Tag Archive for: mining

Trump’s critical minerals order may harm Australian interests

US President Donald Trump is certainly not afraid of an executive order, signing 97 since his inauguration on 20 January. In minerals and energy, Trump has declared a national emergency; committed to unleashing US (particularly Alaskan) resource potential; and established the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC), granting it considerable executive powers.

His latest minerals order, titled ‘Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production’, aims to overhaul US domestic production and reshape domestic and international critical mineral supply chains. It could derail Australia’s efforts for greater domestic production in the process.

At the strategic level, Trump wants to end US reliance on Chinese and adversarial mineral supplies and massively boost US production for national security and economic gains. While there is room for international partners to assist, the order is clearly aligned with the Trump’s broader America First approach.

Operationally, the US government will attempt to unlock mineral and energy production by administratively and financially prioritising new and existing projects and slashing regulatory red tape across critical minerals, uranium, and other commodities.

This will occur across the supply chain, targeting ‘mineral production’  encapsulating mining, processing, refining and end-use manufacturing in technological productions, including semiconductors, permanent magnets, and electric vehicles.

Executive orders are designed for immediate effect. Trump’s minerals order is no different, outlining near immediate actions for departmental heads and agencies. Much of it overseen by the NEDC.

For example, within 10 days of signing, agencies involved in mine production permitting are to produce a list of viable projects to prioritise. In the following 10 days, the Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum, through his role as NEDC chair, will select priority projects for immediate approval.

Similarly, legislative reform to mine waste disposal and treatment—presumably reducing environmental protections—is ordered to be introduced to congress within 30 days of signing.

Alongside Burgum as NEDC chair and Secretary of the Interior, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Secretary of Energy Chris Wright are tasked with significant decision-making across new investments and project prioritisation.

Project prioritisation, expedited approvals, and expedited delivery of supporting infrastructure are the primary levers through which Trump aims to unlock US mineral production. Achieving each will likely come at cost of environmental and social protections.

Whether it achieves rapid overall production increases remains to be seen.

According to S&P data, US mines have an average lead time of 13 years. Discovery and exploration studies account for the largest proportion at 8.7 years on average. Rapid permits should reduce the lag time between the completion of feasibility studies and mine construction, but it will not open new mines overnight.

Commercial factors, technical and financial feasibility, and major financing hurdles must also be considered. Trump’s slate of mineral and energy orders contain some measures to increase financial support to domestic mining and processing projects, including directing the International Development Finance Corporation to distribute more domestic funding. But doing so quickly and efficiently will test the US government. Industry, additionally, will most likely want to see sustained policy commitment and market effects before investing into new capital intensive projects.

Moving forward there will be opportunities for Australia to grasp, as well as risks to manage.

Several Australian mining companies are already operating or proposing government-supported processing plants in the United States. This includes Lynas Rare Earths’ refinery in Texas, Syrah Resources’ graphite refinery in Louisiana and South 32’s potential battery-grade manganese plant fed by its new Hermosa mine in Arizona. These projects could become important linkages in the sector and may benefit from these recent reforms.

The US will also remain reliant on international supply for some minerals and will need to prioritise close international partners with large mineral deposits, such as Australia.

The US has already demonstrated its willingness to provide generous concessional loans and fund minerals processing projects. The financing provisions of the minerals order will create further opportunities while increasing competitive pressure on Australia—particularly regarding our Future Made in Australia aspirations.

But there are risks to Australia’s ability to compete. Faster approvals and greater government funding commitments may draw investment to the US rather than Australia. However, poor implementation or environmental and social backlash may undermine this competitive advantage.

Australia should be most concerned if the US successfully expands its raw outputs quicker than its downstream industry, as US mineral production could flood the market. In 2024, Australia saw similar effects of oversupply in the nickel market (largely due to Indonesia), leading to temporary shuttering of nearly all Australian nickel operations.

Australia will need to assess the risks presented by US production increases. The government must work with industry to protect our domestic production and assess whether demand-side policy responses, such as a national stockpile, will be needed.

Trump’s mineral policy puts America first. Australia must respond and engage directly with the US to negotiate collaboration and maintain fairness in the market. International forums, such as ASPI’s Darwin Dialogue, may become particularly important to achieving this.

Overseas investment is getting riskier. The government needs to step up

Australian companies operating overseas are navigating an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape where economic coercion, regulatory uncertainty and security risks are becoming the norm. Our growing global investment footprint is nationally important, and the Australian government must support it more strongly.

The government needs to do this above all to counter market manipulation by China and even its seizure of Australian assets, but other risks are piling up, too.

Australia’s outward foreign investment is not just about business; it is a strategic imperative, with the country’s superannuation funds, trade stability and national security all tied to the success and resilience of its companies operating in high-risk environments around the world.

Many Australians understand the importance of inward foreign investment in driving economic growth, but far fewer appreciate the scale of Australian capital flowing overseas. Australia’s total investment abroad now stands at $3.8 trillion—82 percent as large as the stock of foreign direct investment in Australia.

Manufacturers, financial institutions and miners lead our outward foreign direct investment (FDI), the establishing or buying of businesses in other countries. It embodies Australia’s deep economic integration with global markets. Yet, as geopolitical risks intensify, Australia can no longer take the security of these investments for granted, especially in the mining sector.

Australian minerals companies have built a huge global footprint. S&P Global data shows that Australian-headquartered and ASX-listed companies operate 331 mines and downstream processing plants domestically and that 120 Australian companies manage 212 mining and processing facilities overseas.

In 2024 alone, Australian companies invested $4.6 billion in exploration, of which 53 percent spent in Australia and the rest on all other continents except Antarctica. The $195 billion in outbound mining FDI recorded in 2023 further illustrates the scale of this global presence, alongside $215 billion in manufacturing FDI, much of which is tied to minerals processing.

Australian miners have a long history of navigating complex global environments. However, rising geopolitical tensions, economic coercion and regulatory instability make risk management increasingly difficult. The sector’s dependence on foreign capital and markets leaves it vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, trade restrictions and political interference, which threaten profitability and long-term strategic resilience.

Front of mind here is China’s increasing economic coercion. China’s actions serve to reshape global minerals markets, creating risks that extend far beyond trade disruptions. Through market manipulation, aggressive acquisition tactics, and political interference, China is systematically undermining competition. It is attempting to seize control of critical minerals projects and even emboldening hostile regimes to detain Australian mining executives as leverage for financial gain.

Chinese-linked companies have used coercive tactics and state-backed influence to try to take control of Australian-owned mining operations, particularly in some African countries with weak governance in minerals. In 2024, an Australian company was awarded US$90 million in compensation after the Tanzanian government unlawfully seized a nickel deposit, highlighting the unstable regulatory environment Australian firms can face abroad.

Meanwhile, Russian-backed military regimes in Mali and Niger, combined with jihadist insurgencies in key West African mining regions, are increasing security risks for Australian businesses. The closure of US military bases in Niger in 2024 further complicated the security landscape, raising concerns about the long-term viability of Australian investment in these regions.

While the Australian government sponsors the West Africa Mining Security Conference, tangible support for Australian companies operating in high-risk regions is minimal. Unlike Canada, which maintains 17 trade offices across Africa, Australia has just one, in Nairobi. Despite Australia’s large mining and petroleum investments in West Africa, there is just one diplomatic post to service nine countries. This lack of diplomatic and commercial representation leaves Australian companies at a significant disadvantage in security and investment advocacy.

Meanwhile, escalating tariff disputes between the United States and China and retaliatory trade measures from Canada, Mexico and the European Union further complicate Australian companies’ investment and trade outlook. The full impact on Australian-controlled production at home and abroad remains uncertain but potentially severe.

Australian mining depends heavily on foreign investment and financial mechanisms, including cash-backed offtake agreements. China dominates the financing and sales mix, making it an essential partner and a strategic risk. China’s deliberate manipulation of mineral prices, particularly in rare earth markets, and its covert and coercive attempts to acquire key mining assets directly threaten Australia’s economic sovereignty.

Multiple takeover attempts of Northern Minerals and allegations of similar activities around control of Global Lithium Resources demonstrate China’s ongoing efforts to increase control over Australia’s critical minerals industry. This threatens national security and broader supply chain diversification efforts.

The Australian government must take decisive action in response to the rapid escalation of geopolitical risks.

First, a dedicated task force led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade should provide real-time risk assessments and direct assistance to companies navigating complex security and regulatory environments. Second, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission must collaborate more closely with the Foreign Investment Review Board to detect and counter corporate coercion threatening Australia’s national interest. Third, Australia must prioritise deeper engagement with like-minded partners, including the US, Canada, Japan, the EU and South Korea, to accelerate the development of more secure, diverse and sustainable critical minerals supply chains.

While Australia has made cooperation commitments under multiple critical minerals agreements, implementation has been slow and inadequate. With global competition intensifying, there is no time to waste.

How Australia, with friends, can secure its place in critical minerals

Australia’s critical minerals sector is at a crossroads. As the United States recalibrates its industrial policies under President Donald Trump, Australia’s role in securing non-Chinese supply chains for critical minerals has never been more important.

To secure its critical minerals industry in partnership with friends such as the US, Australia must ensure US trade policies actively support its push to move up the value chain. It also needs a strategy to sustain key production during downturns, must better align critical minerals, defence and industrial policies, and it should push for stronger reciprocal investment from allies, especially in processing and refining.

While Australia is at the centre of such initiatives as the US’s Minerals Security Partnership and AUKUS, practical outcomes such as viable new supply chains depend on targeted investment and policy coherence. The 2024 suspension nickel mines in Western Australia and ongoing challenges in rare earth and lithium processing expose serious vulnerabilities. Australia risks becoming a weak link in the supply chain, rather than a strategic powerhouse.

Established in June 2022, the Minerals Security Partnership was designed to promote responsible mineral production and processing among partner countries. Joe Biden considered Australia a key part of this vision, but Trump’s return adds uncertainty. While his administration is pushing for reduced dependence on China, his inward-looking trade policies could unintentionally harm Australia’s contribution.

If tariffs extend to processed or refined critical minerals, as they cover aluminium, Australia may be discouraged from moving up the supply chain. As of 2023, Australia supplied about half of the world’s raw lithium but lacked the processing capacity to realise the material’s full value. Mineral refining remains a weak point; China dominates the sector. Australia needs investment to compete, and the US is the partner of choice. Yet Australia supplies relatively few critical minerals to the US, limiting its leverage​.

At least five Western Australian nickel mines suspended operations in 2024 due to global oversupply and falling prices. The closures resulted in major job losses and raised concerns about supply chain resilience.

Nickel is a strategic material, with uses in batteries and defence. Indonesia, the world’s top nickel producer, is aligning itself closely with China and has joined the BRICS. So declining production in Australia is a strategic misstep.

Rather than waiting for market forces to decide the fate of its nickel industry, Australia should have used its 2023 critical minerals strategy to stabilise production. More importantly, countries in the Minerals Security Partnership, particularly the US, should have stepped up and invested in Australia’s mining and processing capabilities. Friend-shoring needs to be more than just rhetoric.

Despite setbacks in nickel, Australia is making progress in rare earths. Lynas Rare Earths is expanding its processing facilities in Kalgoorlie, and Iluka Resources is developing Australia’s first fully integrated rare earths refinery at Eneabba. Federal funding supports these projects.

China controls more than 90 percent of the world’s rare earth refining. It also has used export restrictions and bans as a geopolitical tool.

Australia’s Critical Minerals Production Tax Incentive—a 10 percent tax credit for onshore processing—raises serious questions. Since Australia lacks a viable downstream industry, such as refining, alloy production, or manufacturing, these processed materials still go to China. Australian taxpayers are just subsidising the middle stage of the supply chain, only for China to capture the higher-value downstream benefits. Without a full industrial chain, this policy doesn’t create real resilience in supply; it just makes Australian critical minerals slightly cheaper for China.

Australia’s critical minerals strategy also affects its national security one. Nuclear submarines rely on more than a dozen critical minerals, including rare earths for sonar systems, cobalt for high-performance batteries and titanium for hull construction. Other advanced defence systems depend on stable critical mineral supplies.

Securing these materials requires a coordinated approach. The US, through the Defense Production Act, can prioritise domestic mining, refining and processing of key materials for defence and high-tech industries, reducing reliance on imports from potentially hostile nations. In 2024 Australia was designated as a domestic source for funding, showing the potential for deeper collaboration and greater supply chain resilience.

If the US and Britain see Australia as a long-term defence partner, they should be investing in its critical minerals sector. AUKUS should be a platform for strengthening Australia’s industrial base, including processing and refining critical minerals.

Australia’s approach to critical minerals is guided by a suite of strategic policies and documents that play a role in securing supply chains, strengthening Australia’s industrial base and strategic position, but better alignment is needed.

Closer coordination of critical minerals policy with its defence, industry and trade strategies can revitalise capacity in the industry while helping to diversify mineral supply chains away from China.

Australia can’t afford to take a passive approach. Global supply chains are shifting fast. If Australia wants to be a cornerstone of Western critical mineral security, it must act decisively and demand that its allies do the same.

Northern Australia strengthens its role in economy and energy security

Each day, more than 160 airline flights carrying 13,000 passengers take off and land at Perth Airport to and from destinations across northern Australia. They ferry skilled workers to and from minerals and energy operations. Darwin and Brisbane airports also host air services to and from northern Australian resources hubs.

This provides a real-time indicator of the health of the Australian resources sector, which is overwhelmingly concentrated north of the 26th parallel.

In 2023-24, aircraft and passenger movements between Perth and Western Australian destinations exceeded interstate traffic for the first time, pushing the airport to new throughput records.

Despite price weakness for some minerals, the resources sector remains healthy. Northern Australia’s minerals maintain outsized importance in the national economy and for state and federal government revenues.

The Department of Industry, Science and Resources’ latest Resources and Energy Quarterly, released in December 2024, highlights the fact that the minerals and energy sector generates two thirds of national exports and 11.4 percent of GDP.

Northern Australia’s minerals and energy dominance makes it central to the national resources sector and thus much of the Australian economy. In 2023–24, the combined value of the top four exports from northern Australia—iron ore, liquified natural gas (LNG), metallurgical coal and thermal coal—was $261 billion, or 63 percent of total resource exports.

Northern Australia contributes almost all the nation’s iron ore exports, expected to total more than 900 million tonnes in 2024, or some 56 percent of global seaborne trade in the commodity.  Export value is about $140 billion. While iron ore prices are expected to soften in 2025, volumes are forecast to rise. The Pilbara remains by far the largest iron ore production centre in the world.

Metallurgical coal is northern Australia’s next largest export by tonnage, with the north contributing 46 percent of global supply. All 81 million tonnes of the nation’s LNG exports in 2023-24, worth $69 billion, came from northern Australia. This supply is vital to the energy security of economies such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

Exploration spending is the long-term bellwether for the minerals industry. According to S&P Global data, northern Australia hosts 803 of more than 2000 exploration properties in the country. Australia-headquartered companies operate 632 of them. Identified reserves and resources in exploration properties are valued at $14 trillion.

While data is unavailable on mineral and petroleum exploration spending for northern Australia as a region, there is an indicator in the trend in the Northern Territory, where mineral exploration budgets were up 86 percent in the five years to 2023-24. The search for deposits of critical and strategic minerals such as lithium, copper and uranium drove the rise.

S&P Global records 163 mines in northern Australia, including those under construction. Outputs include copper, lithium, zinc, phosphate, vanadium, manganese, rare earths, gold, and metallurgical and thermal coal. The 11 secondary processing plants in northern Australia produce refined products such as alumina and metals including aluminium, copper and zinc.

Northern Australia, with abundant land and sunshine, is already a major source of renewable energy, with high potential for very large-scale production. From the Pilbara to the central Queensland resources hub, mines and mineral processing plants are increasingly sourcing energy from solar generators, backed by coal or gas. Whether exports of electricity and products such as green hydrogen are viable and will find markets remains to be seen.

While northern Australia’s minerals and energy future and its national economic contribution remain very positive, the region faces challenges in sustaining and growing production. As a December ASPI report highlighted, the region is vulnerable to natural disasters, particularly as some of its infrastructure is inadequate in the face of severe weather events. The government needs to spend more to maintain vital transport links as well as energy and telecommunications services.

Federal and state project assessment and approval processes have improved during the past decade and must continue to do so while maintaining scientific rigor. Efficient coordination between levels of government and between agencies is vital.

New lower-cost LNG supply from the United States and Qatar puts pressure on Australian LNG projects and their host governments to control costs of both construction and operations.

Several critical minerals projects in northern Australia have been held back by depressed and volatile prices, largely due to market manipulation by the current dominant producer, China. Australia and like-minded governments are working together to underwrite the commercial viability of such projects so they can attract global financing and move to construction and operational phases.

The thousands of workers who commute by air to, from and within northern Australia are testament to the strength of the resources sector, but also highlight the region’s chronic shortage of resident skilled workers. More locally and regionally based workers will help northern Australia capture greater value from its industries. The liveability of the north’s cities and towns is key to attracting and retaining more people.

The daily stream of jets from major population centres to northern Australia, however, will remain the main source of skilled people that contribute so much to the national economy and its energy security.

Breaking China’s near monopoly on rare earths will be easier said than done

The past decade of work proving up Australia’s deposits of rare-earth minerals is beginning to pay off, with a number of firms getting close to production. But the supply chains for rare earths still run through China, and that’s unlikely to change any time soon.

Last week’s Australian Rare Earth Conference hosted by the Australian National University and ASPI heard reports of progress and geological challenges from 16 companies in addition to presentations by Resources Minister Madeleine King, Chief Scientist Cathy Foley and academics.

There’s a sense that the sector is achieving critical mass, that the policy frameworks both in Australia and in the US are delivering support, and that the outlook is one of exponential increase in demand.

Yet, for all its promise, the sector is mainly populated by small and speculative stocks. The major resource companies like BHP and Rio Tinto are focused on simplifying their resource portfolios and have left the difficult rare-earth sector alone.

The ASX lists 35 rare-earth companies. Lynas—the leading non-Chinese producer—heads the list with a market value of $7.9 billion, followed by Iluka, valued at $3.8 billion. Iluka is spearheading the Australian government’s strategy to develop a domestic rare-earth processing capacity and in April was awarded a $1.2 billion non-recourse loan to build a rare-earth refinery at its operations in Eneabba, about 300 kilometres north of Perth. Lynas and Iluka are the only two rare-earth interests included in the S&P/ASX200.

Then come the next two promising candidates, Arafura, worth $530 million, and Hastings, worth $450 million. Both are well advanced in securing contracts for their output.

Behind them come a tribe of smaller hopefuls, including 20 firms valued at less than $50 million each. In addition to these are several dozen companies that have rare earths as one of their interests, typically alongside other critical minerals. There are also non-listed companies in the field.

It’s not unusual for Australian resource sectors to be crowded by small players. About half the 65 ASX lithium stocks are worth less than $50 million, although that is a much richer sector, with a dozen businesses worth more than $1 billion.

What has kept the rare-earth sector small is the difficulty of processing and the lack of transparency in the market. It is the antithesis of gold, whose processing is straightforward and pricing is universal. Neodymium, praseodymium and dysprosium may be the metals of the future, but the only window into their pricing comes from expensive proprietary surveys of transactions among Chinese mining and processing businesses. No superannuation fund is going to stump up equity on the basis of that.

The Japanese government delivered the breakthrough for Lynas, which has one of the world’s highest quality deposits at Mount Weld northwest of Kalgoorlie. China banned rare-earth sales to Japan amid a dispute over islands claimed by both nations in 2010.

The Japanese government arranged the funding for the development of the Mount Weld mine and the construction of a processing plant in Malaysia and lined up customers to sign off-take agreements. It took eight years to get the processing plant to produce material of the required specifications, but Japan was patient, rolling over the funding until the operation worked.

The idea that government support was needed to achieve lift-off inspired the Australian government’s decision to finance the development of a processing plant for Iluka. Iluka is a long-established mineral sands miner. It used to send rare-earth-rich sands to a processing plant in France, but that trade stopped in the early 1990s because of local opposition to radioactive waste. Iluka kept stockpiling the rare-earth sands, which were a by-product of its other operations. While the government has provided the $1.2 billion non-recourse loan, Iluka is contributing $200 million and its one-million-tonne stockpile.

Unusually, the deal was done without off-take agreements, but Iluka is confident there will be customers for its product. The plant will also process rare earths from other operations. Northern Minerals, which has been producing concentrate for the highly valued dysprosium (a heavy rare earth) from a pilot plant since 2018, last week announced an agreement to send product to Iluka. Iluka is confident its plant will be able to handle the two very different types of ore.

Arafura has gone a different route, seeking contracts from end users to underwrite its development. It has signed a non-binding off-take agreement with Hyundai and a memorandum of understanding with General Electric, giving it exposure to both electric-vehicle and wind-turbine end users. It is also getting $300 million in government debt funding and is planning a processing plant.

Major US firms have difficulty in dealing with small suppliers, but the recently legislated US Inflation Reduction Act provides an incentive in the form of tax credits for companies that obtain critical minerals from the US or its free-trade partners, rather than from China.

Hastings has also sought to underwrite its development with off-take contracts. It has an off-take contract with German firm Thyssenkrupp and a memorandum of understanding with the Belgian company Solvay, which took over the processing plant that Iluka once sent its sands to at La Rochelle, on the French Atlantic coast. It will sell them a mixed rare-earth ‘carbonate’ rather than building its own refinery.

Another Australia-based rare-earth company, VHM, last week adopted a different strategy, signing an export deal to sell output from its project near Swan Hill in Victoria directly to China’s huge Shenghe Resources. The rare-earth-rich mineral sands in western Victoria are huge and have been likened by some in the sector to Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves.

The involvement of the Australian, Japanese and US governments in fostering the development of rare-earth projects is driven by a desire to achieve supplies that are independent of China.

Western Australian critical minerals analyst Kingsley Jones argues that China is no longer pursuing a monopoly of rare-earth supply. Its strategy, he says, is one of ‘monopsony’, as the sole buyer of rare earths. China’s share of raw material supply has dropped from 85% to 60% as demand has outstripped the capacity of its own mines, some of which have been shut for environmental reasons.

Where China retains a monopoly is in processing and fabrication. Mined rare earths must first be turned into a carbonate, which is a relatively simple process, and then refined into an oxide, which is much more complex. Then the oxide is turned into a metal, which may be alloyed before it is fabricated into permanent magnets and the huge range of other products using some portion of rare earths.

China holds between 85% and 90% of all the downstream processes. Global production of permanent magnets was 174,000 tonnes last year, of which Japan accounted for less than 9% and China nearly all the rest.

Lynas still sends oxide to China to be turned into metal, and Iluka and Arafura are expected to do so too. Even the processing that does take place outside China relies on Chinese suppliers for the chemical reagents.

The aspiration for Australia to capture more of the downstream processing must confront the dearth of metallurgy graduates from Australian universities, after employment in the sector was squeezed by the closure of smelters and metals manufacturing over the past 20 years. Australia’s metals processing industry is microscopic compared to China’s, and China also dominates in research in the sector.

China plainly sees geopolitical advantage in its lock on the rare-earth sector. However, it also intends to dominate the manufacture of downstream products, including electric vehicles, wind turbines and batteries.

Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa: mining and Australia’s interests

Australian mining companies are at the forefront of exploration, operations and investment on the African continent. As Foreign Minister Julie Bishop noted at the Africa Down Under conference in Perth in September 2017, more than 170 Australian resource companies are operating in 35 countries in Africa.

The nature of mining work means that Australian mining companies are engaged in remote parts of the continent where there have been high levels of violent extremist activity. More than 30% of ASX-listed company projects are in countries in West Africa and the Sahel, a region dominated by severe instability. Violent extremism poses a direct threat not only to local civilian populations, but also to foreign interests across the continent, as demonstrated by attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso and Kenya in recent years.

While it is generally well understood that violent extremism presents a threat to the operations, personnel and investments of mining companies in parts of Africa, there has been little analysis of what potential role the mining sector—as a private-sector actor—can have in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Two newly released ASPI reports examine how the mining sector might contribute to P/CVE efforts in Africa.

In Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa: the role of the mining sector, my co-authors, Tim Grice and Sara Zeiger, and I use the case study of the mining sector in Africa to show how a private-sector actor can and does engage in P/CVE efforts. The report (produced in partnership with Hedayah) draws on a combination of desktop and field research in four case-study countries—Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya and Mali—to identify the link between the mining sector and potential drivers of violent extremism in sub-Saharan Africa. It finds that the mining sector is already engaged in activities that can mitigate and exacerbate potential drivers of violent extremism. As a consequence, mining companies are in a position to contribute to P/CVE efforts.

The report’s findings highlight a particularly important opportunity for the Australian mining sector and the Australian government, which have shared interests on the continent. In the second report, an ASPI Strategic Insights paper, Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa: mining and Australia’s interests, I note that the risks posed by violent extremism to Australian nationals, businesses and foreign investment represent a direct threat to Australian national interests.

Australia has a long history of engagement with Africa. Yet Australia’s strategic engagement with countries on the continent is generally not afforded the same high priority given to countries in our immediate region, as demonstrated by the cuts in foreign aid to the continent. Instead, the current government has been focused on ‘leveraging other drivers for development, such as private sector investment’.

In 2015 Julie Bishop noted that ‘Australian investment flows to Africa vastly outweigh any aid flows that could possibly be envisaged’. As I outline in the paper, the Australian mining sector now has an opportunity to strengthen its investments abroad and support efforts to prevent conflict and improve security on the continent. That would allow the Australian government to leverage its approach to economic diplomacy in a more substantive manner on the continent.

Australian mining companies have a direct interest in engaging in P/CVE efforts for several reasons. First, these initiatives provide a tangible way for the sector to reduce security risks. Second, improved security will enhance business operations, potentially providing a ‘win–win’ for the mining company, local communities and host government. And finally, since the potential of the private sector in P/CVE efforts has been underexplored, the Australian mining sector could show leadership in this area. For example, the sector could work with stakeholders—including the Australian federal and state governments and community groups—to develop a set of principles that could guide the work of Australian mining companies on P/CVE.

Our field research showed that Australian mining companies are already engaged in activities related indirectly to P/CVE programs, whether through education programs, youth empowerment or approaches to community engagement. However, there is no guidance or good practice guides for companies to support initiatives that strengthen community resilience to violent extremism. This presents an opportunity for the Australian government and the Australian mining sector.

As Khalid Koser points out in the foreword to the special report that was released today, ‘The global effort to prevent violent extremism can’t succeed without the private sector.’ Governments alone cannot successfully address the threat of violent extremism. The mining sector—and the Australian mining sector in particular—now has an opportunity to show leadership in this area.