Tag Archive for: National Security

National food security preparedness Green Paper

Australia’s agriculture sector and food system produce enough food to feed more than 70 million people worldwide. The system is one of the world’s least subsidised food systems. It has prospered under a global rules-based system influenced by Western liberal values, but it now faces chronic challenges due to rising geopolitical tensions, geo-economic transitions, climate change, deteriorating water security and rapid technological advances. The world is changing so rapidly that the assumptions, policy approaches and economic frameworks that have traditionally supported Australia’s food security are no longer fit for purpose. Potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific is driving enhanced preparedness activity in Australia’s defence force, but that isn’t being replicated across the agriculture sector and food system in a coordinated manner. Food hasn’t featured as a priority in the public versions of the Defence Strategic Review or the National Defence Strategy. This has created a gap in Australia’s preparedness activities: if Australia’s national security and defence organisations are preparing for potential conflict, then Australia’s agriculture sector and food system stakeholders should also be preparing for this period of strategic uncertainty.

Food security is a pillar of whole-of-nation preparedness for an uncertain future. While current targeted preparedness efforts and resilience mechanisms are valuable, they aren’t sufficient. Stakeholders are calling for stronger, proactive national coordination from the government to empower and support private-sector action. Meeting that demand is essential to strengthening overall resilience. So, too, is understanding that Australia’s food security relies on a holistic and interconnected ecosystem rather than a fragmented supply chain. Australia is a heavily trade-exposed nation that exports 70% of production, so any disruption to maritime and other transport corridors or to the infrastructure needed to move food risks undermining both national food security and Australia’s standing as a reliable global supplier.

This work has been written and constructed as a Green Paper, not an academic publication. Informed by six months of consultations with government, the private sector and civil society, the paper combines applied policy analysis and real-world insights to promote deliberate conversation about protecting Australia’s food security with the same priority as protecting Australia’s national security. The Green Paper is divided into four parts. It also includes three case studies in the Appendix, which use a threat and risk assessment to analyse three critical inputs to the food security ecosystem—phosphate, glyphosate and digital connectivity—to help stakeholders evaluate the vulnerabilities in Australia’s food security ecosystem.

The intention of this Green Paper is to deepen understanding of food security as a key public policy issue, stimulate public discussion, inform policymaking and provide both government and key stakeholders with policy options for consideration. This Green Paper’s 14 recommended policy options have been designed to equip governments and the private sector with structured national-security-inspired assessment tools and a framework to continuously identify, prioritise and mitigate vulnerabilities. That includes options to centralise the coordination and decentralise delivery of preparedness activities, establish accountability and embed food security as a national security priority and a key element of Australia’s engagement across the Indo-Pacific.

The ‘official’ histories of Australian and British intelligence: Lessons learned and next steps

Unclassified, official histories of ‘secret’ intelligence organisations, for public readership, seem a contradiction in terms. These ‘official’ works are commissioned by the agencies in question and directly informed by those agencies’ own records, thus distinguishing them from other, outsider historical accounts. But while such official intelligence histories are relatively new, sometimes controversial, and often challenging for historians and agencies alike, the experiences of the Australian and British intelligence communities suggest they’re a promising development for scholarship, maintaining public trust and informed public discourse, and more effective functioning of national security agencies. Furthermore, these histories remain an ongoing project for Australia’s National Intelligence Community (NIC).

A national strategic warning intelligence capability for Australia

Australia’s strategic warning time has collapsed—in response to profound geopolitical shifts. As the ADF is adapting to the hard implications of this change, so must the national intelligence community (NIC).

Australian Government decision-makers need time and insight to identify and prioritise threats (and opportunities) and devise effective responses. Strategic warning intelligence enables and empowers them to do so. But it must be done in a way that keeps up with the rapid pace of geopolitical and technological change, and a widening array of non-traditional strategic threats, and in a fashion best suited to Australia’s circumstances.

To meet this need the NIC should develop a discrete, institutional strategic warning intelligence function—an Australian Centre for Strategic Warning (ACSW). This would recognise the distinct skills, analytical focus and interface with decision-making entailed—and the vital national interests at stake. In implementing an ACSW, much can be learned from our own and other intelligence communities’ ongoing efforts to adapt to threats other than invasion—notably terrorism and pandemics. This will be especially pertinent in its application to grey-zone threats such as economic coercion.

Done right, an ACSW would be an important addition to the suite of Australia’s statecraft tools.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 9

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 9, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months.

Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include;

1. Defence in the North,

2. Developing Northern Australia,

3. Northern Australia and the Indo-Pacific

4. Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities,

5. Space, Food Security and Climate Trends

As in previous editions, Volume 9 contains a range of expert opinions across these varied topics.

Volume 9 also features a foreword by the Hon. Eva Lawler, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Lawler calls readers attention to the relevance of northern Australia in light of the National Defence Strategy and updated Integrated Investment Program as well as Australia’s economic ambitions, stating “the strategies in this volume can inform our efforts to unlock northern Australia’s full potential and build a stronger, more resilient nation.”

The 36 articles discuss practical policy solutions for decision makers facilitating development, prosperity and security of northern Australia. These policy solutions tackle both the challenges and opportunities present in the north, and reflect the potential of the north to increasingly contribute to Australia’s national security and economic prosperity.

National resilience: lessons for Australian policy from international experience

The strategic circumstances that Australia contemplates over the coming decades present multiple, cascading and concurrent crises. Ensuring a safe and secure Australia, able to withstand the inevitable shocks that we’ll face into the future, will require a more comprehensive approach to strategy than we’ve adopted over the past seven decades. We can’t rely on the sureties of the past. The institutions, policies and architectures that have supported the nation to manage such crises in our history are no longer fit for purpose.

The report highlights lessons drawn from international responses to crisis, to assist policymakers build better responses to the interdependent and hyperconnected challenges that nations face. The report brings together the disciplines of disaster management, defence strategy and national security to examine what an integrated national approach to resilience looks like, and how national resilience thinking can help Australia build more effective and more efficient responses to crisis and change.

The report concludes that now is the time to commence action to deliver a national resilience framework for Australia. Collective, collaborative action, enabled by governments, built on the capability and capacity of Australian industry and the community, and aimed at the goal of a resilient Australia, can ensure that we’re well placed to face the future with confidence.

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 8

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 8, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months.

Building on previous volumes, this edition discusses the opportunities and intersections between improved national defence and capability development in northern Australia, regional economic growth, and enhanced engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.

Similar to previous editions, Volume 8 contains a wide range of articles sourced from a diverse pool of expert contributors, writing on topics such as: northern Australia’s critical role for national defence, how Defence can improve operational capability and re-design its strategy in the north, critical minerals and rare earths, national disaster preparedness, and economic opportunity in northern Australia.

Volume 8 also features a foreword by the Hon. Natasha Fyles, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Fyles writes, “this edition sheds light on our region’s position at the intersection of significant national and international interests.”

The 27 articles discuss practical policy solutions for decision makers to facilitate the development, prosperity and security of Australia’s north. The authors share a belief that Australia’s north presents yet to be tapped opportunity and potential, and that its unique characteristics – its vast space, low population density, specific geography, and harsh investment environment – can be leveraged to its advantage.

Incels in Australia: The ideology, the threat, and a way forward

This report explores the phenomenon of ‘incels’—involuntary celibates—and the misogynistic ideology that underpins a subset of this global community of men that has become a thriving Internet subculture. It examines how online spaces, from popular social media sites to dedicated incel forums, are providing a platform for not just the expansion of misogynistic views but gender-based violent extremism.

It raises key questions regarding Australian efforts to counter misogynistic ideologies within our nation. If there’s a continuum that has sexist, but lawful, views on gender at one end and gendered hate speech at the other, at what point does misogynistic ideology tip into acts of gendered violence? What’s needed to prevent misogynistic ideologies from becoming violent? And how do we, as a society, avoid the epidemic levels of violence against women in Australia?

This report doesn’t intend to provide answers to all of those questions. It does, however, seek to make an important contribution to public discourse about the increasing trend in misogynistic ideology through examination of a particularly violent community of misogynists, and proposes a range of policy options for consideration to tackle the threat that misogynistic ideology poses to Australia.

This report makes six recommendations designed to reduce and, where possible, prevent the risk of future occurrence of incel and similar violence in Australia. The recommendations include greater awareness raising and policy recognition that incel violence can be an ideological form of issue-motivated extremism which would provide certainty that incels could formally fall within the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)—in addition to law-enforcement agencies—and would encourage tailored education programs focused on engaging young males at risk from indoctrination in this extreme subculture (along with their parents).

An inflection point for Australian intelligence: Revisiting the 2004 Flood Report

The 2003 Iraq war, and more particularly intelligence failure in relation to Iraqi WMD, led to a broad-ranging inquiry into Australian intelligence conducted by Philip Flood AO. Flood’s July 2004 report has proven an inflection point between the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) of the immediate post–Cold War period and today’s National Intelligence Community (NIC).

Flood laid out an ambitious vision for Australian intelligence and forcefully advocated for sovereign intelligence capability. The scope of his review extended beyond more than ‘recent intelligence lessons’ – that is, Iraq’s WMD, the 2002 Bali bombings and the unrest that led to 2003’s Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands – to the effectiveness of oversight and accountability within the AIC (including priority setting), ‘division of labour’ between AIC agencies and their communications with each other, maintenance of contestability in intelligence assessments, and adequacy of resourcing (especially for the Office of National Assessments – ONA).

It was in addressing these matters that Flood laid the foundation for the future NIC, upon which would be constructed the reforms instituted by the L’Estrange-Merchant review of 2017.

Importantly, Flood’s recommendations significantly enhanced ONA’s capabilities—not just analytical resources but also the resources (and tasking) needed to address the more effective coordination and evaluation of foreign intelligence across the AIC. This was a critical step towards the more structured and institutionalised (if sometimes bureaucratic) NIC of 2023 and an enhanced community leadership role for, ultimately, ONI.

In addition, the Flood Report identified issues that remain pertinent and challenging today – including the vexed issue of the public presentation of intelligence for policy purposes, the central importance of the intelligence community’s people (including training, career management, recruitment and language proficiency), intelligence distribution (including avoiding overloading time-poor customers), the need to maximise collaborative opportunities between agencies, and how best to leverage intelligence relationships (including broadening relations beyond traditional allied partners).

North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 7

The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 7, is a series of articles published in The Strategist over the last six months. It builds on previous volumes by identifying critical intersections of national security, nation-building, resilience and Australia’s north.

This issue, like previous volumes, includes a wide range of articles sourced from a diverse pool of expert contributors writing on topics as varied as critical minerals, rare earth, equatorial space launch, agriculture, advanced manufacturing, fuel and water security, and defence force posturing. Importantly, it addresses the Defence Strategic from a northern Australian perspective. It also features a foreword by the Honourable Madeleine King MP, Minister for Northern Australia.

Minister King writes, “Northern Australia is central to the prosperity, security and future of our nation and will be the engine room of Australia’s decarbonisation effort and drive towards net zero.”

The 24 articles propose concrete, real-world actions for policy-makers to facilitate the development, prosperity and security of Australia’s north. The authors share a sense that those things that make the north unique – its vast space, low population density, specific geography, and harsh investment environment – are characteristics that can be leveraged, not disadvantages.

‘With a little help from my friends’: Capitalising on opportunity at AUSMIN 2022

The annual Australia-US Ministerial Consultations have been the primary forum for bilateral engagement since 1985. The Australian Minister for Defence and Minister for Foreign Affairs will meet with their American counterparts in Washington in 2022, in the 71st year of the alliance, and it’s arguably never been so important.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute is proud to release ‘With a little help from my friends’: Capitalising on opportunity at AUSMIN 2022, a report featuring chapters from our defence, cyber and foreign policy experts to inform and guide the Australian approach to the 2022 AUSMIN consultations.

In this report, ASPI harnesses its broad and deep policy expertise to provide AUSMIN’s principals with tangible policy recommendations to take to the US. The following chapters describe Australia’s most pressing strategic challenges. The authors offer policy recommendations for enhancing Australian and US collaboration to promote security and economic prosperity.

The collection of essays covers topics and challenges that the US and Australia must tackle together: defence capability, foreign affairs, climate change, foreign interference, rare earths, cyber, technology, the Pacific, space, integrated deterrence and coercive diplomacy. In each instance, there are opportunities for concrete, practical policy steps to ensure cohesion and stability.”

Tag Archive for: National Security

Australia’s security architecture must evolve, not regress

The Independent Intelligence Review, publicly released last Friday, was inoffensive and largely supported the intelligence community status quo. But it was also largely quiet on the challenges facing the broader national security community in an increasingly dangerous world, in which traditional intelligence is just one tool of statecraft and national power.

After the January discovery of a caravan laden with explosives in Dural, Sydney, confusion emerged around what federal and state governments knew and when. The review was completed before the caravan was discovered, and the plot was likely beyond the review’s scope. However, government responses to the event should prompt a discussion about Australia’s national security architecture.

Australia faces an unprecedented convergence of threats. We are confronted simultaneously by the rise of aggressive authoritarian powers, global conflict, persistent and evolving terrorism, foreign interference and the normalisation of cyber warfare.

Luck will not protect us; we need structure and certainty. Australia saw these threats early and began to modernise its security architecture in 2017, including the establishment of the Home Affairs portfolio.

But the government has gradually reversed some elements of the consolidation, returning various security responsibilities to the Attorney-General’s portfolio, including for the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. This reversion to an outdated model risks leaving the system ill-equipped to confront the challenges of the 21st century.

Debate on Home Affairs seems fixated on the leadership style of its former head, Michael Pezzullo. Leadership is crucial, but obsession with individual style over substance, distracts from both strategic thinking and the fundamental issue of resurrecting a system that had structural inadequacies and was demonstrably unfit for purpose. We are not simply revisiting a past model; we are resurrecting a failed one.

The Attorney-General’s portfolio, in its traditional guise, was designed for a simpler, less dangerous era. Domestic threats were minimal and tended to come one by one—for example, after the end of the Cold War, security focus shifted from espionage to the emerging threat of Islamist terrorism. The Attorney-General’s oversight was appropriate, as it focused primarily on the legal framework while security agencies executed operations.

However, the proliferation and intersection of modern threats have overwhelmed this antiquated model.

When confronted with asylum-seeker boat arrivals, global terrorism, China and hybrid threats including cyber, the previous system—notwithstanding highly talented people—struggled as the Attorney-General’s portfolio held both the legal and security responsibilities. Having public servants working on legal considerations and intelligence officers doing operations is no longer adequate.

The system’s limitations were evident well before the 2017 restructure. In 2011, prime minister Julia Gillard moved cybersecurity from the Attorney-General’s purview into her own department. Similarly, the 2012 review of illegal boat arrival policy was managed within the prime minister’s department, reflecting that the framework was not up to the task. And as a result of a review after the 2014 Martin Place terrorist attack, the Abbott government created a Counterterrorism Coordinator within the prime minister’s portfolio.

The rise of the Islamic State terrorist group in 2014 exposed policy deficits. While terror laws rightly fell under the Attorney-General’s remit, the broader policy response demanded a more strategic perspective and decisive approach. Changes were needed, partly because laws were so out of date.

But it was China’s rise that finally revealed the urgent need for a dedicated focus on national security policy. The 2016 review into foreign interference was a direct consequence of Australia’s evolving threat landscape.

Few of our closest partners’ chief law officers also function as security ministers. Typically, a dedicated security minister focuses on threat assessment and policy development, while the Attorney-General ensures that all actions are lawful.

Australia’s Home Affairs model strengthened the legal checks and balances by separating security policy and operational functions from the legal oversight function. It ensured that a single minister could not simultaneously identify a threat, determine the appropriate response and authorise the necessary actions without independent scrutiny. The previous system essentially allowed a single minister to mark their own homework.

Dividing security responsibilities between the Attorney-General and Home Affairs portfolios limits the effectiveness of both departments.

If this gradual dilution portends a future abolition of Home Affairs altogether, that would be a mistake. As the Dural caravan controversy unfolded, no one seemed able to agree on what was an appropriate amount of information-sharing between police and security agencies, and state and federal governments. This underscores the need for clarity that Home Affairs is responsible for setting, coordinating and implementing national security policy.

Home Affairs was created because the threat environment was evolving and, within our national security architecture, foreign and defence policy were covered but the third aspect of national security—domestic security—was lacking. So, what security evolution has justified its regression? The Attorney-General’s department has not shown itself to be more capable than Home Affairs in terrorism, cybersecurity or foreign interference.

Home Affairs—to the government’s credit—led the world by banning DeepSeek from government devices. Could we count on such decisive action if lawyers were doing all the work and then reviewing it themselves? Would you allow your lawyer to run your business, rather than provide essential legal counsel?

Technology amplifies threats and is advancing much faster than new laws can be written. Terrorists use encrypted apps to plot attacks and social media to attract recruits. China spreads propaganda through social media and has already begun using cyber intrusions to prepare to conduct sabotage operations in future conflict.

Australia must not only reinstate the separation between the security minister and the attorney-general; it must evolve further to confront 21st-century threats. This should include establishing a National Security Council or Secretariat, like those of many of our partner nations, including Quad countries. This body should be led by a national security adviser who provides strategic coherence and policy coordination.

To navigate the increasingly complex and dangerous global security landscape, we need to evolve, not regress.

Two concepts of patriotism

Most Australians would say that they are patriotic, proud to be Australian, and proud of their nation’s history, even for all of its shortcomings. True, self-denunciation of the nation and its history is in vogue among the cultural elite that is so well described by Musa al-Gharbi in We Have Never Been Woke: The Cultural Contradictions of a New Elite (2024). However, their long-term agenda of ending the nation’s ‘structural oppression’ and rewriting its colonial-settler history, in the name of ‘social justice’, will never take hold in the community at large. 

If the suggested remedy for the historical harms of colonisation—the retelling of the nation’s history, and the pursuit of reparations for those harms—were to be pursued seriously, such action would be rejected by most Australians as being too radical, and an unnecessary distraction from meaningfully addressing the real disadvantage that is experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians. 

Rather than engaging in such national self-denunciation, most Australians practise what might be termed ‘soft patriotism’, an intuitive love of country that is ingrained from early childhood, for those born here, or rapidly acquired by those who choose to make Australia their home, first as permanent migrants, and then as new citizens. 

Patriotism involves more than going to the beach on a summer’s day on 26 January to celebrate Australia’s national day. It is a love of country. It is an understanding that Australia is not an arbitrary geographical space that happens to be inhabited by randomly selected individuals who lack a connection to one another. It is a cherishing of the nation’s shared heritage, which is the legacy of settlers, pastoralists, farmers, miners, administrators, industrialists, workers, and so many more. 

Our institutions of democratic government were shaped by colonial-era founders, who championed the creation of the Commonwealth of Australia in the second half of the 19th century.  Our economy was also built on foundations laid in colonial Australia, when endowments such as wool and gold, and access to capital and product markets, led to Australia being one of the richest countries in the world on a per capita basis at Federation in 1901. These and other foundations of the nation will need to be better taught to future generations in an era when historical understanding is in decline. 

The patriot also intuitively recognises that being a member of a national political community is the best available means of exercising freedom, democracy, and sovereignty. Maurizio Viroli wrote in For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism that patriotism involves a love of the institutions and the way of life that sustains the common liberty of a national people. In a world of sovereign nation-states, we owe no higher loyalty to a global or supranational form of government, to another nation-state, or to any international organisation. 

When the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 became law on 26 January 1949, it established for the first time the legal status of ‘Australian citizen’. At the first citizenship ceremony, held in Canberra on 3 February 1949, the Minister for Immigration, Arthur Calwell, asked the new citizens to respect the Australian flag, and to swear allegiance to ‘our concepts of government’. He explained that Australian democracy was a means for achieving national progress without the ‘chaotic spectacle of revolutionary disturbances ending in dictatorial minority rule’. He said that faith could be placed in the ‘common-sense and national goodwill of the Australian people’, and that political differences could be resolved peaceably through the nation’s democratic processes. That sentiment is today captured in the Australian citizenship pledge, when new citizens are asked to pledge their loyalty to Australia and its people, to share our belief in democracy, to respect our common rights and liberties, and to uphold and obey Australian laws.  

Most Australians embrace this form of patriotism. To call it ‘soft’ is not to diminish it.  Rather, it is to suggest that such patriotism is reflexive and relatively cost-free. It is a love of a readily understood ‘idea of Australia’, which does not require much explanation or ideological rationalisation. 

There is an altogether different, and more challenging, form of patriotism. ‘Hard patriotism’ has a necessarily martial quality, as it is invariably associated with the defence of the nation. It is today being displayed by Ukrainians, and by Israelis. Hard patriotism challenges us to ask of ourselves: what is to be defended, to the last if necessary, and are we prepared to pay that price? 

Hard patriotism cannot be solely expected of our armed forces, although it is intrinsic to the profession of arms, which traditionally have placed a more visible emphasis on duty, honour, service and country. In the event of having to defend the nation, hard patriotism would be required of all. Sacrifice and commitment would be expected from all, subject only to age or incapacity. Hard patriots would need to be found not just in the armed forces, but across a mobilised and resolute population. 

Winston Churchill’s ‘darkest hour’ speeches of 1940 are a supreme example of hard patriotism, expressed in magnificently eloquent words. His theme was ‘never surrender’, because he knew that surrender would mean the loss of liberty and sovereignty, and the end of the British way of life. The British people rose to the occasion, as did the Empire, which for a time stood alone against Nazi Germany.  Compare this with France. French historian Marc Bloch described in The Strange Defeat—written in 1940 and published posthumously in 1946—how the French were still a patriotic people in 1940. However, after a period of national malaise in the 1930s, which had led to a loss of self-confidence, they were not prepared—strategically or morally—for the Nazi onslaught. Soft, demoralised France fell in 1940, while hard, patriotic Britain fought on. Later, Charles de Gaulle emerged as the hard Free French patriot who restored French honour. 

Hard patriotism is the willingness to fight to the end if necessary for three treasured national possessions: freedom, or the liberty to live as we choose, subject only to our own laws; democracy, or our institutions of government that allow us to choose our leaders and lawmakers, and to check abuses of power; and sovereignty, or our capacity to control our territory and resources, and to pursue economic and social development as we see fit, free from external coercion and intimidation. 

Australia has no threatening neighbours, or historical enemies. If we did, hard patriotism would be intuitive and reflexive. Instead, for more than two centuries, we have mentally lived in an imagined ‘sheltered land’, far from strife. No matter that the security of our ‘sheltered land’ has been a function of Australia being prepared to fight distant wars (and a close one in 1942-44) against Eurasian powers, thereby assisting first the British Empire, and then the United States, to prevail over aspiring Eurasian hegemons. 

Today, we still live in a ‘sheltered land’, at least in our national imagination. In the absence of enemies at the gate, it is hard to appreciate that our way of life might one day be threatened—if not necessarily by invasion, then by other forms of strategic coercion or military attack. Australian strategic and defence policy is not couched in the language of hard patriotism. Even though we appear to be pursuing an implied grand strategy of working with the US and others to prevent Chinese hegemony, it is a strategy that dares not speak its name in those terms—principally so as to not disturb the foreign policy of ‘speaking softly’ and stabilising ties with China, but also to avoid the challenge that would be inherent in building hard patriotism. 

Therein lies the problem. Hard patriotism cannot be conjured into being suddenly on the eve of a military crisis, or at the outbreak of a war. Moreso than a significant financial crisis, a serious public health emergency, or a catastrophic natural event, a major war would throw its terrible shadow across society in ways that would require a more far-reaching  mobilisation of the nation, and greater sacrifices. 

A determined and resolute government could today make the case for hard patriotism, so that we were better prepared for the unlikely but credible prospect of major war. This would require a different discussion between the government and the people. Such a discussion would begin with a more honest explanation of the precarious nature of our strategic circumstances. The ‘sheltered land’ of our national imagination is no more. The Eurasian axis of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is seriously challenging the US and its allies in the struggle for mastery in Eurasia, and therefore globally. Distance no longer affords us the protection that it once did, as potential adversaries field longer-range weapons, and potent offensive cyber capabilities. 

In a more honest discussion, we have to consider the possibility of the emergence of a world where an isolated US, following either military defeat or strategic withdrawal, was either unwilling or unable to extend its protective shield over Australia and other allies. In that world, US forces and facilities would not be present in Australia, and its nuclear forces would not protect us. China would rule the waves of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and its military bases would be in our sea-air approaches, including probably in East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands. 

A hegemonic China would be free to impose its will on Australia, including in relation to trade, investment, resources, energy, and more besides. There would be little that we could do about resisting Chinese pressure, other than to develop significantly larger armed forces and military capabilities in an effort to independently deter a military attack. This would probably have to include an independent nuclear deterrent. 

Australia would come under pressure to free up its markets for Chinese investment and acquisition, to drop restrictions on technology access—for instance, regarding 7G and successor technologies—and agree to more China-favourable terms for access to our resources and energy. We would also come under pressure to extradite persons of interest to China, and to ensure that Australian media and public discourse exhibited the ‘correct understanding’ of China and its interests. Local quisling political and business leaders would emerge, who would urge their fellow Australians to ‘adjust’ to the new reality of Chinese supremacy. 

To avoid the possibility of such a future, Australia should be doing more to support the US-led deterrence of China, including being prepared to go to war if required to thwart Chinese hegemony. This would require the building of a hard Australian patriotism, the kind that is seen in frontline states that have a threatening neighbour. 

In any such war, China would employ advanced methods and techniques to undermine the national will to fight, sow discord among the people, fracture the community, amplify quisling voices, and generally attempt to demoralise the population. Cognitive warfare would be employed, waged over TikTok and the like, using technology-enabled propaganda and disinformation. An early objective would be to have sections of the community question the legitimacy of any such war, or at least Australia’s participation in it. Attempts might even be made to undermine Australia’s very legitimacy, perhaps by emphasising its origin as a European settler-colonial society, an ‘outsider’ in greater Asia, with a shameful, racist past. 

China’s President Xi Jinping has made Chinese nationalism a co-equal component, with Marxism, in his overarching ideological framework, as explained by Kevin Rudd in On Xi Jinping: How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World. Chinese strategy mobilises national history and national identity, in competition and in conflict.  Nationalism is employed to sustain a dual narrative of China’s re-emerging to its rightful place of international prestige and leadership, and its cultural superiority, relative to the declining West. China would go into any conflict confident and self-assured, not agonising over a supposedly shameful past. National self-confidence would be crucial to success. Like France in 1940, any soft and demoralised nations would lack the will to fight such a war, calculating that yielding to the ascendent power was the more tolerable course.      

Political leaders in democracies are invariably focused on the domestic priorities of their citizens. They are measured on their ability to deliver prosperity, and not their ability to wage war, unlike earlier times when waging war was central to the prestige of the state. Issues of statecraft typically hold no interest for parochial citizens. In such an environment, building hard patriotism in the absence of a visible threat is almost impossible. However, leaving it to the coming of darker days would be too late. 

True, Australians are likely to unite in a crisis, as was seen in the COVID pandemic and during natural disasters such as the Black Summer of 2019-20. They tend to be trusting of the institutions of government during such crises, even if there is grumbling at inconvenience. However, in those circumstances, governments tend to have more direct levers and a greater power of initiative, such as introducing urgent fiscal stimulus measures, or enforcing strict public health measures. A war fought in defence of the nation would be a more challenging affair. It would require broader and deeper mobilisation, and more directive control being exercised by the federal government, as compared, for instance, with what occurred during the COVID pandemic. 

How might a balance be struck between trying to rally a sceptical people too soon, when many are unlikely to see the need, as against trying to build the hard patriotism that would be required in wartime, when it might be too late? One way might be to ask all citizens, perhaps aged 18-65, to affirm annually a ‘pledge of service’, where we would all be asked to register the kind of national service that we would be willing to render in the event of a military emergency involving the defence of the nation. This would not be limited to being willing to take up arms. It would include other categories of service such as medical, construction, logistics, and so on. Establishing such a register, perhaps as a prelude to establishing an Australian national service scheme—solely for the territorial defence of the nation—would form the basis for a very different discussion between the government and the people about the realities of our strategic circumstances. 

Pursuing this and other initiatives, such as preparing a War Book, and treating national security like the national budget—through an annual,  prime-time, national security statement to the nation—would better prepare the people for what are said to be the worst strategic circumstances since the Second World War. A harder patriotism would build steadily, as the people began to appreciate the stakes, and the potential sacrifices that might have to be made in order to protect all that we cherish about Australia. Unfortunately, Australia is no longer a ‘sheltered land’, and the times call for a new Australian patriotism. 

Australia needs to prioritise local launch providers to grow its sovereign space capabilities

Visiting senior US Space Force officials were on the money when they said Australia is a ‘pot of gold at the end of the rainbow’ for future space operations. Australian space launch providers like Gilmore Space Technologies, Equatorial Launch Australia and Southern Launch have known for some time that Australia has advantages that enable launch vehicles to be sent into any trajectory at any inclination. The country’s geographic position and relatively clear skies make it a prime location for assured access to space. Global companies such as Virgin Orbit have taken notice and are beginning to establish their footprints in Australia to take advantage of these competitive strengths.

If heeded, calls for deeper cooperation between governments and the commercial space sector are likely to attract further foreign investment and put Australia’s space sector on a growth path for many years to come. The challenge, however, remains how to enable such investment while ensuring that Australian launch providers can effectively compete for contracts.

Fortunately, precedents from other jurisdictions provide some answers to this challenge. The European Union mandates that first preference be given to launchers developed by the European Space Agency, followed by Russia’s Soyuz launcher and then any others (though Russia’s war in Ukraine means the Soyuz launcher is no longer a viable option). The US applies similar protective measures by requiring US government satellites to be launched only on US launch vehicles.

There are good reasons for introducing such measures. First, they protect the growth of sovereign space industries and the social and economic benefits they provide. Second, they give policymakers the necessary levers to pull during times of crisis—something the US government knows all too well from past events in other industries. The Jones Act of 1920, for instance, was implemented because of concerns over national defence after the belligerent countries withdrew their merchant fleets to assist in the war effort during World War I, which had a direct impact on the US economy and its later efforts to enter the war. The act was introduced in a bid to subsidise the American merchant navy, which the US military could use in a future war if required.

There’s also the US Civil Reserve Air Fleet program, which was used last year to engage US airlines in evacuating Americans from Afghanistan. The program was established in 1951 following a shortage of US military air-transport capacity during the Berlin airlift. The civil carriers participating in the program ‘are given preference in carrying commercial peacetime cargo and passenger traffic’ for defence-related mission.

Recognising the benefits of such measures, a parliamentary committee inquiry recommended in November 2021 that future government contracts give priority to Australian-owned and -operated space assets. There are already Australian laws in place that grant the government certain rights if there’s a determination that national security is at risk. The recommendation from the committee, however, is just as much about national security as it is about economic prosperity. The policy mechanism is intended to create certainty and work for Australian start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises while ensuring that Australia develops sovereign capabilities for access to space to protect its interests.

Some may argue that such measures are protectionist and anti-competitive. But, as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program demonstrates, when applied appropriately, they can give the government the necessary levers in times of need and still allow an industry to remain viable. For Australia’s space sector, this can be achieved by prioritising a sovereign launch capability and investing significantly to support it. This is far from an uncompetitive blanket protectionist policy. If targeted foreign investment is done well, including by introducing other launch companies, it can help stimulate demand and the broader economy around launch, which will help Australian launchers along the way. But such measures will require sophistication and will need to allow policy mechanisms to be recalibrated as necessary.

Australia hasn’t needed to implement such policies for at least the past three decades. The lack of a large industrial manufacturing base means that Australia has relied instead on the globalised marketplace to fulfil its needs. Another tool that has been widely used in defence acquisitions is the US foreign military sales program. However, while using these mechanisms might resolve an immediate concern, in the long run, they inherently prioritise the growth of another nation’s space capabilities at the expense of Australia’s sovereign space industry. As I argued in a previous article, relying mainly on market-based solutions without considering potential national security risks is fraught with danger which, if realised, will require long lead times and costly solutions down the track.

As Australia’s space industry continues to grow and mature, the government needs to consider prioritising Australian companies for both civilian and defence purposes to help develop a vibrant and competitive sovereign space industry in Australia. This is not a zero-sum game in which the benefits that accrue to Australia’s sovereign launchers come at the expense of global space organisations. But without a level playing field Australian companies will remain at a disadvantage against the more established corporations for the foreseeable future. More importantly, it will mean that Australia will continue to rely on global companies to meet its sovereign needs. If the Ukraine war and the US’s historical experiences are anything to go by, we should not put all our eggs in one global basket and should instead try to mitigate any potential risks by supporting Australia’s space industry to complement existing global players for a prosperous future.

Policy, Guns and Money: Space and national security

This week’s episode is all about space. ASPI recently hosted a masterclass and dialogue focused on space and national security, and we are delighted to be joined by some special guests for conversations on this critical policy area.

ASPI’s Malcolm Davis talks with space-policy experts Namrata Goswami and Kevin Pollpeter about China’s capabilities and ambitions in space. They discuss the country’s space industry and the potential for China to accelerate its lunar program.

Bec Shrimpton, director of ASPI’s Sydney Dialogue, speaks to Virgin Orbit’s Janice Starzyk and Bret Perry about the company’s history and  ambitions. They discuss opportunities for government and industry collaboration in space, including in the areas of national security and defence, and how Virgin Orbit is supporting spacefaring nations.

Shrimpton is also joined by futurist Jeffrey Becker for a conversation on space futures and why futures thinking is an important tool for policymakers. They discuss the role of technology in warfare and the military implications of different technological developments, and the importance of the space domain in military strategy.

Developing a national intelligence threat assessment for Australia

In a previous article, I talked about Australia’s changed threat environment and recommended that the government produce a national threat assessment with both classified and publicly accessible versions. In this follow-up, I’ll focus on what the process for developing such an assessment would look like.

The benchmark for a national threat assessment is set by the US’s Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Notably, the leadership and enterprise management role of Australia’s Office of National Intelligence (ONI) was modelled on the US office.

The release of the US intelligence community’s annual threat assessment is always keenly anticipated. Like the ones before it, the 2021 report is an ‘all threats’ assessment and includes foreign threats such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, as well as transnational threats such as terrorism, cyberattacks, pandemics, climate change and organised crime. (It shouldn’t surprise anyone that China is clearly identified as the US’s most significant threat.)

It is a whole-of–US intelligence community threat assessment that is written as an all-source classified document, then declassified for public release. It’s also accompanied by the public testimony of the director of national intelligence at a hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. While the 2021 unclassified document is only 27 pages, the US government also ensures that it’s readily digestible for time-poor or alternate learners by making a graphics-based version available.

An Australian equivalent process would be for the director-general of national intelligence to lead an annual whole-of–national intelligence community (NIC) process by developing an all-source classified national threat assessment for delivery to the prime minister and the cabinet’s National Security Committee for them to then develop national security strategy and risk assessments.

This document would then be ‘sanitised’ and made unclassified so it could be tabled in parliament by the prime minister and be presented by the director-general of national intelligence as public testimony on the threats Australia faces to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.

It would also be posted on ONI’s website for public access (there are currently no intelligence assessments on the agency’s public website). It’s important that this process be, and be seen to be, apolitical and be accompanied by a public information campaign.

A publicly releasable national threat assessment would ensure the public understands all the threats to Australia’s national security, not just the threat from China, and therefore why the government devotes the resources it does to the departments of Defence and Home Affairs and the NIC.

Currently, if you want to know about threats to Australia, other than the domestic threats of terrorism, espionage and cybercrime, you must go to a US document and translate them to an Australian viewpoint, or rely on think tanks, academia or the media to do it for you with all the attendant risks.

How to make an all-source classified national threat assessment unclassified for public release? Well, not all intelligence collected by the NIC, and the Australian Defence Force’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability on its behalf, is classified to begin with. Indeed, much of it is already drawn from publicly available information sources which is then fused with information collected through secret means.

Open-source intelligence, or OSINT, is already a key collection and analysis discipline—just like signals, human and geospatial intelligence—and has much to offer the national threat assessment process.

Within government, ONI already operates the Open Source Centre, which ‘collects, interprets and disseminates information relating to matters of political, strategic or economic significance to Australia’. Outside government, there are several commercial providers that already work closely with government by providing OSINT products and services.

On the more technical side of things, space-based imagery collection is also no longer the sole remit of government. Commercial vendors now operate satellites capable of capturing high-quality unclassified imagery by night and day in all weather. Radio-frequency transmissions—effectively open-source signals intelligence—are also collected by several commercial satellite operators.

Think tanks and online investigators already very effectively use these commercial sources to support their work, so why not the NIC in the development of the public version of the national threat assessment?

So, because OSINT is already used in agencies’ intelligence processes and products, a good proportion of the classified national threat assessment will already actually be unclassified. The next part of the process will be sanitising secret sources and methods down to unclassified.

Basically, when sanitising secret intelligence, NIC analysts will be able to use publicly available information and OSINT from a variety of sources and methods as a guide as to what is and is not classified and then make conscious decisions about what to include in the public version and what to keep secret. In addition, not all of the detailed ‘evidence’ needs to be made public; sometimes only the broad assessment will be made public because the evidence can’t be.

A move towards developing an annual, apolitical, publicly available national threat assessment, rather than ad hoc speeches and ‘announceables’ made by officials and politicians, would both inform and focus the public. This process would normalise the strategic threat conversation and hopefully reduce the media hype that tends to accompany such announcements. The assessment would be developed by intelligence professionals and delivered to the public through the parliament and its committee processes.

While a national threat assessment should go hand in hand with an ‘all hazards’ national security strategy, which Australia last produced in 2013, this is a separate but important debate. It needs to be stated, however, that a national threat assessment is not reliant on a national security strategy, though a national security strategy would be reliant on a national threat assessment.

An annual all-threats assessment process that produces both classified and unclassified threat assessments for Australians by Australians will enable the Australian public to be properly informed of the significant 1930s- and 1940s-like changes in Australia’s strategic environment—and prepare accordingly.

Why Australia needs a national intelligence threat assessment

The 16th of September 2021 will be remembered as the day Australia’s strategic status changed forever. The AUKUS security partnership and its headline announcement that the United Kingdom and the United States will assist Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, and no doubt other yet-to-be-announced capabilities, give the country the strategic weight that befits its status as the world’s 13th largest economy. Serious countries deal with serious threats in serious ways, and that requires a robust, serious threat assessment process.

As Prime Minister Scott Morrison noted when he launched the 2020 defence strategic update in July last year, this has all come about because of the most serious deterioration in Australia’s strategic circumstances ‘since the existential threat we faced when the global and regional order collapsed in the 1930s and 1940s’. These are clear words indicating a dire threat.

Of course, the 2020 update’s threat perception and last month’s announcements have China written all over them—even though the update only mentions China twice out of the context of competition with the US or the South China Sea and the AUKUS agreement makes no mention of China at all.

One of the most significant aspects of the recent changes in Australia’s strategic circumstances is the rate at which we travelled from an easy economic partnership with China to a point where China felt emboldened enough to issue Australia with its list of 14 grievances. The speed and significance of this shift have of course caught many by surprise—especially the Australian people.

How can the government bring the public along for the ride in understanding the most significant changes in Australia’s national security environment since the late 1930s?

Because of the rapidity of this change, and the existential nature of the threat to Australia as a sovereign nation, the government needs to conduct an annual national threat assessment. The process would draw on all sources and the outcomes would aid the development of national security strategy and risk assessments, and, just as importantly, would increase public understanding and awareness of the threats we face. The product of this process would be classified and unclassified versions of the threat assessment.

The assessment would take the perception of a threat through a coherent, professionalised and apolitical process so that we understand what it is—and isn’t.

Threat assessments, or TAs in the intelligence business, are a key part of the intelligence process and are important artefacts that clearly state the sources and means of threat actors and their assessed intentions. Fundamentally, the concept of threat is built around the notions of capability and intent. For a threat to exist, the actor must have the capability or means to harm you or your interests and the will or intent to inflict that harm.

The TA process examines and articulates adversary capabilities and intent using robust analytical techniques, and the result is a statement of the level of threat—low, moderate, high, and so on,with each term having a precise meaning.

The threat assessment process is a normal, established, repeatable, updatable and robust intelligence process and a TA is one of the most common intelligence products.

In Australia, we don’t have a history of such a public process or document (nor do the other Commonwealth members of the Five Eyes, for that matter). We do, however, have a laudable tradition in making apolitical public policy through publicly available reports by the Productivity Commission, the Australian National Audit Office and the Treasury. So why wouldn’t we do the same for the most significant of national security threats?

Threat assessment as a term is being increasingly used in the contexts of counterterrorism, cybersecurity and, more recently, foreign interference. For example, the 2017 independent intelligence review employed the term ‘threat assessment’ only in the context of the National Threat Assessment Centre and its focus on counterterrorism.

In a significant change, the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Mike Burgess, recently made two annual threat assessments publicly available—the first in 2020 and the other in 2021. The most recent even includes a 30-minute video of Burgess’s address.

The Australian Signals Directorate has released threat reports annually since 2015 (except in 2018). The 2019–20 report was produced by the directorate’s newly established Australian Cyber Security Centre, in collaboration with the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission.

The ASIO threat assessments are a welcome addition to public awareness but, as per ASIO’s remit, they focus on counterterrorism, espionage and foreign interference. The ACSC’s reports likewise focus on cyber threats.

These documents are domestically oriented, specialised and focused. They aren’t threat assessments that span the entire national intelligence community—especially the agencies that have foreign intelligence roles. Instead, they are more akin to the US government’s annual homeland threat assessment. They are also public versions of originally secret assessments.

In December 2018, as recommended by the 2017 intelligence review, the Office of National Intelligence was formed out of its predecessor, the Office of National Assessments. ONI is responsible for ‘enterprise-level management of the national intelligence community‘ is the ‘single point of accountability’ to the prime minister and the cabinet’s National Security Committee for all intelligence matters, both foreign and domestic.

It therefore makes sense that the head of ONI, the director-general of national intelligence, lead the national threat assessment process and coordinate input from across the national intelligence community, and that the assessment’s focus be an ‘all threats’ one.

What might this look like? I’ll deal with that question in my next post.

Australia needs a national crisis-simulation capability

We live in an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape. There’s a greater likelihood of a major crisis or conflict in our region in the next 10 years than at any point in decades. From a direct military attack on Australia to a malicious cyberattack on our critical infrastructure or a natural disaster exacerbated by the impact of climate change, these risks can rapidly become crises.

Australians have witnessed the concurrent and compounding nature of catastrophes in the 21st century. We didn’t predict the numerous and disparate effects of the Covid-19 pandemic; nor, despite warnings, did we foresee the tragic consequences of the Black Summer bushfires—all economic, political and social shocks for the nation.

While it’s always been important to prepare for changes, challenges and crises, the events of the past two years have brought a new urgency to this task. Our responses to future crises can’t be left to chance. They must be practised, considered and well executed if we’re to maintain our security and prosperity.

Australia can use simulations to rehearse such events. A simulation has been described as an ‘open-ended evolving situation with many interacting variables, where the goal for all participants is to each take a particular role, address the issues, threats, or problems that arise in the situation, and experience the effects of their decisions’.

Such exercises are used by governments and emergency management organisations around the world to prepare for crises. In 2015, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work urged the reinvigoration of wargaming, highlighting its ability to improve our understanding of complex, uncertain environments and the changing character of warfare.

Consequently, the US military has shown a renewed interest in wargaming and simulation over the past five years. Similarly, in 2020, Britain established a Defence Wargaming Centre to purpose-design sessions for the Ministry of Defence and other government departments.

Simulation exercises were used in Australia in the lead-up the 2000 Sydney Olympics to stress-test security protocols. Significant changes were made to operational plans ahead of the games based on the insights harvested from those simulations.

The Australian Crisis Simulation Summit is such an exercise. The student-led summit brings together 70 future leaders from around the nation to participate in three advanced crisis simulations. Participants adopt the roles of ministers, advisers, strategists, bureaucrats and journalists. Across state, territory and federal jurisdictions, they work together to resolve an unfolding crisis.

State-of-the-art software emulates all aspects of modern communication, allowing a control team to monitor activities. Simulated news websites, social media channels and a live news talk show keep the public informed and provide feedback to participants. The summit demonstrates what a sophisticated crisis simulation looks like in practice.

The Defence Department recently released documents in response to a freedom of information request that outline the crisis simulations it has conducted over the past six years. They revealed that the department conducted infrequent ‘facilitated discussions of plausible scenarios’, ‘board games’ and ‘table-top exercises’ using PowerPoint presentations to prepare our leaders for the uncertain future ahead.

Whilst the FOI request was narrow in scope and there are numerous examples of more sophisticated government-run simulations, it’s evident that such exercises are not given sufficient priority within government.

The bushfire royal commission recommended that Commonwealth, state and territory governments conduct multi-agency, national-level exercises to assess national capacity, inform capability development and coordination, and stress-test current capabilities to respond to natural disasters.

To act on this recommendation and to strengthen the nation’s preparedness, the government could consider establishing a simulation exercise capability. It could operate within the National Recovery and Resilience Agency and would conduct national-level exercises on forecasted threats and anticipated risks.

Multi-agency, cross-jurisdictional exercises will break down the siloed approach to simulation in government and could encourage the cross-pollination of ideas, build muscle memory and create situational awareness of vulnerabilities, potential consequences and resource requirements. Critically, they could help to build networks across society before a crisis occurs, forging trust and confidence between the people whom we rely on to respond.

The exercises should move beyond paper- or screen-based ‘facilitated discussions about plausible scenarios’. They must be hands-on, practical simulations that utilise the latest technologies and best-practice methodologies. Participants should feel the pressure and intensity of a real-life crisis and be encouraged to think outside the box about the kind of responses we must be prepared to carry out.

Situating this capability outside Defence would redefine the narrative of these exercises, expanding their scope beyond military dimensions and recognising that we must bring whole-of-nation responses to future crises. The branch operating this capability should be able to involve senior public servants, cabinet ministers, Australian Defence Force personnel, civil society organisations, journalists, critical infrastructure operators, private corporations and universities. Covid-19 has demonstrated that we all have a role in tackling a crisis.

As in a fire drill, the coordinating agency should be able to compel participation of stakeholders at a moment’s notice. Crises are unpredictable. Our rehearsals for such events must be, too, if we are to authentically prepare.

Individual exercises could be jointly funded by industry stakeholders, who have as much to gain as government. Privately owned critical infrastructure operators may soon need to comply with the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2020. If this bill becomes law, it will require these operators to conduct cybersecurity exercises to ensure that they have effective preparedness, mitigation and response strategies.

An agency operating at the interface between industry and government could coordinate the exercises, harnessing the resources of industry stakeholders, building collegiality and sharing lessons across private corporations, which may tend to help themselves before helping each other.

Australia must do more to prepare for crises. Clear-eyed, robust, nation-level simulation exercises using the latest technologies and best-practice methodologies will help achieve this. Such simulations are underutilised and underappreciated in Australia’s government, yet our AUKUS partners have already developed advanced capability.

Investing in a sovereign simulation capability will build confidence, strengthen resilience and prepare Australia for the next crisis.

A sovereign space-launch capability is crucial for Australia’s prosperity and security

A satellite in polar orbit providing services to Australians flies over almost every country in the world, every day. No other technology offers the level of global connectivity that advanced space applications provide.

As we’ve entered a more globalised, interconnected and interdependent world, Australia has become heavily reliant on space-based technologies for essential services our communities depend on. However, we’re grossly underperforming in the rapidly growing space sector. Our Indo-Pacific neighbours have recognised the importance of space to their economies, to the welfare of their people and to our region’s shared future. Countries like Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam are grasping opportunities which Australia is yet to identify. This need not be the case if Australia were to invest in developing its embryonic space industry and encourage the development of a sovereign space-launch capability.

Australia risks its closest neighbour, New Zealand, becoming the more commercially attractive location for establishing a launch-dependent space company. New Zealand’s contribution to the global space economy, while modest, is particularly inspiring. Driven by commercial activity, the nation’s space sector has procured contracts worth millions of dollars from the international space market. Its industry is built upon business-friendly regulatory frameworks which achieve safety while supporting innovation. With the Philippines, India and Japan also rapidly developing their foundations to support next-generation launch activities, Australia must act now if it is to win the significant business available in the international market over other players in the region.

Over the next decade, Australia must develop a full-spectrum, strategic, sovereign and globally engaged space sector. Failure to do so would mean losing out on economic opportunities and risking the country’s future security. Australia has a real opportunity to become the leading Indo-Pacific hub for space activity, as well as the world’s preferred location for space-launch services. The country and its capabilities are ideally positioned to play an innovative and significant role in the future global space economy.

An essential ingredient to bring and sustain Australia in the global space market is a safe and reliable sovereign launch capability. First-class launch services will create enduring economic opportunities for the domestic market and will ensure Australia’s continued security and prosperity.

Australia’s civil space strategy aims for the creation of 20,000 new jobs in the domestic space industry by 2030. If harnessed appropriately, the launch industry will directly contribute up to 20% of this targeted growth. If Australia’s full market potential is realised, the gross value added from domestic launch service providers could deliver up to $2 billion of direct, indirect and induced value into the economy over the decade to 2033.

This potential growth represents a unique opportunity to capture foreign investment, create jobs and strengthen the economy as Australia recovers from the economic losses during the Covid-19 pandemic. Investing in the space sector will create national supply chains that will be resilient in the face of increasingly harmful external shocks.

Safe and successful launch operations will also attract and enable investment in, and development of, rocket manufacture, satellite manufacture, satellite mission control, data analytics and other space-related industries. Modern rocket and satellite companies are seeking to shorten their supply chains by positioning manufacturing hubs as close to reliable launch infrastructure as practicable. This reduces logistics costs and transportation timelines. Investment in the launch industry will help develop a broader advanced-technology industry base.

In addition to the economic benefits afforded by providing launch services, there are significant considerations relating to national security. Australia’s access to space will continue to be neither consistent nor secured as long as it relies on foreign nations to provide that access. Without a sovereign launch capability, Australia’s dependence on others for critically important space-based technologies, particularly for national security purposes, becomes a significant threat. If relationships deteriorate with our international partners, Australia may be without a means to launch its payloads into orbit.

ASPI’s Malcolm Davis suggests that in wartime or in a pre-war period, our dependence on American launch providers would likely see Australian payloads bumped in the queue in favour of prioritised US payloads. Maintaining a full-spectrum space industry with capability to design, build, launch and operate satellites will ensure Australia’s unimpeded, rapid access to space, despite any supply-chain disruptions in the global market or other changing circumstances outside of Australia’s control.

Developing and maintaining a sovereign launch capability will also allow Australia to burden-share launch capability with friends and allies. Sharing with allies in the Five Eyes intelligence-gathering network, for example, will distribute costs and risks among alliance partners. Partners and friendly Pacific nations could rely on Australia to launch their payloads when required. In return, Australia would strengthen its strategic partnerships, create opportunities for international collaboration and foreign investment, and develop a more resilient space industry in a region in which it needs to be able to shape outcomes.

Southern Launch’s Whalers Way Orbital Launch Complex on the Eyre Peninsula in South Australia will provide reliable and secure access to high-inclination orbits, such as polar orbits, to civil government, to defence forces and to the Australian and global space industry. Rockets launched from Whalers Way will fly southwards over the Great Australian Bight, where the flight path traverses no delicate marine environments and has minimal air and maritime traffic. The launch site is in an area with a very low population and is being designed as the world’s safest orbital launch site. Manufacturers will be able to launch their small rockets more frequently and more reliably.

The complex at Whalers Way is geographically secure, minimising the risk of a launch vehicle being intercepted or interfered with during ascent. Supported by the regional city of Port Lincoln (a 50-minute flight from Adelaide), Whalers Way is connected to a commercial airport, deep-water harbours, heavy industry and a vibrant population. Satellites launched from the complex can fly over the US mainland within 30 minutes of lift-off, and over Asia within 80 minutes.

The Whalers Way Orbital Launch Complex plays an important role in Australia’s industry growth and does so directly in line with the government’s national civil space priority areas. The launch site will unlock future downstream manufacturing, facilitating further high-tech space-related jobs and growth, while ensuring Australia has dependable access to space on its own terms.

The government must comprehensively engage with launch-related industries to ensure there are no unnecessary bureaucratic or regulatory hurdles preventing this type of access. If the existing hurdles remain, or if new ones are uncovered as the industry steps through this uncharted territory, Australia will have lost the opportunity for the timely and safe development of a sovereign launch capability.

As its space sector grows, Australia must invest in becoming a strategic, sovereign and globally engaged space power with a highly capable domestic space industry. Given the importance of launch services to the long-term security and prosperity of Australia and its allies, the development of Australia’s sovereign launch capability must be a priority for the government.

Let’s stop using the term ‘non-traditional’ about security threats

As a former naval officer and current student of maritime affairs, I have long been infuriated by the blanket use of the term ‘non-traditional’ to describe security threats external to those directly generated by the conflicting interests of nation-states.

In the maritime domain, piracy, smuggling, slave trading and illegal fishing are just a few of the threats to which the ‘non-traditional’ label has been attached. The pundits would know better if they gave the slightest thought to history.

In humanity’s use of the sea, it’s difficult to decide which activity should be counted as seafarers’ ‘second oldest profession’, but piracy and smuggling probably vie for the prize. Illegal fishing follows not far behind. It’s no coincidence that the Fishery Protection Squadron is the oldest formed squadron of Britain’s Royal Navy. Or that the international pennant to distinguish vessels on fishery protection duties dates back nearly 140 years.

Natural disasters and the mechanisms to respond to them are another example. Those interested in understanding how humanitarian assistance can be coordinated by rival great powers and their navies would do well to study the interventions that followed the Messina earthquake in Sicily. It occurred 112 years ago.

The latest misapplication of the term—to pandemics—is perhaps the most egregious example. Pandemics are indeed occasional, even rare, but the idea that they are ‘non-traditional’ is ludicrous. Such disasters for civilisations can be traced back to the beginning of recorded history. Even in the early Christian era, the Antonine Plague of the second century, the Plague of Justinian in the sixth century and that of Emmaeus in the seventh all had profound social, economic and political and thus strategic effects. The Black Death of the 14th century and the Great Plague of London in the 17th are just two more examples.

There are good reasons why this unthinking application of jargon must stop. First, ‘non-traditional’ implies something new. Adopting the label too often means that the historical record is not consulted, the voice of experience is ignored, and the mistakes of the past are all too often repeated.

As in the case of pandemics, it also contributes to our neglecting threats that are recurrent but rare. We discount the need to prepare for them because we pay too little attention to their catastrophic effects, which we have never studied. The belated rush to examine the experience of the Spanish influenza pandemic of 1918–19 is a case in point.

Next, it implicitly minimises the importance of such threats for countries and communities—particularly the smallest nation-states, which have always had them at the forefront of their security concerns. This dynamic is particularly apparent amongst the Pacific island countries. They have reason to be impatient with those preoccupied with nation-state rivalries at the expense of what the islands perceive to be existential threats.

The label also makes it more difficult to identify what really is new in the forms of emerging threats—and new in the shape of the customary ones. Transnational crime is hardly an innovation; it is criminal methods that are evolving. To give another example, the effect of climate change on natural disasters is a major cause for concern. Just what will more severe and frequent weather events mean for us? What needs to change in our preparations as well as in the mechanics of any humanitarian response? These are difficult questions but treating such subjects as something wholly new will lead at best to the reinvention of many wheels—and, most likely, to a failure to achieve the most effective change and adaptation.

I have suggested elsewhere that what most military services need is less tradition and more history. In this matter, what many analysts of contemporary affairs need is less ‘non-tradition’ and more history. It might help them see through the glass, less darkly.

Keeping Australians and their civil liberties safe: Who was Robert Marsden Hope?

In a previous post, I described how three prime ministers, Gough Whitlam, Malcolm Fraser and Bob Hawke, appointed Robert Marsden Hope to conduct two royal commissions and another inquiry into the intelligence and security agencies in the 1970s and 1980s.

This post discusses the skills, qualities and values that Hope brought to the task.

The selection of Hope to conduct the first of the inquiries was one of Whitlam’s wisest appointments. Hope had two sides to his personality, which he himself described as a clash between anarchy and discipline. Most people saw a charming, congenial and collegial man, who won the respect and affection of people of all ages, social backgrounds and political views.

But at times an iron hand emerged from the velvet glove as he expressed sharp disapproval of a barrister, politician or public servant he judged to be incompetent, obstructive or self-serving.

From his childhood, Hope displayed the ability to respect the legitimate demands of established institutions while tolerating, even encouraging, rebels and radicals. He attended Shore School in Sydney, with academic success, but didn’t subscribe to its ‘King and empire’ ethos, absenting himself from the almost-compulsory cadet corps and covering for his sometimes wayward brothers.

Halfway through his law course at Sydney University, Hope enlisted for the Australian Imperial Force and served in both the Middle East and New Guinea, but he declined promotion to any rank higher than corporal.

As a lecturer at the law school, barrister and judge, Hope was regarded as a pre-eminent expert on the complex technicalities of property law and trusts. Away from the bar or bench, he devoted an extraordinary amount of time and energy to cultural, educational and welfare organisations, including theatre companies, an Aboriginal training college and an aged care organisation. His 22 years as foundation chancellor of the University of Wollongong evoked profound respect from all stakeholders, from vice-chancellors to student radicals.

While a senior barrister, Hope was an active member, and for a time president, of the NSW Council for Civil Liberties. Angered by the way in which the NSW police handled anti–Vietnam War and anti-conscription demonstrators, he wrote a pamphlet titled ‘The right of peaceful assembly’, equally critical of undue force by police and violent or illiberal tactics by radical demonstrators. Although normally a Labor voter, he briefly joined the Liberal Party, to secure changes in police regulations. After being appointed to the NSW Supreme Court by a Liberal government, he quickly demonstrated his political independence.

A genuine ‘small l liberal’, Hope earned the respect of both sides of politics, at both state and federal levels, leading to what amounted almost to a second career as an adviser to executive governments. A Liberal government in New South Wales appointed him as chair of an advisory committee on prison reform. This achieved very little, but Hope learned important lessons about inquiries into public policy and policymaking. The Whitlam government then appointed him to chair a committee on ‘the national estate’, whose report led to legislation and administrative structures that embedded in public policy a new outlook on heritage and conservation. Later Hope served for 15 years as the foundation chair of the NSW Heritage Council.

These tasks demonstrated and developed Hope’s skills as an adviser on public policy, most importantly displayed in the inquiries into the intelligence agencies. Whitlam contemplated appointing Hope to the High Court, but instead left him on the NSW Supreme Court, so that he could be appointed (as a serving High Court judge could not) to conduct the national estate inquiry and the intelligence royal commission.

Nearly all of the evidence in the three intelligence inquiries was taken in confidential hearings rather than the quasi-courtroom style seen in television news broadcasts of recent royal commissions. In these hearings, which Hope kept as informal as possible, he was able to deploy his sympathetic charm to encourage information from witnesses who spoke frankly and honestly, sometimes risking their careers, while sternly rebuking those whom he found obstructive or self-serving.

The Combe–Ivanov hearing, which dominated media attention for many months, was the only part of the two royal commissions to be conducted in the quasi-courtroom style. Ironically, this was the format to which this Supreme Court judge was less suited. He was subjected to criticism, often unfair, by civil libertarians and the media, which presented a distorted image of the man and his work.

Although Hope did not study for an arts degree, as he had wished, he devoted considerable time, and a large personal library, to the study of history. He also commissioned a historian to write a history of the Australian agencies before 1945. His approach to his task was based as much on his historical sensibility as on his legal expertise.

These were some of the characteristics of the man whose name is given to the headquarters of the Office of National Intelligence in Canberra. The next posts in this series will discuss the principles underlying the Hope model of intelligence and current challenges to that model.

Tag Archive for: National Security

‘Evil’ silence from Canberra on threat to national security

They say silence breeds contempt but the reticence of the Australian government about national security threats is more akin to the quote attributed to Dietrich Bonhoeffer when resisting Nazi Germany: that “silence in the face of evil is itself evil”.

The government is not responsible for individual violent incidents across our cities, but it is responsible for informing, reassuring and protecting the public. Yet the current malaise of leadership is feeding anxiety and infecting the social cohesion that has stood Australia apart from much of the world despite decades of global terrorism and conflict.

Australia remained united in the face of terrorist plots from al-Qa’ida, attacks by ISIS, wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan, the malicious rise of China, and Russia’s war in Europe. But we are cracking; rising anti-Semitism and national fear shows domestic division is even more insidious than international incidents.

The government’s systemic abdication of responsibility, cloaked in silence and evasive justifications, is not a one-off relating to the caravan plot against Australia’s Jewish community but a troubling trend, exemplified by the tactic of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and ministers only commenting if asked by media and, even then, answering with non-statements.

Australians are not naive. We understand the need for operational secrecy in matters of national security and that classified intelligence should not be divulged lightly. But “operational details” cannot be a catch-all excuse to deflect legitimate scrutiny or hide truth.

Uncertainty breeds fear so governments must be on the front foot. Almost within the hour of Japan bombing Pearl Harbor, US president Franklin Roosevelt was instructing his press secretary to immediately inform the media. While not comparable events, the principle is key: keep the public informed and confident that its government is in control even in the most challenging times – even more important in the digital age.

Albanese’s refusal to address questions about the explosives-laden caravan, due to “ongoing investigations”, added to confusion, anxiety and speculation. A stonewalled public is not a secure one. Similarly, his reluctance to clarify whether he discussed China’s sonar pulse attack on Australian navy personnel in a meeting with Xi Jinping just days after the incident in November 2023, citing the confidentiality of diplomatic talks, simply resulted in doubt and more questions.

While discretion in diplomacy is essential, selective silence is inconsistent given the broad topics of leaders’ meetings, if not the exact words, are usually published, and suggested he just didn’t want to admit he had inexcusably failed to raise the matter.

Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s handling of the case of Yang Hengjun, the Australian arbitrarily detained in China, is equally disconcerting – failing to even acknowledge on January 19 Yang’s sixth year of detention, and previously insisting on being “constrained for privacy reasons”, despite Yang’s own desire for public advocacy. Hiding behind the veil of privacy appears less about protecting Yang’s interests and more about protecting the government’s.

This week marks one year since Beijing sentenced Yang to death so a comprehensive condemnation and demand for release is required. Similarly, Wong omitted to mention China in her readout of January’s discussions with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in contrast to Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya’s honesty that China was a central part of his meeting with Rubio.

Meanwhile, when asked about the US and European countries reviewing the security risk of Chinese-made smart cars, Energy Minister Chris Bowen said no such review would happen here as the priority was consumer choice. On that basis, we’d welcome Russian gas or perhaps Iranian nuclear know-how, not to mention that prioritising price now will mean consumers in the future will have few choices but Chinese-made smart cars.

The pattern of evading, ignoring or downplaying security threats is itself a security threat. It erodes public trust – and cynicism can quickly turn to conspiracy. It creates an information vacuum to be filled by conspiracy theories and speculation, leading not just to an uninformed but a misinformed public. And it has the potential to weaken Australia’s strategic position by reducing the confidence of our allies and increasing that of our rivals.

We’ve seen it before. The flood of illegal boats from 2008 and refusal to acknowledge pull factors created not only a backlash against illegal immigration but reduced confidence in legal immigration and emboldened criminal organisations. It was only by being upfront about the illegal immigration problem that confidence was restored in Australia’s strength as a migration nation.

Importantly, division is distinct from difference. Different opinions, including on world leaders or policies, are to be promoted as the basis of freedom of speech. But support for terrorist groups and acts of intimidation and violence are not free speech.

Our longstanding national resilience means the cracks can’t be papered over but can be resealed quickly by a government willing to lead, including with some good old-fashioned naked truth.

Image: © Thennicke 2016, Wikimedia Commons

Make no mistake, command and control will crush ASPI’s independence

For China watchers, there’s a grim irony contained in the 14 principles that former senior official Peter Varghese recommends in his long-awaited review into national security think tanks, released last week.

Fourteen was also the number of grievances the Chinese embassy notoriously unveiled in 2020 and that Beijing expected to be addressed if diplomatic relations were to improve – the 10th of which was defunding the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Beijing hasn’t quite got its way through the recommendations of Varghese, who is now chancellor of the University of Queensland. But the embassy’s champagne stocks may be a little depleted once its officials have measured his list against their own.

Beyond the impact on ASPI itself, there is a deeper danger in the principles, accepted by the Albanese government: the push to exercise more control over think tanks and to dampen the contestability that researchers provide.

ASPI was set up in 2001 precisely to contest the advice that the Howard government was receiving from the Department of Defence. We have since grown into a broader national security think tank that looks at modern threats ranging from cyber and disinformation to authoritarian abuses of power in places such as China’s Xinjiang.

We are recognised globally for our groundbreaking work on China – none of which is convenient to the government’s narrative of diplomatic stability with Beijing. The idea that the security issues ASPI has pursued independently – and often well ahead of national and global trends – may in future be given the thumbs up or down by ministers and bureaucrats is deeply unsettling. Yet the Varghese report recommends this command-and-control approach.

After delivering the 50-page report, Varghese then wrote an op-ed in these pages at the weekend responding to the responses to his report. This is ironic given his report’s criticism of “op-ed overreach”. The problem with Varghese’s insistence that we all just need a Bex and a good lie-down is that a veritable chasm exists between his rhetoric expressing support for think tank independence and the actions he’s actually recommending.

First, think tanks would have to bid against one another for operational funding. That sounds superficially appealing, but if two institutes are competing for a grant and one has been nicer to the sitting government, who is better placed? Not all think tanks will resist self-censorship when they know fearless critiques may jeopardise future funding.

Second, ministers and their departments would set priorities for research, meaning anything that didn’t match the government’s agenda or was sensitive could be discouraged.

If an organisation wanted to look at China’s political and hybrid warfare, or the rapid and opaque modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army, this might not go ahead if it didn’t suit the government. The government’s response here went further than Varghese by adding ministers, not just department heads, as gatekeepers.

Third, the government will require government officials to sit on think tank councils, making them at least an observer during think tanks’ internal deliberations and perhaps even a voice to influence meetings. Again, the government’s response went further than Varghese’s recommendations.

This is inconsistent with the many other organisations that receive federal funding.

And while Varghese points out some entities already have government officials on their boards, he leaves unanswered his own question of whether they have had independence compromised. The answer is yes, a government official sitting on a non-government board likely has impact, including to censor criticism.

Fourth, specific federally funded research projects would be “co-designed” by bureaucrats, potentially putting guardrails on the researchers’ instincts.

The government gives grant money to the arts but nobody expects a bureaucrat to stand over the artists telling them how to stage a performance of Hamlet or do an interpretative dance.

Finally, there is the shutting of support for ASPI’s Washington office. Here, Varghese appears simply not to understand the role of think tanks’ overseas offices – saying it’s a problem “having ASPI freelance”. Freelance is a synonym of independence and, to be clear, we are independent and not there to push the views of the government of the day.

We are there to foster debate on issues that are important to Australia and its people, such as Indo-Pacific security and global rules. This has long-term value.

ASPI is known and respected across the political aisle in Washington for its nonpartisan and hard-hitting work, with many in the US House of Representatives and the Senate, including incoming secretary of state Marco Rubio, citing our research numerous times.

So it makes zero sense that the Australian government would narrow rather than expand Australia’s options for engaging with Washington when the US is moving into a new Trump administration that will bring challenges for the Australian bureaucracy.

Varghese himself acknowledges that the kind of contestability ASPI was established to provide is essential and refers to our research as “groundbreaking”. Regrettably he also refers to our China research – on human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Beijing’s interference in Australia and other countries – as controversial. Let’s face it, it was controversial only in the sense that Beijing didn’t like it.

Some of this review’s recommendations are reasonable and welcome, but the problems at its heart represent an abandonment of principles that successive governments for more than 20 years have recognised and respected.

Still, ASPI believes in our mission to pour sunlight on security threats to Australia and to help improve understanding – whether among policymakers or the public – of the steps needed to keep ourselves safe. We will continue to build on our proud legacy – because this work has never been more vital.

Why we need a national security adviser

On 16 December the Canberra Times published a short version of Danielle Cave’s article that argues Australia needs a national security adviser. The long version of the article was then published on the ASPI Strategist on 18 December and is available here:

The review of Australia’s intelligence community that’s now underway—as long as it is delivered with ambition so it remains relevant years from now—is one tool that will help prepare the government to confront the speed of global change. In the current environment, maintaining a strategic and technological edge over our adversaries, remaining a sought-after and valuable partner that can keep pace with bigger and better-resourced intelligence communities, and attracting and retaining top workforce talent (for which industry is also fiercely competing) will continue to become harder.

Both the domestic and international stakes are higher for this intelligence review than the terms of reference let on, so the review’s output should be watched closely. But it likely won’t look at a gap in Australia’s security architecture that has been filled in almost all counterpart nations—a dedicated and autonomous national security adviser (NSA). An Australian NSA would report to the prime minister and speak publicly with a trusted voice both internationally and domestically on Australia’s most pressing interests and priorities.

Without such a position, Australia is missing out on a seat at the table at key global meetings, which provide the best opportunities to exercise the kind of influence we want, need and deserve. What’s more, the lack of an NSA means the government lacks an authoritative representative who can help set the tone and focus of our strategic communications across all international security issues.

Most countries—including our most important partners—have an NSA. These roles are as senior as it gets, often equivalent to a department head or sometimes even a minister. NSAs have the ears of their leaders, often travel with them and are always available for briefings and policy advice. Critically, most NSAs also maintain their own remits of policy work and their own busy travel schedules separate from their presidents or prime ministers.

On 20 December former Director-General of ASIS Paul Symon responded with an article on the ASPI Strategist titled ‘Yes, Australia does need a national security adviser.’ Head of the ANU National Security College also joined the debate in the Australian Financial Review on 27 December.

Image: United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during his visit to Kyiv, Ukraine on 20 November 2023. Flickr

Continuing detention orders are a constitutionally valid measure yet we are choosing not to use it in the case of the MCG bomb plotter

Reports that convicted terrorist Abdul Nacer Benbrika might soon be released from jail should be of concern to all Australians.

Alarmingly, the release may happen without the court system even being asked to consider a continuing detention order.

Just three years ago, the then-Home Affairs Minister asked the Victorian Supreme Court for a continuing detention order, a vital last-resort measure that enables the Commonwealth to ask a court to keep a convicted terrorist behind bars after they’ve finished their sentence, on the basis that they continue to pose “an unacceptable risk” of committing further terrorist crimes.

The court agreed, deciding Benbrika posed an unacceptable risk. So what has changed in three years?

Is it possible that Benbrika has reformed such that any risk he poses is now acceptable? That seems highly unlikely, but if a new assessment has found the risk has fallen, the government would at the very least need to explain that shift to ensure public confidence.

So what else has changed? First, the governance arrangements, with the decision to seek a CDO shifting from the Home Affairs portfolio to the Attorney-General.

Second, the strategic and security environment. A few years ago, we were at the height of the Islamic State threat and there was enormous awareness of the risks of terrorism. The terror threat level in Australia was high, with terrorists planning attacks in and against Australia.

By 2022, the terror threat level was reduced from probable to possible. IS was degraded with its control over land in Syria and Iraq removed and capabilities severely reduced. The risk since last year, however, has been an increasing perception that the terror threat was not just temporarily reduced but had faded completely — even though ASIO head Mike Burgess was at pains to say this was not the case.

And we have made this mistake before.

In January 2013 the then Government’s National Security Statement effectively said the era of terrorism was behind us. Yet within the year, IS had risen.

The terror threat level was raised and we reached the alarming realisation that the security law framework was not adequate for this new era.

The control order regime — allowing authorities to put special monitoring arrangements on people of concern — was updated multiple times and new laws were introduced, including the continuing detention regime.

Of course, CDOs are a measure of last resort. The basic principle of justice is that criminals who complete their sentences are released, having received their punishment and, hopefully, a chance at rehabilitation.

But the evidence shows that some offenders remain simply too much of an ongoing security threat. Benbrika was one of these.

He had a proven ability as a leader who could inspire others and coordinate a terrorism plot, including a plan to detonate a bomb at the MCG during the 2005 AFL Grand Final. His failure to reform in prison, and his ongoing proselytisation of violent jihadism, meant he continued to pose a danger.

In the last couple of years, we have moved into an era in which other threats have risen and surpassed terrorism. Foreign interference and espionage were declared in 2021 to be Australia’s top security threats.

But Burgess has always been clear this doesn’t mean terrorism has disappeared. Yet we are now at risk of repeating our mistakes. Because IS and al-Qaeda are no longer on the front pages, we are in danger of complacency about violent extremism.

We saw this play out in March 2023 when the then Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Grant Donaldson, SC — arguably stepping beyond his remit — said that CDOs were not necessary to counter the threat of terrorism and recommended they be abolished.

In doing so, the watchdog was choosing a point in time and misunderstanding the nature of the terrorism threat, which ebbs and flows.

The government is yet to make any response to the INSLM’s recommendation.

In fact, in recent weeks the Parliament has introduced a new preventative detention regime based on the terror laws to deal with the fallout of the High Court ruling that meant more than 150 non-citizens were released from immigration detention, some despite having criminal convictions.

This shows the folly of the original recommendation and shows it is unlikely the government will abolish CDOs altogether — all the more reason why someone as serious as Benbrika should not be released without a court even being given a chance to consider continuing detention.

In another significant development, the Hamas-Israel war has inflamed hatreds for which a firebrand like Benbrika could prove a combustible new accelerant.

Overall, we are proving to be a resilient nation, to the credit of our multicultural society. But there are extremists looking to incite hatred and violence.

Remember, just three years ago, a court found Benbrika to pose an unacceptable risk to society.

And yet the Commonwealth is not even asking the court to hold him further. What risk is there in asking the court the question it affirmed in 2020?

Surely less than the risk of releasing Australia’s most notorious terrorist into the community.

CDOs are a constitutionally valid measure that we’ve just seen used as the model for the immigration detainees. And yet we are choosing not to use it now.

If we don’t use it for someone like Benbrika, when would we use it?

Image: Abdul Naser Benbrika planned to detonate a bomb at the MCG during the 2005 AFL Grand Final. Herald Sun 2023