Tag Archive for: Kevin Rudd

Rudd and Shearer aren’t enough. Washington needs to see more Australian heavy hitters

We need more than two Australians who are well-known in Washington.

We do have two who are remarkably well-known, but they alone aren’t enough in a political scene that’s increasingly influenced by personal connections and therefore reputations.

The two are ambassador Kevin Rudd and the director-general of the Office of National Intelligence, Andrew Shearer. In dozens of meetings with officials, politicians, industry and think tanks in Washington on a recent trip, I repeatedly heard people mention Rudd and Shearer—but rarely other Australians.

What happens when one or both of those people are no longer in office? This country should systematically promote other people with strong reputations and work on developing more heavy hitters for the future.

Australia’s overriding national security issue is the risk that China dominates our region, establishes its authoritarian political system as the norm and uses coercion to extract what it wants from other countries at the expense of their liberty and prosperity.

While Australia must do what it can to look after its own security, we are much better placed with a strong US commitment to our region and to the alliance. It is therefore essential that our voice is heard in Washington.

Traditionally, a person’s access to US officials was determined mainly by his or her position, though reputation and contacts have always been important. But, even before the re-election of Donald Trump, reputation and contacts were pulling ahead of office as influential factors.

I saw in Washington in March and April that they were now dominant. My discussions took place in the usual departments and sensitive compartmented information facilities (known as SCIFs) but also in cafes, restaurants and bars. If you are a government official and work only 9 to 5 on Monday to Friday, on Monday morning you will be behind and scrambling to catch up.

Business these days is done everywhere all the time, and when it’s done away from the office, it’s more likely to be arranged at a personal level.

We are lucky to have Rudd and Shearer, who are well known by Republicans, Democrats and senior bureaucrats. They have both done excellent jobs in building their international networks over many decades, especially in Washington, the hub for international, security and defence debates. It shouldn’t be missed that both have spent time in think tanks and have diverse work experience across government and non-government.

Rudd is seen as a globally recognised, Mandarin-speaking expert on China. He also has great prestige as a past prime minister, which is a stronger factor in the United States, with its presidential system of government and respect for former leaders, than is generally appreciated in Australia.

Shearer is further elevated by being seen in Washington as the Australian official who is most nearly a national security adviser, a position that grabs attention in Washington.

It’s not his job that gives him this status, but his reputation for understanding global security issues. It isn’t hard to understand that we need to offer more than two people whom influential Americans are keen to meet, especially with Shearer based in Canberra.

Behind Rudd and Shearer, the bench is not deep. There are former and current intelligence chiefs, for example, who are listened to globally and have built strong relationships in the US intelligence community, including Australian Security Intelligence Organisation boss Mike Burgess.

Why do we have so few others of the status of Rudd and Shearer? The best explanation is the increasingly domestic focus of Canberra. Serving ministers and responding to a 24-hour media cycle is busy, urgent work. Talking points, possible parliamentary questions, Senate estimates, meeting records and minutes, reams of briefs absorb enormous resources.

I don’t exaggerate too much in saying that we’re incentivising the development of bureaucratic clones.

Yet we do have people in the public service with potential to become heavy hitters internationally. For the medium term, say, the 2030s and beyond, we should identify and begin cultivating them now, putting them in positions in which they can build reputations.

Foreign and security policy requires big picture strategic thinking, an understanding of defence, diplomacy, economics, politics and culture. People with this stature globally have worked through the major crises and twists of recent history.

They’ve built the confidence to be risk managers, not risk-averse. They’ve been mentored by the previous generation of giants. They’ve stood at the shoulders of influential leaders, ready to provide whispered sober advice at moments when an ability to see the forest rather than just the trees was most crucial.

They painstakingly earn their reputations, which then precede them through the doors into the most powerful rooms on earth.

We must identify those Australians who are already on their way to developing strong reputations—perhaps people in government but particularly in academia, business and think tanks.

ASPI is only one of several suitable hosts for the task, but we are also the only one with an office in Washington. Unfortunately, support for our DC office was cut in a government review of national security think tanks.

It’s poor timing to have fewer Australian voices and less convening power in Washington, which is why we aim to keep the office open.

One move that is guaranteed to deliver short-term results is for the next government to create a position of national security adviser. American officials notice that we don’t have one. So do friends in Europe and Asia.

All of our Quad partners, for example, have the role and they meet regularly, with no Australian at the table. In general, a job title may have lost its lustre in gaining traction in Washington, but the job title of national security adviser hasn’t.

Moreover, its lustre will stay with its office holder after he or she has moved on to other things.

So it’s a national priority: create people who, in an increasingly personalised Washington, are attractions not because of their jobs, but because of the wisdom for which they’re recognised. That’s what, and who, we need more of.

Editors’ picks for 2022: ‘China–Solomons deal “politically illiterate” if Beijing wants better ties with Australia: Rudd’

Originally published 29 April 2022.

Former prime minister Kevin Rudd says China’s security deal with Solomon Islands was a ‘politically illiterate’ move if Beijing is sincere about improving relations with Australia.

Speaking at an ASPI event in Canberra on Thursday, he said that while it was not clear that Australian politics had come into China’s calculations, the timing in the middle of an election campaign meant the deal with the Solomons was bound to cause political fireworks.

‘If the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party were seriously in the business of sending out a signal that post the next Australian election, whoever wins, the Liberal Party or my party, the Labor Party, that we wanted to have an agenda shift, we wanted to have a circuit-breaker, I could not have prescribed a worse thing to do than say, “I know what we’re going to do, we’re going to announce or have agreed with our new best buddies in Honiara, this security pact with the government of Solomon Islands.”

It is just politically illiterate for the Chinese party apparatus to have approved that as an approach.’

The deal will make it much harder for whichever party succeeds at the polls to thaw out relations with China, the former Labor PM said.

He said there was no doubt the Solomons agreement was a ‘deeply adverse development’ for Australia.

‘The cardinal principle of Australian security policy, including under Labor governments, since 1945 has been to secure the island states of the South Pacific from external strategic penetration. Governments of both persuasions have done that, but now we have a problem.’

The deal and its likely consequence of torpedoing the chances of improved China–Australia relations could be an indication of the bifurcation between China’s powerful Central Military Commission and its foreign policy establishment.

Rudd said it’s possible the commission wanted to seal the deal with the Solomons in part to demonstrate to Australia that it would face consequences for joining the AUKUS pact and pushing to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.

The strategic geography of Solomon Islands is not lost on Chinese military planners, who also could be interested in submarine cables that connect Australia to the US, links that would be vital in any conflict between the US and China.

‘The Central Military Commission is always wargaming what happens if the balloon goes up,’ Rudd said.

The possibility of such a conflict, likely over Taiwan, is the main theme of his latest book, The avoidable war.

Rudd said the 2020s are likely to be the most dangerous decade as China sees the balance of power with the US tipping further in its favour, something Xi Jinping has been seeking to exploit more and more aggressively since he came to power in 2012.

Taiwan is on track in Xi’s mind for ‘reunification’ by the 2049 centenary of the forming of the People’s Republic of China and probably by 2035, Rudd said.

He estimates that the late 2020s loom as the time this is most likely to happen.

While the military balance of power is increasingly in Beijing’s favour for an attempted invasion, as difficult as that would be, China is still economically and financially exposed.

‘Right now, the Chinese system is massively vulnerable to the United States.’

China is now trying to reduce its reliance in this area, which would give it the freedom of action to invade Taiwan without some of the economic consequences Russia has faced for its attack on Ukraine.

This window does give an opportunity for Taiwan as well as the US and its allies to re-establish deterrence.

Rudd noted that Taiwan is also now turning around its own defence capabilities after years of ‘woeful’ levels of preparedness.

Avoiding a conflict over Taiwan is vital as it would quickly descend ‘into a general war and of catastrophic dimensions,’ he said.

‘In my judgement there is no such thing as a limited war over Taiwan. You cannot construct a warfighting scenario for Taiwan which is just a couple of grey ships taking pot-shots at each other.’

To prevent that from happening, Rudd advocates a framework of ‘managed strategic competition’ through which the US and China agree on ways to acknowledge each other’s red lines, recognise areas where there will likely be ongoing and constant competition, and find issues, such as climate change, on which there can be some level of cooperation.

Without such a framework, the world risks sleepwalking into a war that no one wants, much like it did in 1914 in the months before the outbreak of World War I.

The world must also heed the lessons of appeasement in the several years before World War II that caused ‘the dictators of the time to reach the conclusion that you could continue to salami-slice Europe and ultimately the world’, he added.

‘And partly because of the aftershock of the First World War, then we collectively engaged in appeasement. Governments in the UK, to some extent the United States and certainly in this country as well. And the rest, as they say, is history.’

As China heads towards the 20th CCP congress, at which it is expected Xi will cement his place with a third term as leader, Rudd said there’s a possibility there will be some fallout over Xi’s close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin, especially if Putin is overthrown in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

‘If Putin were to fall between now and 20th party congress, it would have a huge impact. Because not only did your man fail in Ukraine; your man, your best buddy, who you say publicly is your best friend in the world, is now purged out of office and gone.’

Rudd added that, aside from Putin falling, he didn’t think there was any terminal danger for Xi’s reappointment as general secretary.

‘The thing for us to watch as an analytical community is what happens with the rest of the Chinese leadership. In other words, is there an institutional reaction against this concentration of power in a single man’s hands?’

That could lead to a ‘more complex’ set of political arrangements in Beijing and could help set the course for whether war between the US and China is indeed avoidable.

China–Solomons deal ‘politically illiterate’ if Beijing wants better ties with Australia: Rudd

Former prime minister Kevin Rudd says China’s security deal with Solomon Islands was a ‘politically illiterate’ move if Beijing is sincere about improving relations with Australia.

Speaking at an ASPI event in Canberra on Thursday, he said that while it was not clear that Australian politics had come into China’s calculations, the timing in the middle of an election campaign meant the deal with the Solomons was bound to cause political fireworks.

‘If the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party were seriously in the business of sending out a signal that post the next Australian election, whoever wins, the Liberal Party or my party, the Labor Party, that we wanted to have an agenda shift, we wanted to have a circuit-breaker, I could not have prescribed a worse thing to do than say, “I know what we’re going to do, we’re going to announce or have agreed with our new best buddies in Honiara, this security pact with the government of Solomon Islands.”

It is just politically illiterate for the Chinese party apparatus to have approved that as an approach.’

The deal will make it much harder for whichever party succeeds at the polls to thaw out relations with China, the former Labor PM said.

He said there was no doubt the Solomons agreement was a ‘deeply adverse development’ for Australia.

‘The cardinal principle of Australian security policy, including under Labor governments, since 1945 has been to secure the island states of the South Pacific from external strategic penetration. Governments of both persuasions have done that, but now we have a problem.’

The deal and its likely consequence of torpedoing the chances of improved China–Australia relations could be an indication of the bifurcation between China’s powerful Central Military Commission and its foreign policy establishment.

Rudd said it’s possible the commission wanted to seal the deal with the Solomons in part to demonstrate to Australia that it would face consequences for joining the AUKUS pact and pushing to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.

The strategic geography of Solomon Islands is not lost on Chinese military planners, who also could be interested in submarine cables that connect Australia to the US, links that would be vital in any conflict between the US and China.

‘The Central Military Commission is always wargaming what happens if the balloon goes up,’ Rudd said.

The possibility of such a conflict, likely over Taiwan, is the main theme of his latest book, The avoidable war.

Rudd said the 2020s are likely to be the most dangerous decade as China sees the balance of power with the US tipping further in its favour, something Xi Jinping has been seeking to exploit more and more aggressively since he came to power in 2012.

Taiwan is on track in Xi’s mind for ‘reunification’ by the 2049 centenary of the forming of the People’s Republic of China and probably by 2035, Rudd said.

He estimates that the late 2020s loom as the time this is most likely to happen.

While the military balance of power is increasingly in Beijing’s favour for an attempted invasion, as difficult as that would be, China is still economically and financially exposed.

‘Right now, the Chinese system is massively vulnerable to the United States.’

China is now trying to reduce its reliance in this area, which would give it the freedom of action to invade Taiwan without some of the economic consequences Russia has faced for its attack on Ukraine.

This window does give an opportunity for Taiwan as well as the US and its allies to re-establish deterrence.

Rudd noted that Taiwan is also now turning around its own defence capabilities after years of ‘woeful’ levels of preparedness.

Avoiding a conflict over Taiwan is vital as it would quickly descend ‘into a general war and of catastrophic dimensions,’ he said.

‘In my judgement there is no such thing as a limited war over Taiwan. You cannot construct a warfighting scenario for Taiwan which is just a couple of grey ships taking pot-shots at each other.’

To prevent that from happening, Rudd advocates a framework of ‘managed strategic competition’ through which the US and China agree on ways to acknowledge each other’s red lines, recognise areas where there will likely be ongoing and constant competition, and find issues, such as climate change, on which there can be some level of cooperation.

Without such a framework, the world risks sleepwalking into a war that no one wants, much like it did in 1914 in the months before the outbreak of World War I.

The world must also heed the lessons of appeasement in the several years before World War II that caused ‘the dictators of the time to reach the conclusion that you could continue to salami-slice Europe and ultimately the world’, he added.

‘And partly because of the aftershock of the First World War, then we collectively engaged in appeasement. Governments in the UK, to some extent the United States and certainly in this country as well. And the rest, as they say, is history.’

As China heads towards the 20th CCP congress, at which it is expected Xi will cement his place with a third term as leader, Rudd said there’s a possibility there will be some fallout over Xi’s close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin, especially if Putin is overthrown in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

‘If Putin were to fall between now and 20th party congress, it would have a huge impact. Because not only did your man fail in Ukraine; your man, your best buddy, who you say publicly is your best friend in the world, is now purged out of office and gone.’

Rudd added that, aside from Putin falling, he didn’t think there was any terminal danger for Xi’s reappointment as general secretary.

‘The thing for us to watch as an analytical community is what happens with the rest of the Chinese leadership. In other words, is there an institutional reaction against this concentration of power in a single man’s hands?’

That could lead to a ‘more complex’ set of political arrangements in Beijing and could help set the course for whether war between the US and China is indeed avoidable.

China: Engage & Hedge are different universes

Kevin Rudd

China’s economy may be facing its 1929 moment. Or this may be only the painful burst of a big bubble. Will it become a cascading catastrophe or just a crashing correction?

Pay your money and place your bets. And hold your breath. No jests about a Communist Party flummoxed by the workings of a central motif of capitalism, please.

The obvious point for Australia is that Greece is concerning but China is the main event. For Oz, Chinese investors panicking at plunging values trump Greeks shaken by the shrivelling of their economy.

In the 20th century, recession in Europe and America meant something similar would happen in Australia. In the 21st century, Australia’s economy has decoupled from the US economy. America gets pneumonia but Australia doesn’t sneeze. Plugged into Asia, Australia sailed past the US dotcom bust and the Great Recession. Australia is coupled to Asia. And at the head of the train is China.

As the IMF noted, Australia’s decoupling from America’s economy, made explicit at both ends of the previous decade, means the US negative effect on Oz is ‘no longer statistically significant’.

A huge shift of historic dimensions. Ho hum, say the nation of pragmatists who live in Oz. Old news. Got the Asian Century memo, thanks, understood the point. The calm rests on the reality that so far the decoupling from the American economy and the firm coupling to Asia has delivered copious good news.

China’s market mayhem highlights another great decoupling—the parting of the ways of Engage & Hedge. This is the grand strategy that the US and Australia have employed towards China since the end of the Cold War. Engage economically. Hedge militarily.

Engage & Hedge were never really closely aligned or tightly joined. Now, though, they exist in different universes. Engage & Hedge can no longer be seen as the twin legs of a coherent strategy.

Two concepts supposed to run at least in parallel aren’t even in parallel universes. They have become policy poles with opposed existences. That’s why the US effort to create a Trans-Pacific Partnership excluding China is much more about the Hard-Power-Hedging universe than the Win-Win-Engage-and-Trade universe.

Tony Abbott got the terms of the decoupling into one vivid phrase when he said that Australia’s policies towards China are driven by two emotions: ‘fear and greed.’ The fear demands strategic hedging and the greed fuels economic engagement. These are opposed, not linked emotions. Off in their different universes, fear and greed no longer feed into a united policy recipe.

Fear of the hedging universe is going to keep growing whether China booms or busts. A rich China has shown it can be aggressive and assertive. A China that suddenly confronts the danger of being poorer than the trend line promised might be worse.

A Communist Party that can’t deliver ever-enriching growth has to play instead to the emotions of pride and nationalism (and belligerent fear of the perfidious foreign powers that seek to block China’s rise). The world’s second biggest economy is plenty big enough to matter, no matter what happens next. So whether China goes up or down, the demands of hedging just increase. Not much linkage there between Engage & Hedge.

Kevin Rudd captures the truth of the decoupling of Engage & Hedge in his Harvard report describing ‘the emergence of an asymmetric world in which the fulcrums of economic and military power are no longer co-located, but, in fact, are beginning to diverge significantly.’

The Ruddster is a sensitive and difficult subject in Oz. It’s going to take a long time for Australia—much less the Labor Party—to get over The Kevin. So approach the Rudd study via a recommendation from a fine former Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, who nominates Rudd as the smartest guy in the room:

‘Rudd’s recommendations are undoubtedly ambitious. But, given his credentials—he is a formidable Chinese linguist and creative policy thinker, with long and close personal relationships with key figures in both the US and China—his argument must be taken seriously. Indeed, though Rudd’s tenure as Australia’s prime minister was anything but smooth, his sheer force of intellect is unmatched by that of any public figure with whom I have interacted over the last 30 years. (Not that this will much help his evident willingness to be drafted as the next UN Secretary-General: in that role the major powers have always preferred bland secretaries to creative generals.)’

Rudd advocates a new framework of ‘constructive realism’ between the US and China. The choice he describes is stark. Either China and America create a common understanding of mutual benefit and achievement—including a common strategic narrative—or they will drift toward conflict.

The Engage policy must become so dominant and so central that it changes the colour of the sky in the Hedge universe. A big, big ask. Kevin is always ambitious.

Kevin being Kevin, he asks and then answers seven core questions on the rise of China. And publishing a couple of months before the crashing sounds out of Shanghai, Rudd offers his answer about whether we are seeing catastrophe or mere painful correction.

‘Sorry,’ he writes, ‘but on balance the Chinese economic model is probably sustainable.’ That confident prediction about China’s next decade is about to get an extreme pressure test.

The white paper that cannot die

kevin DWP2013In a recent article in the Security Challenges Journal, I set out the case for analysing Defence White Papers in their political contexts. These statements are as much about the contest of politics as they are about policy. The success or failure of White Papers depends on the survival of the Ministers, Prime Ministers and Governments that produce them. So it is that the content of the 2009 and 2013 White Papers are intimately tied to the political aims and objectives of the Prime Ministers of the day.

In 2009 then PM Rudd put forward a document (PDF) with a tough-edged strategic assessment and a somewhat pessimistic view of regional security prospects. The document said ‘the pace, scope and structure of China’s military modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours cause for concern if not carefully explained’ (paragraph 4.25) and also discussed measures the ADF might need to take in the event that a ‘major power adversary’ sought to operate ‘in our approaches’. (8.45) From this flowed plans to double the submarine fleet, significantly expand the Navy’s surface capabilities, all backed by long term projections for defence spending growth. Read more