or lifting sanctions, arguing they’ve been ineffective and hurt Europe’s economy. Perhaps most significantly is Germany’s open questioning of the political and economic hardline towards Russia.

Russian observers couldn’t help but view the NATO Warsaw meeting in the context of the contemporary challenges to EU unity. NATO and the EU issued a joint declaration in Warsaw. That initially seems odd as membership of those organisations overlaps to a significant degree—it would be astounding if their views weren’t in accord. NATO has 28 member countries, 22 of which are members of the EU. Both organisations make decisions by consensus among representatives of the same national governments represented at the European Council of Ministers or the North Atlantic Council.

The joint declaration is aimed directly at connecting EU unity with European security, in the hope of shoring up support for the EU. It was purely a political exercise.

Russia would be justified in believing that NATO’s decision to rotate troops through Eastern Europe is largely tokenistic and that the appetite for confrontation isn’t strong among Western European countries. As European leaders currently face strong challenges from euro-sceptic nationalists emboldened by Brexit—and the real possibility of a NATO-sceptic Trump presidency looms—Russia won’t be uneasy post-Warsaw.

The second annual Sino–US High-Level Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues was held last Wednesday in Beijing. According to a Department of Homeland Security press release the ministerial-level meeting agreed on several new initiatives including a second cybercrime table top exercise and  implementation of the ‘US–China Cybercrime and Related Issues Hotline Mechanism’ before September 2016. The US and China also agreed to increase bilateral exchange of cybercrime information and further cooperation in several areas including the misuse of technology and communications for terrorist activities. In The Diplomat  Franz-Stefan Gady noted that the countries’ cooperation on terrorism is particularly ‘striking’, given their very different understandings of what might be classified as terrorism.

Talks such as this are one part of the US strategy to address cyber incidents linked to China, a strategy that not all parts of the US establishment agree is effective. However, a new report from FireEye seems to indicate that something is working, as the activity of Chinese-linked Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) observed by FireEye s has declined significantly since 2013. FireEye believes that there are several probable causes including its own ‘APT1’ report, US legal action against PLA hackers, and reports that the US was considering sanctions against China before the visit of Xi Jinping in September 2015. In that time there has also been a complete reorganisation of China’s military, which included the establishment of the Strategic Support Force incorporating the PLA’s cyber personnel. This doesn’t mean China is no longer a threat, and the report notes China’s cyber operations have become ‘more focused, calculated, and still successful in compromising corporate networks’.

Russian cyber capability is also under an increasingly bright spotlight this week, as NATO considers its response to Russia’s increasing use of ‘grey zone’ strategies such as cyber operations before its summit in Warsaw next month. In The New York Times, David Sanger has critically reviewed NATO’s approach to cyberspace, specifically its passive approach to cyber threats and the hesitance of the US and UK to share cyber capability with other members. Sanger quotes RAND’s Martin Libicki who said that Russia’s cyber activities are part of a broader Russian strategy to spread misinformation to keep NATO partners off-balance and intimidate the smaller members of the alliance.

Over at DefenseOne  Jarno Limnell from Finland has also called for a stronger response to Russian cyber activity. Limnell emphasises the threat the complexity of Russian cyber operations poses to security and the muted response of the west so far noting that, ‘Russia is at the forefront of the global move toward a greater strategic use of cyber capabilities to persuade adversaries to change their behaviour’. That goes some way towards explaining the news in Der Spiegel this week that German security agencies have concluded that Daesh’s ‘Cyber Caliphate’ is more likely a Russian enterprise with no connection to Daesh. Russia’s cyber expertise extends to the criminal sphere also, with Kaspersky Lab researchers releasing information this week on a Russian cybercrime forum that sells access to compromised servers, pre-loaded with all the software required for a plethora of malicious cyber activities for as low as AU$8.

In the UK, the Parliamentary Inquiry by the Culture, Media and Sport Committee into last year’s hack at telco TalkTalk has produced its first report. The report made 17 recommendations to improve cyber security practice and protection of personal data. Among the recommendations was the suggestion that ‘CEO compensation should be linked to effective cybersecurity’ and that companies be fined for cyber security breaches. It was also proposed that fines increase in severity if the breach is the result of the exploitation of well-known vulnerabilities. The Committee noted its surprise that developers of major new major new IT systems and applications aren’t required to incorporate security considerations, and recommended that ‘security by design’ become a core principle for new systems.

Export controls for cyber security and encryption products are on the agenda at the next round of Wassenaar Arrangement talks in Vienna this week. The US is seeking to reverse the previously agreed restrictions that it believes restricts the export of legitimate cyber security software and technology. The restrictions—which Australia has incorporated into its Defence and Strategic Goods List of export controlled items—are intended to prevent technology such as cyber intrusion software being provided to authoritarian regimes. Meanwhile, major cyber security exporter Israel has just finalised a review of its cyber export requirements to try and balance the Wassenaar requirements and the health of its cyber security industry. Israel’s National Cyber Directorate and Ministry of Economy will establish a new agency to manage the export of cyber technologies. This does, however, exclude the technologies being supplied to security agencies and military users, which will remain under the oversight of the Defence Ministry’s Defence Export Controls Agency.

And finally— if dystopian visions of a looming cyber apocalypse are your preferred bed time reading— check out this annotated account of a future cyber-attack from New York Magazine.

Recent developments in Ukraine are raising serious concerns about the credibility and trustworthiness of the Russian Federation as a member of the international community. The annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and Russia’s role in forging and escalating an armed conflict in eastern Ukraine have been done with complete disregard for international law. Russia’s actions have posed a direct threat to the post-1989 European security order. Moreover, they’ve already had global implications. Among the multitude of consequences was the downing of Malaysia Airlines MH17 plane in Donbas, which claimed the lives of 36 Australians. The Ukraine–Russia conflict was suddenly an issue of concern to Australia’s elected representatives. As fighting in Donbas continues and Australia supports consecutive rounds of sanctions being imposed on Russia, it’s imperative that we understand Putin’s world view and the logic behind his regime’s actions in Russia, Ukraine and globally.  

The following points attempt to present the perspective of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Readers should maintain a healthy distance to it and not treat it in a literal manner.

1. Russia first: Domestic affairs are a priority. The wider world is a contrasting and sinister background for Russia’s re-emergence as the only morally legitimate global power, competing in a multipolar world on equal terms with the United States and China. To rule the Russian Federation, subordinated authorities can and should control the minds and actions of the citizenry through any means necessary.
2. Democracy is a noble but unrealistic idea: The very concept of democracy has largely been discredited in Russia and abroad. Democracy can’t be fully realised anywhere. The attempts to introduce democracy in Russia in the 1990s resulted in anarchy and downgrading of the Soviet legacy. Today, as in the past, Russians expect to be ruled by strong leaders who implement rigorous legislation. However, the severity of Russian laws is balanced by the fact that their enforcement is optional.
3. Soviet Union to be reincarnated: Whoever doesn’t miss the Soviet Union has no heart; whoever wants it back has no brain. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster. Tens of millions of compatriots found themselves outside of the Russian state. The Eurasian Economic Union is the Soviet Union’s new embodiment; it will be a Russian dominium.
4. West—divide et impera: Western societies (US, EU) are demoralised and shouldn’t be perceived as a model for Russian development. Despite its economic or military attributes, the West lacks strong political and moral leadership. It is thus impotent. This is the image that needs to be reinforced in the minds of both Russians and of those in Western societies. Psychological subversion should be inspired in the West to destabilise its social order and its structures of power, authority and hierarchy. Instigating proxy wars is praiseworthy and should be a common practise—the old KGB practice is to strike first.
5. Ukraine is too important to lose: The territory of Ukraine isn’t Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’, it’s a rightful Russian land. Zbigniew Brzezinski was correct to say that ‘without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.’ Reunifying Crimea was a move justified by history, security interests and the need to protect the peninsula’s predominantly Russian population. The crisis in Ukraine is the result of ‘programming’ errors in the past, as well as active Western meddling in the country’s affairs. These errors are compounded by America’s willingness to significantly weaken the Russian Federation through ‘annexing Ukraine’ into the Western liberal democratic order. Ukraine has to cooperate with Russia. If not, it will turn into no man’s land; a new ‘Ukrainian Curtain’ will descend across the continent to separate Russia from the West. Crimea is Ours! /Крым наш!/
6. NATO was and will continue to be our enemy: Recent defence doctrine justly identifies NATO as the chief threat to Russian security and claims the right to use nuclear weapons to counter any aggression that “threatens the very existence” of Russia. Cooperation with NATO is tolerable only with a paradigm that win-win policy isn’t satisfying. While a military victory over NATO isn’t possible, a political victory is achievable and should be pursued by weakening the morale of NATO members, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.
7. Oligarchs must be loyal: The tenants of the Russian treasury are useful as long as their loyalty is unquestionable. There are three rules to follow. First, federal policy is the president’s business. Second, oligarchs must pay taxes. Third, each oligarch is subject to investigation. Those who don’t take the first two rules seriously should be confronted with the implementation of the third one.
8. Armed Forces must deter: Maintaining one of the world’s biggest nuclear arsenals is less expensive than modernising the entire Armed Forces. However, military expenses should be a priority in the federal budget; they take priority over the social needs of the citizenry. Soldiers are our pride, but their executives should be replaced or relocated regularly so as not to accumulate significant power. Trust, but verify! /Доверяй, но проверяй!/
9. Sanctions won’t hurt us: Russian compatriots need to believe that they are citizens of a rising global power; this comes with costs. These costs, such as sanctions, are to be borne by both the state and its citizens. Sanctions will work to make us self-reliant and independent from external markets. As no state is an island in the world economy, China will become a main trading partner. Our common ground is anti-American and anti-Western.
10. A free media—free from Western influence: Journalists should be missionaries of ideas, not neutral observers. The Russian media is free to promote the ideal of a ‘Strong Russia’ and the marked stress on patriotism and social solidarity. Individualistic cultures in the demoralised West demand to be fully informed but collectivistic societies value loyalty above all. Information must serve a social purpose. The internet was a CIA project, therefore Russian government is obliged to censor its deleterious effect on society. The media should take into account the challenges the nation is facing now. When the nation mobilises to achieve a goal, the obligations belong to everyone, including the media.

Australians seem unconcerned about the new sanctions the government seems set to impose on Russia. After the MH17 tragedy, that’s understandable. But sanctions could sour relations with Russia for decades to come. Truth is, they’ve never really been good.

Having played the leading role in defeating Napoleon, tsarist Russia immediately replaced France in the fears of our nineteenth-century forebears: batteries erected in the 1850s to deter a feared Russian invasion still line the headlands of many Australian cities.

Precisely because the imaginative path to ‘Russia as enemy’ in Western culture is so well trodden, we should beware of following it blindly. Read more

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has chalked up a string of wins lately—all in the field of strategic policy. The visit by President Obama led to a public strengthening of US commitments to defence of the Senkakus; last week’s new formal partnership agreement with NATO underlined Tokyo’s continuing shift towards becoming a more ‘normal’ ally; and the latest moves to reinterpret the collective defence provisions permissible under Article 9 of the Constitution free the hands of Japanese policymakers to explore new forms of strategic engagement with friends and partners. All in all, it’s been a productive few weeks in Japanese strategic policy.

It’s true, of course, that Obama’s reassuring tones won’t completely assuage Tokyo’s concerns that its ally is playing a smaller role in Asia Pacific security these days. But the Japanese extracted from the president’s visit about as much as could have been reasonably expected. Obama’s reassurance that the Senkakus were covered by Article 5 of the Japan–US Security Treaty wasn’t—as some have cast it—a promise to go to war with China. The Treaty is much like ANZUS: it commits the parties to act to meet the common danger if either is attacked, but it doesn’t say how they must act. Nor was Japan looking for such a promise; it wanted a US statement that distinguished between the Senkakus and the various South China Sea disputes, in which the US makes no determination of ownership. That was delivered—and the delivery should give Beijing pause for reflection. Read more