Following the release of the Australia’s Surface Fleet Review, a big problem remains: the Australian Defence Force lacks sufficient maritime firepower to credibly implement deterrence-by-denial in the next 10 years. 

Building ships and submarines is complex, eye-wateringly expensive and slow. Fielding ground-based strike systems and asymmetric naval capabilities can be much faster and cheaper. 

While new frigates are under construction, and before the first Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarine arrives in 2032, what else can be done? How could the ADF more robustly deny access to Australia’s northern approaches? 

Fortunately, there are a few maritime-firepower efforts underway in the army that we could expand and accelerate. Meanwhile, the navy can embrace unpredictable capability ideas generated within its own ranks and industry. Pursuing this would mean applying the force-design guidance from the Defence Strategic Review (DSR): mindsets must change, overcoming ‘the current bias towards platforms.’ 

So, here are three affordable ways in which the army and navy could counterintuitively field new options in a strategically relevant timeframe. 

First, the army should accelerate and expand its existing land-based anti-ship missile plans, which are based on using launcher trucks, such as the HIMARS. They are agile, easily hidden, rapidly deployable by air or sea and can be acquired far more cheaply and quickly than ships. 

The plans have been under consideration for some time, although they have been more modest than US Army and Marine Corps efforts and have had lower priority than Australian acquisition of new tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Equipped with PrSM Increment 2 missiles, for example, the army will be able to strike maritime (and other targets) out to 500km. When combined with counter-space and air defence systems, and matched with new littoral watercraft accelerated for delivery by 2026, the army will be able to field credible area-denial complexes over archipelagic chokepoints in Australia’s northern approaches. 

But the army will need more money to do this faster and at larger scale. Responding to the DSR, the government announced a second HIMARS regiment capable of maritime strike would be grown, but it reportedly won’t be ready before 2030. With new or reallocated money and more flexible recruitment, including by harnessing the reserve, the army has the can-do that’s needed to quickly adapt and deliver this option by the end of 2026. 

Second, since the navy can’t deploy sufficient mass at sea before the mid-2030s, it should give the army some of its early deliveries of Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6s, which are surface-to-air missiles that can be used ballistically against ships and ground targets. The army would deploy them on land. Production capacity of the missiles is limited and there’s competing demand from US and Japanese forces, but if Canberra can negotiate sufficient timely stocks, the army could establish a single long-range anti-access battery by the end of 2028. 

The army could learn and adapt from the US Army’s nascent Typhon system, which is fielding Tomahawks and SM-6s. The navy could even share some of its people to help set up the team and gain valuable experience for its future deployment of the missiles. Supporting systems already being bought for the navy, such as the Theatre Mission Planning Centre and Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System, would enable land-based Tomahawk employment, though the army would eventually need its own multi-domain intelligence and targeting staff. 

US rotational presence in Australia can potentially help with training and on-the-job experience as the army executes its current plans for maritime firepower and potentially adds to them with navy missiles. That’s because the US Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) and the US Marine Corps’ Marine Littoral Regiments are already being built to apply land-based maritime firepower. 

Canberra should pursue more long-term rotations of such units. This would also benefit Washington, since the US Army is yet to find a forward home for its third Indo-Pacific MDTF. Offering to accommodate it might also allow Canberra to gain earlier deliveries of Tomahawks and SM-6s, either new or borrowed from US stocks. 

Finally, the navy should generate its own asymmetric maritime force. This would offer a family of clandestine capabilities designed to create surprise and unpredictable advantages from the sea, generated from the naval workforce and by leveraging Australia’s defence and civil maritime industry. Many of our allies and major partners have sophisticated naval special-forces capabilities, but we don’t. Naval drones used by Ukraine, commercial-like projection platforms for special forces and World War II auxiliary raiders hint at the potential. 

A rejoinder to all of this might be that alternative maritime options are already being pursued. The navy’s Hobart-class air warfare destroyers will shortly be upgraded with Tomahawks and SM-6s. That’s a great development, but there are only three of these ships, each with only 48 vertical launch cells. As the new missiles are added, the ships’ combat systems are also being upgraded to Aegis Baseline 9. This will be a lengthy process which won’t add firepower depth anytime soon, even if the upgrade runs to schedule.  

With asymmetric intent, the navy is also introducing sea mines and extra-large underwater drones. But for each of these equipment categories, there’s still an associated military signature in deployment. More novel options cloaked with deception beyond these are still needed. 

Delivering faster and cheaper is easier said than done. The proposal argued here would be challenging to put into effect. But with warning time dissipated, we must heed the DSR’s call to dispense with business as usual. The government’s expanded surface fleet plan is commendable, but trends in Australia’s strategic environment won’t stop and wait for the 2030s and 2040s. It’s time to move faster and think differently. 

On 17 March, Rear Admiral James Goldrick died in Canberra after a brave battle with illness. He was a naval officer of exceptional intellect and influence who became Australia’s most internationally acclaimed naval historian.

Goldrick’s service in the Royal Australian Navy included command of the Darwin-based patrol boat Cessnock, executive officer of the destroyer Perth and twice commanding the frigate Sydney. As a commanding officer he was competent and even-tempered with a sincere interest in the welfare and advancement of his officers and sailors. His ships were invariably happy ones. James could, however, be unintentionally intimidating because of his encyclopaedic knowledge of all things naval. One of his officers remarked that it was like having Dumbledore as your captain.

In 2002, he saw operational service commanding the multinational Maritime Interception Force in the Persian Gulf. He revelled in the complexity of that role and made important tactical contributions to enforcing the UN Security Council’s sanctions against Iraq.

His senior shore appointments included chief staff officer to the chief of the navy, director of the RAN Seapower Centre, director general of military strategy, commander of Border Protection Command, twice commandant of the Australian Defence Force Academy and commander of the Australian Defence College. Between 2005 and 2008 he also found time to be president of the Australian Naval Institute.

While at the Seapower Centre, Goldrick wrote the navy’s capstone document, Australian Maritime Doctrine. He also played a key part in the creation of both the Sea Power Conference and the King-Hall History Conference. A particular aspect of this was bringing to these shores distinguished strategists and historians.

In all his naval appointments Goldrick made important contributions, but it was at the Defence Force Academy and the Defence College that he had the greatest impact on the next generation of officers through his example and an interest in their individual development. James’s advice to them was to build an interior intellectual life sustained by wide reading, writing and critical thinking. He also observed that your first command is about proving yourself to yourself and that every subsequent command is about helping others prove themselves to themselves.

Goldrick retired from the navy in 2012 and soon was lecturing at the Defence College he once headed, as part of the Australian National University’s instructional team. He regularly astounded Australian and international students with the breadth of his naval knowledge. He was also a founding member of the Naval Studies Group at UNSW Canberra, the only such entity at an Australian university. James edited its yet to be published book on Australian chiefs of naval staff and was a regular panellist on the university’s Australian Naval History podcast series. Fittingly, James received the degree of Doctor of Letters honoris causa from his alma mater.

As a retired officer, Goldrick was a frequent writer and speaker on maritime and naval affairs. He gained a wide and appreciative readership. James was an honorary professorial fellow at the Wollongong University’s Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, an honorary professor at the ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and a non-resident fellow at the Lowy Institute.

In 2015, James was a visiting fellow at All Souls College at the University of Oxford. This allowed him to complete the first of two books he is most noted for, Before Jutland: the naval war in northern European waters, August 1914 – February 1915. It was followed by, in 2018, its companion, After Jutland: the naval war in northern European waters, June 1916 – November 1918. International recognition followed. 

Within the Royal Australian Navy and the national security community more generally, Goldrick was a towering intellect and the most articulate writer and speaker on the importance of seapower for Australia.

James was a mentor, shipmate and friend to many. His loss to the navy is irreplaceable.

For the best part of 50 years, NATO has maintained a standing force of mine countermeasure vessels at the ready to respond to a mining incident in the English Channel and approaches.

The force originally consisted of seven to nine mine countermeasure vessels from the Royal Navy, German Navy, Royal Netherlands Navy and Belgian Naval Force, which were assigned to the squadron for either six or 12 months to counter the threat of Soviet mines being laid by air or by submarine during the Cold War.

The force still exists, augmented by the Danish and Norwegian navies and split into two groups. Standing NATO Mine Counter Measures Group 1 is responsible for northern Europe, and Group 2 for southern Europe.

My recent Strategist post discussed the threat posed by the arsenal of mines held by China. During the Cold War, China obtained a range of Russian mine types that it has technically exploited, copied and improved to such an extent that it now possesses perhaps the largest arsenal of modern mines in the world.

Several laboratories in China are believed to be studying and developing a range of mine types. These include mobile mines, which are torpedo-like devices that can be fired from submarines and can self-navigate over substantial distances to their resting place, perhaps inside a harbour, and rocket-assisted rising mines, which blast upwards at a ship passing overhead. Another variant is a capsule, which rests in deep water waiting for a submarine to pass before releasing a torpedo to attack it.

China has been building such weapons in abundance. Other, less sophisticated mines can be launched from aircraft, surface ships, submarines, merchant ships and fishing vessels. They are effective and relatively cheap to manufacture.

In recent years, Chinese merchant ships and fishing vessels have been observed practising mine-laying, as have the large array of other dedicated Chinese navy mine-layers.

Shift focus now to the Malacca Strait, one of the world’s most important shipping lanes, through which some 94,000 ships pass each year. Their cargo includes a quarter of all global oil supplies.

Much has been said about the parlous state of Australia’s fuel reserves and the plan to stockpile oil in the United States. If the time comes to call on that emergency reserve, it will pass through the Malacca Strait. It is also a crucial route for much of Australia’s other imports and exports, including most of our coal, gas, bauxite and iron.

A mining incident in the Malacca Strait would be cataclysmic for many Asian nations and for Australia.

Mine-countermeasure assets, skills and practices among Southeast Asian navies bordering the Malacca Strait are poor, except for those of Singapore, which has continued to build its mine countermeasure capabilities and now, arguably, is well ahead of Australia.

In an attempt to raise standards in the region during the late 1990s, Australia was instrumental in having mine countermeasures included in Western Pacific exercises with allies.

But these skills were practised only every second year and were limited to very basic drills.

To counter the growing threat in the region, Australia needs to champion the establishment of a standing mine countermeasure force for the Malacca Strait. This initiative could be forged under the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Australia, the UK, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore all have the capacity to contribute to such a standing force, which should be ready to react at short notice to any mining incident in the strait or its approaches.

Rotating the Huon-class coastal mine hunters through such a force in Singapore would be the basis of Australia’s commitment. That would require the Royal Australian Navy to reverse its decision to remove the Huon class from service in the next four years.

In addition, the RAN has a significant number of unique minesweeping systems, now sitting idle, that can be towed easily by other ships or craft of opportunity, such as fishing vessels. A number of these minesweeping systems should be relocated to ports along the Malacca Strait, at least to Singapore and Lumut, and Malaysian and Singaporean personnel trained to use them.

New Zealand could assist with autonomous vehicle teams and Malaysia with a minehunter. Britain’s Royal Navy could also deploy a mine-hunting vessel or an autonomous vehicle team.

The standing force should commence operations under the Five Power Defence Arrangements, but vessels from other nations (such as Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan), along with the two US mine countermeasure vessels based in Sasebo, could also be invited to participate as required.

This initiative should be a high priority for the Australian government and the RAN.