military reform Archives

More unneeded officers, more military influence. Indonesia’s law revision is a mistake

8 April 2025

Amendments to Indonesia’s military law risk undermining civilian supremacy and the country’s defence capabilities. Passed by the House of Representatives on 20 March, the main changes include raising the retirement age and allowing military officers to serve in more government agencies. These are not as harmless as they sound.

Under the changes, the maximum retirement age for officers will be increased from 58 to 60. Meanwhile, four-star generals could serve until 63, with an additional two-year extension applied at the president’s discretion.

This move could exacerbate a pressing issue: the growing number of high-ranking officers without official assignments. According to Indonesia Strategic and Defence Studies, at least 120 high-ranking officers currently lack active postings within the military. Extending their service would likely worsen this excess, delaying the regeneration of leadership and reducing opportunities for younger officers to rise through the ranks.

Furthermore, service extensions risk favouritism within the military. Because they will be discretionary, the system may prioritise loyalty over capability, potentially sidelining more competent officers from important roles. As shown by the Iran-Iraq War, in which the Iraqi officer corps mainly consisted of Saddam Hussein’s personal aide, this priority of loyalty over skills may hinder response and capacity.

Another contentious aspect is the expansion of the number of civilian government agencies where military personnel can work. Under the previous law, active military officers could serve in just 10 government agencies, such as the National Search and Rescue Agency and the National Resilience Institute. Initially, the new law increased the number to 15, including the Supreme Court, Attorney General’s Office, National Narcotics Agency, and Ministry of Marine and Fisheries. After pushback from civil society, the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries was excluded.

While some may argue that the new regulation establishes clear boundaries for military involvement in government agencies, it remains unclear whether military personnel will be assigned only to specific positions or if they could occupy any available role.

In Indonesia, the military is often regarded as more disciplined and loyal than civilians, fostering an unhealthy and imbalanced power dynamic between military personnel and civilian professionals. This issue is further exacerbated by the military’s strong esprit de corps, which risks prioritising fellow soldiers for key positions over more skilled civilian candidates.

Additionally, the military’s hierarchical structure can weaken fair and inclusive decision-making within agencies. When military officers assume leadership roles, it raises the risk of groupthink and cognitive biases, as decision-making tends to be centralised around a single leader rather than following a more deliberative bureaucratic process.

More importantly, there are still loopholes, as some military figures can bypass regulations. For example, the appointment of active-duty officer Teddy Indra Wijaya as Indonesia’s Cabinet Secretary would normally have been illegal. To legitimise his decision, President Prabowo released a presidential decree, moving the Cabinet Secretary under the Presidential Military Secretariat. Prabowo’s efforts to accommodate Teddy show the ability of the president to override regulations, when necessary, which raises concerns about the effectiveness of safeguards against unchecked military influence.

This growing military involvement in civilian governance is a red flag for Indonesia’s democratic trajectory. If left unchecked, it could undermine one of the key achievements of post-Suharto reforms: the principle of civilian supremacy. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the military’s expanded role could erode investor confidence and comfort, potentially triggering capital flight.

Rather than raising the retirement age, a more effective approach would be restructuring and expanding combat units within the military to employ surplus officers. The military should also consider making its employment regulations more flexible. Currently, officers must complete 10 years of mandatory service before being eligible for retirement. Reducing this duration would allow them to retire earlier and, therefore, reduce surplus personnel. Additionally, the government may consider offering incentives for early retirees and upskilling programs to prepare them for career transition into the private and other civilian sectors.

Furthermore, to improve the military’s capability, defence policymakers should focus on combat capacity rather than only addressing personnel management issues. The law makes no comprehensive mention of modern warfare priorities such as cybersecurity and artificial intelligence—despite previous commitments from armed forces commander Agus Subiyanto to integrate these elements into a new military doctrine. This omission is particularly striking, given the growing importance of cyber warfare in contemporary security dynamics.

The revision should concern Australia, the United States and other democratic powers that supported Indonesia’s political and military reform in the Reformasi era. This era is marked by numerous human rights violations by the military, such as the kidnappings of students in the 1998 riots and alleged involvement in the 1999 East Timor crisis.

This revision’s reversing of progress in military professionalisation and setting back of civilian supremacy reflect the ineffective use of spending intended to reform the military in the early 2000s. This includes the International Military Education and Training program, which focuses on professional military education, human rights training and joint exercises.

The ADF reserve system is obsolete. We need a dramatically expanded force

21 March 2025

Australia needs to radically reorganise its reserves system to create a latent military force that is much larger, better trained and equipped and deployable within days—not decades.

Our current reserve system is not fit for purpose. It was designed many decades ago to support distant expeditionary operations, not the prospect of major war in our immediate region emphasised in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR).

With doubts growing about the reliability of our major ally, we have no choice but to prepare to defend ourselves—if necessary, largely on our own. This requires whole-of-nation preparations that were described in the DSR. The driving needs are to deter and provide effective defence against an aggressive China.

But the Review of the ADF Reserves, quietly released before Christmas, addresses none of this. At best, it is an administrative review that describes how management of the current system can be refined. It is an exercise in deck chair rearrangement, when we need a credible plan to build a far larger latent force that can be mobilised to carry much of the load if we must fight alone with little notice.

Commissioning this review of Australian Defence Force reserves was a key recommendation of the DSR. The DSR said:

The strategic risks we face require the implementation of a new approach to planning force posture, force structure, capability development and acquisition… It is clear that a business-as-usual approach is not appropriate.

The DSR said that the force structure was ‘not fit for purpose’ and that the country needed a larger defence force, greater war-fighting endurance and stronger national resilience.

The review of reserves doesn’t address these issues at all but does describe the current reserve system. It states that in early 2024 some 41,000 people were registered as ADF reserves, but they included 10,000 who had never rendered service. Some of the remaining 31,000 provided specialist skills that were in short supply elsewhere in Defence, some filled gaps in permanent units, and a few served as a base for ADF force expansion in future emergencies.

At best, the reserves review performs a process-reform function, suggesting tweaking of current systems for efficiency and effectiveness. It recommends three categories of reserve service, accelerated entry pathways, adoption of an approach of providing minimal essential training, and a further review of conditions of service. However, the review proposes a recruitment target of only another 1000 personnel by 2030.

This is clearly not what the authors of the DSR had in mind.

There are limits on how many permanent ADF personnel can be recruited short of major war. However, given our strategic circumstances, a steep increase in part-time personnel should be a priority.

Advanced democracies variously use three reserve force models. The first is an expeditionary one suitable for countries which are not directly threatened but whose militaries periodically deploy to fight in distant wars of choice. Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Australia use this model.

The second type is the homeland and theatre defence model. It is used by countries that face serious threats of direct attack with little warning and therefore need to be able to field a very large defence force to fight wars of necessity within a few hours or, at most, a few days.

Examples include: Finland which, with a population of 5.6 million, operates a force of 24,000 permanent military personnel and 254,000 trained and equipped reservists; Israel, which from a population of 9.8 million, fields 170,000 permanent force personnel and 465,000 active reservists; and Singapore, which, with a population of 6 million, can field 51,000 permanent force personnel and 253,000 trained and equipped reservists.

The third type is a hybrid, such as the US model. From a population of 340 million, the United States it has a permanent military force of 1.3 million supported by 807,000 well-trained and well-equipped reservists.

The reserves review should have asked which model was now most suitable. Our expeditionary model, inherited from forward commitments in Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam, is obsolete. It provides some operational capabilities but generates limited resilience and would require many years to expand the reserves to the size needed for major regional war, which we could face before the end of this decade.

We must rapidly transition to a homeland and theatre defence model or, possibly, some sort of hybrid model. We must quickly prepare a reserve force that is much stronger than what we have: better trained, equipped and organised, and much larger. It must be deployable within days.

We must simplify and accelerate the way we bring people into it and improve ADF access to the national skills pool. Many intelligence, cyber, transport, medical, maintenance and other roles can be filled by qualified civilians following short training periods.

This next-generation ADF reserves system demands big changes in leadership, culture and organisational habits. The government must explain the security challenges Australia faces, why major changes are needed and why people should enlist.

What’s needed now is an action plan to quickly develop a much larger ADF reserve force. We needed it yesterday.

The ADF needs more specialists. To get them, it needs more flexibility

23 January 2025

The Australian Defence Force needs a new way to recruit and retain hard-to-find experts, such as specialist engineers. Current systems do not allow for the flexibility that the 21st century demands, nor do they match industry salary standards.

These shortcomings were highlighted by the Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves, which identifies the need to adopt a Total Workforce System that supports more innovative and flexible workforce arrangements.

The problem has been worsening as tasks within the ADF have become more complex. But maybe the solution has been right in front of us all along.

We could adapt the existing Specialist Services Officer (SSO) system through which the army currently engages people in fields such a healthcare, finance, law, chaplaincy, management, public affairs, aviation, engineering or education, without necessarily requiring the full military training of standard army service. The SSO arrangement needs to be more flexible: rather than limited to pre-defined fields, it must be open to whatever roles the ADF requires.

It would thereby enable the ADF to employ a much wider range of specialists, and it would apply to people with particularly valuable skills who could already be in the ADF under a different role.

The adaption, renamed Specialist Service Person (SSP), could also replace the Specialist Service Soldier scheme, which the army is trialling for enlisted personnel and which is focused on specific trades.

For example, the army may need someone with specialist sanitation knowledge for an operation, but ‘sanitation engineer’ isn’t on the Specialist Services Officer list or a job in the ADF. The review of the reserves advocates creating pathways that allow a broader range of specialists to enter the ADF, ensuring operational requirements guide employment rather than rigid role categories.

Instead, operational needs should guide employment, and a system unconstrained by pre-defined employment categories and open to negotiable pay should ensure that ever-changing service demands are met.

Other examples of skills that the ADF can acquire with far more flexibility are artificial intelligence experts, automation engineers, naval architects, procurement specialists and unknown future roles we haven’t thought up yet.

The SSP system, like the SSO, would apply to civilians entering the ADF or to reservists with specialised skills. This gives the ADF options to move people into roles where there is an operational need and move them out when it is over.

A continuous full-time service (CFTS) contract, as already used for upgrading reservists to full-time employment, could be used. Under the SSP model, the ADF could call upon specialists when needed, similar to the reserves, rather than keeping people permanently on contract but underemployed.

Additionally, ADF also relies on a contracted external civilian workforce for niche expertise. They are often employed by companies that they work for directly, adding complexity, cost and conflicts of interest. Instead, such skills should be available from service members under SSP CFTS contracts.

Offering realistic market salaries under the SSP system would also improve the chance of keeping highly skilled ADF members who have grown beyond their standard employment model.

This proposal takes inspiration from the US Warrant Officer system and Singapore’s military expert system.

The US Army pays more for its technical experts through its Warrant Officer ranks. These members are specialists in specific fields rather than generalist leaders, enabling them to focus on their core skills. This system allows the military to retain and access the expertise of its best specialists.

The Singapore Armed Forces directly recruit specialists from the civilian sector, tapping into a wider talent pool to meet evolving defence needs. These specialists, known as military experts, can then develop their skills through the Military Domain Experts Scheme.

Like the US model, the proposed SSP system would recognise and promote expertise from within the ranks. Like Singapore’s approach, it would acknowledge the need to bring in external expertise when required. This hybrid model ensures seamless integration of both internal and external specialists, optimising the ADF’s capabilities.

The SSP system could also be used to keep the skills of people who would otherwise leave the ADF—for example, because medical conditions make them unfit for standard duties. If they hold the right in need skillsets the ADF in the SSP model would have the flexibility to reengage them under a CFTS contract with defined duties, salary and outcomes.

Currently, specialists often face pay cuts when they move from private companies into ADF roles. This concern is echoed in the review of the reserves, which emphasises the need to modernise conditions of service and adopt a more competitive pay structure to improve retention and recruitment outcomes.

The key word is ‘flexibility’. That’s what the ADF must have as it tries to employ and keep people with the ever-enlarging range of skills that it needs.

Fresh thinking to deal with ‘not quite wars’ (part 2)

14 September 2017

Military men and women love their sports metaphors (no matter their nationality, from my experience); invariably, whatever the mission, goal or enemy, it can be described by sport. So, in that vein, let’s continue our discussion on the evolution of military thought by dipping into a cross-cultural use of the sports metaphor.

Today’s security environment requires military professionals who can play a game like cricket more than one like grid-iron football. Today’s warfare is enduring, has no real end point, and requires nuanced strategy that includes consideration of endurance. While brute force will always be an element of national security, especially for the uniformed personnel whose job it is to threaten or inflict violence on an adversary for national interest, a carefully finessed use of force that has an eye to a longer game of strategic balance and competition is more the norm for future requirements.

As mentioned in my last piece here on The Strategist, a shift in military doctrine to focus on continuous campaigning to create strategic advantage—as opposed to a focus on linear ‘phases’ that culminate in ‘decisive’ military action and transfer back to civilian actions—is a welcome change, and one more in line with the need for wicket-keepers than linebackers. However, to truly get our military institutions prepared for conflict that’s based around continuing advantage and assertion of control instead of decisive tactical victory, we must first educate our leaders and planners.

The education process begins at the entry of men and women into our military. War must be taught as an overarching concept to be embraced and understood, not merely as a big, amorphous concept in which battlefield tactics somehow play a role. For example, instead of constraining minds by focusing exclusively on tactics as a physical action undertaken by squads or platoons and explained through select battle vignettes devoid of their context, battles could be taught in the context of why they occurred and most especially their long-term impact on an overall conflict or campaign. For instance, rather than spending days detailing how Hannibal defeated consuls Paullus and Varro at Cannae through a double envelopment, instructors could provide an overall contextual look at Hannibal’s campaign, and ultimate defeat, through a Fabian strategy of exhaustion and invasion of Carthage, while also quickly describing the tactics involved that led to the employment of such a strategy and the result. As the shift in Joint Publication 5-0 to campaigning recognises, war is a condition to be managed, not a series of steps to be accomplished—we should teach it that way, as well.

Such an approach would not distract from the development of tactical and technical skills required of our junior leaders, but rather provide them better context in which to understand the uses of their tactical and technical expertise. It will also set the foundation for these men and women to succeed as future senior leaders. Because when it comes down to it, even while we’re developing people who can threaten or exercise violence on behalf of the state, we’re also developing leaders who can understand, influence and execute strategy—the theory of success required in continuous campaigning. Just as ‘[g]ood strategy is a non-linear process that must constantly be tended and adapted, and vigilance is rewarded’, so goes our military leaders’ ability to think about and manage that process. We need cricketers who can play a long, continuous game, not footballers who put all their effort into a limited timeframe.

To do that, however, we also need the institutional structures, authorities and processes (to include interoperability with allies and partners) in place to develop such leaders, create the force structure to succeed on future battlefields and extended campaigns, and create the strategies to succeed in such an environment. Approaches to do this from an institutional perspective will be covered in a future post.

Alfin Febrian Basundoro