Tag Archive for: Minister for Defence

Oz submarines: 12? 9? 6?

The answer is 6

The answer to the headline question is now six. To be clear, that’s my answer. The Defence Minister, David Johnston, says the cost of 12 subs ‘is just not achievable’. So six subs starts to look like the number to replace the existing six.

The promise of 12 new submarines in Labor’s two Defence white papers is submerging. In fact, consider it just about sunk.

The Abbott government is to ‘re-examine’ the number of submarines needed. That’s a line from the Defence Minister in what he described as his ‘carefully-written speech’ and is the first major defence announcement from the new government. Not a thought bubble, but something that edges beyond a signal towards an announcement. Read more

The ongoing unreality of Australian defence planning

A computer generated image of the Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD). The project will deliver three world-class ships and their support systems to the Royal Australian Navy ( RAN).

A little while back, we identified a set of challenges that whichever incoming government and Defence Minister would have to grapple with. In the new ASPI paper Agenda for change: strategic choices for the next government, we go into more detail on those, including the questions that we think the Minister should ask of the department.

We identified eight areas of concern, but there’s one that stands out as especially important: matching ends and means. No amount of good governance, project oversight or clever military strategy will help if there’s a mismatch between the objectives and the money allocated. There’s a case to be made that Defence’s medium- to long-term plans have always had an aspirational air to them—we can recall a ‘bow wave’ of unapproved projects being on the books 20 years ago—but the situation now seems to be significantly worse than usual.

At the moment, we have the combined effect of a raft of major projects delivering, or about to deliver, new platforms to the ADF which will be very demanding of future sustainment resources. These include the LHD amphibious ships, air warfare destroyers, Super Hornets and Growlers. The last couple of years have also seen initial operating capability of new air-to-air refuellers and Wedgetail aircraft, as well as sophisticated new helicopters for Army and Navy. Many of these capabilities—some of which date back to the 2000 defence white paper—were approved at a time when support for defence was high in the wake of the Timor-Leste deployment and the 9/11 attacks, and budget pressures were minimal (yes, Virginia, there really was a time when Treasury consistently underestimated government revenue). They’re being delivered into a very different environment. Read more

Welcome aboard, Minister

Keep calm and carry on

With the news that we’re about to get another new Defence Minister, we thought we’d provide our thoughts on what the executive summary of an incoming brief should look like. We’re tempted to copy the approach of the Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy and print ‘Don’t Panic’ in large friendly letters on it. We’d also suggest that the incoming Minister probably shouldn’t dwell too much on how frequently in the past 15 years this has been a valedictory posting for long-time politicians…

Minister, welcome.

First, a few salient facts. The Australian Defence organisation is an extraordinarily complicated enterprise. Its military operational activities range from routine daily in-base administrative work through to sophisticated foreign intelligence collection and high-intensity combat. The Defence Materiel Organisation manages projects and equipment costing well over $100 billion. The Defence Capability Plan contains more than 100 projects, some of which will probably still be running in the 2030s. Defence’s total workforce numbers around 100,000, with staff located in countries around the globe, including some inhospitable and dangerous locations.

For all of those reasons, Defence will never be the easiest portfolio to manage. You can reasonably expect some tough times, and a crisis might be just around the corner. Some of the problems of Defence are deep and seemingly perennial, and a series of well-researched reform programs dating back decades have only partially ameliorated them. And at the moment there’s also a significant problem in the funding plans for future force structuring. Read more

Equipment acquisition: surprise from the skies

A Royal Australian Air Force F-111Media reporting indicates that we’ll soon see an announcement about the acquisition of twelve extra F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter aircraft at a cost of US$3.6 billion. This will be a classic example of a ministerially driven defence equipment acquisition—the occasional (and often very short-notice) buys that aren’t anticipated in Defence plans. Of course all Defence acquisitions are ultimately sanctioned by government, but most emerge from lengthy force structure development processes. I’ll write on the Super Hornet decision specifically in a second post. For now I’ll provide a potted history of some notable ‘surprise’ equipment announcements over the last quarter century.

Kim Beazley famously decided on the acquisition of 14 Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV-25) following a visit to the United States in 1989. It led to a forensic and (from this distance entertaining) Senate Estimates Committee exchange in which Defence reluctantly acknowledged the vehicles had no air cooling system, overheated in the north and could not operate effectively off roads. ‘One would envisage … its being used primarily for surveillance of road nodal points, airfields, and beach sites—all of those, of course, having road access’ deadpanned the then Major General Mike Jeffery. Over time, and with extensive modification, the Australian Light Armored Vehicle (ASLAV) became the mainstay of the Army’s armored reconnaissance capability.

A much larger surprise acquisition was announced in answer to a question without notice in the Senate on 15 October 1992. Minister for Defence Robert Ray reported on a visit to Washington:

I did raise … the possibility of Australia acquiring additional F-111 aircraft from approximately 250 being taken out of service by the United States. The reaction from the United States was positive. Since my return there have been further discussions within Government and a team will be sent to the United States to negotiate the purchase of up to 18 F-111 aircraft.

Read more

Pamphlets, papers and policy

Kazimir Marevich's 'White on White', 1918.

Dear Minister

In some quarters, your promised 2013 Defence White Paper is already being ridiculed as ‘the white pamphlet’. Others take an even more pessimistic view, with Hugh White doubting that a document will be delivered at all. I really do hope that’s not the case.

The ADF is struggling to handle deep near-term budget cuts, and neither you nor the opposition is willing to say how much they plan to spend on defence in the medium or long term. What was a mess is now becoming a crisis. Coherent planning is impossible, our allies are confused, and morale is declining in the ranks. We need a new Defence White Paper and we need it soon.

The good news is that there is no reason why a credible White Paper cannot be produced. Defence has a well-documented strategy framework with literally hundreds of people working full time on intelligence assessments, strategic policy, capability plans and the like. If you can’t readily access the information you need on the costs, benefits and risks associated with options for Australia’s defence, heads should roll.

Even if your mandarins and generals have been sitting on their hands in a stupor of learned helpless for the past six months, which is doubtful, there’s still time to pull together a White Paper in the first half of next year. Here’s how to do it. Read more

Minister, mandarins and the military

Department of Defence, Russell Offices, Canberra

Who is really in charge of the Defence Department? Many would guess the military chiefs, which is logical enough. Some would even say the Minister—civil control and all that. Or perhaps, given the recent discussion about the influence of Ministerial advisers over the public service, others would suggest we should be looking to the Secretary—Sir Humprey always did seem to get his way.

Another way to ask the question would be to consider who got the blame when reviews such as Rizzo, Black and Coles highlighted a lack of accountability, confused responsibilities and dysfunctional linkages between levels of authority across the Department? No clear answers there.

There is something even more telling, however, than the inability to identify who is really in charge of Defence. Read more

Two cheers for ministerial staffers

Parliament House, CanberraJennifer Westacott of the Business Council of Australia deserves credit for her speech on public service reform (PDF) a fortnight ago, and for the attention which she also drew to the roles of ministerial staff. Her focus on the importance of good quality processes as an essential prerequisite for making good quality policy must surely have been met with approving high-fives inside the Parliamentary Triangle.

Westacott, though, overstates the need for a separation between policy making and the political process:

While a high performing public service is still answerable to its political masters, the policy making process can and must transcend political cycles. Most importantly, it must independently and diligently put the right things on the agenda.

As presented here this conflates two important but separate ideas. The public service isn’t independent of government, nor is it a neutral entity (except during pre-election caretaker periods). It’s there to advise government on policy design and to implement that policy. As such, policy has to take account of political cycles. For this process to work a general principle must apply that governments care as much about delivering good policy outcomes as the public service. Read more