Tag Archive for: Mali

ADF deploys officer to UN peacekeeping mission in Mali

For the first time in almost two decades, the Australian Defence Force has deployed an officer to a United Nations peacekeeping mission in West Africa. The Defence Department hasn’t publicly announced the new operation or added it to its global operations map. However, an amended regulation was adopted to provide deployment benefits for personnel on ‘Operation Orenda’, which was published in the government’s August fiscal update. The latest UN data show that Australia has had a staff officer on the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) since August.

Expanding Australia’s footprint to another UN peacekeeping mission is a welcome move. It hopefully reflects a renewed interest in supporting peacekeeping, while also offering a small indication of Australia’s interest in playing a leadership role in global security affairs. But like all overseas deployments in warlike conditions, it comes with risks.

MINUSMA is one of the UN’s most challenging and complex peacekeeping missions. It began on 1 July 2013 after Malian authorities requested assistance with addressing the deteriorating security situation in the country. Australia was one of the 15 nations on the Security Council that supported the creation of the mission and provided funding to support its African Union–led predecessor.

Operating in an environment with an ongoing threat of terrorism and a range of asymmetric threats, MINUSMA has suffered more casualties from malicious acts than any other current UN peacekeeping mission. A peacekeeper was killed by a roadside bomb near the town of Kidal in northern Mali only last week.

With an annual budget of just over US$1 billion and more than 15,000 military, police and civilian personnel deployed across Mali, the mission is the UN’s third largest. Its mandate has two strategic priorities: support implementation of the 2015 peace agreement and facilitate implementation of the stabilisation strategy for central Mali. The mission is also tasked with protecting civilians, supporting dialogue towards reconciliation, promoting and protecting human rights, and providing humanitarian assistance.

MINUSMA’s ability to fulfil its mandate has been complicated by the evolving political situation on the ground. In August, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was ousted in a military coup. While the military has agreed to put in place a transitional civilian government for 18 months, these events haven’t brought more stability (the last coup in 2012 created a governance vacuum that was exploited by terrorists to seize territory in the north). The situation has been compounded in recent weeks by the release of close to 200 jihadist militants in a prisoner exchange, which could fuel more violence and instability.

The threat environment in Mali has meant that the UN is not the only actor undertaking military operations on the ground. More than 4,500 French soldiers are deployed across the region as part of Operation Barkhane, making it France’s largest overseas deployment. The G5 Sahel (G5S) has a joint force deployed in Mali and across the Sahel region, focused on counterterrorism, cross-border crime and human trafficking. The European Union also has training and capacity-building missions in the country (although they were suspended following the coup). This plethora of actors has presented a challenge to the very nature of UN peacekeeping and raised questions about whether it is blurring the lines with counterterrorism operations. But it has also offered opportunities for personnel deployed to Mali to engage with a range of international partners in a complex operational environment.

Most of the top contributors of military and police to MINUSMA are African countries, though Bangladesh, China, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Indonesia have deployed from the Indo-Pacific. The mission has prompted a modest return to peacekeeping by European and other Western contributors, with the Germans, Dutch and Canadians deploying contingents in the north at various stages of the mission. The UK is expected to deploy 250 soldiers to the mission at the end of 2020.

Australia hasn’t been involved in a UN peacekeeping mission in West Africa since it supported the mission in Sierra Leone in 2003. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the ADF regularly deployed to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, serving in Namibia, Mozambique, Western Sahara, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Rwanda and Somalia. However, this was also a time when operational demands on the ADF were much lower.

Over the past two decades, Australia’s strategic interests have been increasingly focused on supporting deployments by allies in the Middle East and prioritising the security environment in the Indo-Pacific, which has diminished understanding and institutional knowledge about UN peacekeeping.

Australia is ranked 84th out of the 119 troop and police contributors globally. According to UN statistics from August, there are around 26 ADF personnel serving on operations in South Sudan, the Middle East and Cyprus (in addition to MINUSMA). While Australia has continued to demonstrate its support to UN peacekeeping through these deployments, as well as through training, funding and policy advocacy, deploying so few personnel on UN peacekeeping missions has increasingly restricted the pool of ADF personnel who are competitive for positions in UN headquarters, and diminished Australia’s reputation as a contemporary peacekeeping country.

It’s unclear at this stage whether the deployment of one ADF staff officer in a planning role in MINUSMA’s headquarters indicates an intent to widen Australia’s peacekeeping commitment to the mission. There was no reference to peacekeeping in the 2020 defence strategic update. Nonetheless, the government has signalled its intent to work with some other countries in the region on co-deployments.

The September 2019 Fiji–Australia Vuvale Partnership stated that both countries intended to ‘enter a peacekeeping partnership’ that would support joint deployments on missions (although plans for the ADF to deploy to the Golan Heights with Fiji have not eventuated). Similarly, in February, the government affirmed its intention to work with Indonesia ‘toward the establishment of a co-deployment to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation’ as part of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries.

Australia’s history of engagement in UN peacekeeping has shown that considerable advantages can be gained from having ADF personnel serving in these environments. The deployment to Mali enables the ADF to gain experience in another complex multinational environment with a range of regional actors on the ground. It can also strengthen key bilateral relationships and foster cooperation with diverse military and police partners, including the Europeans (notably the British, French and Germans) and several countries in the Indo-Pacific. These deployments also demonstrate Australia’s tangible support to the rules-based international order and the multilateral institutions it wishes to strengthen.

The contribution to MINUSMA will no doubt be well received by the UN and Australia’s regional and bilateral partners. It also offers a timely opportunity for the government to engage the public in a discussion about why Australia contributes to UN peacekeeping missions and how they support Australia’s interests.

Counterterrorism Yearbook 2018: West Africa and the Sahel

The security situation is evolving rapidly in West Africa and the Sahel—and worsening in places. The region has already featured quite prominently in the news in the first quarter of 2018. There has been another mass abduction of girls by the Islamist group, Boko Haram, in Nigeria, then an attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso’s capital, against the army’s headquarters and the French embassy.

And then there was the release of a video documenting the attack against American green berets in Niger last October, which resulted in the first American military casualties in the country. Those are just the incidents that grabbed the most headlines.

The latest developments follow a very intense 2017. As well as continued incidents in the north, there was an upsurge in the number of attacks in central Mali, particularly in the Mopti region. Towns and military camps throughout the country, including in the south, suffered several sophisticated attacks. In October, the UN reported a more than 100% increase in the number of Islamist attacks since June. It identified the newly formed al-Qaeda umbrella group Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen as the prime culprit.

Jihadi violence has continued to spill into neighbouring countries, particularly in Niger and Burkina Faso. Those countries face both local jihadi movements such as Burkinabe Ansarul al Islam, and an array of other security challenges. Those include violent jihadi extremists with links to both al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS), as well as criminal networks (especially human smuggling—Niger is a key transit hub).

Niger also remained preoccupied with its southern region as Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon contended with the enduring threat of Boko Haram. A combined military response, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), significantly weakened the insurgents and forced them to operate in a much smaller area (mainly in Nigeria’s Borno state).

Yet, from October 2017 a resurgence of attacks in the Nigerian states of Yobe and Adamawa, and in northern Cameroon, threw into question the effectiveness of the counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency missions. Attacks expanded to states that had been virtually untouched to that point, such as Taraba and Edo. Female and child suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices, village raids and ambushes against the military were recurrent features. Boko Haram frequently attacked convoys and helicopters delivering aid to internally displaced people.

The regional dimension of the challenges has translated into region-wide responses, making the Sahel a highly militarised region. In addition to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the region-wide Operation Barkhane and the MJTF in the Lake Chad Basin, last year saw the creation and first deployment of the G5 Sahel Force. That force is a welcome addition to the array of efforts to fight terrorism and human trafficking in the region. However, it faces several challenges, not least that of sustainability given its high dependence on Western financing.

Continued jihadist activity across the region in 2017 followed some established patterns. First, jihadi groups continued to fragment, scatter geographically and undergo ad hoc mergers. Second, al-Qaeda and IS leaders exploited the overlap between broader jihadist agendas and local drivers and grievances to recruit new members.

In operational CT, progress was made by capturing militants, retaking control of villages that had fallen prey to jihadists and introducing a host of new measures, including judicial agreements to facilitate the prosecution of suspected terrorists.

However, it was also evident that progress can be undermined by gross mistakes and misconduct on the part of security forces and governments that need to regain the trust of their citizens. Renewed trust would facilitate information exchanges about terrorist activities and reduce the groups’ popular support.

The transnational nature of the threat and the inability of many individual nation-states to fight that threat highlighted the importance of regional and international collaboration. That, however, shouldn’t overshadow the need to understand local dimensions. This notion was particularly evident in the case of jihadist activity in Burkina Faso’s Soum Province.

All jihadi groups active in the region have exploited, to varying but substantial degrees, discontent about poverty, the lack of employment and education, and political marginalisation. With that in mind, it’s encouraging that countries such as Nigeria and Burkina Faso are releasing funds to promote economic development in regions at risk of radicalisation and violent extremism.

However local communities also require government assurances and support if they’re expected to welcome large numbers of former hostages, as well as former fighters who are seen as potential security threats. Short of that, tensions seem inevitable, particularly as residents in many host communities are short of food and water.

‘Vive la France’ – the surprise French lead into Mali

Lancement de l'opération Serval le 11 janvier 2013

The conflict in Mali that has been making headlines this week has been brewing for many months now. As I pointed out back in October last year, all signs were that an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force would be deployed into Mali to repel Islamist fighters in the north of the country early in 2013. Much of the international community appeared highly reluctant to become actively embroiled in the fight, being happy to back a UN mission to the country but reluctant to commit troops, aircraft and vehicles to the approaching engagement.

So what has taken many by surprise has been the sudden rapidity of France’s whole-hearted engagement in the conflict, throwing their weight into Mali in a way that wasn’t expected. Why did this happen and what are the consequences for Mali?

In fact, the script has been prepared for some time for the intervention in Mali. The UN passed a resolution in October requesting West African states under the ECOWAS banner to speed up the process of providing a plan for military intervention. It seemed that there was ready-made force of 3500 ECOWAS troops available for deployment, backed by logistical support from the US and France. However, as the planning became more intense, it was felt that the Malian forces, whom ECOWAS would be supporting, would require increased training and strengthening and the ECOWAS force wouldn’t be ready for deployment until September 2013. Read more

UN intervention in Mali – preventing terrorism or providing a new training ground?

Touareg independence fighters are reportedly continuing their advance, advancing south towards Mopti. April 2012

On 12 October the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution urging African regional troops and the UN to present within 45 days a plan for military intervention in Mali, seven days later Australia won its seat on the Security Council. This highly precarious situation in Mali is one that Australian diplomats will have to understand as the consequences of poor decisions will be far reaching beyond the immediate Sahel region.

Mali is one of the poorest nations on the planet, and its citizens have undoubtedly experienced a traumatic year so far in 2012. And with the recent announcement of the plan to deploy Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troops into northern Mali under the auspices of the UN it looks like things will become even tougher for the country before it becomes better, if in fact that happens in the long term.

First, let’s take a look at the background of this situation. With the return to Northern Mali of somewhere in the region of two to three thousand angry, highly armed, battle-hardened Tuareg fighters who had been serving under Gadaffi in the previous year’s Libyan conflict, came the beginnings of the present rebellion, beginning in January 2012. The influx of Tuareg fighters was compounded by the lack of action on behalf of the Mali government to counter the problems they were causing. The uprising by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamist Tuareg group Ansar Dine began with the killing of many government soldiers in a series of battles, which also led to a humanitarian crises as tens of thousands of civilians fled the fighting. As the fighting intensified, the Malian military became increasingly incensed at what they perceived as a lack of political will to end the rebellion and a lack of sufficient munitions, supplies and equipment to drive it back. Thus on 21 March a military-led mutiny at these conditions culminated in the resignation of President Amadou Toumani Touré and the temporary placement of a military Captain as the nation’s leader. Read more