Tag Archive for: Media

To counter anti-democratic propaganda, step up funding for ABC International

A global contest of ideas is underway, and democracy as an ideal is at stake. Democracies must respond by lifting support for public service media with an international footprint.

With the recent decision by the United States to freeze funding for the US Agency for Global Media, crippling media bodies including Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, the ABC’s international media activities across the Indo-Pacific are needed more than ever.

The ABC’s international media channels and the bespoke content we create, distribute and share with our media partners showcase an Australian society that is diverse, free and equal, with an independent media that holds power to account.

We show a positive alternative to the authoritarian systems that illiberal states promote through their own international media activities, and we reach out to people across our region with an Australian voice.

The US has also frozen foreign aid (which affects media houses and journalists across the globe) and, according to former secretary of state Hillary Clinton, is making cuts to its diplomatic service, with planned closures of representative offices.

The timing of this broad-based US withdrawal of soft power is of particular concern. Autocratic states are subjecting populations across the globe to an information assault. Russia, China and others are vigorously propagating the narrative that they are part of a battling Global South, fighting against a degenerate Western agenda that champions women’s rights and minority interests to the fundamental detriment of people everywhere.

Democracy, the narrative goes, does not lift people out of poverty, and human rights are merely a Western notion. In the absence of a strong US information presence around the world, that view has more opportunity to take hold.

Today authoritarian states take soft power as seriously as hard power and work together to sell, share or otherwise promote their content across social media, in multiple languages and across regions. China invests about US$7 billion to $10 billion per year in its media outlets, including Xinhua News Agency, China Global Television Network, China Radio International and the China Daily web portal. While funding is generally opaque, Russia’s international media operations are estimated to receive $9 billion a year.

With the US pulling back, Australia’s security in our region is challenged. We cannot afford to sit back and wait for a change in the US position; we need to project our soft power with all available tools.

In December 1939, when Australian prime minister Robert Menzies saw the threat posed by the regional propaganda of the Axis powers, he announced the formation of Radio Australia specifically because, he said, ‘the time has come to speak for ourselves’.

ABC International, of which Radio Australia is now a part, works through partnerships, creating programming for, with and about the peoples of the Indo-Pacific region. Its output covers many genres including news and current affairs, arts, sport, science and culture. This commitment to regional perspectives and voices is well recognised by our neighbours and seen as a sign of Australian sincerity and friendship. The ABC’s increasing reach across the Indo-Pacific is both strengthened by and lends strength to Australia’s diplomatic presence and foreign policy initiatives.

Through media capacity building projects funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and with funding under the Indo-Pacific Broadcasting Strategy, our ABC International Development team partners with media houses, press councils, media associations, journalists and content makers in countries across the Pacific, in East Timor and in Indonesia. These collaborations help our neighbours strengthen their own media, bolster their civil societies and thereby counter the influence of malign external actors.

There is much more that could be done, both to expand existing programs and to step up Australia’s media engagement with vulnerable and growing economies, and large populations in our region including Indonesia, Vietnam and India.

Funding for ABC International broadcast and digital activities, excluding DFAT grants for media capacity building activities but including additional funding from the government as part of the Indo-Pacific Broadcasting Strategy, currently sits at around $20 million per year.

This is a modest investment when compared to the funds being deployed by China, Russia and others in promoting autocracy and their world views. Further spending by the government in our media outreach to the region would be well justified, especially when compared with hard power investment, and it can be swiftly scaled up.

We are defending and promoting free speech, reliable information, independent media and citizenship. For Australia, it means ensuring that our neighbours understand us and value our friendship. And ultimately it enhances the security of our nation.

Life after D-notices: Australia can learn from Britain’s updated system

For decades, Britain and Australia had much the same process for regulating media handling of defence secrets. It was the D-notice system, under which media would be asked not to publish.

The two countries diverged when, around 1982, Australia’s much-maligned D-notice system fell into disuse. Britain kept but progressively overhauled its framework, eventually creating the Defence and Security Media Advisory (DSMA) system in 2015.

Something like Britain’s DSMA system could have significant benefits for Australian government and media and has been recommended by, for instance, the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. Although the present monitor, Jake Blight, assesses that Australian government and media don’t trust each other enough to make it work.

A successful Australian system would require deliberate steps to build the trust which underpins the British system. But this could be achievable through: careful appointments, a media-led approach (including a media-majority committee), a clear separation from national security laws, and ongoing engagement between the press and national security agencies.

A healthy tension between government and the media is fundamental to democracy, ensuring transparency while holding power to account. In national security, however, this balance is particularly delicate—too much disclosure can compromise capabilities and lives, while excessive secrecy risks unchecked power, eroding public trust and democratic oversight. Balance is essential to safeguard national security and maintain confidence in the institutions that protect it.

A structured space for dialogue between government and media could help balance openness and security by allowing the government to convey national security concerns and ensuring the media’s editorial independence.

Today in Britain, the DSMA Committee oversees a voluntary system centred on five standing DSMA-notices covering military operations, weapons systems, military and intelligence techniques, physical property and assets, and personnel (and their families) who work in sensitive positions.

Each notice sets out why inadvertent disclosure of certain information should be prevented and requests that editors and journalists seek advice from the DSMA secretary before publicly disclosing related material. The DSMA Committee meets twice a year (and other times as necessary) to consider these notices, the system as a whole and requests for advice.

The DSMA Secretariat comprises Secretary Brigadier (Retired) Geoffrey Dodds, assisted by Deputy Secretaries Captain (Retired) Jon Perkins and Lieutenant Commander (Retired) Stephen Dudley. The wider committee includes senior officials from the Home Office, Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and Cabinet Office on the government side.

Balancing this, 20 senior media representatives—including chief editors from major print and digital outlets—ensure broad industry engagement and representation. The committee operates at the intersection of national security and press freedom: it is chaired by the Ministry of Defence’s director general of security policy, supported by ITN’s head of compliance as vice-chair.

In contrast to the now defunct D-notice approach, the DSMA system is widely regarded in a positive light by, remarkably, both media and government actors. It holds significant promise for Australia, which could learn four key lessons from Britain.

First, the secretary must have full security access and extensive experience and must earn the trust and backing of media representatives. This is an important but challenging requirement. The appointment of trusted individuals shifts the focus away from the unrealistic goal of full institutional trust and instead ensures credibility through the reputation and independence of key personnel.

Second, the committee must be media-led. It consists of a strong majority of respected industry professionals who uphold press freedom, public interest and expertise in media practices.

Third, the DSMA system must remain advisory. It operates within the editorial sphere to balance national security and public access to information, free from legal enforcement or censorship. Clear separation between the system and national security laws prevents legal entanglements and ensures the process remains advisory rather than regulatory, let alone investigative or prosecutorial.

Finally, the system must be genuinely voluntary. An editor or journalist can choose to ignore DSMA advice. Trust will develop in practice rather than existing as a prerequisite through education and ongoing engagement between media and security officials.

Altogether, the idea of ‘slapping a D-notice’ on something as a form of censorship does not apply. The committee’s media-led nature means the secretariat draws insights from leading editors and media players in formulating its advice, which carries the weight of those actors as well as the secretariat itself.

Ultimately, the DSMA system’s relative success lies in trust, respect and shared interests. At their core, media and government serve the public interest. Neither is interested in unethical (or even sloppy) journalism. Both pursue the well-being and security of the nation and its people.

What can emerge from the DSMA system are negotiated outcomes in which crucial parts of a story can be told (from a journalist’s perspective) without disclosing truly problematic information (from a security standpoint). That discussion must be had from a position of mutual trust and respect.

This article has been corrected to say that the Australian D-notice system fell into disuse around 1982 and to correctly state the title ‘Independent National Security Legislation Monitor’.

Social media as it should be

Mathematician Cathy O’Neil once said that an algorithm is nothing more than someone’s opinion embedded in code. When we speak of the algorithms that power Facebook, X, TikTok, YouTube or Google Search, we are really talking about choices made by their owners about what information we, as users, should see. In these cases, algorithm is just a fancy name for an editorial line. Each outlet has a process of sourcing, filtering and ranking information that is structurally identical to the editorial work carried out in media—except that it is largely automated.

This automated editorial process, far more than its analogue counterpart, is concentrated in the hands of billionaires and monopolies. Moreover, it has contributed to a well-documented list of social ills, including large-scale disinformation, political polarisation and extremism, negative mental-health impacts and the defunding of journalism. Worse, social-media moguls are now doubling down, seizing the opportunity of a regulation-free operating environment under Donald Trump to roll back content-moderation programs.

But regulation alone is not enough, as Europe has discovered. If our traditional media landscape featured only a couple of outlets that each flouted the public interest, we would not think twice about using every available tool to foster media pluralism. There is no reason to accept in social media and search what we would not tolerate in legacy media.

Fortunately, alternatives are emerging. Bluesky, a younger social-media platform that recently surpassed 26 million users, was built for pluralism: anyone can create a feed based on any algorithm they choose, and anyone can subscribe to it. For users, this opens many different windows onto the world, and people can also choose their sources of content moderation to fit their preferences. Bluesky does not use your data to profile you for advertisers, and if you decide you no longer like the platform, you can move your data and followers to another provider without any disruption.

Bluesky’s potential does not stop there. The product is based on an open protocol, which means anyone can build on top of the underlying technology to create their own feeds or even entirely new social applications. While Bluesky created a Twitter-like microblogging app on this protocol, the same infrastructure can be used to run alternatives to Instagram or TikTok, or to create totally novel services—all without users having to create new accounts.

In this emerging digital world, known as the Atmosphere, so named for the underlying AT Protocol), people have begun creating social apps for everything from recipe sharing and book reviews to long-form blogging. And owing to the diversity of feeds and tools that enable communities or third parties to collaborate on content moderation, it will be much harder for harassment and disinformation campaigns to gain traction.

One can compare an open protocol to public roads and related infrastructure. They follow certain parameters but permit a great variety of creative uses. The road network can convey freight or tourists, and be used by cars, buses, or trucks. We might decide collectively to give more of it to public transportation and it generally requires only minimal adjustments to accommodate electric cars, bikes and even vehicles that had not been invented when most of it was built, such as electric scooters.

An open protocol that is operated as public infrastructure has comparable properties: our feeds are free to encompass any number of topics, reflecting any number of opinions. We can tap into social-media channels specialised for knitting, bird watching or book piles, or for more general news consumption. We can decide how our posts may or may not be used to train AI models, and we can ensure that the protocol is collectively governed, rather than being at the mercy of some billionaire’s dictatorial whims. Nobody wants to drive on a road where the fast lane is reserved for cybertrucks and the far right.

Open social media, as it is known, provides the opportunity to realise the internet’s original promise: user agency, not billionaire control. It is also a key component of national security. Many countries are now grappling with the reality that their critical digital infrastructure—social, search, commerce, advertising, browsers, operating systems and more—is subordinated to foreign, increasingly hostile, companies.

But even open protocols can become subject to corporate capture and manipulation. Bluesky itself will certainly have to contend with the usual forms of pressure from venture capitalists. As its CTO, Paul Frazee, points out, every profit-driven social-media company ‘is a future adversary’ of its own users, since it will come under pressure to prioritise profits over users’ welfare. ‘That’s why we did this whole thing, so other apps could replace us if/when it happens.’

Infrastructure may be privately provided, but it can be properly governed only by its stakeholders: openly and democratically. For this reason, we must all set our minds on building institutions that can govern a new, truly social digital infrastructure. That is why I have joined other technology and governance experts to launch the Atlas Project, a foundation whose mission is to establish open, independent social-media governance and to foster a rich ecosystem of new applications on top of the shared AT Protocol. Our goal is to become a countervailing force that can durably support social media operated in the public interest. Our launch is accompanied by the release of an open letter signed by high-profile Bluesky users such as the actor Mark Ruffalo and renowned figures in technology and academia such as Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales and Shoshana Zuboff.

There is nothing esoteric about our digital predicaments. Despite the technology industry’s claims, social media is media, and it should be held to the same standards we expect from traditional outlets. Digital infrastructure is infrastructure, and it should be governed in the public interest.

National security: the public debate and the end of ‘just trust us’

Last week, Australian Signals Directorate Director-General Mike Burgess gave an on-the-record speech to ASPI’s artificial intelligence and national security masterclass. Following his speech, he took some tough questions from the media and the audience.

Public speeches by Australian security and intelligence chiefs are rare. Too rare. The website of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, for example, very appropriately uses the singular ‘speech’ to capture the one time, six years ago, when a former director-general spoke to the Australian public.

A lot has changed since 2012 when we last heard from a director-general of ASIS. We are living in a time of global uncertainty where the rules-based international order isn’t what it once was. Our most important security alliances and economic relationships face fresh, often unexpected, challenges and pressures, many of which we aren’t well prepared for. And technology and cyberspace have helped create new threats, while also breathing life into old threats.

Has there ever been a more important time for this rarity to end?

This limited public engagement is more than just a neglect of—or indifference to—public communications. It has actually created problems for Australia at a time when our place in the world is under strain. It means, for example, that people are understandably sceptical when ‘national security concerns’ are cited to explain the latest international stance or policy position.

What does ‘national security concerns’ really mean when it’s said by one of our politicians or senior public servants? And does it mean the same thing every time it’s used by the government?

The Australian Financial Review’s Angus Grigg touched on this tension recently in ‘Can we trust the spies on China’s Huawei?:

This refusal to divulge the details of Huawei’s alleged miss-steps, beyond the umbrella term of ‘national security concerns’, has been grudgingly accepted over the past six years.

But we shouldn’t have to grudgingly accept anything. If our national security agencies have evidence that is being used to underpin policy decisions—and that information can be shared without revealing sources, methods and access—then the government needs to work harder to get that information into the public domain (for example, by being more strategic with public messaging or releasing redacted/unclassified versions of reports).

Parts of the Australian intelligence and security community won’t like taking on more of this responsibility, and it won’t be easy. Ministers will have to empower senior officials to speak more freely and frequently. But ministers can’t shy away from this. After all, ensuring the public are as informed as possible about national security threats is in their interests. More importantly, it’s squarely within Australia’s interests.

Getting more information out into the public domain will also require a cultural shift in how Australia’s security and intelligence agencies have traditionally seen their place within government. But it’s a cultural shift that’s long overdue, and one that is already underway in other countries around the world (see every hyperlink in this paragraph).

Why is this so important? Because the ‘just trust us’ line is getting tired.

Having senior intelligence and security officials speak more freely and frequently will help inform, it will help build confidence and it will help foster public trust.

As my colleague Tom Uren wrote recently, some stories need to actually be told.

If the Australian government expects us to get on board with national security decisions, it’s going to have to be more proactive about getting out into the public domain to explain some of these issues, and the various tensions that colour them. But it’s not just the Australian government that must shoulder more responsibility for better informing public discourse on foreign policy and international security issues. Australia’s academics, think-tankers and journalists already play a vital role, but they, too, must become more proactive.

For example, there’s nothing more important to Australia’s future prosperity than understanding and navigating China’s rise, and Australia needs to invest in understanding its political, security and economic implications. As things stand, can we really say Australia is producing enough high-quality, relevant, timely and inquisitive research and reporting that helps us all understand this phenomenon? And understand it from a range of different perspectives?

One major problem is that at a time when we need them the most, our media outlets are retreating from reporting on the world and retreating from getting Australian reporting to the world. It’s no secret that Australia’s most talented journalists working on international, security and China-focused issues are already swamped trying to cover their expanding patches with precious few resources. In such an environment, important stories will of course be missed. Or, too often, they’re ‘covered’ by republishing American reporting (which leaves us wondering: what does this mean for Australia?).

On the research front, do we really have enough analysis coming out of our think tanks, universities and NGOs? Research undertaken by an assortment of specialists who bring different expertise to the tables? Specialists with a deep knowledge of the Chinese Communist Party and its structure; a proficiency in Chinese languages; and a strong understanding of China’s legal system, the lessons to be learned from history, and the current reforms undergoing in the People’s Liberation Army or the changing shape of China’s economy.

I’m going to say no.

Perhaps I’m saying ‘no’ because I’m greedy—I want more. And I want more from all disciplines. Democracy and decision-making are improved by better information and more informed debate, from diverse perspectives.

As ‘just trust us’ continues to hold less and less weight, we need to think carefully about, when it’s eventually ousted for good, what replaces it. We do not need more poorly informed research and reporting, valueless talking points or ‘whataboutism’. What we do need is more evidenced arguments, high-quality investigative reporting, policy-relevant research and analytical depth.

If we want to navigate Australia’s changing place in the world from the best position possible, we should all be working together—across government, media, industry and civil society—to avoid what we don’t need and encourage bucketloads of what we do need. Adding a ‘speeches tab to the barren websites of our various intelligence agencies would be a good place to start.

Fake news and weaponised media

‘Fake news’ approaches the 100th anniversary of its creation moment.

The 11th of November marks the centenary of the end of World War I, the exhausted crescendo of the catastrophe that produced the modern craft of misinformation—propaganda.

Fake news is today’s propaganda: new technology begets a new title for an old set of issues.

Take heart that governments and peoples struggled with this scourge as a dark element of the electronic century, just as it challenges the media age.

Propaganda had notable effects in its day. Now, fake news is scoring scary wins. One of the benefits of big data is that researchers can put a figure to their estimates of how much fake news and digital deception shift history:

Twitter bots may have altered the outcome of two of the world’s most consequential elections in recent years, according to an economic study. Automated tweeting played a small but potentially decisive role in the 2016 Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s presidential victory …

The research by the US National Bureau of Economic Research calculated that bots added 1.76% to Britain’s leave vote in the referendum on exiting the European Union, and could explain 3.23% of the vote for Donald Trump in the US presidential race.

That’s propaganda with punch.

In WWI, propaganda was driven by government, pumped out one-way, from powers-that-be to the people. Propaganda was one to the many.

Today, fake news can be the many to the many—propaganda has been decentralised and networked. The technology is transformative, yet much of the discussion of fake news (hyping and reinforcing existing opinion, seeking echo chamber effects) treks across old propaganda terrain.

Experiences from a century ago offer useful thoughts on today’s dilemmas. Come see the propaganda experience via one of the great US newspaper columnists, Walter Lippmann, who coined the phrases ‘Atlantic community’ and ‘Cold War’ (although on the Cold War, Lippmann said he merely repurposed a phrase used in Europe during the 1930s to characterise Hitler’s war of nerves against France).

During WWI, Lippmann helped draw up Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points peace proposal, before sailing to Europe to work on the US propaganda effort against Germany.

Lippmann took the same approach to propaganda that he did to journalism: render the complex subject simply; be lucid, brief and go for the jugular.

During September and October 1918, as German forces wavered, Lippman’s small unit in Paris produced five million copies of 18 different leaflets to be dropped on the German lines.

Lippmann’s propaganda masterpiece—a million copies printed—was the one found most frequently on captured soldiers, stressing the good treatment of prisoners, using the ‘voice’ of a captured German: ‘Do not worry about me. I am out of the war. I am well fed. The American army gives its prisoners the same ration it gives its own soldiers: beef, white bread, potatoes, prunes, coffee, milk, butter …’

From propaganda to bots, give the audience what they yearn to hear, and make it vivid.

Drawing on the war experience of manipulation and press distortion, Lippmann wrote a series of books on how opinion can be influenced, what he called the manufacture of consent. If sovereignty had passed from parliament to public opinion, he wrote, then giving the public accurate, reliable information had become ‘the basic problem of democracy’.

Lippmann’s 1922 book, Public opinion, is a classic. He didn’t foresee the bots, but he described much that we confront in the media age. The image people have of the world, he wrote, is reflected through the prism of their emotions, habits and prejudices: ‘The pictures inside people’s heads do not automatically correspond with the world outside.’

People see what they are looking for, what they want to see: ‘We do not first see, and then define; we define first and then see.’

Long before the Trump White House gave us ‘alternative facts’, Lippmann wrote that ‘facts’ are often a matter of belief and judgement: ‘While men are willing to admit that there are two sides to a “question”, they do not believe that there are two sides to what they regard as a “fact”.’

In a distinction journalists always wrestle with, Lippman argued that truth and news are not the same thing: ‘The function of news is to signalise an event, the function of truth is to bring to light hidden facts, and to set them in relation with other facts, and to make a picture of reality on which men can act.’

The press, Lippmann wrote, is ‘like the beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of the darkness into vision’.

In his masterful biography of Lippmann, Ronald Steel judges Public opinion the work of a writer ‘disillusioned with mass democracy and wary of propaganda and an unreliable press’. Sound familiar?

Whatever that pessimism about propaganda, parliament and the press in 1922, Lippmann devoted the next 45 years to journalistic punditry, ruefully acknowledging during WWII ‘how wide has been the gap between my own insight and my own hindsight’.

As Lippmann wrote in his 1920 book on Liberty and the news, the modern state has a critical interest in keeping pure the ‘streams of fact which feed the rivers of opinion’.

Ultimately, the pundit believed precision could beat propaganda, offering a recipe for diplomats and politicians as much as journalists. In a column in 1956, Lippmann ruminated that a good foreign minister ‘uses words precisely which mean genuinely what they say’, while a diplomat who peddled propaganda was ‘like a doctor who sells patent medicine’.

Media shams and shonky shamans are nothing new; going digital merely speeds the effect and widens the reach. Lippmann still offers answers, not least keeping pure the stream of facts, however hard it is to pin down a fact that all will accept. And the need for ceaseless effort to line up the facts to achieve a reality we can act on.

A journalist’s job is to report

Sofia Patel absolutely nails the nexus between media reportage and terror. Terrorism is a strategy of desperation—that’s why it’s embraced by the marginalised. We in the media offer such actors a microphone, allowing them to disseminate their message. Journalism implicitly legitimises such groups by treating them as genuine actors. It amplifies their activities.

This is bad, but what’s the alternative?

My difficulty comes not with Patel’s diagnosis of the problem but rather with her implied solution. ‘Media outlets,’ she opines, ‘have a responsibility to dispel such myths and rumours, to minimise harm—both physical and rhetorical—when reporting on terror.’

That’s actually not true. Most importantly, it displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the media.

As a journalist I was always told my job was to report the truth. Only by doing this could I enable the audience to trust what was being reported.

It’s obvious that no individual reporter could ever have a handle on the whole truth, nor perhaps even be confident that the particular event being reported occurred exactly the way described. Nevertheless, we do attempt to ensure any reporting is as perfect a representation of what’s occurred as possible.

The premise on which this style of reporting is based is both simple and obvious. That’s why it persists.

But Patel wants us to censor our reporting. That’s wrong.

When I began working for the ABC, I was taught that each individual story, every small report (no matter how seemingly inconsequential), added a sliver of reality to the audience’s total picture of how and why the world works. The aim of the reporter was simply to ensure that their reports were as accurate as possible. By the time they reached the end of the bulletin, the aim was to ensure that the listener, viewer or reader was in possession of the most complete picture that could be presented of what’s occurring in the world, offered in a manner that’s of direct relevance and interest to them.

Our trade remains to report, as accurately and rapidly as possible, on events of interest to our audience. Any attempt to interfere with this process risks sounding suspiciously like censorship.

What’s changed, as a result of the internet, is the velocity with which news travels and with which it can be wrapped up with opinion.

People are still demanding to know (in detail) not simply who did what to whom, and when and how things happened. The big difference is the speed with which news travels and the demand to know why things have happened.

This ‘why’ is critical to our understanding of events. Without understanding the cause of events, we can’t really know what’s occurring in our society. Perhaps most significantly, it also enables us to attempt to draw conclusions about what might happen next, and about what occurrences that might affect us. This is the appeal of news. As you get closer to events, however, you become aware that determining exactly why they’re happening is actually very difficult.

This is rarely an issue, however, for someone poised in front of their keyboard. That’s why what’s occurring on the internet is very different from journalism.

Journalism is a product. Our stories are designed around the requirements of individuals, just like clothes. A shopper will pick something up, try it on, and discard anything they think doesn’t suit them. It’s no use insisting, for example, that ties really are sartorially elegant—too many young men have already decided that they don’t need to wear them. News has a similar problem. People don’t want the old-fashioned product any more: it’s far more boring and uninteresting than opinion.

I wish the very best of luck to anyone advocating that ‘online platforms [should] work with news media outlets to develop appropriate ethical, editorial and practical guidelines’ as a means of curbing ‘the spread of misinformation or “fake news”’. It’s a lovely idea. It’s also similar to suggesting that Little Red Riding Hood should work proactively with the Big Bad Wolf to combat world hunger. It’s a great concept, but somewhat harder to understand how it might actually work in practice.

The problem is that there are three, or perhaps really four, players in the media environment. The motivations and interests of each of these participants are utterly divergent. We need to call these out for what they are, because that will make quite clear why there’s no chance of them co-operating with one another.

Firstly, we have the public. It demands to know what’s happening as soon as it happens. Quite naturally, audiences come to events with preconceptions based on their own prejudices and experience. Some are also prone to conspiracy theories and racism.

Secondly, there are the journalists or ‘old media’. With a disintegrating financial model, we’re reduced to pandering to smaller and smaller audiences. Is it any wonder there’s such insistent pressure from editors to grab eyeballs in any way possible?

Thirdly, there’s the new media. That’s Facebook and Twitter, or whatever platform is coming next to distribute news, gossip or voices. These sites emphasise that they have absolutely no interest, none whatsoever, in editorial control or standards. They pretend they don’t influence or editorialise, whereas the reality is that they do. After all, this is the entire point of an algorithm. They exist simply to prioritise particular types of content, which is the definition of editorial. They won’t admit this, of course, because it would mean destroying their business model.

And finally, although we often forget them, there are those with political barrows to push. These are the very groups and individuals who aim to profit from sowing division and capitalising on the real and significant problems identified in Patel’s post.

Perhaps this time, instead of blaming the media, we could instead call for politicians to come together and resolve society’s problems by working ethically and harmoniously together.

Unfortunately, I just don’t see that happening.

Sofia Patel responds:

I thank Nic Stuart for responding to my piece on Media and terror in the age of social media but I feel compelled to reply to some clear misinterpretations. I never suggested that the media should be censored. I said the media should not speculate in the aftermath of an attack and called for proportionate reporting based on facts. That’s responsible journalism, not censorship.

Nic claims that calling for the media to ‘dispel myths and rumours, to minimise harm—both physical and rhetorical—when reporting on terror’ demonstrates a ‘fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the media’. If the job of a journalist is to report the truth (which it is), then dispelling myths and rumours consolidates this ethos rather than undermining it.

I focussed on the complexities of being a journalist in a social media age. The nuance required to wade through the range of fake news and misinformation is challenging especially when attempting to maintain journalistic integrity.

There’s no ready made way to counter fake news and misinformation. International research suggests that we must develop appropriate policy and legislative frameworks that are flexible and adaptable; there are roles to play for government, tech companies and media corporations here—it’s not the role of any one party.

A dumb Oz decision in the South Pacific

Image courtesy of Pixabay user annca /.

The decision of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation to end shortwave broadcasts to the South Pacific is a serious blunder, based on a shrinking, insular view of ABC responsibilities.

The ABC should be embarrassed that 31 January marked the end of eight decades of Australian shortwave to the Islands. Overturning that lousy policy call—with an annual price tag of only $2 to $3 million—should provide the opportunity for the ABC to halt its exit from the South Pacific and start rebuilding. It would be a chance to recognise that the broad policy trend is wrong.

A rebuild should dictate more communications muscle of all sorts—shortwave, FM and digital in all its cascading dimensions—plus lots more ABC reporting staff and much more work to re-engage with media across the Islands.

The ABC should return to the centre of the South Pacific media landscape, not shrink towards the exit. And the rebuild should have a special focus on Papua New Guinea.

The ABC killed shortwave based on a penny-pinching false dichotomy between shortwave or FM. The chant was ‘shortwave old, FM new’. The choice is dumb because it misunderstands the central role radio still plays in the South Pacific.

Only an organisation that’s spent the last decade withdrawing resources from the South Pacific would’ve been trapped into choosing between shortwave and FM transmitters. Shortwave speaks to a whole country while FM’s more limited reach means it covers the capital or a region. Both services are essential in the South Pacific because radio is vital to the life of the Islands.

The extent of the ABC’s error is detailed by submissions to the Senate Inquiry, aimed at forcing the ABC to resume shortwave transmission.

Note the letter from the Prime Minister of Vanuatu, Charlot Salwai, on this ‘strange’ ABC decision that could cost many lives in the South Pacific:

‘Our experience during Cyclone Pam [in 2015] is that some of the most reliable and comprehensive early warnings and post-disaster information came from Radio Australia’s shortwave service. Australian shortwave assisted communities to prepare for, survive and recover from a terrible natural disaster. For us it is not outdated technology at all. It is appropriate and ‘fit-for-purpose’ and an important means to inform and safeguard Ni-Vanuatu people. Vanuatu values its close association with Australia at so many levels yet this strange decision by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation to end shortwave services to our region seems at odds with the recently strongly-stated goals of the Australian Government to help improve disaster preparedness and risk management in our region.’

The Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, was right to point to Pacific ‘concern’. Her ‘please explain’ to the ABC was too polite, given the damage the ABC is inflicting on Oz interests.

The decision on shortwave isn’t an ABC aberration, but a logical step in the Corporation’s shredding of its important place in the life of the South Pacific. The ABC is casting off Australia’s central media responsibility in the Islands and destroying an important instrument of Oz assistance, influence and soft power.

For the past decade, the ABC has been hacking away at its international service, Radio Australia (RA)—particularly the important job RA does as a daily journal of record for the whole South Pacific.

Why has the ABC been cutting lose from its historic role in the South Pacific? Partly, because the Islands and Islanders—obviously—aren’t a domestic Oz constituency. Indeed, the Senate inquiry got going because killing shortwave hurt Australians in remote parts of Oz.

There’s no big domestic constituency for good foreign policy—but the nation pays for bad foreign policy. That’s why phrases as varied as ‘national interest’ and ‘good international citizen’ should be more than just slogans for the Oz polity. On this one, the ABC Board—an important part of the polity—lost sight of Oz interests in its own region.

Embracing the future, the ABC is busy jumping on all sorts of platforms to deliver content to multiple audiences (radio is old school, audio pumps out on everything). By all means, give the South Pacific what it needs on lots of platforms. But shortwave is still a platform that matters in the Islands (and across northern Australia) however much it might seem to be a legacy system in the cities of Oz.

The Senate inquiry offers the ABC Board and ABC Management the chance to rethink. This isn’t about ABC independence. It’s about changing a bad decision. Just as you should never let a good crisis go to waste, so a policy U-turn is the moment to rethink and redo poor policy.

Beyond a U-turn on shortwave, the ABC needs a fresh, bigger vision of what it must do in the South Pacific. Ever ready to help, the next column will offer some views on that vision.

Military beware: here be media monsters!

microphoneOver a long career in Canberra hackdom I’ve often marvelled at the way the Australian Defence Force thinks about itself. The strangeness in the way the Oz military understands what it is—soul, history, purpose, future—has some parallels in the way the military deals with politicians and the paying customers (aka: fellow citizens). Add in the eternal irritations and heartaches of coping with the civilian bureaucracy in Defence and there’s a lot of oddness and strangeness to go around. And, finally, there’s the way strangeness shades towards paranoia at the appearance of a simple hack with a notebook or microphone.

Thus it’s fascinating to get some reports from inside the belly of the beast to the effect: if you think it looks unusual from the outside, you should feel what it’s like on the inside. James Brown covers a lot of ground in his excellent book ‘ANZAC’s Long Shadow’, and while attacking the Oz culture of remembrance he also has some astute observations about the military culture he served. Brown says important things about how the ANZAC talisman makes it ‘impossible to criticise the Australian Defence Force, even when it makes the same mistakes over and over’. For the great power of the talisman to repel criticism, see the storm that enveloped Labor’s shadow Defence Minister when he dared to accuse a Lieutenant General of a ‘political cover up’. Read more