The reappearance of JI has major relevance for Australia given that Indonesia is a large and important strategic partner; any threats to Jakarta’s internal stability must therefore occupy a central place in Canberra’s foreign, defence and security calculations.
This is especially true at a time when Australia is seeking to court a closer relationship with Indonesia in response to Beijing’s increased assertiveness in the region and its uncompromising stance on territorial disputes in the South China Sea. At the same time, Australia has been directly caught in the cross-hairs of JI’s past violent activities, with the 2002 bombings in Bali remaining the largest loss of life to a terrorist attack in the nation’s history.
Australia could do several things to help Indonesia in dealing with the re-emergent JI threat:
First, the scope of support that Canberra is currently providing for Jakarta’s evolving strategy of countering violent extremism could be further expanded, particularly by better leveraging civil society organisations in program design and implementation.
Second, advice could be rendered on how best to ensure that kinetic counterterrorist responses don’t boost the JI missive that Jakarta’s secular order is inherently biased against the country’s Muslim interests.
Third, assistance could be provided to support reform of the national penal system, which in many respects continues to act as an important incubator for terrorist indoctrination and recruitment.
Fourth, best practices for restricting online vectors for disseminating extremist propaganda could be shared. Assisting with the development of the nascent Bandan Siber dan Sandi Negara (National Cyber and Encryption Agency) would be useful in this regard.
Finally, Australia could serve as an intermediary between Jakarta and Manila for determining whether there are any concrete indications that JI is seeking to reconsolidate its logistical presence in Mindanao. One potential mechanism that could be leveraged to promote this dialogue is the existing trilateral commission supporting Malaysia–Philippines–Indonesia (MALPHINDO) naval patrols in the Sulu and Celebes seas.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/17222338/beach-ocean-storm.jpg4501350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2019-03-21 06:00:002025-03-06 15:10:32Jemaah Islamiyah: An uncertain future
Preparing for the Era of Disasters, a new ASPI Special Report by Dr Robert Glasser, warns that we are entering a new era in the security of Australia, not because of terrorism, the rise of China or even the cybersecurity threat, but because of climate change.
As the world warms beyond 2°C, as now seems increasingly likely, an era of disasters will be upon us with profound implications for how we organise ourselves to protect Australian lives, property and economic interests and our way of life.
The Report surveys the features of this emerging era of disasters including an increase in concurrent extreme weather events and in events that follow in closer succession. Communities may manage the first few but, in their weakened state, be overwhelmed by those following. Large parts of the country that are currently marginally viable for agriculture are increasingly likely to be in chronic crisis from the compounding impacts of the steady rise of temperature, floods, drought and bushfires. Dr Glasser contends that the scale of those impacts will be unprecedented, and the patterns that the hazards take will change in ways that will be difficult to anticipate.
He notes that this emerging Era of Disasters will not only increasingly stretch emergency services, undermine community resilience and escalate economic costs and losses of life, but also have profound implications for food security in our immediate region, with cascading impacts that will undermine Australia’s national security.
Dr Glasser outlines a number of steps the Australian Government and the state and local governments should begin taking now to prepare for the unprecedented scale of these emerging challenges, including:
scale-up Australia’s efforts to prevent the effects from natural hazards, such as from extreme weather, from becoming disasters through greater investment in disaster risk reduction.
increased planning for financial support to States for economic recovery following disasters and “fodder banks” and “land banks” to address the needs of communities in chronic crisis and the permanently displaced.
strengthening disaster response capacity and planning at all levels, including in the military which will play an increasingly important role in transporting firefighters and equipment, fodder drops from helicopters and the provision of shelters, etc. Joint task forces to coordinate the defence contribution, like the one established during the Black Saturday Victorian bushfires, will become increasingly necessary.
ensure that flood and bushfire risk maps, building codes, planning schemes, infrastructure delivery and the supporting legislation fully embed consideration of climate change effects.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/15225748/SR135_Preparing_Era_Disasters_banner.jpg4501350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2019-03-06 06:00:002025-03-06 15:05:36Preparing for the Era of Disasters
In 2018, many commentators pronounced the rules-based global order to be out for the count. This presents serious challenges for a country such as Australia, which has been an active contributor and clear beneficiary of that order. The government that we elect in 2019’s federal election will be faced with difficult strategic policy choices unlike any we’ve confronted in the past 50 years.
This volume contains 30 short essays that cover a vast range of subjects, from the big geostrategic challenges of our times, through to defence strategy; border, cyber and human security; and key emergent technologies.
The essays provide busy policymakers with policy recommendations to navigate this new world, including proposals that ‘break the rules’ of traditional policy settings. Each of the essays is easily readable in one sitting—but their insightful and ambitious policy recommendations may take a little longer to digest.
Previous Agenda for change publications are also available here: 2016 and 2013.
Launch Event
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/17220605/auParliamentHouse.jpg4491350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2019-02-26 06:00:002025-03-06 15:20:38Agenda for change – 2019
The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities.
What’s the problem?
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is expanding its research collaboration with universities outside of China. Since 2007, the PLA has sponsored more than 2,500 military scientists and engineers to study abroad and has developed relationships with researchers and institutions across the globe.1
This collaboration is highest in the Five Eyes countries, Germany and Singapore, and is often unintentionally supported by taxpayer funds.2 Australia has been engaged in the highest level of PLA collaboration among Five Eyes countries per capita, at six times the level in the US. Nearly all PLA scientists sent abroad are Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members who return to China on time.
Dozens of PLA scientists have obscured their military affiliations to travel to Five Eyes countries and the European Union, including at least 17 to Australia, where they work in areas such as hypersonic missiles and navigation technology. Those countries don’t count China as a security ally but rather treat it as one of their main intelligence adversaries.3
The activities discussed in this paper, described by the PLA as a process of ‘picking flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China’ (异国采花，中华酿蜜), risk harming the West’s strategic advantage.4
Helping a rival military develop its expertise and technology isn’t in the national interest, yet it’s not clear that Western universities and governments are fully aware of this phenomenon.5 Some universities have failed to respond to legitimate security concerns in their engagement with China. Current policies by governments and universities have not fully addressed issues like the transfer of knowledge and technology through collaboration with the PLA. Clear government policy towards universities working with the PLA is also lacking.6
What’s the solution?
Understanding and responding to PLA collaboration will require closer engagement between governments and universities. While universities haven’t self-regulated on this issue and haven’t controlled the associated security risks, universities and researchers will not effectively limit the risks of PLA collaboration on their own until governments develop clear policies on it.
Governments need to explore a wider range of tools for limiting technology transfer, including better scrutiny of visa applications by Chinese military scientists and further legislation targeting military end users.
Governments should also consider increasing funding to strategic science and technology fields, while actively limiting problematic foreign investment in those fields. Universities must recognise the risks of such collaboration and seek to learn the extent and nature of their collaboration with the PLA by actively working with government, civil society and security professionals.
Introduction
In 2017, the head of the American Association for the Advancement of Science said that ‘Scientific progress depends on openness, transparency and the free flow of ideas.’7 This collaborative and open spirit, including collaboration with Chinese scientists, has led to some of the great scientific achievements of recent times.8
While countries such as Australia and the US pride themselves on their scientific achievements, their universities and research institutes face limited or declining domestic funding.9 To address these issues, many universities have turned to China—an emerging scientific powerhouse that has sought to build ties to scientific communities around the world.10 This collaboration has generally been a productive and welcome part of the Australia–China relationship.
The Chinese military has also ridden this wave of research collaboration, sponsoring more than 2,500 scientists to travel to universities in technologically advanced countries such as Australia as students or visiting scholars over the past decade.11 The volume of peer-reviewed literature produced by PLA scientists in collaboration with foreign scientists each year has grown steadily since 2008, following increases in the number of PLA scientists sent abroad (Figure 1).12 Those scientists work in strategic and emerging technology sectors such as quantum physics, signal processing, cryptography, navigation technology and autonomous vehicles.
The PLA’s program of sending scientists abroad is different from standard military exchanges, in which military officers visit each other’s institutions. Those open exchanges build understanding, communication and relationships between militaries.
Figure 1: PLA collaboration, as measured by the number of peer-reviewed articles co-authored by PLA scientists with overseas scientists, 2006 to 2017
In contrast, the PLA National University of Defense Technology (NUDT, 解放军国防科学技术大学) appears to conceive of its military exchanges separately from its international research ties, which are concentrated in foreign universities and not military institutions.13 Scientists sent abroad by the PLA have minimal or no interaction with military personnel in their host countries. Some of those travelling overseas have actively used cover to disguise their military affiliations, claiming to be from non-existent academic institutions.
Around half of those sent abroad are PhD scholars who either complete their doctorates overseas or spend up to two years as visiting PhD scholars and who can usually be identified by searching peer-reviewed literature. While most come from NUDT, the Army Engineering University is another major source.14 The remaining half are sent overseas for short-term trips, spending up to a year as visiting scholars. Few of those scientists have left online traces of their time overseas.
While foreign universities’ ties with the PLA have grown, it isn’t clear that universities have developed an understanding of the PLA and how their collaboration with it differs from familiar forms of scientific collaboration. To date, there’s been no significant public discussion on why universities should be directly contributing to the technology of a non-allied military. Importantly, there’s also little evidence that universities are making any meaningful distinction between collaboration with the Chinese military and the rest of their collaboration with China.
A handful of universities have strongly defended their collaboration with the PLA. Among universities in Five Eyes countries, the University of New South Wales (UNSW) has published the most peer-reviewed literature in collaboration with PLA scientists. After attracting scrutiny for this collaboration, the university’s deputy vice-chancellor wrote, ‘Any fears that our intellectual property or security is undermined through our work with international partners are entirely unfounded.’15
Australia’s Curtin University has described its collaboration with the PLA in similar terms, insisting that work by its scientists with PLA experts on explosions and projectiles doesn’t violate any laws and is civilian research.16
Government research agencies have also engaged in collaboration with the PLA. For example, researchers at the Australian Government’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) have collaborated with NUDT scientists on cloud computing technology.
Those same NUDT scientists were using cloud computing technology for combat simulations.17 Large sums of government funds have been used for collaboration with PLA scientists. One professor at UNSW, for instance, worked with PLA scientists using Australian Research Council grants worth $2.3 million.18 Internationally, defence funding has also been used for research with PLA scientists; for example, a paper written by University of Manchester scientists with a visiting student from NUDT lists US Air Force and Navy grants as funding sources.19
International military–civil fusion
In China, the PLA’s overseas research collaboration is described in frank terms. The PLA Daily uses the saying ‘Picking flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China’ to explain how it seeks to leverage overseas expertise, research and training to develop better military technology.20
This is one aspect of what China calls ‘military–civil fusion’ (军民融合). The term refers to China’s efforts to improve its military’s ability to take advantage of the creativity of the civilian sector and develop its own indigenous military–industrial complex. Described by PLA experts as a ‘cornerstone of PRC national defense reform’, military–civil fusion is helping to drive the modernisation of the PLA.21
So important is military–civil fusion to President Xi Jinping’s military reforms that he described it earlier this year as a prerequisite for building strategic capabilities and a strong military.22
Illustrating the benefits that the PLA obtains from its overseas research collaboration, a publication run by China’s Ministry of Education stated that NUDT’s collaboration with the University of Cambridge to train visiting PLA students will ‘greatly raise the nation’s power in the fields of national defence, communications, anti-jamming for imaging and high-precision navigation’.23 Likewise, before travelling to Sweden for doctoral studies in quantum physics, an NUDT scientist was told by his supervisor, ‘Without breakthroughs in physics, how can there be rapid developments in weaponry?’24
Figure 2: Lieutenant General Yang Xuejun (2nd from right) and Xi Jinping, chairman of the Central Military Commission, in July 2017
Lieutenant-General Yang Xuejun (杨学军, Figure 2), who oversaw a substantial rise in NUDT’s overseas links when he was its president from 2011 to 2017, appears to be one of the key figures behind this phenomenon. NUDT, as the Chinese military’s largest science and technology university, can be seen as representative of broader initiatives in this area. The university is the main source of PLA scientists studying abroad and by 2013 had reportedly sent more than 1,600 scientists overseas as students or visiting scholars, including roughly a third of its PhD scholars.25 An article written by NUDT scholars claims that the university received 300m renminbi ($A60m) from the Chinese government to send 765 graduate students to study abroad.26 According to General Yang, who has implied that NUDT’s overseas ties are a form of military–civil fusion, the university ‘has already reaped great benefits from going down the open university path and the military–civil fusion road’.27
General Yang’s recent promotion to membership of the 205-member 19th CCP Central Committee and to leadership of the Academy of Military Sciences, the PLA’s premier research institution, reflects Xi Jinping’s emphasis on ‘rejuvenating the military with science and technology’.28 It was probably also a recognition of the success with which Yang developed NUDT’s international ties.
Yang, himself a supercomputer expert, has collaborated extensively with UNSW and ran the program to develop the Tianhe-1A supercomputer, once ranked as the world’s fastest supercomputer.29 The NUDT supercomputer program’s role in nuclear weapons testing led to NUDT being placed on the US Government’s Entity List in 2015, meaning that the university faces stricter export controls, yet substantial numbers of NUDT scientists continue to train outside China, including in the US, the UK and Australia.30
The PLA encourages scientists to work on areas of interest to the military while they’re overseas. For example, a 2016 article by NUDT specialists in graduate student education recommends that, in choosing where to study overseas, students’ first priority should be the relevance of the research direction of an overseas institution to their work in China, as they ‘must comprehensively consider the continuity of their research work when in China with that when they are studying overseas’.31 When students are overseas, the report adds, they should ‘fully take advantage of the cutting-edge research conditions and environment abroad’ and ‘map out the arrangements of their overseas research and their plans for research after returning to China’. This alignment of domestic and overseas work indicates that the cases of PLA scientists gaining skills while in Australia that they then use for military projects aren’t outliers; they’re representative examples.32
Sources of and destinations for PLA scientists
PLA scientists come from a wide range of institutions and disciplines within the Chinese military. Analysing peer-reviewed publications co-authored by PLA scientists and overseas scientists indicates that the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Germany were, in that order, the top five countries engaged in research collaboration with the PLA in 2017 (Figure 3). Those countries appear to be the primary destinations for PLA scientists sent abroad.
Figure 3: The top 10 countries for PLA collaboration, as measured by peer-reviewed literature co-authored by PLA scientists, 2006 to 2017
PLA scientists sent abroad as visiting scholars came from institutions such as:
the Northwestern Institute of Nuclear Technology (西北核技术研究所), which works on nuclear and high-power microwave weapons
the Chemical Defense Institute of the Academy of Military Sciences (军事科学院防化研究院), which specialises in chemical weapons research and has sent a sarin gas expert overseas
the Navy Submarine Academy (海军潜艇学院) in Qingdao
the Armored Forces Engineering Academy (装甲兵工程学院) in Beijing, which works on tank technology
the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center (中国空气动力研究与发展中心), which has sent scramjet researchers to study overseas
the Rocket Force Engineering University (火箭军工程大学), which conducts research for China’s missile programs
the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology (装备指挥技术学院), which in 2007 sent a specialist in antisatellite weaponry to the University of Michigan using civilian cover.33
The volume of peer-reviewed literature co-authored by PLA researchers and overseas researchers is a rough indicator of the level of PLA collaboration at each university. Figure 3 shows that the leading countries for PLA collaboration by this measure for 2017 were, in order, the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Germany, indicating that they’re likely to be the main destinations for PLA scientists studying abroad. Singapore, Sweden and the Netherlands are other major destinations for PLA scientists. Over the past decade, Australia has been engaged in the highest level of this collaboration among the Five Eyes countries per capita, at six times the level in the US.
It’s also possible to estimate the number of PLA scientists sent to each country since 2007, based on the above findings.34 Approximately 500 Chinese military scientists were sent to each of the UK and the US, roughly 300 each to Australia and Canada and more than 100 each to Germany and Singapore. Hundreds more have been sent to other countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan and France.
Figure 4, using the same dataset, shows the top 10 universities outside China for PLA collaboration. Nanyang Technological University in Singapore has the highest level of PLA collaboration, followed closely by UNSW in Australia. Other universities in Canada, Australia, the UK and the Netherlands also engage in high levels of collaboration with the PLA.35
Figure 4: The top 10 universities outside of China for PLA collaboration, as measured by the number of peer-reviewed publications, 2006 to 2017
The PLA’s links to universities across the world go beyond student admissions. The Chinese military, through its own universities and research institutions, has worked to build relationships with overseas universities and leading overseas researchers. A 2014 document published by NUDT claimed that the university had recruited 20 foreign nationals as teachers and ‘established academic relationships with over 100 universities and research units in over 50 countries and regions’.36
Scientists from Australia, the UK and the US are listed as potential doctoral supervisors for NUDT students in 2018.37
NUDT has also built ties with overseas universities at the institutional level. For example, NUDT’s Quantum Information Interdisciplinary Talent Training Program cooperates with the University of Cambridge’s Cavendish Laboratory.38 The People’s Daily claimed that, in addition to agreements with Oxford and Cambridge, NUDT has established ‘overseas study bases’ at institutions including Harvard University.39 New Zealand’s Massey University also signed a memorandum of understanding with NUDT in 2008.40
Maintaining loyalty to the CCP
The PLA, as the armed wing of the CCP, insists that all overseas party members strictly abide by ‘external exchange discipline standards’.41 According to the PLA Daily, ‘the openness of internationally expanding talent cultivation does not represent a “relaxation”, and we certainly cannot “let go”.’42 General Yang Xuejun has also specifically warned of the need to carefully manage military secrets while increasing the university’s openness.43
Those permitted to study overseas go through intensive training prior to their departure and are ‘all budding shoots with good grades and strong potential for innovation’.44 Alongside academic credentials, political credentials are also of key importance for military scientists hoping to study abroad. The PLA Daily warns that, if students sent overseas ‘develop issues with their politics and ideology, the consequences would be inconceivable (后果不堪设想)’.45 NUDT therefore appears to sponsor only CCP members for overseas study and works hard to maintain their loyalty to the party and negate ‘all kinds of harmful ideologies’.46 Reportedly, all 200 students and researchers from NUDT who were studying or visiting overseas in 2013 were party members.47
The People’s Daily claimed in 2013 that students sent overseas by NUDT had established eight party branches overseas and organised events for party members, so that ‘personnel studying abroad would keep their convictions rock-solid’ (坚守信念如磐).48 Another report from 2015 claimed that NUDT’s College of Optoelectric Science and Engineering alone had established 10 overseas party branches.49 More recent reports hint that such branches are still being established. For example, party media reported in October 2017 that students from one of NUDT’s colleges had established a WeChat group for the college’s more than 30 students overseas to study the 19th Party Congress.50 ‘Their red hearts,’ the report concluded, ‘look to the party.’
Party branches have also been used to coerce overseas Chinese scholars. An investigation by Foreign Policy found that some visiting students from Chinese universities who formed party branches abroad were asked to report on any subversive opinions held by their classmates.51 It’s probable that similar kinds of pressure are exerted on overseas PLA researchers.
Online communication forms an important part of PLA efforts to maintain discipline among overseas personnel and is complemented by in-person contact. One report stated that students from NUDT’s College of Optoelectric Science and Engineering ‘regularly chat with College leaders by video call and exchange emails with NUDT academic supervisors and student cadres to discuss their thoughts, exchange ideas on academic matters, and clarify points of interest’.52 Regulations on the political education of overseas students by the same NUDT college include provisions for ‘overseas inspection’ and for students to return to China in the middle of their study for ‘remedial education’.
One NUDT professor used a trip to an overseas conference as an opportunity to meet eight NUDT scientists studying in the region to ‘pass on the greetings and requests of party organisations’. The regulations also include provisions for ‘joint education and interaction with families’, which may imply that pressure on the family members of overseas PLA scientists is used to maintain discipline.53
The close watch that the PLA keeps on its overseas scientists helps ensure that all those sent abroad return to the Chinese military. NUDT, for example, requires that those applying to study abroad show their intent to return to ‘serve the construction of the nation, national defence and the military’.54
The PLA Daily claimed in 2013 that all the students whom NUDT had sent abroad in recent years returned on time to ‘become key forces in their work units’.55
Institutes that don’t exist: deception by PLA scientists
While most scientists sent abroad by the PLA appear to be open about which institutions they come from, this report has identified two dozen new cases of PLA scientists travelling abroad using cover to obscure their military affiliations. In at least 17 of these cases, PLA scientists used cover to travel to Australia. These scientists use various kinds of cover, ranging from the use of misleading historical names for their institutions to the use of names of non-existent institutions.
Features of deception by the PLA
An article from 2002 on the website of a Chinese overseas study agency offers insights into the use of cover. In response to a question asking whether having graduated from a military institution would affect one’s ability to get an overseas visa, the company responded:
Many military colleges and military units externally have common names (民间称呼) that don’t reveal their military characteristics. NUDT, for example, is externally known as Changsha Institute of Technology. This is the best way [to avoid having your visa application rejected].56
The Changsha Institute of Technology was a PLA institution subsumed by NUDT in 1975.57 While the quote above doesn’t come from an official source, it at least indicates how these unsophisticated but nonetheless effective covers are understood as tools for hiding one’s military background.
Besides using non-existent institutions with innocuous-sounding names as cover, PLA members also claim to be from real civilian institutions in the same regions as their military units. New Zealand MP Yang Jian, for example, who taught intelligence officers at the PLA Foreign Languages Institute in Luoyang, claimed in his New Zealand residency application to have worked at Luoyang University.58 Before moving to New Zealand in 1999, Yang received an Australian Government aid scholarship to study at the Australian National University, earning a master’s degree and doctorate in international relations. During that period, he interned at the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, and headed the Canberra Chinese Students and Scholars Association, which retains intimate ties to the Chinese Embassy to this day.59 Yang told media, ‘the system asked me to use the partner university,’ referring to Luoyang University.60
A number of PLA scientists using cover to travel abroad have created LinkedIn profiles using their cover institutions, which may have been used to shore up their claimed affiliations while overseas.61
The use of cover appears to be managed differently by each institution, some of which use cover far more often than others.62 Cover is also not used consistently within each institution. As described below, PLA Information Engineering University (PLAIEU) researchers have both used cover and openly stated their affiliation at the same conferences. It’s unclear whether this indicates that the use of cover is up to the discretion of each researcher or perhaps that it relates to the sensitivity of a researcher’s work or position in the PLA.
NUDT appears to no longer use the ‘Changsha Institute of Technology’ as cover, but it engages in a different kind of deception. A document published by NUDT for students hoping to study abroad advises them that, when providing documentation in their applications to foreign institutions, ‘military and political courses can be excluded’ from their academic records.63 This appears designed to mislead overseas authorities, universities and researchers by downplaying the extent to which NUDT is a military institution and to which these students are military scientists.
The Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology
Scientists from the PLA Rocket Force Engineering University (RFEU, 火箭军工程大学)64, a key research base for the PLA Rocket Force, claim to be from the ‘Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology’ (西安高技术研究所), which appears to only exist on paper.
At least five RFEU scientists claiming to be from the Xi’an Research Institute have travelled overseas as visiting scholars, including one of the PLA’s leading missile experts, Major General Hu Changhua (胡昌华), and three of his close associates at RFEU. General Hu (Figure 5), who heads RFEU’s Missile Testing and Control Simulation Experimental Teaching Centre, visited the University of Duisburg–Essen in Germany for four months in 2008.65 It’s unclear what he worked on in Germany, as he didn’t publish any papers while there, but his work for the PLA focuses on flight control systems and fault diagnosis for missiles.66
Two RFEU scientists who frequently publish with Hu, Zhou Zhijie (周志杰)67 and Wang Zhaoqiang (王兆强),68 were visiting scholars at universities in England; they claim in their English publications to be from the Xi’an Research Institute.69
Figure 5: Major General Hu Changhua, profiled by China Central Television’s military affairs channel in 2016:
‘Right now I’m a professor at RFEU and head of the Military Key Lab on Missile Testing and Control Technology.’
Figure 5: Major General Hu Changhua, profiled by China Central Television’s military affairs channel in 2016: ‘Right now I’m a professor at RFEU and head of the Military Key Lab on Missile Testing and Control Technology.’
Source: CCTV, 28 October 2016, YouTube.
Hu Xiaoxiang: a case study
Identifying the Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology as a cover institute helps shed light on the January 2015 expulsion from Norway of a Chinese scientist and his supervisor, a dual citizen of Germany and Iran. The expulsion came after Norwegian authorities determined that the work of the Chinese scientist, later named in court as Hu Xiaoxiang (扈晓翔), could be used to develop hypersonic cruise missiles (Figure 6).70
Figure 6: Hu Xiaoxiang
Hu wrote five papers with his supervisor at the University of Agder, all of which listed the Xi’an Research Institute as his affiliation. The papers focused on air-breathing hypersonic vehicles, which travel at over five times the speed of sound and ‘can carry more payload than ordinary flight vehicles’.71 Hu’s work was supported by a Norwegian Government grant for offshore wind energy research.72
Besides his affiliation with the Xi’an Research Institute, there’s a large body of evidence tying Hu to RFEU. The website of RFEU’s missile research centre states that Hu Xiaoxiang won an award in 2014 for his PhD thesis on hypersonic aircraft, supervised by General Hu Changhua.73 The website also says that in 2014 he received 250,000 renminbi (A$50,000) from the Chinese Government for a three-year research project on hypersonic aircraft (Figure 7).74 In 2016, he was described as a lecturer at the centre, which received 14 awards for missile research between 2010 and 2014.75 In some publications, Hu also listed the Harbin Institute of Technology, a civilian university heavily engaged in military research, as a second affiliation.76
Relations between China and Norway were put on ice when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chinese democracy activist Liu Xiaobo in 2010, and the Chinese Government was quick to attack Norway for Hu’s expulsion.77 Only in December 2016 did the two countries ‘normalise’ diplomatic relations. Public statements by Norwegian authorities didn’t explain the Chinese scientist’s military affiliation or mention the Xi’an Research Institute, as the information was likely classified.
Figure 7: A paper published by Hu Xiaoxiang shortly after his expulsion from Norway, stating an affiliation with RFEU in the Chinese version of the abstract but the Xi’an Research Institute in the English version.
A few months later, in September 2015, a court overturned the expulsions. Hu’s lawyer stated after the trial that ‘there is no evidence in the case that my client is part of research collaboration on missiles and weapons with China.’78 The University of Agder lauded the decision as a win for academic freedom.
The Norwegian Government later successfully appealed the overturning of Hu’s supervisor’s expulsion. However, it’s unclear whether any appeal was made in Hu’s own case, which hasn’t been made publicly available.79 Neither the Xi’an Research Institute, Hu Changhua nor RFEU was mentioned in the judge’s ruling on the German-Iranian supervisor’s case or any coverage of the expulsions.
The Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping
Among the 40 Chinese military scientists listed as presenting papers at the 9th International Symposium on Mobile Mapping Technology, nine claimed to be from an institution with no apparent military affiliation.80 Most of the other 30 military scientists at the conference, hosted by UNSW in December 2015, were openly from NUDT and a research institute of China North Industries Group Corporation (also known as Norinco Group), China’s largest arms manufacturer; the rest came mainly from the PLA Information Engineering University.
The nine claimed to be from the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping. This institute, which was officially known as the PLA Institute of Surveying and Mapping, no longer exists, having been subsumed in 1999 by PLAIEU—itself a major player in cyber operations and a key training ground for signals intelligence officers.81 The Zhengzhou Institute appears to live on as cover for PLA scientists interacting with foreigners. Nearly 300 peer-reviewed papers have been published by authors claiming to be from the institute.82
The use of the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping as cover doesn’t stop at international conferences. Numerous examples of visiting scholars claiming to be from there have been uncovered for this report. They include Zhu Xinhui (朱新慧), a lecturer at PLAIEU specialising in navigation technology, who visited UNSW from 2015 to 2016.83 In numerous journal articles and in the program of the mobile mapping conference mentioned above, however, she is described as being from the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping.84
Guo Jianfeng (郭建锋), an associate professor at PLAIEU, visited Curtin University for a year in 2014. A specialist on navigation system data processing, Guo was described on the website of Curtin University’s Global Navigation Satellite Systems Research Centre as being on ‘sabbatical leave from the Department of Geodesy of the Institute of Surveying and Mapping, Zhengzhou, China’.85
The Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute
Another cover institute, the Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute (ZISTI), which appears to exist only on paper, has also been widely used by PLAIEU scientists to publish research and travel overseas. More than 1,300 pieces of peer-reviewed literature have been authored by individuals claiming to be from ZISTI.86
One paper in a Chinese-language journal by a PLAIEU researcher, which includes an English version of the abstract and author information, clearly shows that ZISTI is a cover institute (Figure 8). The paper’s Chinese text describes the first author as affiliated with PLAIEU, but the English version describes the same author as affiliated with ZISTI.87 Nearly all of the authors sampled who claimed an affiliation with ZISTI could be shown to be working at PLAIEU.
Figure 8: Chinese and English versions of a paper published by a PLAIEU scientist, demonstrating the use of the Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute as cover.
Scientists claiming to be from ZISTI have attended international conferences both inside and outside China. For example, seven researchers affiliated with ZISTI are listed in the program of a conference on signal processing at the Gold Coast in Australia in 2014. Experts from American, Australian and Korean defence research agencies were also in attendance.88
As with the Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping, ZISTI has been used as cover for PLA scientists travelling overseas as visiting scholars. For example, Zhu Yijun (朱义君) is an associate professor at PLAIEU specialising in signals engineering.89 Claiming to be from ZISTI, in 2011 he visited Canada’s McMaster University, where he worked on wireless communications technology with wide-ranging military applications.90
PLAIEU scientists claiming to be from ZISTI have also travelled to the US as visiting scholars and for conferences.91
Espionage and intellectual property theft
In addition to their overt activities, PLA researchers, especially those who haven’t been forthcoming about their military affiliations, may engage in espionage or steal intellectual property while overseas. The PLA engages in such high levels of espionage that in 2014 the US Government took the unusual step of publicly indicting five Chinese military hackers.92 Military scientists abroad who regularly communicate with superiors in China, receive visits by superiors while overseas and return home in the middle of their time abroad for ‘remedial education’, as described in the examples outlined above, offer safe and convenient channels for Chinese intelligence agencies to access sensitive information from overseas.93
Amateur collectors with STEM expertise have been implicated in a high proportion of intellectual property theft and espionage cases involving China.94 Scientists and engineers involved in military research projects, while they might not have received formal training as spies, are uniquely qualified to identify and exfiltrate valuable information to overcome specific hurdles in the development of new technologies.
Should universities collaborate with the PLA?
Assessing the costs and benefits of research collaboration with the PLA shows that it comes with significant security risks while offering unclear benefits. It isn’t in the national interest of most of the countries examined in this report to help build the capabilities of a rival military. Other forms of cooperation with the Chinese military, such as joint exercises and exchanges that build understanding and communication, are largely beneficial but distinct from the kinds of research collaboration addressed in this report.
The benefits of research collaboration with the Chinese military are difficult to measure, but could include the following:
Training PLA scientists and working with them leads to scientific developments and published research while attracting some funding.
A small proportion of collaboration with the PLA appears sufficiently transparent and falls into areas of fundamental research such that the benefits may outweigh security risks. One possible example is cooperation between the American and Chinese governments on the multinational Daya Bay Reactor Neutrino Experiment, which involves NUDT.
A number of benefits usually associated with research collaboration with militaries and foreign countries haven’t been observed in PLA collaboration:
PLA collaboration doesn’t lead to long-term improvement in the talent of institutions and countries accepting PLA scientists, as the PLA claims that 100 per cent of scientists sent abroad by NUDT in the years before 2013 returned to China on time.95
The forms of PLA collaboration studied in this report don’t promote understanding and relationships between militaries, as they aren’t military exchanges and often aren’t overt.
While overseas, PLA scientists remain under the close watch of the CCP, which works to ensure that they remain loyal and aren’t influenced by their experience living in free societies.
It’s improbable that PLA scientists working with overseas civilian researchers would share with or disclose to those researchers any significant research breakthroughs of military value.
There are many risks and costs associated with current approaches to training and collaborating with PLA scientists:
Training PLA scientists improves the scientific talent and knowledge of a military treated by many as a strategic competitor.96
PLA scientists often engage in deception in their interactions with foreign institutions and their staff, making it difficult for those collaborating with them to take appropriate security precautions.
PLA scientists could gather intelligence and steal technology while they’re overseas, especially if they’re hiding their military affiliations.
Failures to address concerns about PLA collaboration and to develop policies differentiating it from wider engagement with China risk tarring all research ties with China with the same brush.
Research collaboration with the PLA contributes to technology that may be used against Australia and its partners in a conflict or for intelligence collection.
Universities with ties to the PLA risk eroding trust between themselves and funders of research, such as defence research agencies, scientific agencies and industry.
Universities risk reputational damage by collaborating with a non-allied military.
Public funding worth millions of dollars is being used for collaboration with a non-allied military, with little to no input from taxpayers.
Current policy and legislation are inadequate
Export controls are the primary mechanism by which countries seek to manage the supply of sensitive technology and goods to overseas entities. However, the ability of export control laws to effectively manage the risks posed by PLA research collaboration is limited. In Australia, few cases of research or cooperation contrary to our national interests are believed to have been prevented through the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012.97 The current review of the Act offers an opportunity to address some of these limitations.
There are a few reasons for these difficulties. First, intangible transfer of technology—the primary form of technology transfer taking place through the kinds of collaboration studied in this paper— is extremely difficult to control in practice because it doesn’t involve the export of physical goods.98 Second, the Act doesn’t regulate the supply of controlled technology, which includes instruction and training, to individuals in Australia even if they’re PLA members. Third, some of this collaboration covers emerging technologies, such as quantum physics, that are important but not included in the Defence and Strategic Goods List, as their applications aren’t yet fully known. Export control lists tend to be slow to incorporate emerging technologies, so regulatory power can come well after issues become apparent. Fourth, the Act doesn’t regulate the supply of controlled technology by Australians when they’re outside of Australia, such as training given to PLA members by Australian academics visiting China.
Recommendations
The PLA’s collaboration with foreign universities is growing and the expansion of international ties remains one of NUDT’s priorities.99 The developments outlined in this report warrant more attention and different approaches from those currently employed by most governments and universities. Responses to PLA collaboration need to be informed by clear government policies and move beyond export controls, using the full range of tools available to governments and universities. The Australian Government, for example, can do more to work in partnership with our research sector to advance scientific progress while protecting national security and ensuring that relevant research doesn’t advance the Chinese military’s capabilities.
Based on the findings of this report, it is recommended that governments pursue the following measures:
Deepen discussions within government on PLA collaboration to determine how it relates to the national interest
Determine what kinds of collaboration with the PLA should be further controlled or even prohibited and establish clear policy on engagement with PLA research organisations and personnel.
Foster international discussions on PLA collaboration to develop multilateral responses.
Develop interagency responses to PLA collaboration to ensure better integration of efforts by defence and export control agencies, intelligence agencies and immigration agencies.
Share information about cases and trends in PLA collaboration, particularly cases of deception by PLA scientists, with partners across the globe.
Increase communication and outreach to universities, companies and publics
Establish a committee bringing together members of the national security community and university leaders. This committee could serve as a forum to share key information and foster a more cooperative working environment while also providing a space for the university sector and national security community to better understand each other’s perspectives. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Security Higher Education Advisory Board is a useful model to emulate.100
Ensure that companies funding research at universities are aware of any PLA collaboration and understand future measures to control such collaboration.
Politicians and senior public servants should better articulate what’s in the national interest and publicly explain why advancing China’s military capabilities isn’t in the national interest.101
Improve the scrutiny of visa applications by foreign military personnel
Enhance and better coordinate efforts by government agencies such as Australia’s Department of Home Affairs, Department of Defence and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to ensure that military scientists applying for visas are identified and properly vetted.102
Create a list of Chinese and other non-allied military and military-linked research institutions, including civilian universities heavily engaged in military research, for use by immigration officials.
Re-examine export controls
The Australian Government should consider further controlling technology transfer to certain end users. Transfers of controlled technology to PLA members and civilians heavily engaged in military research should be restricted regardless of their geographical location.
The Australian Government should create a list of entities posing national security risks that are subject to special export licence requirements, modelled on the US’s Entity List.
The government should help universities train and provide resources for staff with export control compliance duties.
Work continuously with experienced scientists in emerging technology fields to determine whether and how emerging technologies should be controlled.
Ensure that universities are fully complying with controls relating to the intangible transfer of technology in their collaboration with the PLA.
Regulate scientific training given to foreign military personnel
Introduce legislation that draws on the US Code of Federal Regulations’ rules on defence services, which require those offering training to foreign military personnel to first receive a waiver from the US Department of Defense.103 This could take the form of an expansion of the Defence Trade Controls Act that restricts technology transfer to members of certain governments and organisations.
Regulate the use of government resources in collaboration with the Chinese military and other non-allied militaries
Update internal policies in government research institutions such as CSIRO to limit or ban collaboration with non-allied militaries, particularly in dual-use areas.
Funding bodies such as the Australian Research Council should prohibit funding in some areas from being used in collaboration with non-allied militaries.
Carefully evaluate any collaboration with PLA scientists on government-funded projects, particularly defence projects.
Increase government and other funding for research in strategic research areas
Fields such as artificial intelligence and quantum physics should receive more government funding to ensure that talent and ideas stay in Australia.
Universities working in strategic research areas should be encouraged to collaborate with allied military and defence countries rather than non-allied militaries.
Limit problematic forms of foreign investment in strategic research areas
Investment by Chinese defence companies such as China Electronics Technology Group Corporation into strategically important fields should be prohibited.104
Universities should also pursue the following measures:
Build understanding of PLA collaboration
Produce credible and thorough assessments of the extent of PLA collaboration on campuses.
Develop processes for managing PLA collaboration so that security risks can be identified and resolved
Raise awareness among employees
Ensure that those interacting with members of non-allied militaries take appropriate security precautions.
Exercise greater oversight of visiting scholar and student application
Develop internal policies on collaboration with foreign military personnel
Require employees to receive approval before collaborating with or training members of non-allied militaries.
Important disclaimer
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.
This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Notwithstanding the above, educational institutions (including schools, independent colleges, universities and TAFEs) are granted permission to make copies of copyrighted works strictly for educational purposes without explicit permission from ASPI and free of charge.
First published October 2018
This estimate has sought to exclude PLA medical scientists and doctors by not counting those affiliated with PLA medical institutions. Media reports, many of which are cited in this report, were one important source for determining the number of PLA scientists sent abroad. Feng Chunmei 冯春梅, Cai Weibin 蔡渭滨, Li Zhi 李治, ‘Guofang keji daxue shixiang weilai zhanzheng de rencai hangmu’ 国防科技大学 驶向未来 战争的人才航母 [NUDT—An aircraft carrier of talent steering towards future wars], Renmin Ribao 人民日报, 8 August 2013, online, claims that NUDT had sent 1,600 scientists overseas as students or visiting scholars ‘in recent years’. Assuming the 1,600 figure describes the number of NUDT scientists sent abroad between 2007, when the PLA substantially increased the number of scientists it sent overseas, and 2013, this gives roughly 230 NUDT scientists sent overseas each year. Conservatively, this indicates that well over 2,000 NUDT scientists have been sent abroad since 2007. Accounting for the fact that NUDT is responsible for approximately 80% of publications written by PLA scientists with overseas scientists and assuming that represents the proportion of PLA scientists overseas who are from NUDT, this means that more than 2,500 PLA scientists have been sent overseas since 2007. This estimate was also supported by a second set of open-source data which, to prevent the information from being removed, has not been revealed. ↩︎
New Zealand is not counted here, despite being a Five Eyes country. It has high levels of PLA collaboration, especially relative to its population, but is not among the top countries for collaboration more generally. ↩︎
C Uhlmann, ‘China an “extreme” threat to Australia: ASIO’, 9 News, 31 January 2018, online; Bill Gertz, ‘FBI director warns China is America’s most significant intelligence threat’, The Washington Free Beacon, 19 July 2018, online; ‘German intelligence unmasks alleged covert Chinese social media profiles’, Reuters, 10 December 2017. For a discussion of the case of Huang Jing in Singapore, see John Garnaut, ‘Australia’s China reset’, The Monthly, August 2018. ↩︎
Wang Wowen 王握文, ‘Zouchu guomen, dang zuzhi shenghuo “bu diaoxian”’, 走出国门，党组织生活’不掉线’ [Exiting the country, they stay connected with the life of party organisations], Jiefangjunbao 解放军报, 1 July 2015, online. ↩︎
One of the only papers to address research collaboration with the PLA is Elsa Kania, Technological entanglement, ASPI, Canberra, 28 June 2018, online. ↩︎
Section 1286 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 offers an important starting point for policies on scientific engagement with China and the PLA, seeking to protect scientists from undue foreign influence, safeguard important information and support the growth of domestic talent. ↩︎
Richard Holt, AAAS statement on White House proclamation on immigration and visas, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 25 September 2017, online. ↩︎
See Yangyang Cheng, ‘The future of particle physics will live and die in China’, Foreign Policy, 2 November 2017, for an eye-opening discussion of the level of political involvement in China’s scientific research, even research into particle physics, online. ↩︎
DJ Howard, FN Laird, ‘The new normal in funding university science’, Issues in Science and Technology, 2013, 30(1), online; M Clarke, ‘Federal government university budget leaves 10,000 places unfunded, Universities Australia says’, ABC News, 18 January 2018, online; N Whigham, ‘Medical and scientific research at a crossroads in Australia as funding stagnates’, News.com.au, 7 November 2016. ↩︎
UNSW, for example, has partnered with the Chinese Government’s Torch Program, attracting tens of millions of dollars in R&D funding from Chinese companies. See ‘UNSW celebrates first anniversary of Torch partnership with China’, UNSW Media, 28 March 2017, online. ↩︎
It appears that most of those sent abroad are PLA ‘civilian cadres’ (文职干部), rather than ranking military officers. While they’re counted as members of the PLA, civilian cadres aren’t combat personnel and often work in technical areas, such as scientific research. See information about civilian cadres at the following link. ↩︎
Peer-reviewed literature is the most accessible but not the only measure of PLA collaboration. Other facets of PLA collaboration include visiting and lecturing at PLA institutions, supervising PLA students and visiting scholars, which are correlated with but distinct from the level of peer-reviewed literature. Findings on peer-reviewed literature by PLA scientists with foreign researchers are based on searches in Scopus, the largest database of peer-reviewed literature, covering 16 PLA institutions and aliases. Hong Kong wasn’t counted together with the PRC mainland. Note that publications by PLA scientists from medical institutions have been excluded. The following institutions and aliases were included in the search: National University of Defense Technology, National Key Laboratory for Parallel and Distributed Processing, PLA University of Science and Technology, PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute, Zhengzhou Institute of Surveying and Mapping, Air Force Engineering University, Second Artillery Engineering College, Xi’an Research Institute of High Technology, Academy of Armored Force Engineering, Academy of Equipment Command and Technology, National Digital Switching System Engineering and Technological Research Center, Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology, China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center, Naval University of Engineering and PLA Electronic Engineering Institute. ↩︎
See the section on international ties, which discusses sending students abroad and building academic ties separately from military exchanges, in Liu Hang (ed.), 2015 National University of Defence Technology admissions guide, online. ↩︎
The Army Engineering University was formed in August 2017 through the merger of the PLA University of Science and Technology and a number of other army colleges. See Anonymous, ‘Lujun gongcheng daxue jiepai, you gongchengbing xueyuan deng 5 suo yuanxiao heping zujian’ 陆军工程大学揭牌，由工程兵学院等5所院校合并组建 [The Army Engineering University is unveiled, formed by the merger of the Engineering College and five other institutions], Pengpai 澎湃, 3 August 2017, online. ↩︎
Brian Boyle, ‘Chinese partnerships are vital for universities and global research’, Financial Review, 29 October 2017, online. ↩︎
Clive Hamilton, Alex Joske, ‘Australian universities are helping China’s military surpass the United States’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 2017, online. ↩︎
Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion, Hardy Grant Books, 2018, 190–193. ↩︎
Hamilton & Joske, ‘Australian universities are helping China’s military surpass the United States’. ↩︎
Mengjian Zhu, Moshe Ben Shalom, Artem Mishchsenko, Vladimir Falko, Kostya Novoselov, Andre Geim, ‘Supercurrent and multiple Andreev reflections in micrometer-long ballistic graphene Josephson junctions’, Nanoscale, 2018, issue 6, online. ↩︎
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/24171348/Picking-flowers-making-honey_policyBrief10-static-banner.jpg10801920nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2018-10-30 06:00:002025-03-24 17:15:41Picking flowers, making honey
The private security guarding sector is a vital piece of the national security puzzle that has not been drawn into Australia’s counterterrorism planning.
There are more than 120,000 licenced security guards in Australia. The security industry has more than double the personnel of Australia’s combined police agencies and permanent Australian Defence Force. Private security staff provide the ‘eyes, ears and hands’ before any terrorist attack and an ability to be first responders after any security-related incident.
This report outlines the problems that are holding the guarding sector back from being an active participant in national counterterrorist plans and presents recommendations to enable the private security industry to become an effective part of our counterterrorist capability.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/17215153/crowd.jpg4501350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2018-10-17 06:00:002025-03-06 15:05:48Safety in numbers
Over the course of 2018, ASPI staff and writers for The Strategistparticipated in a dynamic public debate about the participation of Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturer Huawei in Australia’s 5G network.
Australia’s 5G network is critical national infrastructure and this was one of the most important policy decisions the government had to make this year.
ASPI felt it was vital to stimulate and lead a frank and robust public discussion, in Australia and throughout the wider region, which analysed and debated the national security, cybersecurity and international implications of Huawei’s involvement in this infrastructure.
In this report, in chronological order, you’ll read a range of views written up in The Strategist, The Australian and The Financial Times.
These articles tackle a variety of issues surrounding the decision, including the cybersecurity dimension, the broader Australia–China relationship, other states’ experiences with Huawei, the Chinese Government’s approach to cyber espionage and intellectual property theft and, importantly, the Chinese party-state’s view of state security and intelligence work.
When it comes to important national security, cybersecurity and critical infrastructure decisions, ASPI will continue to stimulate Australian public discourse and fill gaps in global debates.
We also encourage the Australian Government to take a more forward-leaning approach to its participation in public discourse so that the public and key stakeholders are as informed as possible when hard and complicated policy decisions like this need to be made.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/15190418/huawei-in-australia-banner.jpg4511350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2018-10-10 06:00:002025-03-06 15:05:57Huawei and Australia’s 5G Network
While Australia no longer rides upon the sheep’s back, strong economic and cultural links with agriculture remain and our economy is still intrinsically linked to agricultural production.
As the so-called ‘strawberry sabotage’ clearly demonstrates, accidental or deliberate biosecurity breaches present very real existential and economic threats to Australia that can harm agricultural exports as well as impact food security and trigger concerns about its safety.
ASPI’s latest research report ‘Weapons of Mass (economic) Disruption: Rethinking Biosecurity in Australia’ highlights the importance Australia’s effective and successful plant and animal biosecurity systems and border protection services to our wellbeing and economy and adds a further perspective on new and emerging threats that need to be addressed.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/17214639/bioSecurity-banner.jpg4501350nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2018-09-27 06:00:002025-03-06 15:20:52Weapons of mass economic disruption
The reality of the world we live in today is one in which cyber operations are now the norm. Battlefields no longer exist solely as physical theatres of operation, but now also as virtual ones. Soldiers today can be armed not just with weapons, but also with keyboards. That in the modern world we have woven digital technology so intricately into our businesses, our infrastructure and our lives makes it possible for a nation-state to launch a cyberattack against another and cause immense damage — without ever firing a shot.
ACS’s aim in participating in this policy brief is to improve clarity of communication in this area. For Australia, both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities are now an essential component of our nation’s military arsenal, and a necessary step to ensure that we keep up with global players. The cyber arms race moves fast, so continued investment in cyber capability is pivotal to keep ahead of and defend against the latest threats, while being able to deploy our own capabilities when and where we choose.
So, too, is ensuring that we have the skills and the talent to drive cyber capabilities in Australia. This means attracting and keeping the brightest young minds, the sharpest skilled local talent and the most experienced technology veterans to drive and grow a pipeline of cyber specialists, and in turn help protect and serve Australia’s military and economic interests.
Yohan Ramasundara President, Australian Computer Society
What’s the problem?
In April 2016, Prime Minister Turnbull confirmed that Australia has an offensive cyber capability. A series of official disclosures have provided further detail, including that Australia will use this capability against offshore cybercriminals.
This was the first time any state has announced such a policy.
However, this commendably transparent approach to telegraphing our capability and intentions hasn’t been without challenges. In some cases, these communications have created confusion and misperceptions. There’s a disconnect between popular perceptions, typified by phrases like ‘cyber Pearl Harbor’, and the reality of offensive cyber operations, and reporting has at times misrepresented how these tools will be used. Public disclosures and the release of the report of the Independent Intelligence Review have also raised questions about how Australia will build and maintain this capability.
What’s the solution?
To reduce the risk of misunderstanding and misperception and to ensure a more informed debate, this policy brief seeks to further clarify the nature of Australia’s offensive cyber capability. It recommends improving communications, using innovative staff recruitment and retention options, deepening industry engagement and reviewing classification levels in some areas. Looking forward, the government could consider increasing its investment in our offensive capability to create an asymmetric capability; that is, a capability that won’t easily be countered by many militaries in our region.
Introduction
Governments routinely engage in a wide spectrum of cyber operations, and researchers have identified more than 100 states with military and intelligence cyber units.1
The cyber units range considerably in both their capability and their compliance with international law. Leaks have highlighted the US unit’s advanced capability, and public documents reveal its size. US Cyber Command’s action arm, the Cyber Mission Force, is building to 6,200 military and civilian personnel, or about 10% of the ADF, and for the 2018 financial year requested a US$647 million budget allocation.2 China has been widely accused of stealing enormous quantities of intellectual property. North Korea has used cyber tools to steal money, including in a US$81 million heist on the Bangladesh central bank. Russia is accused of using a range of online methods to influence the 2016 US presidential election and has engaged in a wide spectrum of actions against its neighbours, such as turning off power stations in Ukraine and bringing down government websites in Georgia and Estonia. Israel is suspected of using a cyber operation in conjunction with its bombing raid on a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007 by temporarily ‘tricking’ a part of Syria’s air defence system to allow its fighter jets to enter Syria undetected.3
In Australia, the government has been remarkably transparent in declaring the existence of its offensive cyber capability and its applications: to respond to serious cyberattacks, to support military operations, and to counter offshore cybercriminals. It has also established robust structures to ensure its compliance with international law. Three additional disclosures about Australia’s offensive cyber capability have followed the Prime Minister’s initial April 2016 announcement. In November 2016, he announced that the capability was being used to target Islamic State,4 and on 30 June 2017 Australia became the first country to openly admit that its cyber offensive capabilities would be directed at ‘organised offshore cyber criminals’.5 The same day, the then Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Cyber Security, Dan Tehan, announced the formation of an Information Warfare Division within the ADF.
While these disclosures have raised awareness of Australia’s offensive cyber capability, the limited accompanying detail has meant that the ensuing public debate has often been inaccurate or misleading. One major news site, for example, led a report with the title ‘Australia launches new military information unit to target criminal hackers’.6 Using the ADF to target criminals would have been a radical departure from established protocols.
This policy brief seeks to clarify some of the misunderstandings arising from sensationalist reporting.
The report has the following parts: 1. What’s an offensive cyber operation? 2. Organisation, command and approvals 3. Operations against declared targets 4. Risks 5. Checks, balances and compliance with international law 6. Strengths and weaknesses 7. Future challenges and recommendations.
Tom Uren and Fergus Hanson on Offensive Cyber
1. What’s an offensive cyber operation?
For the purposes of this policy brief, we use a draft definition that’s being developed as part of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s Cyber Lexicon project. It defines offensive cyber operations as ‘activities in cyberspace that manipulate, deny, disrupt, degrade or destroy targeted computers, information systems, or networks’.7 Given the range of countries with varying capabilities and using examples from open sources, offensive cyber operations could range from the subtle to the destructive: removing computer accounts or changing passwords; altering databases either subtly or destructively; defacing web pages; encrypting or deleting data; or even attacks that affect critical infrastructure, such as electricity networks.
Even though it may use the same tools and techniques, cyber espionage, by contrast, is explicitly designed to gather intelligence without having an effect—ideally without detection. The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace has commissioned ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre to do further work on defining offensive cyber capabilities.
2. Organisation, Command and Approvals
Australia’s offensive cyber capability resides within the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD).8 It can be employed directly in military operations, in support of Australian law enforcement activities, or to deter and respond to serious cyber incidents against Australian networks. While physically housed within ASD, the military and law enforcement applications have different chains of command and approvals processes.
MILITARY
The Information Warfare Division within the Department of Defence was formed in July 2017 and is headed by the Deputy Chief Information Warfare, Major General Marcus Thompson.
Major General Thompson has presented the ADF approach to cyber capabilities as two distinct functions: cybersecurity (consisting of self-defence and passive defence 9), and cyber operations (consisting of active defence and offence 10).
The Australian Government’s offensive cyber capability sits within ASD and works closely with each of the three services, which embed staff assigned to ASD from the ADF’s Joint Cyber Unit. Offensive cyber in support of military operations is a civil–military partnership. The workforce to conduct offensive cyber operations resides within ASD and is largely civilian. Advice from Defence is that the laws of armed conflict are considered during the development and execution of operations, and that ASD personnel will act in accordance with legally approved instructions. There’s no reason to doubt that, and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security has noted in the context of cyber operations in support of the ADF operations in Iraq and Syria that ‘guidance in place at the time was appropriate and followed by staff, and no issues of legality or propriety were noted’.
The ability to conduct an operational planning process that takes into account the desired outcome, situational awareness and the possible range of effects is a military discipline that resides in the ADF. This arrangement is expected to continue under proposals from the 2017 Intelligence Review to make ASD a statutory authority within the Defence portfolio.
As clarified in Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, ‘Offensive cyber operations in support of [ADF] operations are planned and executed by ASD and Joint Operations Command under direction of the Chief of Joint Operations.’11 Targeting for offensive cyber operations occurs in the same manner as for kinetic ADF operations. Any offensive cyber operation in support of the ADF is planned and executed under the direction of the Chief of Joint Operations and, as with any other military capability, is governed by ADF rules of engagement.
The announcement that Australia would be using its offensive cyber capability against offshore cybercriminals created considerable confusion. Public messaging was one contributing factor: the announcement about the ADF’s Information Warfare Division bled into the same-day announcement that the government would also be using its offensive cyber capability to deter offshore cybercriminals, making them appear one and the same thing.14
While some media outlets characterised the announcement as Australia potentially attacking the whole suite of ‘organised offshore criminals’, the announcement focused only on offshore actors who commit cybercrimes affecting Australia.
Decisions on which cybercriminal networks to target follow a similar process to those for military operations, including that particularly sensitive operations could require additional approvals, although the exact processes haven’t been disclosed. Again, these operations would have to comply with domestic law and be consistent with Australia’s obligations under international law.
3. Operations against declared targets
Australia has declared that it will use its offensive cyber capabilities to deter and respond to serious cyber incidents against Australian networks; to support military operations, including coalition operations against Daesh in Iraq and Syria; and to counter offshore cybercriminals. Given ASD’s role in intelligence gathering, operations can integrate intelligence with cyber operations—a mission critical element.
…will use its offensive cyber capabilities to deter and respond to serious cyber incidents against Australian networks…
4. Risks
Offensive cyber operations carry several risks that need to be carefully considered. For cyber operations in support of the ADF, as with conventional capabilities, the commander must weigh up the potential for achieving operational goals against the risk of collateral effects and damage.
When offensive cyber capabilities are used, there’s a high chance that future effectiveness might be compromised. Unlike defending against kinetic weapons, an information system might be protected from cyberattack through relatively simple measures, such as upgrades, patches or configuration changes.
Another risk is that, despite extensive efforts to disguise the origin of the attack, the Australian Government could lose plausible deniability or be identified (including contextually) as the source and face embarrassment or retaliation.
5. Checks, balances and compliance with international law
When the first public disclosure of Australia’s offensive cyber capability was made, the Prime Minister emphasised Australia’s compliance with international law: ‘The use of such a capability is subject to stringent legal oversight and is consistent with our support for the international rules-based order and our obligations under international law.’15
Interviews for this policy brief suggest that the users of the capability take compliance with domestic and international law extremely seriously. The core principles are as follows:
Necessity: ensuring the operation is necessary to accomplish a legitimate military / law enforcement purpose.
Specificity: ensuring the operation is not indiscriminate in who and what it targets.
Proportionality: ensuring the operation is proportionate to the advantage gained.
Harm: considering whether an act causes greater harm than is required to achieve the legitimate military objective.
These capabilities are subject to ASD’s existing legislative and oversight framework, including independent oversight by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. However, there seems to be room for updating these provisions to account for technological developments. Section 7(e) of the Intelligence Services Act 2001, for example, authorises ASD ‘to provide assistance to Commonwealth and State authorities in relation to … (ii) other specialised technologies’—a foundation that could be strengthened for 21st-century technological applications.
When seeking approval for operations from the Minister for Defence, ASD seeks legal, foreign policy and national security advice from sources external to Defence. Every offensive cyber operation is planned and conducted in accordance with domestic law and is consistent with Australia’s obligations under international law
6. Strengths and weaknesses
Offensive cyber capabilities have both strengths and weaknesses.
STRENGTHS
For military tasks, they can be integrated with ADF operations, adding a new capability and creating a force multiplier.
They can engage targets that can’t be reached with conventional capabilities without causing unacceptable collateral damage or overt acknowledgement.
They provide global reach.
They provide an asymmetric advantage against an adversary for a relatively modest cost.
They can be overt or clandestine, depending on the intended effect.
WEAKNESSES
Capabilities need to be highly tailored to be effective (such as the Stuxnet worm that targeted Iran’s nuclear centrifuges), meaning that they can be expensive to develop and lack flexibility.
When used in isolation, they are unlikely to be decisive.
Major, blunt attacks (such as Wannacry or NotPetya) are relatively cheap and easy, but are unusable by responsible state actors such as Australia. Achieving the appropriate specificity and proportionality requires investment of time and effort.
The capability requires constant, costly investment as cybersecurity evolves.
Government must compete for top-tier talent with private industry.
For operations short of ‘cyber attacks’,16 the effects can be relatively short-lasting and limited.
Capability can’t be showcased as a deterrent in the same way that conventional capability can, because revealing specific capability renders it redundant as defences are repaired.
Target development can require intensive intelligence support and can take a very long time.
7. Future challenges and recommendations
Offensive cyber operations are relatively new and developing in a fast-moving environment. Below are issues and recommendations stemming from research for this report.
RECOMMENDATION 1: CAREFULLY STRUCTURE COMMUNICATIONS TO REASSURE NATION-STATES AND ENFORCE NORMS
As Australia’s offensive cyber capability has only recently been publicly acknowledged and is subject to sensationalist reporting, careful communication is required. When he first acknowledged the capability, the Prime Minister said doing so ‘adds to our credibility as we promote norms of good behaviour on the international stage’.17 Poor communications, however, can have the opposite effect. The limited detail and mixed reporting of the announcement that Australia would use offensive cyber capability against offshore cybercriminals inadvertently sent the message that it was acceptable for states to launch cyberattacks against people overseas whom they considered to be criminals. This might encourage some states to use crime as a pretext to launch cyber operations against individuals in Australia.
To address this, the Australian Government should be careful when publicly discussing the offensive capability, particularly to distinguish the military and law enforcement roles. One option to do this would be to have the Attorney-General, the Minister for Justice or the new Home Affairs Minister discuss operations related to law enforcement aspects of the capability and to have the Minister for Defence discuss those related to military capabilities.
RECOMMENDATION 2: USE INNOVATIVE STAFF RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OPTIONS
Recruiting and retaining Australia’s top technical talent is a major hurdle. In the medium term, ASD will have to continue to invest heavily in training, raise salaries (ASD becoming a statutory authority will help it address this) and develop an alumni network and culture that allow former staff to return in new roles after a stint in private industry. A pool of alumni working as cleared reservists could also be used as an additional workforce without the significant investment required in conducting entirely new clearances.
RECOMMENDATION 3: DEEPEN INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT
ASD capability being deployed against cybercriminals is likely to generate increased interest from corporate Australia. There’s a policy question about whether or not Australia’s offensive cyber capability should be used in support of Australian corporate interests. Given the finite resources and the tricky situations that could arise, government should consider useful ways industry could engage, clarify the limits of industry engagement and assess how to handle industry requests to use the offensive cyber capability against actors targeting its operations.
RECOMMENDATION 4: CLASSIFY INFORMATION AT LOWER LEVELS
It has long been argued that over-classification of material, such as threat intelligence, by governments prevents easy information exchange with the outside world, including key partners such as industry. The government has recognised this and is positioning ‘Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) 2.0’ to facilitate a more cooperative and informed relationship with the private sector. Similarly, the government should continue to scope the potential benefits from lowering the classification of information associated with offensive cyber operations. In particular, there are benefits in operating at the SECRET level for workforce generation and training, and providing a ‘halfway house’ to usefully employ incoming staff as they wait during vetting procedures. More broadly, excessive classification slows potentially valuable two-way information exchange with the information security community.
RECOMMENDATION 5: INVEST TO CREATE AN ASYMMETRIC CAPABILITY
The 2016 Defence White Paper noted that ‘enhancements in intelligence, space and cyber security will require around 900 ADF positions’.18 Those positions were part of the $400 million 19 in spending announced in the White Paper and will be spread across the ADF. While this is significant, given the limits of what can be achieved with current spending on conventional kit, the Australian Government should consider conducting a cost–benefit analysis on the relative value of substantial further spending on cyber to provide it with an asymmetric capability against future adversaries. This would need to include a considerable investment in training.
RECOMMENDATION 6: CONSIDER UPDATING THE POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
There appears to be sufficient legislation, policy and oversight to ensure that ASD and the ADF work together in a lawful, collaborative and cooperative manner to support military operations. The 2017 Independent Intelligence Review noted that ASD’s support to military operations is indispensable, and will remain so.
While those oversight arrangements may be sufficient for now, the ADF will inevitably need to incorporate offensive cyber on the battlefield as a way to create local effects, including force protection measures and to deliver effects currently generated by electronic warfare (such as jamming communications technology). It should not always be necessary to reach back to the national authorities for clear-cut and time critical battlefield decisions. There appears to be scope to update the existing policy and legislative framework that governs the employment of offensive cyber in deployed operations to support those kinds of activities.
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Noah Shachtman, Peter W Singer, The wrong war: the insistence on applying Cold War metaphors to cybersecurity is misplaced and counterproductive, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 15 August 2011, online. ↩︎
Michael S Rogers, Statement of Admiral Michael S Rogers, Commander, United States Cyber Command, before the House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 23 May 2017, p. 1, online; Laura Criste, ‘Where’s the cyber money for fiscal 2018?’, Bloomberg Government, 19 July 2017, online. ↩︎
Thomas Rid, Cyber war will not take place, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 42. ↩︎
Malcolm Turnbull, ‘Address to parliament: national security update on counter terrorism’, 23 November 2016, transcript, online. ↩︎
Malcolm Turnbull, ‘Offensive cyber capability to fight cyber criminals’, media release, 30 June 2017, online. ↩︎
‘Cyber warfare: Australia launches new military information unit to target criminal hackers’, The Australian, 30 June 2017, online. ↩︎
The Counter Terrorism Yearbook is ASPI’s annual flagship publication curated by the Counter Terrorism Policy Centre, now in its second year of publication.
It is a comprehensive resource for academics and policymakers to build on their knowledge of counterterrorism developments in countries and regions around world.
Each chapter in the Yearbook is written by internationally renowned subject matter and regional experts, who provide their insight and commentary on counterterrorism policy, legislation, operations and strategy for a specific country/region, concerning the year in review, and looking at challenges for the year ahead.
Europe and Australia are connected in many ways. As liberal democratic societies, they share a common normative foundation of values that set the parameters for what the state may or may not do.
Based on that background, in September 2017 a delegation from Australia composed of practitioners, policymakers and academics travelled to Germany and Belgium to participate in the 3rd Australian Strategic Policy Institute – Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Australia–Europe Counterterrorism Dialogue, entitled Transforming the New Threat Landscape.
https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/17211821/E1BAP1-1_Hi-Res.jpg7441608nathanhttps://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/10130806/ASPI-Logo.pngnathan2018-02-27 06:00:002025-03-06 16:43:593rd Australia-Europe Counter-Terrorism Dialogue: ‘Transforming the New Threat Landscape’
Hu wrote five papers with his supervisor at the University of Agder, all of which listed the Xi’an Research Institute as his affiliation. The papers focused on air-breathing hypersonic vehicles, which travel at over five times the speed of sound and ‘can carry more payload than ordinary flight vehicles’.71 Hu’s work was supported by a Norwegian Government grant for offshore wind energy research.72
The reality of the world we live in today is one in which cyber operations are now the norm. Battlefields no longer exist solely as physical theatres of operation, but now also as virtual ones. Soldiers today can be armed not just with weapons, but also with keyboards. That in the modern world we have woven digital technology so intricately into our businesses, our infrastructure and our lives makes it possible for a nation-state to launch a cyberattack against another and cause immense damage — without ever firing a shot.
Even though it may use the same tools and techniques, cyber espionage, by contrast, is explicitly designed to gather intelligence without having an effect—ideally without detection. The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace has commissioned ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre to do further work on defining offensive cyber capabilities.
