Tag Archive for: Mindanao

Insights from Marawi for a changing threat paradigm

There is a growing debate, domestically and internationally, about the nature of future conflict. Recently Australian Defence Force chief Angus Campbell drew attention to political warfare as a key element of a changing threat paradigm.

The Australian Army’s futures statement, titled ‘Accelerated warfare’, warns that ‘the advent of rapidly evolving, easily accessed technology increasingly offers asymmetric capabilities to both established powers as well as non-state actors and even individuals’. It notes that the intersection of such technology with geostrategic and socio-political change, including urbanisation, increases the scope for adversaries to coerce, control and influence. This demands a response that integrates kinetic elements and information operations.

The Marawi crisis—the seizure of the Southern Philippine city by militants linked to Islamic State and the response by Philippine authorities from May to October 2017—illustrates such a strategic play by asymmetric actors within an evolving threat landscape. Adopting a ‘seize–defy–discredit’ approach, and replicating IS tactics employed in Mosul and Raqqa, insurgents tapped into an existing militant clan culture to raise a thousand-man force with stockpiled weapons and explosives.

The insurgency’s key objectives were to seize dense urban terrain and hold the population hostage; defy the government by exploiting the acute difficulties it had regaining control; and discredit the government by forcing either capitulation or the destruction of the city. As it turned out, the Armed Forces of the Philippines took five months to regain control and destroyed much of Marawi in the process.

Our latest report for ASPI, The Marawi crisis—urban conflict and information operations, examines both the capability aspects of kinetic hard power and the lessons from soft-power information operations, and how they intersect in the urban environment. It draws on interviews with academics, members of the Philippine military in Manila and Marawi, local government stakeholders and displaced residents in Mindanao during a research trip in October 2018.

The report highlights the need for states to be better prepared to engage in kinetic urban operations, or to support allies in such operations, with a clear focus on reducing military and civilian casualties. Equally important, it demonstrates the relevance of widening the concept of ‘the battlefield’ to include the narrative space.

The insurgents’ seizure of Marawi was accompanied by a systematic IS propaganda campaign aimed at projecting an image of triumph and strength. The Philippine forces engaged in active counter-messaging to undermine rebel narratives, both online and through traditional methods such as leaflet drops, banners, and radio or loudspeaker broadcasts. Tactically, the objectives were to avoid civilian casualties and to stem further recruitment and popular support for the insurgents. Strategically, the messaging was intended to morally denounce the militants and undercut their support bases.

Our report provides the following insights and recommendations.

Hard power

It can be tempting to attribute the five-month-long fight for Marawi to unpreparedness of the Philippine military. Similarly, a seize–defy–discredit strategy may appear to be relevant only when there’s both a substantial jihadi force and a compliant or coerced population. Such deductions overlook the acute challenges urban terrain presents to any military, no matter how well trained.

Eliminating the last 50 militants from an area less than a kilometre square still took a month—despite hard-won operational experience, new weapons and equipment and the support of allies. Critics of the Philippine response ignore the similar experiences of our allies in recent battles such as Mosul. Without specialist capabilities, a force clearing a determined enemy from urban terrain suffers heavy losses unless it applies overwhelming firepower—inevitably causing casualties among civilians.

After decades of low-cost ‘precision war’, the Australian public don’t expect to pay such a price. That dissonance represents a reputational risk for the ADF that adversaries can exploit. There’s a requirement for:

  • a whole-of-government capacity to enable and encourage populations to leave cities during armed conflict
  • capabilities that reduce risks to soldiers and civilians during urban combat operations, including unmanned robots, smoke systems and special weapons that breach walls or attack targets inside buildings with reduced collateral damage
  • an Australian army combat engineering entity that’s able to conduct unmanned combat search and clear operations in an urban environment in support of our own or friendly nations’ operations.

Soft power

The destruction of Marawi has given rise to accusations of the use of excessive, indiscriminate force by the Philippine armed forces—a source for further extremist recruitment. This highlights the need for clear, open communication on the dilemmas of urban warfare in order to avoid a loss of legitimacy. The Philippines’ political and media environment—exemplified by tight government control of media narratives during the battle—is distinctly different from that of Australia.

The Marawi information operations nevertheless provide a useful case study that highlights some key principles of building legitimacy. They can be applied beyond military operations to the ensuing political process and the wider practice of preventing and countering violent extremism.

The narratives surrounding the conduct of operations aren’t merely a supporting element but are just as crucial as the military objective. Effective use of soft power plays an important role in achieving a favourable political outcome.

Ultimately, Marawi demonstrates that the most essential elements in a soft-power campaign are credibility and legitimacy beyond mere persuasion—especially considering whole-of-government responses shaped by political imperatives and long-term security and stability concerns. This means going beyond reputational concerns.

Key lessons include the following:

  • Responding to the socio-political and emotional realities of the target audiences in an empathetic way is crucial in proactively avoiding the ethical traps jihadis (or other asymmetrical actors) seek to lay.
  • Political victory can be brought about only by avoiding dissonance between military/government effects and narratives. Legitimacy requires a close match between words and deeds.
  • Information operations shouldn’t be regarded as a technical exercise but a human one, premised on a thorough understanding of the causes and drivers of political violence. This includes a focus on values and ethical stances, and how they’re constructed on the ground.

Australia should rethink its involvement in Marawi

Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has described the city of Marawi, in Mindanao, as a candidate for becoming the Raqqa of Southeast Asia. He has authorised the dispatch of Australian military trainers (not special forces, as erroneously reported) to help train Filipino troops, should President Rodrigo Duterte ask for support.

Since May, Marawi has been at the centre of intense fighting in which more than 750 people have died and by which over 350,000 have been displaced. Australia’s prime minister and foreign minister have argued that Australia needs to support the Philippine government to prevent Daesh establishing a beachhead from which it could undermine regional security.

There are several reasons why Australia needs to rethink its involvement in the Marawi conflict.

First, supporting Duterte is dangerous. Since winning power in 2016, he has permitted the extrajudicial killing of around 3,000 suspected drug offenders by the police and another 4,000 by vigilantes. He also supported such actions during his 20-year tenure as mayor of Davao, a city of 2 million people, and bragged about personally killing people during that time. He has said that he doesn’t ‘give a shit’ about human rights, which he sees as a Western concept, and has supported a reduction in the funding of the country’s Commission on Human Rights to just 1,000 pesos ($20) for 2018. He has also threatened to use the Philippine Air Force to bomb indigenous Lumad schools.

Second, there’s more to this conflict than jihadi extremism. The current round of fighting began as a response to an attempt by the Philippine military to capture Isnilon Hapilon, also known as Abu Abdullah al-Filipini, who is the leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a terrorist-cum-criminal enterprise that’s been operating in Mindanao since the early 1990s. The fighters who took over Marawi declared it the regional headquarters of Daesh, but they have a rather nebulous connection to the jihadists. Duterte responded to the takeover by declaring martial law and sending in thousands of troops to battle the militants.

In fact, the conflict has its roots in competition over civil contracts involving two powerful individuals: Farhana Maute, the matriarch of the Maute family, and Dimnatang Pansar, the mayor of Butig. The Mautes have formed a relationship with Isnilon Hapilon, so the conflict might not be based so much on religion or Daesh’s ability to establish a wilayat (province) as on the desire for power and money. Moreover, Daesh is known to make declarations that aren’t based on fact, such as its claim that it has killed 289 Filipino troops since April 2015, which the government disputes. It also opportunistically declares links with people and groups even though there’s no way for it to control its so-called affiliates.

Third, foreign intervention is likely to exacerbate the situation, especially in the wake of Duterte’s decision to abandon the Bangsamoro peace process. The region has a history of violence mainly because the local Moros, who make up around 5% of the Philippines’ population, have historically being discriminated against. In the 1970s, that led to the emergence of the Moro National Liberation Front and its offshoot, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which have fought for either autonomy or independence. The Bangsamoro process was intended to deliver limited autonomy for the Moros.

The actions of the military against the Marawi insurgency are bound to produce long-term ill-feeling. Duterte has not only joked that he would claim responsibility if Filipino soldiers have raped women, but has allowed the military to effectively shoot on sight anybody ‘not authorised by [the] government to carry arms’.

Duterte, Daesh and the militants in Marawi all have a vested interest in claiming that Daesh is in Mindanao and is threatening to expand. Some people are waving Daesh flags, the military has seized Daesh propaganda paraphernalia and some ASG members have pledged allegiance to Daesh, but that doesn’t mean that the group is establishing a beachhead. The reality is that policymakers show a natural reaction to intervene to prevent another Raqqa or Mosul whenever there’s any mention of Daesh. They should consider what can happen when they respond with force to organisations that neither have a real link to the jihadists nor pose a substantive threat.

Southern Mindanao has been a problem region for decades. It has suffered from substantial underinvestment, and its people have endured discrimination and mistreatment by successive governments. In its quest to retake Marawi, the Philippine Army may have been responsible for as many as 300 civilian deaths, which is a serious toll in an area that features clans and blood feuds and where the rule of law is what people make of it. Once the army gains control of the city, those militants who have evaded capture may revert to guerrilla tactics to continue the insurgency, while those who are captured may use their prison time to radicalise others.

Why should Australia support the Philippine Army, especially when the Americans are providing ‘non-combat assistance’? The ADF is already stretched and is likely to face continued demands from Washington to support the ongoing US effort in Afghanistan.

And there may be serious reputational costs for us, as Duterte isn’t a partner whom we can cajole or work with. He shows contempt for our values, undermines human rights and isn’t willing to compromise or negotiate: it’s his way or the highway.

Instead, we need to interact and engage with bona fide partner countries that are concerned about the Daesh contagion.