Tag Archive for: military

Urban warfare in Ukraine and Gaza with John Spencer

In this episode of Stop the World, ASPI Senior Analyst Alex Bristow interviews John Spencer, the Chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point and host of the Urban Warfare Project podcast.   

Alex and John discuss urban warfare in the context of the conflict in Ukraine and Gaza, asymmetric capabilities and the impact of technology on warfare. 

They also talk about the laws of armed conflict and the public debate around Israel and Gaza, as well consider prospects for peace in Ukraine.   

Guests:  

Dr Alex Bristow  
John Spencer  

Tag Archive for: military

Militarisation of policing in America and lessons for Australia: accountability

In my previous post, I discussed the militarisation of American policing and its adverse effects during the recent protests. Militarisation, coupled with a perceived lack of police leadership, accountability and trustworthiness, presents a worrying future for American policing and provides lessons for the international law enforcement community.

Accountability starts at the top. Police leaders set the tone for their forces. Policy development and implementation, training, enforcement of ethical standards and a willingness to cooperate with, and heed the recommendations of, external oversight bodies mould the environment in which policing occurs. Minimising efforts in any of these areas, through words or actions, can spiral out of control and leave police staggering from one problem to another.

Politicians are also accountable for what happens in their jurisdictions. Their words and actions define the space within which the community and police operate. What message did President Donald Trump’s ‘When the looting starts, the shooting starts’ tweet send? Do his remarks have any less power than those of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who gave shoot-to-kill orders for people breaking community quarantine rules during the Covid-19 pandemic and instructed police to kill anyone believed to be connected with the illicit drug trade?

Words can demonise some and empower others, perhaps to the detriment of all. Again, what message was Trump sending when he blamed Antifa for America’s problems while ignoring the far right? All too often, political rhetoric and re-election considerations overpower good public policy.

Accountability suffers most when the stars align and political expediency meets a politically compliant, or corrupt, policing establishment. Such an alignment was seen in Queensland during Joh Bjelke-Petersen premiership with the policing abuses under commissioner Terry Lewis. Similar concerns arise around the world. In China, police are used to override and constrain freedoms and human rights at the behest of their political masters.

In democratic societies, accountability occurs through the dispassionate application of the law without regard to political whims. The politicisation of public service has weakened the institutions on which accountability depends. America has a longstanding tradition of a winner-takes-all approach to elections that allows presidents, governors and others in leadership positions to appoint politically acceptable agency heads and functionaries, even if their qualifications are dubious. This is also occurring in the Westminster tradition. In Australia, various governments have used a ‘night of the long knives’ to install more politically palatable agency heads, endangering the long-held objective of a professional public service providing frank and fearless advice.

To maintain community support for policing, ensuring accountability through efficient and effective oversight is essential. The US Department of Justice has broad powers to investigate unconstitutional policing practices. However, the department conducted 12 investigations of law enforcement agencies for practices that violated the constitution during George W. Bush’s first term and 15 during Barack Obama’s, but has opened only one since Donald Trump became president. This is a worrying trend.

The apparent view of some US police that they are above the law is also reflected in the qualified immunity that shields them from civil liability for violating a civilian’s constitutional rights in most circumstances. The Supreme Court has upheld that doctrine numerous times. In Pearson v Callahan, for example, the court held that ‘qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably’. That seems a reasonable argument, but the concept of qualified immunity appears to have been taken to extremes. And last week, the court decided not to hear a set of cases challenging the doctrine, effectively handing the issue over to Congress to resolve.

Perhaps this partly explains why, in 2019 alone, 1,099 people were shot and killed by American police. African Americans comprised 13% of the population, but 24% of those killed. (In contrast, England and Wales had a total of 55 fatal police shootings between 1990 and 2014; in Australia, there were 47 fatal police shootings between 2006 and 2017.)

Between 2013 and 2019, 99% of killings by police in the US did not result in officers being charged with a crime. That may change now given the recent civil unrest and calls for justice throughout the country. The proliferation of weapons in the US is clearly another key factor.

Qualified immunity doesn’t explain why the Minneapolis police use force against African Americans seven times more often than against whites. Nearly 60% of those subjected to physical force by the city’s police are black, even though African Americans make up only about 20% of its population.

Of course, institutional racism is not a peculiarly American phenomenon. Worldwide demonstrations in support of the Black Lives Matter movement highlight the impact of racism in Western societies. Australian statistics and royal commission findings show that our policing is not immune to this pernicious cancer. In New South Wales alone, the number of Aboriginal people charged by police increased by 67% over the past 10 years, while the increase for non-Aboriginal people was 8%.

Australia has a different mix of constitutional and legal mechanisms to oversee policing. These important independent processes of accountability must be supported by proper funding and staffing. One need only look at the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity and its backlog of finalised and ongoing cases to realise that more could be done. The old adage ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ applies.

In the end, policing is about trust. Communities trust that when they obey the law, they’ll be left alone to live their lives. They trust that, only where necessary, will police use their powers to maintain the peace. Communities trust that when police abuse their powers they’ll be brought to account, quickly and appropriately. In this complex environment there are no easy, short-term or ill-considered solutions.

Building and maintaining confidence requires providing mechanisms for community involvement in policymaking; having leaders who listen to their communities; ensuring strong and effective oversight mechanisms are in place; and reaffirming the community policing model based on the Peelian principles of modern policing. Only then will communities hold confidence in, and support the ongoing legitimacy of, police in our society.

Militarisation of policing in America and lessons for Australia: trust and legitimacy

Perhaps with unintentional irony, US President Donald Trump said in a recent national address that America ‘needs creation, not destruction; cooperation, not contempt; security, not anarchy; healing, not hatred; justice, not chaos’. In any community, policing is essential to realising these goals. Police, however, can only be effective with community support and acceptance of their role.

Police and the communities they serve have an unspoken contract. For peace and wellbeing, the community gives police permission to use coercive force in certain circumstances. But communities in return expect police to be accountable for their exercise of that power. With the death of George Floyd and the riots that followed, this contract between the community and police has been undermined and weakened.

The cause of the recent demonstrations ultimately traces back to America’s original sin of slavery and the historic failures of its institutions and systems to address entrenched racism and inequality. However, current policies have contributed to, and inflamed, these events, calling into question the US model of policing—particularly the overt militarisation.

The process starts with the recruitment of ex-military personnel through programs that have no counterparts in Australia. To attract recruits, the Los Angeles Police Department, like many others, provides additional benefits that are supported by national veterans’ programs under the GI Bill. Former military personnel bring important skills like teamwork, discipline and proficient use of weapons, but it’s not easy for them to transition from ‘warriors to guardians’. Their training and experience embed a mindset that doesn’t always align well with the requirements of community policing.

Recruitment and training standards are relatively consistent across Australia’s states and territories. This approach is assisted by the small number of police services, eight in total, and the large scale of those services compared with the American average. In the US there are more than 12,000 local police services, which vary significantly in size depending on the size of the communities that support them. Consequently, recruitment, transition programs and training standards vary greatly.

Police training in the US has also been subject to militarisation. The 1981 Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act allows the US armed forces to cooperate with and assist domestic law enforcement agencies in areas such as counterdrug operations, civil disturbances, special security operations, counterterrorism and explosive ordnance disposal. This work necessitates joint training activities during which ideas and tactics are exchanged. Of course, in the US context, the proliferation of high-powered weapons in the community understandably provides a difficult working environment.

There are benefits to police engaging in joint training activities with military personnel, but there can also be negative consequences if these tactics and use of force are applied inappropriately, as we saw in some cases during the recent large protests in the US. In 2019, John Sutton, a lawyer and former Australian Defence Force officer, raised similar concerns about frontline and specialist police teams being trained in military-style tactics and thinking in Australia.

The militarisation of police continues with the US Department of Defense’s 1033 program, which provides, free of charge, surplus military equipment to civilian police forces across America. That includes military-grade weapons, night-vision goggles and armoured vehicles more appropriate to a war zone. One study suggested that there’s a ‘statistically significant relationship between 1033 transfers and fatalities from officer-involved shootings’. Another found that ‘the increased use of military equipment has coincided with an increased use of military tactics, such as SWAT teams and no-knock raids’. A similar program operates in Australia through the national counterterrorism funding program, but the use of such equipment here is not limited to counterterrorism activities.

Another change in policing is the introduction of military-style uniforms. Studies suggest that what police wear has a strong psychological influence on how people perceive them. Uniforms denote power and authority, but these perceptions can be influenced by the colour of the material used. Darker police uniforms, such as the black clothing widely used in America and increasingly in vogue in Australia, send negative subconscious signals to citizens. These signals are exacerbated by the increasingly militaristic tactical vests and equipment worn by police; police should be approachable, not intimidating.

Concerns have been raised about the impact of post-traumatic stress disorder on police. PTSD rates vary among veterans depending on the conflict in which they served, but it’s estimated that 11% to 20% of US veterans suffer from PTSD in a given year. The estimated prevalence of PTSD in the general adult population is much lower, at around 6.8%. Given the stigma associated with PTSD, it’s likely that these figures under-represent the extent of the problem and that the under-reporting continues into future employment. In stressful situations the red mist of anger can descend, making it difficult to determine what is an appropriate use of force and police powers. The overlay of PTSD, in violent confrontations, can exacerbate this problem.

The violent clashes in the US have highlighted that communities and some police are unsure what environment they’re operating in. The concept of community policing, and the role of police in the community, need to be clearly defined and distinguished from a military model of operation. Police must be trained to understand that the powers the community bestows on them are a privilege, not a right. When officers abuse their powers, that trust is fractured.

Policymakers, in consultation with their communities, must consider whether they want a respectful and lawful interplay between community and police or are willing to see communities become battlegrounds. Unfortunately, America may have reached a point where many police departments have become akin to military forces in their communities, resulting in a loss of legitimacy and trust. We must be vigilant to ensure that the same thing doesn’t happen in Australia.

Policy implementation and review, accountability and leadership have direct roles to play in setting the parameters for what communities expect of their police services. I’ll explore those themes in my next post.

Not a tweet from Australia on Trump’s military transgender ban

A fortnight ago, while most Australians were safely tucked into bed, America’s Twitter-happy president took to his favourite platform to tap out another policy announcement. You never know what you’re going to get from @realDonaldTrump, and this was no different. Across three tweets he announced that his government:

will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the US Military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail.

Secretary of Defense James Mattis was on vacation at the time, and sources allege that he was appalled the president chose to unveil his decision in tweets. The US Defense Department has been waiting for formal direction and it’s now been reported that President Trump has approved a ‘guidance policy’ for implementation that will be delivered to Secretary Mattis.

Arguing that America’s soft power is in decline has become all too easy this year. A soft-power index out of the UK found that America has fallen from number one in the world to third this year, largely due to sharp declines in international polling. At home, Lowy Institute polling found that 60% of Australians say President Trump causes them to have an unfavourable opinion of the United States. The president’s announcement, and the callous way in which it was delivered, will only further chip away at America’s soft power. Uniquely in the world of international relations, much of this erosion can be tied to the president’s engagement with cyberspace and his abrupt style of digital diplomacy. No other leader has ever tweeted out policy announcements and given us their daily thoughts in real time.

But if you don’t give weight to the concept of soft power, let’s throw dollars into the equation. RAND estimates (PDF) that there are between 1,320 and 6,630 transgender personnel in active service and 830 to 4,160 in reserve. Given that they’ll no longer be allowed to serve ‘in any capacity’, the US military has an expensive recruitment drive in front of it. Earlier this year, the US Army budgeted US$300 million to recruit 6,000 additional soldiers.

The personnel that need to be replaced won’t all be in the army, and nor will they all be full-time. But these figures don’t take into consideration the expense of security clearances, training or replacing senior officers and intelligence specialists. Even applying a conservative lens to the figures, Trump’s ban—if enacted—will cost hundreds of millions of dollars. On the flipside, the financial burden brought on by transgender personnel who request financial support for transition-related medical treatment is estimated at US$2.4–8.4 million annually.

Several governments have come out online to condemn the ban. The Canadian defence force spoke about jobs, while also sending out a message about its commitment to diversity. Within 24 hours, a tweet from Canada’s Armed Forces welcoming Canadians of all sexual orientations and gender identities and imploring potential recruits to ‘Join us!’ went viral, racking up 33,000 re-tweets from around the world.

Commander of the UK’s Maritime Forces Rear Admiral Alex Burton tweeted: ‘As an @RoyalNavy_LGBT champion and senior warfighter I am so glad we are not going this way.’ Among the many tweets from the UK’s Second Sea Lord and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, this stood out: ‘So proud of our transgender personnel. They bring #diversity to our @RoyalNavy and I will always support their desire to serve their country.’ Lieutenant General Patrick Sanders added, ‘The British Army is proud to have many transgender soldiers serving their country. Like all soldiers, they are prepared to lay down their lives for their country. We are a stronger and better Army for being inclusive and we benefit from the rich diversity of all represented in the British Army.’

Australia is one of the world’s 18 countries that allow transgender personnel to openly serve in their militaries. The Washington Post recently reported that an Australian Air Force diversity handbook (PDF) on gender transitioning had been labelled the ‘gold standard’. The government is about to release a foreign affairs white paper that has been repeatedly described as ‘a statement of values’. Last month, the government celebrated its election to the UN Human Rights Council, something our foreign minister and her department have been actively lobbying for since 2015.

All of which makes it incredibly surprising that the Australian government has said nothing about the triple-tweet announcement. They would have certainly seen our closest allies taking to their keyboards to condemn the absurd policy, making it clear to their citizens that they won’t be following suit.

Our political leaders and defence chiefs are long accustomed to an online world. They send out daily tweets, emojis and videos. In fact, the Australian Army has developed a particularly good reputation for its savvy social media use. But not a tweet from Australia. Zip from the dozens of social media accounts administered by Canberra. Nothing witty, nothing kind, nothing strong, nothing factual about Australia’s position on the inclusion of transgender personnel in—to borrow the military’s hashtag—#YourADF. So where is our voice? Only days after Trump’s Twitter storm, a diversity recruitment campaign was even launched that provided the perfect forum for our defence leaders to take a strong stance.

Last year Prime Minister Turnbull said that he wouldn’t engage in Trump commentary. He, his Cabinet and our defence chiefs shouldn’t be expected to comment on every development or tweet. Their time is incredibly valuable and most days they have bigger fish to fry.

Equally, however, as we get ready to take our seat on the UN Human Rights Council, how can we shirk important global debates like this? It is vital that our political and defence leaders speak out to publicly and proudly reinforce Australia’s commitment to values in times like this. Because the military’s hashtag is spot-on—it is #OurADF—and there’s nothing but shame in deafening silence.

Fresh thinking to deal with ‘not quite wars’ (part 1)

If there’s one topic that lends itself to pedantry, it’s military doctrine. Add in a little strategy and cross-cultural thinking and you’ve hit the trifecta required for heated dogmatic commentary. However, in the hope of creating some greater understanding, let’s delve a bit into how doctrine captures the intellectual evolution of military thought, despite the veneer of what some consider unchanging military jargon. In the end, I think we’ll find some illumination not just on military doctrine, but also on strategy and how both affect our military forces.

Any military discussion requires genuflection to the past, so we’ll begin with an apocryphal saying from the Cold War. Attributed to an anonymous Soviet officer frustrated by his attempts to figure out the Americans, it goes: ‘A serious problem in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine.’ While enjoyable to relate, it’s not true, at least not in the contemporary military. In fact, military members tend not only to use doctrine, but to abuse it shamelessly to sell their latest projects or ideas—and to conform it to their conceptions of linear military campaigns.

An example of that abuse is the doctrinaire approach to phasing in planning and execution depicted in Figure 1. That phased approach to planning was used for decades in joint doctrine. It was designed to depict how to think about breaking up a military campaign into smaller chunks for planning. Instead, it became a checklist on which planning was based. It even crept into the defence vernacular, with steady-state operations becoming ‘Phase 0’, conventional war ‘Phase 3’, etc. Military leaders and planners began thinking in those arbitrary phases.

Figure 1: Phases of a notional operation plan versus level of military effort

Source: US Department of Defense 2011, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (PDF)

Make no mistake, this linear approach plays on the greatest strengths of military planners and leaders: the thoughtful, methodical coordination of military resources to achieve objectives that have been developed and clearly defined by defence and policy leadership. However, clear objectives and adversaries who lend themselves to linear military solutions are rare. Take, for instance, operations in Iraq post-Saddam, Afghanistan since 2001, East Timor or Vietnam. Or look at the ‘grey zone’ (PDF) conflicts that are now slowly burning in Eastern Ukraine and the South China Sea.

In an attempt to shift military planning from linear to more diverse approaches and determine how to plan and act in ‘not quite war’ scenarios, most Western militaries have embraced tools such as complexity theory and design methodologies (PDF). The most recent example is the latest version of the US military’s doctrine on joint operations (PDF). Instead of linear contingency campaigns, it focuses on developing steady-state, continuous campaign plans as the foundation of all military action. The linear, contingency-based planning then becomes an offshoot of overall campaigns, as depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2: A new campaigning construct

Source: US Department of Defense 2017, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning (PDF)

The shift away from linear campaigns is explained as follows:

[Military planning] seeks to capitalize on the cumulative effect of multiple coordinated and synchronized operations, activities, and investments that cannot be accomplished by a single major operation. [Emphasis added]

The new doctrine appears to encourage an approach to thinking in ‘cumulative’ terms over the linear. This harks back to a less well-known strategic thinker, but one with many lessons for today, J.C. Wylie.

In his Military strategy: a general theory of power control, Wylie proffered a useful approach to military campaigns, postulating that military forces should focus on asserting control where possible to create strategic advantage. That is in sharp contrast to conventional linear thinking about war as a loss of equilibrium that must be regained, and about war and peace as a black-and-white dichotomy. Wylie believed that thinking about control, as opposed to a war versus peace, would result in better long-term decisions, and thereby a greater comparative advantage strategically.

Wylie’s theory of control has two categories of strategies, sequential and cumulative. Sequential strategies are offensive assertions of control, typically in a linear campaign, that strive for finality. An example might be the series of engagements that would ultimately seize and occupy a capital city, à la the coalition forces’ march on and seizure of Baghdad in 2003. On the other side, cumulative strategies are a defensive aspect of control that take the strength of an adversary, effectively denying its ability for decision or finality. This then creates an overwhelming series of actions that exhaust the enemy. An example of this approach might be the Allied bombing campaign of Germany in 1943, which degraded military industrial production.

With the addition of such concepts as cumulative strategy to the stereotypical sequential approaches found in military theory, even incrementally, the military is better positioning itself to address both steady-state operations, as managed by the regional combatant commands, and slow-burning ‘not quite wars’. That’s certainly a step forward.

However, conceptual change in the military is a slow process. It takes years to disseminate new approaches into professional military education, into training, and into use by operational and strategic planners. Such a change also logically dictates changes to institutional structures, authorities and processes, to include interoperability with allies and partners. I’ll address those implications in future posts.

Turkey’s baffling coup

Image courtesy of Flickr user Daniel Arauz

Military coupssuccessful or otherwisefollow a predictable pattern in Turkey. Political groupstypically Islamistsdeemed by soldiers to be antagonistic to Kemal Ataturk’s vision of a secular Turkey gain increasing power. Tensions rise, often accompanied by violence on the streets. Then the military steps in, exercising what the soldiers claim is their constitutional power to restore order and secular principles.

This time, it was very different. Thanks to a series of sham trials targeting secularist officers, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had managed to reconfigure the military hierarchy and place his own people at the top. While the country has been rocked by a series of terrorist attacks and faces a souring economy, there was no inkling of unrest in the military or opposition to Erdogan. On the contrary, Erdogan’s recent reconciliation with Russia and Israel, together with his apparent desire to pull back from an active role in the Syrian civil war, must have been a relief to Turkey’s top brass.

No less baffling was the almost amateurish behavior of the putschists, who managed to capture the chief of the general staff but apparently made no meaningful attempt to detain Erdogan or any senior politicians. Major television channels were allowed to continue to operate for hours, and when soldiers showed up in the studios, their incompetence was almost comical.

Planes strafed civilians and attacked the parliamentvery uncharacteristic behavior for the Turkish military outside areas of Kurdish insurgency. Social media were full of pictures of hapless (and apparently clueless) soldiers being pulled out of tanks and disarmed (and sometimes much worse) by civilian crowdsscenes I never thought I would see in a country that’s come to hate military coups but still loves its soldiers.

Erdogan was quick to blame his former ally and current nemesis, the exiled preacher Fethullah Gülen, who leads a large Islamic movement from outside of Philadelphia. There are obvious reasons for taking this with a grain of salt, but the claim is less outlandish than it may seem. We know that there’s a strong Gülenist presence in the military (without which the government’s earlier move against senior Turkish officersthe so-called Eregenekon and Sledgehammer casescouldn’t have been mounted). In fact, the military was the last remaining Gülenist stronghold in Turkey, since Erdogan had already purged the movement’s sympathisers in the police, judiciary, and media.

We also know that Erdogan was preparing to make a major move against the Gülenists in the military. A few officers had already been arrested for fabricating evidence in earlier trials, and it was rumored that a large-scale purge of Gülenist officers was in the works for next month’s meeting of the Supreme Military Council.

So the Gülenists had a motive, and the timing of the attempt supports their involvement. It’s a supreme irony that the coup Erdogan long feared from the secularists may have eventually come from his one-time allieswho themselves were responsible for fabricating myriad coup plots against Erdogan.

Yet a bloody military coup lies very much outside the traditional modus operandi of the Gülen movement, which tends to prefer behind-the-scenes machinations to armed action or explicit violence. The coup may have been a desperate last-ditch effort, given the prospect that they were about to lose their last stronghold in Turkey. But, with so many unanswered questions about what took place, the emergence of many strange twists and turns in the coming weeks would be no surprise.

There’s less uncertainty about what’s likely to happen next. The coup attempt will add potency to Erdogan’s venom and fuel a wider witch-hunt against the Gülen movement. Thousands will be sacked from their positions in the military and elsewhere, detained, and prosecuted with little regard for the rule of law or the presumption of innocence. There are already alarming calls to bring back the death penalty for putschists, which recent experience shows is a very broad category for Erdogan. Some of the mob violence against captured soldiers portends a Jacobinism that would jeopardize all remaining due-process protections in Turkey.

The coup attempt is bad news for the economy as well. Erdogan’s recent, somewhat skin-deep reconciliation with Russia and Israel was likely motivated by a desire to restore flows of foreign capital and tourists. Such hopes are now unlikely to be realised. The failed coup reveals that the country’s political divisions run deeper than even the most pessimistic observers believed. This hardly makes for an attractive environment for investors or visitors.

But, politically, the failed coup is a boon for Erdogan. As he put it while it was still unclear if he was going to emerge on top, ‘this uprising is a gift from God to us because this will be a reason to cleanse our army’. Now that the coup has failed, he will have the political tailwind to make the constitutional changes he’s long sought to strengthen the presidency and concentrate power in his own hands.

The coup’s failure will thus bolster Erdogan’s authoritarianism and do little good for Turkish democracy. Had the coup succeeded, however, the blow to democratic prospects surely would have been more severe, with longer-term effects. That provides at least some reason to cheer.