On 21 May, Mullah Mohammed Akhtar Mansour, leader of the Afghani Taliban, was assassinated by an American drone strike in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, just across the border with Afghanistan. Mullah Mansour’s death was announced by President Obama during his visit to Vietnam. It’s the most successful American operation in the region since the elimination of Osama Bin Laden five years ago. The political decapitation of the Afghan Taliban will have far-reaching consequences at three levels: on internal Taliban dynamics; on the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan; and on US–Pakistan relations. Let me address those in that order.

On Monday the Taliban leadership met to start the process of choosing a new head. There’s a sense that it’s important a new leader be agreed to quickly to avoid the long, acrimonious discussions that took place last year to replace the previous leader, Mullah Omar.

Most experts would agree that the choice of a new leader will come down to three individuals. A favourite for the position is the powerful Sirajuddin Haqqani, at present one of the two deputy leaders and head of the notorious al-Qaeda-affiliated Haqqani network which has given so much grief to American and Coalition forces over the years—and still does. Despite a reputation for ruthlessness, he was instrumental in bringing together all the different Taliban factions following the selection of Mullah Mansour as leader last year. Haqqani has a US$5 million bounty on his head.

Another candidate for the job is Haibatullah Akhundzada, the other deputy leader of the Taliban and a cleric. He comes from Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban, and had the trust of the late Mullah Omar. That gives him an edge over Haqqani, who comes from the eastern part of Afghanistan.

The third of the contenders is Mullah Omar’s 27-year-old son, Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob. He has already been a strong, charismatic and popular candidate during the last selection process—and he was very unhappy that he didn’t get the job the last time. Being the son of the founder of the Taliban gives him an edge and some feel that he would be less of a divisive figure.

It’s difficult to assess with certainty so soon after the event what impact the removal of Mullah Mansour will have on the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan, specifically on the talks convened by the US, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan earlier this year. However, one thing is certain: given Mansour’s active opposition to the talks, the peace process was going nowhere. So depending on his replacement, there may well be an opportunity to move those talks forward. That’s why both President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah welcomed the news of Mansour’s death.

If Mullah Yaqoob, who’s reportedly receptive to the talks, becomes the new leader, then there may be a glimmer of hope that the peace process may move forward. However, if Haqqani is chosen, then we might as well forget the talks. It’s important to remember that it’s under Haqqani’s critical leadership position in the Taliban that there’s been such a substantial increase in deadly attacks in Kabul and elsewhere. And regardless of who eventually gets the top job, we can expect some nasty retaliatory terrorist acts in the near future to avenge the death of Mullah Mansour.

Importantly, even if a pro-talks leader emerges, it won’t be easy to sell the idea of negotiations to the Taliban governors, leaders and commanders given how well the Taliban is doing on the battlefield; it’s now in control of at least one-fifth of Afghanistan. Washington-based experts and analysts generally agree that there’s little incentive for the Taliban to enter into negotiations with Kabul, at least at this time. However, one thing may nevertheless focus the Taliban’s minds on that issue. The drone strike on Mullah Mansour has sent one clear message to whoever is the next Taliban leader: unless you enter peace negotiations in good faith, you will be fair game anywhere, anytime, with no place to hide—including in Pakistan.

Third, it’s obvious that the elimination of Mansour will have a major negative impact on an already fragile relationship between the US and Pakistan. Although Pakistani leaders should be pleased that the Taliban head has been removed from the equation—given that the Pakistan military announced publicly some two years ago that all terrorists would be hunted down—they would be fuming with rage. Mullah Mansour was always considered ‘their’ man and the lack of pre-warning before the attack would have upset them. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s official reaction was relatively muted.

There was an unwritten agreement between Washington and Islamabad that the Taliban leadership was off limits, as were drone attacks in Baluchistan, where Taliban leadership had been given refuge by Pakistani authorities. All previous drone attacks (almost 400 of them) had all taken place in the tribal areas of Pakistan, north of Baluchistan. This is now off. The Obama administration has sent a clear message to military and civilian leaders in Pakistan that the US will no longer turn a blind eye to Islamabad providing safe havens to the Taliban and their fellow ideological travellers who threaten the lives of American and other Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Put differently, if in the future Islamabad doesn’t put genuine pressure on the Taliban to come to the negotiating table, it could expect more of these sort of drone attacks on the Taliban leadership. Complaining about the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, as it did in this case, would make no difference.

While President Obama’s decision to eliminate Mullah Mansour appears to be an escalation of America’s war in Afghanistan, it’s no more than a continuation of his 2009 objective of ‘disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and its extremist allies’. Why the Taliban leadership wasn’t targeted earlier is difficult to understand. And while this successful attack on the Taliban will give the Obama administration a badly needed boost of credibility to its battered foreign policy, Afghanistan will continue to be an unresolved issue waiting for the next occupant of the White House.

It’s been a little over a year since the ISIS chapter of Australia’s long war in the Middle East commenced. As I’ve said on a number of occasions over the last year, starting here and more recently here, the obsessive focus by the US on the tactical fight against ISIS without a pragmatic overarching Middle East political strategy was destined to lead to failure. Professor Hew Strachan observed in his book The Direction of War that ‘the application of the title “the long war” has made the struggle against terrorism impractical, unfocussed, and therefore astrategic (if such an epithet exists)’—and so it has!

The unipolar moment in the affairs of nations has passed. The US no longer has the political or economic will to play the role as the world’s knight in shining armour. The Middle East of 2015 looks more like the Middle East of the middle decades of the 20th century than some ‘new’ or unique phenomena. Yes ISIS is new, but the underlying causes and the potential political solution may not be. What is novel is the need to rediscover the norms of international behaviour, which have led to de-escalation and negotiated solutions to the Arab-Israeli wars of the past.

It’s time while the refugee disasters capture the world’s attention to pause and re-think our collective approach to Syria, ISIS and the immediate Middle East crisis. We really need to put aside the Twitter/Instagram approach to strategy and leverage the processes that have been relearnt through the P5+1 approach to Iran. There will not be immediate gratification, but progress toward some form of enduring peace which meets the humanitarian need and starts building political norms will be possible. Political norms that enable unique regional solutions to be found, that ensure respect for state boundaries, and support the development of internal governance, would be a good start.

A pragmatic solution would be made up of several elements. To start there’s a critical need to de-escalate the contributing tensions in the region and reinforce the isolation of ISIS. To do so, Assad must be an issue for tomorrow, Iran and the Gulf States need to step back from their proxy conflicts and enable confidence building measures to be developed with urgency, Turkey can’t be allowed to continue to inflame the Kurdish issue.

The norms of post-WWII international relations for all their shortcomings need to be re-discovered urgently. It needs to be remembered that Russia (as the Soviet Union) has, opposite the US, played a stabilising role in the post-World War II Middle East. Washington and Brussels need to see Moscow, for all its current challenges, as a means to an end in the Middle East.

The UN Security Council, while far from perfect, has been a theatre within which solutions can be found—we need the P5 to rediscover how to make it work! In part, the P5+1 plus Iran approach through the Geneva II forum may offer an opportunity. As part of this UN effort, a security force under a UN flag needs to be explored—when and how to deploy the force will be a challenge but the principle of a stabilisation force must be at the forefront of international discussion. This, coupled with internationally enforced no-fly zones and safe areas for non-combatants, will reinforce the priority of de-escalation and containment of ISIS. It also takes the pressure off the neighbouring countries that most need it: Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Turkey.

The refugee camps in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan require adequate funding not just on humanitarian grounds but as part of an overall political strategy in the Middle East. First, because the refugee flow into Europe can only be slowed at its source. But second, of equal importance is that the Syrian refugee camps, if managed well, will be a first step toward undermining the ISIS threat from within. The Palestinian refugee camps are a stark reminder of the international community’s failures in the past.

Finally, the future of Syrian governance is non-trivial. Syria like Iraq is probably beyond repair—but Assad’s future is an issue for another day; a political vacuum in Syria can’t be allowed to develop. Syria and Iraq’s futures as nation states must be on the solution table. Equally the issue of the Kurds must be placed explicitly on the table. It will be for the Kurds to determine their future, but for all their weaknesses, they have earned the right to decide.

In this process, Australia has a role. Australia needs to find its voice—we have a long relationship with the Middle East dating back to WWI. We have well-developed political, diplomatic, security, economic and social links which provide us with access and influence. Equally, the phoney war that is the pre-presidential election period in the US means that the current administration is unlikely to make any brave political moves in the Middle East. However, it’s the time for a bipartisan Australia to push hard on all its access points in Washington.

This is the time and place for well-executed middle power diplomacy on the part of Australia. It must start in the next month in New York at the UN General Assembly. Both sides of Australian politics should rightly stand condemned if they cannot put childish partisan politics aside to ensure a unified Australian diplomatic voice is found. An assertive voice that’s heard clearly, publically and privately in Washington, Europe and the Middle East.

This post coincides with Friday’s release of an ASPI Insight paper by Lydia Khalil entitled Trends in a tumultuous region: Middle East after the Arab Awakening.

The Middle East has seen its share of troubles, but this tumultuous region is arguably going through its most transformative and turbulent time in its modern history. Two years ago, a wave of people power protests toppled numerous long-standing regimes in the region in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya. It ushered in reforms and changes to many more. It was a hopeful and transformative time.

The hope was that the Middle East had finally found its path towards a more representative and prosperous future after decades of stagnation and dictatorships. This hope quickly soured. The removal of dictatorships created a power vacuum that was filled by political jockeying between Islamists and secularists, and by sectarianism and neo-militarism. With the possible exception of Tunisia, which has begun to adopt a more inclusive and reconciliatory approach to post Ben Ali governance, there have been no truth and reconciliation like approaches in any of the countries. Zero-sum politics maintains its grip, especially in Syria, which has devolved into a horrific civil war. Read more